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Abstract 
The aim of this thesis is to analyse the Aboriginal crisis in Van Diemen's Land 
with a view to establishing what effective efforts were made in the late 1820s 
and early 1830s towards realising a treaty between the colonial administration 
and the Aboriginal tribes of Van Diemens Land. The idea is not a new one. In 
1995 Professor Henry Reynolds' published Fate of a Free People in which he 
argues that for a number of prominent Aboriginal leaders, at least, a de facto 
peace treaty was negotiated with the Colonial Government. Reynolds focuses 
primarily on roles played by the Aborigines in bringing their people in and their 
interpretation of how the crisis was concluded. This thesis does not challenge 
Reynolds' claims. Instead, it attempts to evaluate the Aboriginal-settler clash 
from the perspective of the Colonial Government, and Lieutenant-Governor Sir 
George Arthur in particular. Specifically it seeks to determine to what extent 
Arthur participated in a treaty-making process, even if he did not ultimately 
conclude a treaty with the Aborigines of Van Diemen's Land. -
v 
This thesis examines British policies towards the Aborigines of Van Diemen's 
Land from the time of its official settlement in 1804 through to the effecting of 
the Treaty of Waitangi in January 1840. While it focuses in greatest detail on 
relations between the colonial government and the Aborigines of Van Diemen's 
Land in the 1820s and early 1830s, the study of colonial relations is broad-
ened both chronologically (to 1840) and geographically-north to mainland 
Australia, and east to New Zealand-to include brief accounts of the nego-
tiations of the Batman treaty and the Treaty of Waitangi, so as to provide 
a wider context by which to evaluate Governor George Arthur's efforts with 
treaty-making in the Van Diemen's Land. 
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The Natives' Lament 
Oh! where are the wilds I once sported among, 
When as free as my clime through its forests I sprung, 
When no track by the few which our fires had made, 
Had tarnished the carpet that nature had laid; 
When the lone waters dashed down the darksome ravine, 
O'erhung by the shade of the Huon's dark green; . 
When the broad morning sun o'er our mountains could roam, 
And see not a slave in our bright Island home. 
When our trees were unscath 'ed, nor our echoes awoke, 
To the hum of the stranger, or woodman's wild stroke; 
When our rocks proudly rose 'gainst the dash of the main, 
And saw not a bark on the wide azure plain; 
When the moon through the heavens roll'd onward, and smil'd, 
As she lighted the home of the free and the wild. 
Oh! My country, the stranger has found thy fair climb, 
And he comes with the sons of misfortune and crime; 
He brings the rude refuse of countries laid waste, 
To tread thy fair wilds, and thy waters to taste; 
He usurps the best lands of thy native domains, 
And their children must fiy, or submit to his chains; 
He builds his dark home, and he tricks it about, 
With trinkets and trifles within and without; 
When the bright sun of nature sinks into the main 
He light little suns to make day-light again; 
And he calls a crowd round him, to see him preside, 
And our tyrant himself is the slave of his pride! 
Oh! dearer to us, is our rude hollow-tree, 
Where heart joins to heart with a pulse warm and free; 
Or our dew-covered sod, with no canopy o'er it, 
But the star-spangl 'd sky, -we can lay and adore it! 
Or if worn with fatigue, when the bright sun forsakes us, 
We lay down and sleep, till he rises and wakes us! 
Our wants are but few, and our feelings are warm, 
We fear not the sun, and we fear not the storm; 
We are fierce to our foes, to our loves we are fond, 
Let us live and be free-life has nothing beyond. 
Oh! I would not exchange the wild nature I bear, 
For life with the tame sons of culture and care, 
Nor give one free moment as proudly I stand, 
For all that their arts and their toils can command. 
Away to the mountains, and leave them the plains, 
To pursue their dull toils, and to forge their dark chains. 
(Author Unknown, Colonial Times, 5th May, 1826) 
Big River 
Figure 1: 
Territorial Boundaries of the Aboriginal Tribes of Van Diemen's Land prior 
to British Settlement. Source: Lyndall Ryan's The Aboriginal Tasmanians 
Chapter 1 
Introduction 
On Sunday 18 April 1999, the Tasmanian government announced it would 
traI_lsfer ownership of the Wybalenna Aboriginal Station Historic Site to the 
Flinders Island Aboriginal community. Drafted and signed at Whitemark on 
Flinders Island, the decree was dubbed the "Treaty of Whitemark". Though 
not a treaty in any legal sense, still the agreement is viewed by many in the 
community as a symbol of the process of " ... reconciliation that puts the past 
to a positive use for the future." 1 
The idea of negotiating a modern treaty between Australian Aboriginal 
groups and the Australian Commonwealth government has been circulating 
since the late 1970s. The treaty movement began in 1979 when the National 
1M. Roughley-Shaw, 'Wybalenna and the Treaty of Whitemark,' Indigenous Law Bul-
letin, 4, no.22 (1999), pp.10-11. 
1 
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Aboriginal Council passed a resolution calling for a "'Treaty of Commitment' 
[to] be executed between the Aboriginal Nation and the Australian Govern-
ment." The resolution was supported by the Aboriginal Treaty Committee, 
a group of prominent non-Aboriginal Australians, including H.C. (Nugget) 
Coombs, C.D. Rowley and Judith Wright McKinney. Until 1983 the Abo-
riginal Treaty Committee agitated for the creation of a "treaty, covenant or 
convention freely negotiated with the Commonwealth Government by their 
representatives." 2 
Both the Liberal and Labor parties have paid "lip service" to the notion 
of a treaty, though neither has ever made serious efforts to negotiate one. 3 
Successive federal governments have, instead, focused on the concept of recon-
ciliation, resulting in the passing of Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation Act 
in 1991. However, many Australians, both Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal, feel 
2P. Bayne, "The Makarratta: A Treaty with Black Australians", Legal Services Bulletin, 
6, (1981), pp.232-236; "Proposed Treaty Between Aborigines and the Commonwealth", The 
Australian Law Journal, 53, (1979), pp.743-744; "We Call for a Treaty Within Australia, Be-
tween Australians", advertisement in The National Times, week ending August 25, 1979 in 
S. Harris, 'It's Coming Yet ... ' An Aboriginal Treaty Within Australia Between Australians, 
(Canberra, 1979), p.12. 
3The debate continues whether a modern treaty is the best option for a true and lasting 
healing between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal Australia. While a modern treaty is not 
the concern of this thesis, prominent in the debate is the controversial historian and author, 
Keith Windschuttle, who argues against a treaty. In his recent book, The Fabrication 
of Aboriginal History, Windschuttle attempts to demonstrate that no historical context 
exists for its consideration-though his argument is notable for the extraordinarily brief 
consideration it gives to the key deliberations of the Executive Council of Van Diemen's 
Land during 1830 and 1831; see K. Windschuttle, "Why There Should Be No Aboriginal 
Treaty", Quadrant, (2001), pp. 15-24 & K. Windschuttle, The Fabrication of Aboriginal 
History, volume one: Van Diemen's land, 1803-1847, (Sydney, 2002); see especially 'The 
Non-Existence of an Aboriginal Treaty' !section, pp.232-237. 
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that true reconciliation cannot even begin until issues regarding land rights 
are addressed. In this regard, a major advance came on 3 June 1992 when the 
High Court of Australia handed down its judgement on what has come to be 
known as the M abo case. 4 
Taking ten years to conclude, Eddie Koiki Mabo finally won a posthumous 
victory for h1s people when the High Court determined that the Murray Is-
landers retain sovereign title to their lands because native title in the Murray 
Islands had never been extinguished. In December the following year the Na-
tive Title Act was passed which established in law that where groups could 
prove so, the Government would recognise other native title claims. 
With the passing of the Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation Act in 1991, 
the favourable conclusion of the Mabo case in 1992 and the establishment of 
the Native Title Act in 1993, powerful precedents have been established in 
both the executive and legal arms of government for Aboriginal land rights 
claims, and, thus, reconciliation, to advance.5 Nonetheless, progress has not 
4 Mabo and Others v. Queensland (No. 2) (1992) 175 CLR 1 F.C. 92/014. 
, 
5H.C. Coombs, "Signing an Australian Peace Treaty,'' Social Alternatives, 1.6, (1980), 
pp.63-64; "A Treaty and the NAC" in E. Olbrei, Black Australians: The Prospects for 
Change, (Townsville, 1982), pp.57-80; Two Hundred Years Later: Report by the Senate 
Standing Committee on Constitutional and Legal Affairs on the Feasibility of a Compact or 
'Makarratta' Between the Commonwealth and Aboriginal People, (Canberra, 1983), pp.7-
25; "Makarratta or Treaty-What Can Be Achieved? Who Will Be the Parties?", Human 
Rights for Aboriginal People in the 1980s, (Sydney, 1983), pp.109-126; K. Baker. A Treaty 
with the Aborigines?, (Canberra, 1988), pp.1-50; M.P.K. Sorrenson, "Treaties in British 
Colonial Policy: Precedents for Waitangi" in W. Renwick (ed), Sovereignty & Indigenous 
Rights: The Treaty of Waitangi in International Contexts, (Wellington, 1991), pp.7-29; D. 
Mercer, "Terra Nullius, Aboriginal Sovereignty and Land Rights in Australia: The Debate 
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always been smooth and some believe that a modern treaty is still the only 
option for true and lasting healing between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal 
Australia.6 It is this issue that the recent publication Treaty7 addresses. 
Treaty authors Sean Brennan, Larissa Behrendt, Lisa Streinlein and George 
Williams consider the feasibility of a modern treaty between the government 
and the indigenous peoples of Australia. They examine the state of Aboriginal 
land rights in Australia, tracing the reconciliation process. They discuss issues 
of sovereignty and native title and consider treaty-making practises in other 
nations such as the United States, Canada and New Zealand. An overarching 
Continues", Political Geography, 12.4, (1993), pp.299-318; G. Johns, "Reconciliation: Read 
the Fine Print" (Draft Document for Aboriginal Reconciliation), Quadrant, 43.11, (1999), 
pp.16-20. 
6 The year 2000 was an important one in this regard. Professor Henry Reynolds, a 
staunch advocate for a treaty, gave a number of public lectures across the country, each 
time discussing the idea of creating a treaty to deal with the continued marginalisation 
of Aboriginal groups socially, politically and legally. The September 2000 issue of the 
Australasian Journal of Philosophy focussed solely on issues relating to indigenous rights 
and its first article discussed some philosophical issues regarding treaties and treaty-making. 
On 13 October 2000 a one day symposium was held at the University of Newcastle, entitled 
Treaties and Constitutions: Representing Indigenous Peoples in the Pacific. The conference 
sought to gather together academics, lawyers and community representatives to discuss the 
possibility of eventually negotiating a treaty between the Australian Aborigines and the 
Federal government. Problems faced by Pacific countries, including Fiji where treaties have 
been concluded but which still face difficulties representing native groups within western-
based constitutions, were discussed. These issues were evaluated within the broad historical 
contexts within which they have developed; see R. Goodin, "Waitangi Tales" , Australasian 
Journal of Philosophy, 78.3, (2000), pp.309-333; other articles in this issue include: J. 
Thompson, "Historical Obligations", R. Sparrow, "History and Collective Responsibility", 
D. Ivison, "Political Community and Historical Injustice", J. Raikka, "The Moral Relevance 
of Cultural Disadvantage", A. Kolers, "The Lockean Efficiency Argument and Aboriginal 
Land Rights", and R. Perrett, "Indigenous Language Rights and Political Theory: The Case 
of Te Reo Maori". 
7 S. Brennan, L. Behrendt, L. Strelein & G. Williams, Treaty, (Annandale, 2005). 
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theme that emerges from the book is that the challenges involved in conclud-
ing a treaty seem overwhelming to some and that despite the political rhetoric 
there is not sufficient motivation at the federal level to see a treaty negotiated. 
However, the authors maintain that a treaty is still the most promising option 
for reconciliation. Certainly, they are realistic about the difficulties and limita-
tion of treaties. "A treaty is not a panacea" they note. "A national agreement 
or a range of sub-national treaties around the country will not solve all of the 
problems confronting Indigenous people and the wider Australia community." 
Nonetheless, a treaty "offers a process broad enough to address both the prac-
tical and the symbolic and, as a foundational document for a renewed society, 
it can speak to the past, the present and the future." 8 
The idea of an Australian treaty has gained prominence since Professor 
Henry Reynolds, in his 1995 book, Fate of a Free People, claimed that what 
resulted from the Aboriginal crisis in Van Diemen's Land of 1824 to 1831 was 
in effect a de facto treaty between the colonial government of Van Diemen's 
Land and the Big River and Oyster Bay Tribes. Reynolds looks to a little 
known, and rarely considered, petition sent by eight Wybalenna residents to 
Queen Victoria in March 184 7 as evidence that an agreement had been reached. 
8Brennan, et al, Treaty, pp.153 & 155. 
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The petitioners claimed that "we were not taken prisoners but freely gave up 
our country to Colonel Arthur then the Governor after defending ourselves". 9 
Reynolds holds this to be definitive evidence that, for the Aborigines at least, a 
deal was brokered that, in effect, could be viewed as a de facto treaty between 
the Lieutenant-Governor of Van Diemen's Land, George Arthur and Big River 
tribe of the east coast. 10 
Historians including Lyndall Ryan and A.G.L. Shaw have considered the 
idea. While both recognise that the Aborigines certainly could claim rights to 
the land, even within British legal guidelines, and that Arthur, himself, even-
tually came to realise this, neither go so far as to accept that an actual treaty 
was effected. Shaw argues that Arthur "was inclined to recognise Aboriginal 
rights, and so to deny the terra nullius doctrine." However, Shaw feels that 
the notion of terra nullius was ingrained so deeply in the colonial psyche that 
an official acknowledgement of Aboriginal land rights would never have been 
made.11 
In the 1996 edition of her book The Aboriginal Tasmanians, Ryan responds 
to Reynolds ~ith a similar sentiment. By her interpretation of the contem-
porary records she finds it impossible to recognise that a formal treaty with 
9H. Reynolds, Fate of a Pree People, (Ringwood, 1995), p.8. 
10H. Reynolds, Fate of a Pree People, pp.7-9. 
11 A.G.L. Shaw, "Sir George Arthur After Ten Years", Bulletin of the Centre for Tasma-
nian Historical Studies, 1.2, (1986), p.10; For a discussion of the term terra nullius and the 
recent debate about its origins see Chapter 2. 
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the Aborigines could have ever been authorised. However, she does agree that 
the governor, with the help of George Augustus Robinson, a missionary who 
spent five years in the wilderness of Van Diemen's Land "conciliating" the 
Aborigines, managed to secure an Aboriginal surrender through inducements 
which the latter took to be a negotiation of the terms of peace.12 
Indeed, there is no question that an official, ratified treaty with the Tas-
, manian Aborigines which acknowledged and protected their exclusive access 
to, use of, and sovereignty over specific tracts of lands, such as those nego- . 
tiated in north America during the same period, was ever attempted in Van 
Diemen's Land. Nor, during the Aboriginal crisis, did Arthur ever suggest that 
a treaty should actually be negotiated. A number of circumstances-political, 
economic and military-existed (or, to be sure, did not exist) in Van Diemen's 
Land that hindered the evolution of race relations based on treaty-making 
traditions there. 
So why did Governor Arthur and before him, Chief Justice John Lewes 
Pedder, come to the conclusions that they did about the need for a treaty with 
the Aborigines of Van Diemen's Land? The task of this thesis is to examine 
what Arthur was doing and saying during the Aboriginal crisis that showed in 
fact that he was-even if only subconsciously-formulating Aboriginal policies 
121. Ryan, The Aboriginal Tasmanians, (St. Leonards, 1996), p.xxviii. 
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that emulated those implemented in other parts o_f the world where treaties 
were the primary tool for managing race relations. 
§ 
The term 'treaty' originated in the fifteenth century. In Middle English it 
meant "a settlement or arrangement arrived at by treating or negotiating; an 
agreement, covenant, compact, contract." 13 Its _modern definition is "a con-
tract between two or more states, relating to peace, truce, alliance, commerce 
or other international relation; also a document embodying such contract, in 
modern usage formally signed by plenipotentiaries appointed by the govern-
ment of each state." 14 The 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
solidified this meaning, defining a treaty as "an international agreement con-
eluded between States in written form and governed by international law .... "15 
During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries treaties concluded be-
tween European colonial powers and native groups tended to reflect the origi-
nal, less stringent meaning. It was only after the Revolutionary War in north 
America, when the sovereign rights the Native American nations became an 
issue, that treaties evolved into formalised agreements that followed specific 
13J. Simpson and E Weiner (eds), Oxford English Dictionary, 2, (Oxford, 1989). 
14C. Soanes and A. Stevenson (eds), Oxford Dictionary of English, 2, (Oxford, 2003). 
15United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1155. 
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guidelines for their negotiation and ratification. It was the less formalised def-
inition that guided Britain's treaty-making traditions with Native American 
nations which, for the most part, were focused on establishing the terms for 
peace and political alliance.16 
To be sure, never during Aboriginal crisis did Arthur suggest that a treaty 
with the Aborigines be attempted. Rather, what he and others in his admin-
istration made repeated references to was the need to conciliate and negotiate 
with the Aborigines. So what did they mean when they spoke of conciliation 
and negotiation, and how did this relate to treaty-making? 
The Oxford English Dictionary defines "conciliation" variously as "the ac-
tion of bringing into harmony; harmonizing", "reconcilement; the gaining or 
winning by quiet means", "peaceable or friendly union" and "conversion from 
a state of hostility or distrust; the promotion of good will by kind and con-
siderate measures; the exhibition of a spirit of amity, practice of conciliatory 
measures" . 17 
From the beginning of settlement, as this thesis will consider, the Colonial 
Office instructed the governors of New South Wales and its outlying territories 
16Interestingly, it is to this definition that consideration of a modern Australian treaty 
has reverted. Thus, the authors of Treaty use the term to mean "political agreements 
involving Indigenous peoples and governments that have a binding legal effect." A modern 
treaty, they conclude, will be defined by three characteristics. It will be "a starting point of 
acknowledgement"; there will involve "a process of negotiation" and it will have "outcomes 
in the form of rights, obligations and opportunities." See Brennan et al, Treaty, p.3. 
17http://dictionary.oed.com/. 
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to establish peaceable and harmonious relations with the Aborigines. The 
Secretaries of State for the Colonies were well aware that the Aborigines needed 
to be accommodated and that they needed to be protected from the deleterious 
affects of settlement. This was very much the case in Van Diemen's Land. 
Later, when relations became strained, as they did in every colony, the focus 
of Aboriginal conciliation moved to a "conversion from a state of hostility or 
distrust". To achieve these aims the Colonial Office and early governors, alike, 
realised that they would have to negotiate with the Aborigines the terms of 
their accommodation. Where treaties came into consideration in Van Diemen's 
Land was with the realisation that, at the end of a long and deadly war, the 
Aborigines could only be conciliated by means of negotiation if the negotiations 
took the form of a treaty. Treaties in other British colonies had allowed, if only 
temporarily, for harmonious relations such as those Arthur sought in his own 
colony, and much that Arthur advocated for as he developed his Aboriginal 
policy was achieved in other colonies through the negotiation of treaties. It 
was only after the opportunity to conclude one had passed, however, that 
he realised that a treaty might have been the answer that had eluded him 
throughout the crisis. 
§ 
In order to examine what effective efforts were made in Van Diemen's Land 
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towards concluding a treaty between the Colonial Government and the Abo-
rigines, this thesis will evaluate the evolution of race relations in the colony, 
concentrating primarily on the years 1803 to 1831. However, this focus neces-
sarily requires broadening both chro:q.ologically and geographically in order to 
evaluate what treaty-making policies and practises, implemented in other parts 
of the world, might have been guiding Arthur in Van Diemen's Land. Chap-
ter 2 will examine a number of historico-legal aspects of the treaty-making 
tradition that evolved in British colonies, and specifically the north American 
colonies, especially as they related to native groups. Theories of sovereignty, 
as well as those of scientific racism, will be evaluated to place in context the 
unique nature of the treaty-making process as it was carried out with these 
native groups. Three cases brought before the United States Supreme Court 
in the 1820s and 1830s will be reviewed to illustrate just how challenging were 
issues of native sovereignty and land rights to colonial policy makers in the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. 
The years from the initial settlement of Risdon Cove in Van Diemen's 
Land in 1803 until the end of Lieutenant-Governor Sorell 's administration in 
1824 will be discussed in Chapter 3. The development of race relations during 
this time reflected the uncertainty that guided the development of the colony 
as a whole. Though the break out of war was a seemingly shocking turn 
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of events, this chapter will demonstrate that very few opportunities existed 
for the incorporation of the Aborigines into the various social, economic and 
political structures in Van Diemen's Land and, as such, in hindsight war was 
almost inevitable. 
The nature of the Aboriginal guerrilla war against the European settlers 
and convicts that plagued Van Diemen's Land for almost a decade will be 
considered in Chapter 4. This chapter seeks to demonstrate just how effective 
guerrilla-style warfare proved to be. It_will show that the guerrilla combatants 
were so proficient that, despite an initial abhorrence of this kind of warfare, 
ultimately the colonial government found that if it was going to resort to force 
to quell Aboriginal hostilities, this was the only style of combat that would 
prove effective. Chapter 5 subsequently focuses on the military policies that 
Arthur implemented in the hopes of ending the Aboriginal crisis by force. 
Chapters 6 will examine the conciliation policies that Arthur subsequently 
adopted which ultimately proved far more effective that the use of force. By 
engaging agents, in the form of a group of Aboriginal women and later George 
Augustus Robinson, to go to the Aborigines, Arthur was finally able to achieve 
Aboriginal conciliation, regardless of the longer-term sacrifices that he realised 
he would need to make on their behalf. The activities of the Aboriginal women 
as well as those of Robinson throughout his initial "friendly missions" to the 
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 13 
Aborigines of the west and north coasts will be discussed in this chapter to 
give a context to the events that finally led to contact with the Big River and 
Oyster Bay tribes. 
Chapter 7 will then review Robinson's time with the sealers of the Bass 
Strait. The role played by the sealing community, both in undermining Robin-
son's efforts and in demonstrating that the Aborigines of Van Diemen's Land 
could survive an upheaval even more drastic than the invasion of their lands, 
will be discussed. This chapter will also consider how and why, during Robin-
son's time in the straits, Arthur was forced to conclude that there seemed no 
alternative to exiling those Aborigines of Van Diemen's Land who still sur-
vived. The lead up to and eventual meeting with the Oyster Bay and Big 
River tribes will then be examined in Chapter 8. It was during this time that 
Arthur's actions, conscious or otherwise, came closest to emulating those of 
someone who, under different circumstances, might very well have concluded 
a treaty. 
Chapters 9 and 10 move away from Van Diemen's Land to focus on treaties 
that were concluded after the end of the Aboriginal crisis-specifically the 
Batman Treaty and the Treaty of Waitangi. Though it was never recognised 
by colonial officials as having any legitimacy, the Batman Treaty of 1835 was 
still an extraordinary event. This chapter will consider what transpired both 
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before and after Batman negotiated his treaty with the Aborigines of Port 
Phillip in order to show how attitudes to Aboriginal land rights had evolved 
since the end of the Aboriginal crisis in Van Diemen's Land. The final chapter 
will focus on the negotiation of the Treaty of Waitangi. The aim of this chapter 
is to consider to what extent the decision of the Colonial Office to conclude 
a treaty in New Zealand might have been guided by Aboriginal policies and 
practises across the Tasman Sea. 
Chapter 2 
Treaty-Making Traditions 
"You are with the consent of the Natives to take possession of 
convenient Situations in the Country in the Name of the King of 
Great Britain ... " 1 
In December 1827 Van Diemen's Land settler, William Walker of Breadal-
bane, wrote to Governor Arthur's office with the suggestion that a treaty might 
be negotiated with the Aborigines of Van Diemen's Land. Four years later, 
Chief Justice John Lewes Pedder, in a speech to the Executive Council in 
February 1831, presented it as an alternative to Aboriginal exile. It was only 
1King's instructions to Captain James Cook, 1772 in J.C. Beaglehole (ed.), Journals of 
Captain James Cook on his Voyage (Cambridge, 1955), p.clxviii. 
15 
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after exile had become, to Arthur's deep regret, inevitable, that the Gover-
nor realised that this is what he should have done all along. Consequently, 
he wrote to the Colonial Office on a number of different occasions to advise 
them to seriously consider negotiating treaties with the Aborigines of the new 
colonies in South Australia and Swan River in Western Australia. Lamenting 
that he had not pursued this course with his own native subjects, Arthur had 
come to the conclusion that race relations could only be successful if the land 
rights of the Aborigines were officially acknowledged and defined; and the only 
way to effectively do this was with a treaty.2 
To be sure, race relations in other British colonies had been evolving 
through treaty-making processes for several centuries before Van Diemen's 
Land was settled. In the north American colonies treaties were the main tool 
by which colonial powers maintained formal relationships with native groups. 
In Africa, too, European governments and private enterprises, alike, had been 
concluding treaties with indigenous groups throughout the previous century.3 
So by the time George Arthur made his seemingly remarkable plea for a treaty 
in Australia there already existed a long and solid history of treaty-making 
throughout the British empire. This chapter will consider what precedents and 
2Walker to Burnett, 20December1827, CSO 1/316/7578, Reel SLTX/AO/CS/114, p86-
88; Minutes of Executive Council, 23 February 1831, in Arthur to Murray, 4 April 1831, CO 
280/28, PRO Reel 247, pp.436-438. 
3 See T. Bennion, Treaty Making in the Pacific in the 19th Century f3 the Treaty of 
Waitangi, (Wellington, 1987). 
CHAPTER 2. TREATY-MAKING TRADITIONS 17 
traditions existed that led Arthur to conclude that a treaty with the Aborigines 
of Australia was just as necessary. 
2 .1 Treaties as Political Tools 
Scholar of Native American history, Francis Paul Prucha, makes the impor-
tant point that the treaties concluded during the settlement of north America 
during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries were fundamentally a western 
mechanism. They were used by European colonial powers to legitimatise and 
solidify their claims to lands where a prior sovereignty claim had been recog-
nised.4 In theory, these treaties should have been a tool by which the colonial 
power and the indigenous group in question could both protect their rights. 
However, in practice, they became a method by which the colonial powers 
sought to gain control of the peoples and resources of the new lands. 
Treaties concluded during the colonial period in north America were ne-
gotiated primarily for economic and political purposes. As the British, the 
French, and to a lesser extent the Spanish vied for dominance there, treaties 
with Native American tribes were negotiated so as to create a buffer between 
the colonial adversaries. Eventually as Britain ousted France and Spain from 
4F.P. Prucha, American Indian Treaties: The History of a Political Anomaly (Berkley, 
1994), p.xiv. 
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the region, the need for alliances with Native American nations became less 
important and the political clout of the various native groups quickly dwin-
dled. At the conclusion of the Revolutionary War the newly established United 
States of America claimed sovereignty over all of the lands to the east of the 
Appalachian Mountains, and those tribes whose holdings fell within the bor-
ders of the new states were the first to be stripped of all of thefr rights and 
dispossessed of their lands altogether as they were forced onto reserves away 
from white settlement. The history of treaty-making in north America in 
essence is a history of marginalising indigenous groups as pawns in a struggle 
between competing European powers.5 
Nonetheless, treaties were still entered into, and native groups, in theory 
at least, were granted an element of control over their own destinies. What 
processes, then, were implemented to ensure that native groups would ratify 
these political agreements? Again, a look at the north American story gives 
the clearest insight. Treaties involved very specific procedures. Formal cere-
monies took place, usually at a site in the territory in question, and usually in 
the presence of a number of delegates from both parties. These delegates held 
the solemn ceremonies that were undertaken as important. For Native Ameri-
can groups the completion of elaborate gift-giving ceremonies was fundamental 
5F.P. Prucha, American In~ian Treaties· The History of a Political Anomaly (Berke-
ley, 1994), pp.xiii-xiv; K. Sorrenson, "Treaties in British Colonial Policy: Precedents for 
Waitangi", pp.15-29. 
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to the process. Gift-giving played a central role in diplomatic relations, for 
its use as a metaphor in many Native American languages meant the offering 
and receiving of gifts came to have complex meaning. What was offered and 
to whom held specific meaning for the indigenous groups and so the English, 
French and later the United States government invested vast resources in pro-
viding the appropriate endowments. The offering of the initial gifts, followed 
by the promise of gifts in perpetuity, then, symbolised for the Native American 
nations the ratifying of those pledges which the written treaty detailed. 6 
Similarly, European powers concentrated on ceremonies involving the corn-
pilation and signing of the various official documents. These documents were 
their evidence that negotiations had been concluded and so the signing and 
witnessing of the papers became the most important element of the treaty-
making process for the Europeans. In the words of modern political philoso-
pher, Robert Goodin, "[s]igned agreements, concluded by ceremonies sufficient 
to signal their seriousness to all concerned serve[d]" to "signify the consent of 
the signers." 7 By the time Britain was ousted from north America, treaties con-
eluded with Native American nations had taken the form of legally binding 
6 F.P. Prucha, The Great Father: The United States Government and the American In-
dians (Lincoln, 1984), pp.16-17; W. Jacobs, Wilderness Politics and Indian Gifts: The 
Northern Colonial Frontier, 1748-1763 (Lincoln, 1966), pp.11-28. 
7 Goodin, "Waitamgi Tales", pp.313-314. 
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documents signed by representatives of the Native American groups, govern-
ment agents and finally the President, himself, and always involved a discus-
sion of sovereignty. While the negotiation process could be long and complex, 
for both parties involved it was the completion of the ceremony which held 
the greatest importance because it denoted that a de jure treaty had been 
concluded.8 
While treaties ultimately did not create political equality between the 
colonising and the native groups, nevertheless, their ratification, which came 
to inevitably involve the transferring of title to land, still undeniably acknowl-
edged that the indigenous groups involved had originally held a right to the 
lands upon which they presided-at least to the degree that the hegemonic 
powers involved sought to offer these groups some measure of compensation 
for their loss. This was so because, as Reynolds explains, the Native American 
nations "were in occupation of the land and had rights based on immemorial 
possession-they had what became known as native title." 9 Thus, land could 
only be appropriated through "negotiation and purchase." This, however, led 
to an anomaly as the sovereignty of the various Native American nations grad-
ually eroded, effectively creating a body of what United States' Chief Justice 
8Prucha, The Great Father, pp.16-17; Jacobs, Wilderness Politics and Indian Gifts, 
pp.11-28. 
9 H. Reynolds, "The Aboriginal Land Rights of the Tasmanian Aborigines", Bulletin for 
the Centre for Tasmanian Historical Studies, 2.1 (1988), p.24. 
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John Marshall would later dub "domestic dependent nations". These nations 
fell into a liminal position where they were under the protection of and reliant 
on. the United States government for economic support, but still technically 
sovereign entities.10 
Issues of sovereignty and nationhood, however, have not always been ele-
ments of the treaty-making tradition. The very early treaty-making practices, 
especially those focussed on negotiating for political or military alliance, were 
much more informal and defined by the relationships between and the moti-
vations of the parties involved. During the Middle Ages treaties whose aim 
was to establish peace were often not even committed to paper. Instead, as 
medieval historian, Hanna Vollrath, explains, "most peace treaties were con-
eluded without a written document .... Other gestures were employed instead 
to validate the pact: oaths were sworn, hostages exchanged or sureties given, 
and very often the whole procedure was rounded up by a kiss of peace." 11 
As late as the eighteenth century British peace treaties with Native American 
tribes reflected this same flexibility. Rather than signed and ratified contracts 
that acknowledged the sovereignty of each party involved, they came in as re-
ports, speeches, meetings, conferences, even journals that detailed negotiations 
10Prucha, American Indian Treaties, p.5. 
11 H. Vollrath, "The Kiss of Peace", in R. Lesaffer ( ed), Peace Treaties and International 
Law in European History: From the Late Middle Ages to World War One (Cambridge, 
2004), pp.162-163. 
CHAPTER 2. TREATY-MAKING TRADITIONS 22 
carried between British agents and Native American groups. 12 The titles given 
to a number of seventeenth and eighteenth century treaties give an indication 
of their variety: "Articles of Peace Between the Most Serene and Might Prince 
Charles II ... and Several Indian Kings and Queens", "Propositions Made by 
the Sachems of the Three Maquas Castles to the Mayor, Aldermen and Com-
monalty at Albany, 25Lh February, 1690", "A Journal of what Passed in the 
Expedition of His Excellency Coll. Benjamin Fletcher, Captain General and 
I 
Governor in Chief of the Province of New-York etc. to Albany, to Renew 
the Covenant Chain with the five Canton Nations of Indians, the Mohaques, 
Onydes, Onondages, Cayouges & Sinnekes, 1696", "The Conference with the 
Eastern Indians, at the Ratification of the Peace, held at Falmouth in Casco 
Bay in July and August, 1726" .13 
The agents concluding the treaties, moreover, were not necessarily rep-
resentatives of a sovereign nation. In Africa, Asia and the Pacific private 
companies wishing to expedite their penetration into new lands would often 
negotiate commercial agreements with indigenous groups which were recog-
nised as treaties by their own governments. With the tribal societies of the 
Pacific treaties of friendship and peace were concluded as a way to introduce 
12Prucha, American Indian Treaties, pp.xiii-xiv. 
13H. De Puy, A Bibliography of the English Colonial Treaties with the American Indians, 
Including a Synopsis of each Treaty (New York, 1917). 
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Christianity to the islands as well as a means to establish commercial ties. 14 
In north America the most celebrated treaty-maker-because it is said 
that his treaty with the Delawares was the only one never broken-Quaker 
William Penn, did not act as the King's representative when he negotiated 
with the tribe. Charles II had granted Penn vast tracts of land in what would 
be later the eastern portion of Pennsylvania. However, Penn was not satisfied 
with merely having the King's permission to settle there. He felt obliged to 
negotiate with the Delaware nation for the purchase of those tracts he intended 
occupying. Penn had lofty plans for his new settlement which would be a refuge 
for those who had been persecuted for their religious views. For this reason, of 
central importance to Penn was that the Delawares were treated appropriately. 
Even before he arrived in Pennsylvania he wrot_e to them seeking their " ... love 
and consent, that we may always live together as neighbours and friends." In 
1682 he concluded the "Treaty of Shackamaxon" or the "Great Treaty." 15 All 
of this he did as a private settler, never at the behest of the British government. 
Additionally, treaties did not always acknowledge the sovereignty of the 
14T. Bennion, Treaty-Making in the Pacific in the Nineteenth Century and the Treaty of 
Waitangi. 
15Penn to Delawares, 18 October 1681, in J. Soderlund (ed), William Penn and the 
Founding of Pennsylvania, 1680-1684, A Documentary History (Philadephia, 1983), p.88; 
G. Nash, Red, White and Black: The Peoples of Early North America (Englewood Cliffs, 
1974); H.E. Wildes, William Penn (New York, 1974); M. Geiter, William Penn (London, 
2000). 
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parties involved. While settlement remained confined to the eastern seaboard 
in north America treaties negotiated with Native American tribes were not 
necessarily focussed on land rights. Because of the size of north America 
it seemed that there would always be enough land for Native American and 
European groups to coexist. However, as settlement continued to expand south 
and west treaties concluded with the eastern nations increasingly focused on 
defining the limits of their sovereignty and native title. 
To be sure, in colonial north America land rights always played a central 
role in the treaty-making process because the British and French had to ac-
commodate the various Native American tribes on whose lands they had hege-
monic designs. However, the land itself was not always the focus of treaties 
being concluded. Rather it was the activities of the parties on that land 
that was at issue. Most of the early British treaties with Native American 
groups sought peace and friendship. These treaties all had the central aim 
of securing alliances with the Native American nations so as to maintain the 
economic and political balance of power in north America. The fur trade had 
quickly developed in north America as native groups found a commodity that 
the colonists eagerly sought. Similarly, treaties of peace and friendship were 
concluded when tensions seemed likely to lead to war. When war broke out 
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both sides discovered that they needed the support of those Native Ameri-
can groups in the regions being fought over. Similarly, when war broke out 
between Native American groups, they, too, sought the support of the cola-
nial powers. As such, many treaties were negotiated to establish and confirm 
economic, political and military alliances. Consequently, the colonial treaties 
of north America tended focused on peace and friendship. It was only later, 
after the Revolutionary War that the characte~ and form of treaties evolved 
into documents of international law.16 
2.2 The Explorers and Scientific Racism 
Eighteenth century Europe has been characterised as the Age of Enlighten-
ment. It was a time when scientific enquiry flourished, when intellectual en-
quiry about religion, society and culture was based in empiricism and science. 
It was a time when the British and French sought to learn more about the 
lands and the people of the Pacific, a region still relatively unknown. The 
Englishman, William Dampier, had explored sections of the coast of Western 
Australia in 1688 and then again in 1699. His description of the land and 
its people left a lasting impression on future ,explorers, especially the English 
16Vollrath, "The Kiss of Peace", pp.162-183; H. De Puy, A Bibliography of the English 
Colonial Treaties with the American Indians, Including a Synopsis of each Treaty; Prucha, 
American Indian Treaties, pp.xiii-xiv; K. Sorrenson, "'Ireaties in British Colonial Policy: 
Precedents for Waitangi", pp.15-29. 
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voyager, Captain James Cook who, one hundred years later, would claim the 
east coast in the name of King George III. However, real interest in the Pacific 
did not develop until after French-British tensions in Europe had eased with 
the end of the Seven Years War in 1763. At the behest of several newly formed 
scientific societies, voyages of exploration were sponsored. Both territorial am-
bition and scienLific curiosity motivated French and British efforts (and served 
to keep each wary of the other's activities), though for the French, exploration 
took priority over acquisition. Consequently, the French added significantly 
more to the knowledge base, albeit limited, already gleaned about the region 
and its people. 17 
Following discovery was a need to classify. European scientific enquiry 
attempted to place what was being revealed into context. Included in this 
classification were the various peoples who inhabited the new antipodian lands 
being explored. Moral philosophical thought attempted to establish a scale by 
which to categorise their biological and social development. This scale came to 
be known as the "Great Chain of Being." It was a static scale, created by God, 
17Though in no position to equal Britain as a global power, France did entertain some 
territorial ambitions in the south Pacific. The nation still hoped to re-establish in the 
southern hemisphere the position that it had lost in the north hemisphere when Britain had 
won Canada in the Seven Years War. The efforts of Bougainville, de Surville and Marion du 
Fresne were all aimed toward this end; see J. Dunmore, French Exploration in the Pacific, 
1 (Oxford: 1965); see also D. Miller (ed), The Blackwell Encyclopedia of Political Thought 
(Oxford: 1991), pp.166-170; JC. Beaglehole, The Exploration of the Pacific (London, 1966), 
& N.J.B. Plomley, "The French in Van Diemen's Land: Organisation and the Fruits of 
Discovery", Bulletin of the Centre for Tasmanian Historical Studies, 2.1 (1988), pp.4-20. 
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wherein the place of all living beings, from the simplest single-cell organism 
through to the highly complex human being, did not change. Humankind, 
it was determined, had reached the peak of this scale. However, the various 
human races were far from equal. Some were determined to be more socially 
and politically advanced than others. From this emerged a social philosophy 
that attempted to evaluate where on this scale the various human races were 
placed "to determine which stage in the history of civil society offered the best 
condition for the social and spiritual well-being of humankind" .18 
The native peoples of the Australian colonies were regarded as "savages" by 
many who observed them. Their small numbers, their hunter/gatherer mode of 
subsistence, and their lack of Christianity relegated them, in the minds of their 
observers, to the lowest on the scale -of human development. Writing in 1688, 
Dampier was the first European to record his impressions of the Aborigines of 
Australia.19 Though his experience with the Aborigines was fleeting, spending 
only about a week amongst them, he concluded that they were "the miserablest 
people in the world ... and setting aside their humane shape differ but little 
from brutes." 20 However, other early explorers were more philosophical about 
what they observed. Captain James Cook appreciated their simplicity. "From 
18R. Dixon, Course of Empire (Melbourne, 1986), pp.6-7. 
19W. Dampier, A New Voyage Round the World. Describing particularly, the Isthmus 
of America, Several Coasts and Islands in the West Indies, ... their Soil, Rivers, Harbours, 
Plants, ... I (London, 1703). 
20w. Dampier, A New Voyage Round the World., p.464. 
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what I have seen of the natives of New-Holland they may appear to some to 
be the most wretched people on Earth," he wrote, 
but in reality they are far more happier than we Europeans; being 
wholy unacquainted not only with the superfluous but the neces-
sary conveniences so much sought after in Europe, they are happy 
in not knowing the use of them. They live in tranquillity which is 
not disturb'd by the inequality of condition .... 21 
Members of the d'Entrecasteaux expedition to Van Diemen's Land in Febru-
ary 1793 drew simil~r conclusions. Elisabeth-Paul-Edouard de Rossel noted 
that "the way of life of these people [is] so close to nature" and their "honesty 
and bounty are so much in contrast with the vices of the civilisation." 22 Unac-
quainted and unencumbered by the complexities of civilised life brought about 
by a focus on intellectual thought, social sophistication and a close association 
with God, the Aborigines were viewed by those impressed by their seemingly 
simple existence as "noble savages"-a term coined by social philosopher Jean 
Jacques Rousseau. 23 
21 J.C. Beaglehole, The Journals of Captain James Cook: The Voyage of the Endeavour, 
1768-1771 (Cambridge, 1955), p.399. 
22 A. Ferguson, "An Essay on the History of Civil Society" in Dixon, Course of Empire, 
p.8; N.J.B. Plomley & J. Piard-Bernier, The General: The Visits of the Expedition Led by 
Bruny d'Entrecasteaux to Tasmanian Waters in 1792 and 1793 (Launceston, 1993), p.307. 
23 
"Jean-Jacques Rousseau, 1712-1778" in K. Thompson, Fathers of International Thought 
(Baton Rouge, 1994), pp.94-98; For a discussion of this theory of human social and political 
development, especially as it has been applied to the Aborigines of Australia see R. Mc-
Gregor, Civilisation or Extinction: The Destiny of the Aborigines in the White Australian 
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Philosophers and social theorists differed about which of the two states 
was preferable. One school of thought claimed that living in a state of nature 
held virtues as the noble savage "spurns luxury, the intrusion of the mercenary 
arts, and the passion for private ownership of land and property." 24 Conversely, 
others considered that without civilisation man is merely a brute, an "ignoble 
savage", prone to warfare, cannibalism and human sacrifice, and "represent-
ing the zone of transition between man and the higher animals." 25 From this 
emerged the idea that only "civilised" man has the power to reason and this 
allows him to develop a "divinity" that can ensure a closeness with God that 
savage man can not hope to attain. 26 
The idea that a certain amount of happiness came from living simply was 
contrasted with the assumption that it was absolutely necessary that man 
attempt to advance along the scale of humanity for, according to one philo-
sophical school, as espoused especially by James Burnett (also known as Lord 
Monboddo), in the late eighteenth century, 
[i]t is the destiny of man to liberate his mind from the perceptions 
Imagination, c.1880-1939, Doctor of Philosophy, James Cook University (Townsville, 1993), 
and R. McGregor, Imagined Destinies: Aboriginal Australians and the Doomed Race Theory, 
1880-1939 (Carlton, 1997). 
24Dixon, Course of Empire, p.8. 
25Dixon, Course of Empire, pp.17-18. 
26Dixon, Course of Empire, p.18; see also Prucha, The Great Father, p. 7. 
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of sense. He must cultivate those aspects of his nature which dis-
tinguish him from the animal and vegetable creations and attain a 
state as close as possible to that of the 'divine intelligences': and 
'if we cannot be gods, let us continue to be men, and not to be 
degraded brutes'. 27 
Monboddo's interpretation of the scale of man, thus, condemned the "no-
ble savage" as a political being or entity deserving of political consideration. 
Robert Dixon, author of The Course of Empire: Neo-Classical Culture in New 
South Wales, 1788-1860, notes the contributions of Lieutenant-Colonel David 
Collins to this new ethnographic discipline. 28 As judge-advocate in New South 
Wales from 1788 to 1796, Collins spent nine years observing the Aborigines 
in and around Botany Bay. In that time he took a keen interest, ultimately 
publishing a forty-four page account of his observations of their culture' and 
society. Indeed, he came to know a few individuals intimately and while he 
never completely understood their customs and habits, he eventually realised 
that it was their social development rather than their intellectual limitations 
that kept them in their "state of nature" :29 
27Dixon, Course of Empire, pp.17-18. 
28Dixon, Course of Empire, pp.18-19. 
29D. Collins, An Account of the English colony in New South Wales [from its first settle-
ment in January 1788, to August 1801: with remarks on the dispositions, customs, manners, 
&c. of the native inhabitants of that country. To which are added, some particulars of New 
Zealand (London, 1802); see also J. Currey, David Collins: A Colonial Life (Melbourne, 
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That they are ignorant savages cannot be disputed; but it is hoped 
that they do not ... ~ppear to be wholly incapable of becoming one 
day civilized and useful members of society. 30 
To be sure, Collins noted that the Aborigines of New South Wales demon-
strated a number of social and intellectual characteristics shared by their Eu-
ropean counterparts. They were a moral people who distinguished between 
"good and bad". They had a strong work ethic, proving "as handy and as 
useful as any other persons could have been." Most significantly, they had a 
sense of land ownership. Certain parcels of land were the exclusive property 
of individuals and ownership of that land usually passed from one generation 
to the next.31 
Collins also chronicled the quick decline in race relations that followed 
settlement. He was concerned that the Aborigines' lack of ability to distinguish 
between various European groups would exacerbate hostilities.32 When he 
arrived in Van Diemen's Land in 1804 to begin his tenure as Governor of 
the new colony of Van Diemen's Land he would quickly learn that similar 
trends in race relations would follow. His native policies, limited as they were, 
2000), Chapter 7 for a discussion of Collin's experiences with the Aborigines of New South 
Wales. 
30D. Collins, An Account of the English colony in New South Wales ... , p.394. 
31 D. Collins, An Account of the English colony in New South Wales ... , pp.355, 385 & 
386. 
32D. Collins, An Account of the English colony in New South Wales ... , p.18. 
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were based on the assumption that the Aborigines of Van Diemen's Land 
were similarly socially and intellectually degraded, and that they too would be 
unable to distinguish between the intentions of the various European groups.33 
The idea that savages and barbarians could be "civilised" and drawn up the 
scale of humanity was prominent in nineteenth century European. Ultimately 
it was reflected in the policies of the various British colonists and colonial 
administrators of the time, such as Governor Collins and the 'conciliator' G.A. 
Robinson. 34 Bound to this was the notion that social advancement was possible 
only if the Aborigine was converted to Christianity and also taught to live the 
civilised life of one who cultivates the soil. When explaining his reasons for 
believing that the interior of New Holland was uninhabited Cook's botanist, 
Joseph Banks pointed to this natural progression of man to determine that 
none but coastal societies could survive in this arid land: 
The sea has I believe been universally found to be the chief source 
of supplys [sic] to Indians ignorant of the arts of cultivation: the 
wild produce of the Land alone seems scarce able to support them 
33See Chapter 3 for a discussion of the Risdon Cove affray in 1804. 
34Robinson-who would come to work with and know the Aborigines of Van Diemen's 
Land more intimately than any other government official-spoke of the desire to raise "in 
the scale of beings ... the inhabitants of this territory"; see N.J.B. Plomley (ed.), Friendly 
Mission: The Tasmanian Journals and Papers of George Augustus Robinson, 1829-1834 
(Hobart, 1966), p.51. 
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at all seasons, at least I do not remember to have read of any 
inland nation who did not cultivate the ground more or less, even 
the North Americans who were so well versd [sic] in hunting sowd 
[sic] their Maize. But should a people live inland who supported 
themselves by cultivation these inhabitants of the sea coast must 
certainly have learnd [sic] to imitate them in some degree at least, 
otherwise their reason must be supposd [sic] to hold a rank little 
superior to that of monkies [sic].35 
The British and French held to these intellectual preconceptions during the 
exploration of the Pacific in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. These 
social theories would provide a context for their observations of native peoples 
in their natural state. Thus the Aborigines of New Holland and Van Diemen's 
Land were relegated to the position of "savages" on the social and intellectual 
scale of humankind. 
The legal status of both the Aborigines and the British in the new lands 
was judged and maintained accordingly. As such, in 1820, James Stephen, 
then permanent legal counsel to the Colonial Office and later Colonial Under 
Secretary, articulated the position of the British government towards native 
35J.C. Beaglehole (ed.), The Endeavour Journal of Joseph Banks, 1768-1771, 2 (Sydney, 
1962), pp.122-123. 
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land rights. Describing the power of the king to make laws and the exten-
sion of these laws to the colony of New South Wales-which, at that time, 
included Van Diemen's Land-Stephen determined that, "the Colony was ac-
quired neither by conquest nor cession, but by the mere occupation of a desert 
or uninhabited land." 36 An Aboriginal policy, once it was required, was fur-
ther simplified because with "primitive man as a fit object for the Christian 
virtue of charity" 37 the road_was cleared, in the eyes of policy-makers ~t least, 
for indigenous populations to bE) accommodated, albeit in the lowest strata 
of the English class system. Their rights as quasi-citizens could be summar-
ily dismissed as a focus on their "civilisation" and Christianisation was given 
priority over their protection and the promotion of their rights as the original 
possessors of the land, and equal members of society. 
2.3 Theories of Sovereignty 
New South Wales and Van Diemen's Land were settled according to assump-
tions about the rights of European explorers and "discoverers" to make claims 
to foreign lands, established by two hundred years of European legal tradition. 
Since the middle of the sixteenth century legal and political theorists such as 
36 J. Stephen, Opinion re validity of statute 20 George II, c.xix, in Bathurst to Brisbane, 
7 October 1822, Historical Records of Australia, IV.l (Sydney, 1914-), pp.412-417. 
37Dixon, Course of Empire, pp.21-22. 
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Jean Bodin, Hugo Grotius, Thomas Hobbes and John Locke had been <level-
oping theories of international relations. No'Y that there was a need to apply 
these theories, European nation states seeking to claim new lands had to jus-
tify, according to tenets of international law, how they could claim possession 
of lands that were already peopled. To this end, theories concerning the rights 
of the "discoverers", as well as the lack of rights of some native groups con-
cerned, to make claims to those same land had to be formulated. The basis 
of many of these theories were founded upon notions of "sovereignty", which 
ultimately determined the extent to which a nation state could claim political 
autonomy and independence. 38 
The notion of "sovereignty" was first developed by the French philosopher, 
Jean Bodin, in the 1550s. Writing at a time when many European nations were 
in a state of domestic disarray, Bodin's theories were developed in response to 
the need to establish political harmony among states whose histories were long 
and very much intertwined. Bodin argued that a state, or more specifically, a _ 
government, could not rule effectively unless it had absolute legal power and 
political authority over the people it claimed to represent. 39 
38For a discussion of theories of sovereignty and international relations see K. Thomp-
son, Fathers of International Thought, J. Suanzes, "Sovereignty in British Legal Doc-
trine", Murdoch University Electronic Journal of Law, 6.3 (1999), pp.1-45, URL: 
http://www.murdoch.edu.au/elaw/; ; F.H. Hinsley, Sovereignty, 2 (Cambridge, 1986). 
39J. Franklin (ed), J. Bodin, On Sovereignty: Four Chapters from The Six Books of the 
Commonwealth (New York, 1992), pp.1-45. 
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A century later the English lawyer and philosopher, Thomas Hobbes, de-
veloped a similar argument. In his famous treatise, Leviathan, Hobbes spoke 
of the development of society in terms of the creation of a social pact between 
individuals who, having been born into state of nature where life was "poor, 
nasty, brutish and short", sought physical protection from a greater power. 
This power would be the "state". 40 The development of the state, then, came 
about as individuals ceded their individual natural rights to this more power-
ful political and legal authority in return for its protection. Both Bodin and 
Hobbes felt that for government to be effective, political rule must come from 
"above", that the government held absolute political and legal authority. Nev-
ertheless, the government's sovereignty ultimately lay with the ruled, rather 
than the ruler, because the government would not exist without the people, 
for it was merely an agent of the people, carrying out the peoples' will and 
acting for the good of the people.41 
At the conclusion of the English Civil War, seventeenth century political 
philosopher, John Locke (1632-1704), developed the argument that not only 
was the state responsible for protecting its citizens, but the people had the 
right to reject the government, even replace it, if the state did not fulfil its 
responsibilities to its citizens. Locke focussed on property rights. He argued 
40 
"Thomas Hobbes, 1588-1679" in K. Thompson, Fathers of International Thought (Ba-
ton Rouge, 1994), pp.76-80. 
41 
"Hobbes" in Thompson, Fathers of International Thought, pp. 76-80. 
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that society existed to protect private property rights. These property rights 
come into being, however, only after the individual cultivates and develops 
the property: "[w]hatsoever, then, he removes out of the state that nature 
hath provided and left it in, he hath mixed his_ labou~ with, and joined to it 
something that is his own, and thereby makes it his property." Writing at a 
time when the parliament was subsuming much of the monarchy's authority, 
Locke argued fervently for the notion of "popular sovereignty". He was a 
convincing advocate of the idea that the government was obliged to protect 
each individual's "natural rights", the most important being personal and 
property rights.42 
Jean Jacques Rousseau (1712-1788), writing during the age of the En-
lightenment, also considered the development of the "civil" individual, most 
notably perhaps in his 1762 publication, du Contrat Social.43 Society and so-
cietal order, for Rousseau, was the ultimate determiner of morality. He held 
that standards of morality begin and end with society. Society is greater than 
the sum of all of its parts (i.e. individuals within society) because the "general 
will" is different from the will of each citizen. In other words, citizens acting 
together will behave differently than if acting alone. This "general will" is 
Rousseau's popular sovereignty, albeit in a very abstract sense.44 
42J. Locke, Two Treatises of Government (London, 1966), pp.129-141. 
43 J .J. Rousseau, Du contrat Social, ou, Principes du Droit Politique (Amsterdam, 1762). 
44 A. Mazrui, "Alienable Sovereignty in Rousseau: A Further Look", Ethics, 77.2 
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In the 1760s English jurist, William Blackstone, addressed the concept of 
sovereignty in his Commentaries on the Laws of England.45 This most famous 
work sought to completely review and revise theories of English law. Even 
as newer English laws focussed more on the people and less on the monarchy, 
Blackstone remained unsure about where a state's ultimate sovereignty lay. 
He defined the "state" as a collective of individuals working together to form 
a single voice. Howeyer, he also conceived parliament to be a "supreme, irre-
sistible, absolute, uncontrolled authority ... "46 where these same people were 
obliged to obey its authority. In a sole paragraph relating to the rights and 
responsibilities of Britain as a coloniser, Blackstone wrote, 
... our more distant plantations in America, and elsewhere, are 
also in some respects subject to the English laws. Plantations, or 
colonies in distant countries, are either such where the lands are 
claimed by right of occupancy only, by finding them desart [sic] 
and uncultivated, and peopling them from the mother country; or 
where, when already cultivated, they have been either gained by 
conquest, or ceded to us by treaties. And both these rights are 
founded upon the law of nature or at least upon that of nations. 
(1967), pp.107-121; K. Thompson, Fathers of International Thought, pp.94-98; 'Jean 
Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778)' entry, The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy URL: 
http://www.iep.utm.edu/r/rousseau.htm. 
45W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, Book the First (Dublin, 1766). 
46Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, p.49. 
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But there is a difference between these two species of colonies, with 
respect to the laws by which they are bound, For it is held, that 
if an uninhabited country be discovered and planted by English 
subjects, all the English laws are immediately there in force. For as 
the law is the birthright of every subject, so wherever they go they 
carry their laws with them. But in conquered or ceded countries, 
that have already laws of their own, the king may indeed alter and 
change those laws .... 47 
With specific reference to the colonisation of north America, Blackstone noted 
the unique relationship of the Native American nations to their colonisers: 
Our American plantations are principally of this latter sort, being 
obtained in the last century either by right of conquest and driving 
out the native (with what nature justice I shall not at present en-
quire) or by treaties. And therefore the common law of England, as 
such, has no allowance or authority there; they being no part of the 
mother country, but distinct (though dependent) dominions .... 48 
47Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, p.104-105. 
48Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, p.105. For a discussion of Black-
stone's theories see: W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England; W. Blackstone, 
The Sovereignty of the Law (Toronto, 1973), pp.34-39; J. Jezierski, "Parliament or People: 
James Wilson and Blackstone on the Nature and Location of Sovereignty", Journal of the 
History of Ideas, 32.1 (1971), pp.95-106; G. Jones (ed), & J. Suanzes, "Sovereignty in British 
Legal Doctrine", pp.1-45. 
CHAPTER 2. TREATY-MAKING TRADITIONS 40 
By the 1830s philosophers including Englishman John Austin had <level-
oped theories of popular and absolutist notions of sovereignty that sought 
to reconcile these opposing theories. Austin proposed that the reality of 
the English political situation was that the monarchy-an absolutist form 
of government-shared its authority with the parliament-a popular form of 
government. Sovereignty lay with the combined authority of both.49 Austin's 
commentaries were significant because he published them at a time when a 
number of colonial governments were also considering where and to what ex-
tent notions of sovereignty played a role in the political relations between 
themselves and the various native groups with whom they found they must 
form relationships. 
While political debate over theories of sovereignty vacillated between ab-
solutist and popular, at its most fundamental the notion of "sovereignty" de-
veloped as a theory pertaining to the meaning of political and legal authority 
in terms, not of one's power or control over other governments or states, but 
of one's independence from other governments or states. Thus, regardless of 
the nature of a state's authority, a state can still claim to be sovereign if it can 
demonstrate that it can and does exist as a separate functioning entity, free 
498.M. Woody, "The Theory of Sovereignty: Dewey Versus Austin", Ethics (1968), 
pp.313-318; see also "John Austin and the House of Commons as Trustee of the Electorate", 
J. Suanzes, "Sovereignty in British Legal Doctrine", p.38-42. 
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from control from other states. 50 This is important to note in light of the le-
gal and political theories of international relations being developed during the 
seventeenth, eighteenth and nineteenth centuries which had a direct impact 
on those native groups who were, in every case, feeling the deleterious impact 
of European "discovery" and "settlement" of their lands-be they recognised 
nation states or otherwise. 
2.4 New South Wales: the "Desert & Unin-
habited" Land 
When Captain Arthur Phillip, commander of the First Fleet, arrived in Botany 
Bay on 26 January 1788 no one questioned whether or not this group of soldiers 
and convicts had the right to be there, because Cook had taken possession of 
the east coast of New Holland several years -earlier. This assumption grew 
from deeply ingrained notions about both the basis on which colonial powers 
could legitimately colonise foreign lands and the position of the native peoples 
with regard to their own rights to those same lands. 51 
Captain James Cook, who, on his first voyage to the South Pacific during 
50 A. James, Sovereign Statehood: The Basis of International Society (London, 1986), 
pp.3-9) & J. Suanzes, "Sovereignty in British Legal Doctrine", pp.38-39; W. Blackstone, 
Commentaries on the Laws of England (Oxford, 1765-1769), p.49. 
51Section heading reference: Stephen, Opinion re validity of statute 20 George II', c.xix, 
pp.412-417. 
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the years 1768 and 1775, had "claimed" New Holland on behalf of King George 
III, had established the basis for Britain to later colonise that land. To be sure, 
he had been given precise instructions for how he was to establish his claim. 
"You are with the consent of the Natives", his Royal instructions of 1768 
stated, 
to take possession of convenient Situations in the Country in the 
Name of the King of Great Britain, and to distribute among the 
Inhabitants some of the Medals with which you have been fur-
nished to remain as traces of your having been there. But if you 
find the Country uninhabited you are to take possession of it for 
His Majesty by setting up proper Marks and Inscriptions as First 
Discoverers and Possessors.52 
Cook, thus, returned to Britain having claimed, as "first discoverer,'' the 
east coast of New Holland. Though on a number of occasions throughout 
his travels Cook observed Aboriginal groups, the explorer, nevertheless, felt 
that it was appropriate to "take possession" of New Holland. By British legal 
interpretation, his claim was legitimised thus: during the eighteenth century 
when eastern New Holland was being considered as a possible penal colony, 
new theories of empire building were emerging due to the efforts of jurists such 
52J.C. Beaglehole (ed.), Journals of Captain James Cook on his Voyage, p.clxviii. 
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as M. de Vattel, Christian Wolff and Hugo Grotius. British claims to the east 
coast of New Holland and Van Diemen's Land followed strict tenets established 
in international law that established a framework by which colonial powers 
could claim new territories. Sovereignty over new lands could be established 
by carrying out a process of acquisition. After "discovery" an inchoate, or 
preliminary, title to the land could be claimed. Inchoate title could then be 
made inviolate by settling the land with colonial subjects. Once settled, a 
permanent sovereign claim could be made. 53 
This process, however, could only be undertaken if the land was "unoccu-
pied" or as Henry Reynolds describes it terra nullius. Reynolds uses the term 
in two different ways. Literally, he states, its Latin meaning is "empty land" 
or "unoccupied land", but for the sake of nineteenth century European legal 
doctrine a land was considered terra nullius if it was "a country without a 
sovereign recognized by European authorities and a territory where nobody 
owns any land at all, where no tenure of any sort existed." 54 New South Wales 
and Van Diemen's Land were considered terra nullius because at that time 
Britain did not recognise a previous claim of indigenous "ownership", and no 
other European power disputed Britain's claim. 
If there appeared to be a politically-organised community already existing 
53See H. Reynolds, The Law of the Land (Ringwood, 1992), Chapters 1 & 2, & pp.7-53. 
54Reynolds, The Law of the Land, p.12." 
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in the land and a rival claimant sought to take possession then the latter had 
two options: the original possessor could be convinced to submit to a new 
sovereign, or the land could be purchased from the original sovereign. New 
South Wales and Van Diemen's Land, later in 1803, fell to the British by the 
first method, "first discovery and effective occupation", because the land was 
considered unoccupied. Cook's orders, though, clearly indicate that he was 
authorised to purchase the lands of those Aboriginal groups he met, though 
of course he had to communicate this desire to the Aborigines.55 
In international law, questions of ownership were more complex than recog-
nising that people merely inhabited the land which was being "discovered". 
The British justified their claim over New Holland based on two criteria. 
Firstly, those who had explored the various Australian coasts before the British 
did not attempt to settled any region of the continent. As such, they did not 
even established inchoate title to it. Secondly, the notion that the Aborigines 
might hold native title to their various lands was summarily dismissed because 
the Aborigines were deemed far too primitive to claim such rights. Cook and 
Banks found no evidence of a farming or cultivating culture along the coastline 
and so, guided by Lockean theory, they did not consider that the Aborigines 
had any possessory rights to the lands over which they ranged. Consequently, 
55 A. Frost, "New South Wales as Terra Nullius: The British Denial of Aboriginal Land 
Rights", Historical Studies, 19.77 (1981), pp.514-515. 
CHAPTER 2. TREATY-MAKING TRADITIONS 45 
they were in no position to negotiate its transfer, nor to receive compensation 
for relinquishing it. 56 
Cook also felt justified in claiming British sovereignty over New Holland 
and Van Diemen's Land because of the apparent scarcity of people on the 
coast. He inferred that this also indicated that inland tracts of land must also 
be uninhabited. Having observed lands free of cultivation along the coastline, 
Banks conjectured that the interior must also be uninhabited because no group 
could survive away from the coast without cultivating crops upon which to 
survive. If inland groups had developed techniques for cultivating the land 
there would be evidence of such activity along the coastline. Combined with 
this was the apparent pusillanimity of a people whom Banks was convinced 
would "speedily abandon the Country to the New Comers" if settlement was 
to follow. For all of these reasons Cook felt justified in claiming New Holland 
as a land uninhabited by a "civilized" sovereign government. To this end, the 
British colonial authorities assumed that they were in a solid position to later 
settle their new "discoveries" as convict colonies, because for all political and 
legal intents and purposes the land was terra nullius. 57 
Michael Connor recently criticised the use of the term "terra nullius" by 
56Frost, "New South Wales as Terra Nullius ... ", p.515; Reynolds, The Law of the Land, 
p.11; Beaglehole, Journals of Captain James Cook, p.148. 
57Beaglehole, Journals of Captain James Cook, p.146; Beaglehole, The Endeavour Journal 
of Joseph Banks, p.122. 
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historians and legal scholars. Taking a very literal position he argues that, 
rather than being a term used to describe the legal reality of colonial Aus-
tralia, terra nullius is a modern expression first used in a 1977 legal case by 
Paul Coe who "sensed its usefulness for the emerging political arguments in 
favour of Aboriginal land rights." Subsequently, Connor maintains, the term 
was introduced into mainstream Australian politics by High Court Justice Li-
onel Murphy who, by making reference to it, helped usher in its acceptance 
as a " ... legal and historical doctrine for explaining Australia's sovereignty." 
Connor concludes that terra nullius- " ... was never used by the British govern-
ment to justify the settlement of New Holland", rather it has been adopted by 
historians seeking to influence modern legal and political debates". 58 
Nonetheless, regardless of when the term terra nullius was coined, as his-
torian Merete Borch explains, in the early decades of the nineteenth century 
"it became settled in law that the land inhabited by Aboriginal peoples, who 
subsisted on hunting and gathering, could be regarded as ownerless and there-
fore taken possession of as if it had been uninhabited." Consequently, British 
"doctrine which proclaim_ed land inhabited by hunters and gatherers to be 
58 
"Michael Connor: Dispel Myth of Terra Nullius and Historians are on Shaky Ground", 
The Australian, 9 July 2004; M. Connor, "Error Nullius", The Bulletin (Sydney), 26 August 
2003, pp.76-78. 
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ownerless, became fairly widespread in legal thinking in the nineteenth cen-
tury." 59 
§ 
There is nothing new in the suggestiqn that British possession of New Hal-
land and Van Diemen's Land was inappropriate at best, unlawful at worst. 
The processes that the British explorers and early colonisers followed to en-
sure legitimate ownership, in the eyes of European law, meant that British 
sovereignty was never seriously questioned or challenged by another European 
power. New Holland had been previously "discovered" (i.e. explored) by the 
Dutch and the Spanish; Van Diemen's Land, by the Dutch and the French. 
However, all three had lost their inchoate title having failed to take occupa-
, 
tion of either New Holland or Van Diemen's Land in a timely manner.60 Had 
closer attention had been paid by the early explorers to the Aborigines in 
both lands, evidence would have been gleaned of political, cultural and social 
systems. However different these may have been from European models, their 
existence mi~ht have convinced the early explorers and colonisers to reconsider 
their assumptions about the sovereign rights of the various groups with whom 
59M. Borch, "Rethinking the Origins of Terra Nullius", Australian Historical Studies, 
32.117 (2001), p.238. 
60K. McNeil, Common Law Aboriginal Title (Ox~ord, 1989), p.2. 
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they came into contact. In the meantime, the problem in Van Diemen's Land 
was that after two decades of ever-expanding settlement various Aboriginal 
groups began to resist further intrusion into their lands. As they became more 
politically and militarily adept a number of colonists began to realise the chal-
lenge that the Aborigines were presenting to British sovereign claims to the 
island. 
The breakdown of race relations between the A?origines and the colonists 
during Governor Arthur's time ultimately lea him to recognise certain Abo-
riginal rights and privileges to lands that the British legal system had not 
recognised at settlement in 1803. Consequently he was forced to face the Abo-
riginal challenge while English law failed to address the confusing and often 
contradictory laws that led to the colonisation of a land that was neither desert 
nor uninhabited. Hence, Arthur's troubles stemmed primarily from the fact 
that Cook had made a terrible error when he failed to recognise that Abo-
rigines of New Holland had at least possessory rights to lands upon which 
they resided. Arthur's comments regarding the missed opportunity to negoti-
ate a treaty with the Aborigines of Van Diemen's Land61 reflected what was 
happening in other parts of the world, and in particular North America. 
61 This will be discussed in detail in Chapter 10. 
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2.5 Domestic Dependent Nations 
By the time Arthur came to consider the notion of a treaty in Van Diemen's 
Land, thqse being negotiated in north America were very much focused on 
resolving issues of Native American land rights and sovereignty. During the 
1820s and 1830s three cases were brought before the United States Supreme 
Court that dealt directly and decisively with the concept of tribal sovereignty. 
Their outcomes established the foundation of federal Indian law in the United 
States. 
The two major actors were the Cherokee nation and the State of Georgia. 
Adjudicated by Chief Justice John Marshall, the outcome of the cases came to 
be known as the "Marshall Trilogy". Marshall's judgements gave a legal con-
text to the unique concept of the trustee-ward relationship that had developed 
between the federal government and most Native American tribes. The nature 
of the relationship was, Marshall found, such that the Native American na-
tions had developed as "domestic dependant nations", not directly answerable 
to, but also not completely independent of the United States government. The 
Marshall trilogy was the American legal precedent that determined views of 
native sovereignty across the globe at the time. The three federal cases heard 
by Marshall were Johnson v. Mcintosh (1823), Cherokee Nation v. Georgia 
(1831) and Worcester v. Georgia (1832).62 
62 Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. 543, 5 L.Ed. 681, 8 Wheat. 543 (1823); Cherokee Nation 
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Figure 2.1: 
Chief Justice John Marshall, 1755- 1835, Source: Library of Congress Prints 
and Photographs Division Washington , D.C. 20540 USA: 
http: //memory.loc.gov/ammem/. 
To be sure, the judicial process which finally determined the position of 
native American nations under federal United States law took more than two 
decades to conclude. It began with a case in 1810 t hat was brought before 
the Supreme Court that involved the question of Indian native title. Fletcher 
v. Georgia, 30 U.S . 1, 5Pet.l, 81.Ed.25 (1831); Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S . 515, 6Pet.515, 
81.Ed.483 (1832). For a detailed study of the Marshall trilogy and events surrounding it 
see: Jeremy Hunt Gates, Westward Removal: Andrew Jackson and the Fate of the Eastern 
Cherokee, unpublished PhD thesis , , University of Miami, 1988; & F.P. Prucha, Documents 
of U.S. Indian Policy (Lincoln , 2000) . 
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v. Peck was a suit concerning fraudulent land sales made by the Georgian 
government. Though the Cherokees were not represented in the case, because 
a portion of the land in qµestion was Cherokee land, the Federal Court was 
forced to consider the tribe's native title to it. What the Court found was that 
the Cherokees held a title "certainly to be respected by all courts, until it be 
legitimately extinguished." 63 
Thirteen years later in 1823, Johnson v. Mcintosh, the first of Marshall's 
trilogy of native title cases, came before the Supreme Court. This was the 
first federal case that sought to directly answer a native title question. The 
case involved two white parties who were both claiming title to a parcel of 
land in Illinois, 50 million acres in size. Johnson, the plaintiff, claimed he had 
purchased the land from a group of Native American tribes from northwest 
of the Ohio River. Mcintosh, the defendant, also argued that he held title to 
the land because he had received the land through a grant from the Federal 
Government. The central issue for Marshall was "confined to the power of 
Indians to give, and of private individuals to receive, a title, which can be 
sustained in the courts of this country." Marshall ultimately held that while the 
Native American nations were free to dispose of land to non-native Americans, 
those receiving the land would be subject to the same restrictions to which 
63M. Ball, "John Marshall and Indian Nations in the Beginning and Now", The John 
Marshall Law Review, 33.1175 (2000), p.1184. 
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the original possessors, as wards of the government, were subject. Marshall, 
thus, ruled for Mcintosh, noting that title to lands must "depend entirely on 
the law of the nation in which they lie". However, he made sure to note that 
as a result of colonisation, native American "rights to complete sovereignty, 
as independent nations, were necessarily diminished" and thus their rights to 
dispose of soil thence denied. Nonetheless "the doctrine of discovery did not 
destroy Native American claims to the land .... Sovereign nations that claimed 
by discovery and maintained authority by conquest were still morally and 
legally obliged to respect the Native American right of occupancy." 64 
By the end of the 1820s the state of Georgia had begun an aggressive cam-
paign to extend its jurisdiction over those Cherokee lands which fell within 
its borders. Supported by a sympathetic fed~ral government, the removal of 
the tribes of eastern Georgia appeared inevitable. Andrew Jackson, a staunch 
advocate for a removal policy, had won the presidency the previous year. With 
gold recently discovered in Georgia, pressure to remove Native American tribes 
from the state intensified. Though the Cherokee nation fiercely resisted Jack-
son's efforts, the president was determined to see his plans come to fruition. 
In May 1830 Jackson's removal bill was signed into law. Jackson legitimised 
his position to his opponents by arguing that the continued exposure of whites 
64Prucha, Documents of United States Indian Policy (Lincoln, 2000); K. Newmyer, John 
Marshall and the Heroic Age of the Supreme Court (Baton Rouge, 2001), pp.443-444. 
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to native American groups would ultimately result in the latter's demise (an 
argument used by Governor Arthur when discussing the option of removing 
the Tasmanian Aborigines). Jackson held that 
[surrounded] by the whites with their arts of civilisation, which 
by destroying the resources of the savage doom him to weakness 
and decay, the fate of the Mohegan, the Narragansett, and the 
Delaware65 is fast overtaking the Choctaw, the Cherokee and the 
Creek. That this fate surely awaits them if they remain within the 
limits of the States does not admit of a doubt. 66 
Tacitly acknowledging his government's inability to effectively control the 
activities of whites against Native American tribes, the President argued that 
by removing these groups, he would be saving them from ''this fate [that] 
surely awaits them if they remain within the limites [sic] of the States .... " On 
the new reserves established in Oklahoma, Jackson promised, the dispossessed 
nations "may be secured in the enjoyment of government of their own choice, 
subject to no other control from the United States .... " While he maintained 
that the move must be a voluntary one, he also made clear that those who 
chose to stay would be subject to state and federal laws. 67 
65These were tribes from the New England region whose numbers had been decimated in 
earlier centuries by frontier wars and European disease. 
66President Jackson on Indian Removal, December 8, 1829 in F.P. Prucha (ed), Documents 
of U.S. Indian Policy, pp.47-48. 
67Newmyer, John Marshall and the Heroic Age of the Supreme Court, p.444; Prucha, 
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Having failed with the legislature, the Cherokee nation turned to the courts 
for justice. In March 1831 notice was served to the Georgian governor and 
attorney general, stating that a motion would be filed with the Supreme Court 
asking the court to 
restrain the state of Georgia from the execution of certain laws 
of that state, which, as is alleged, 'go directly to annihilate the 
Cherokees as a political society, and to seize for the use of Georgia 
the lands of the nation which have been assured to them by the 
United States in solemn treaties repeatedly made and still in force.' 
The suit stated that "the Cherokee Nation of Indians is a foreign state, not 
owing allegiance to the United States, nor to any State of this Union, nor 
to any prince, potentate or State, other than their own ... ;" that the Chero-
kees were "a sovereign and independent state ... [that] ... had been repeatedly 
recognized, and still stands recognized by the United States, in the various 
treaties subsisting between their nation and the United States." Cherokee Na-
tion v. Georgia was brought before Chief Justice Marshall. Marshall heard 
the case with a view to determining whether or not the Federal Court had 
jurisdiction in this matter. 68 Marshall found that the "Indian tribe or nation 
Documents of United States Indian Policy, pp.47-48. 
68M. Ball, "John Marshall and Indian Nations in the Beginning and Now'', p.1184; 
Newmyer, John Marshall and the Heroic Age of the Supreme Court, p.446; Prucha, Docu-
ments of United States Indian Policy, pp.57-59 
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within the United States is not a foreign state in the sense of the Constitution, 
and cannot maintain an action in the courts of the United States." However, 
neither was it completely dependent upon and answerable to the laws and 
authority of the state in which its territory lay. Instead, in what has come to 
be arguably his most famous determination, Marshall found that 
[t]hough the Indians are acknowledged to have an unquestionable 
and; heretofore, unquestioned right to the lands they occupy until 
that right shall be extinguished by a voluntary cession to our gov-
ernment, yet it may well be doubted whether those tribes which 
reside within the acknowledged boundaries of the United States 
can, with strict accuracy, be denominated foreign nations. They 
may more correctly, perhaps, be denominated domestic dependent 
natwns.69 They occupy a territory to which we assert a title inde-
pendent of their will, which must, take effect in point of possession 
when their right of possession ceases: Meanwhile, they are in a 
state of pupillage. Their relation to the United States resembles 
that of a ward to his guardian. 70 
Twelve months later, Marshall heard the third case in the trilogy-Worcester 
v. Georgia. What resulted outside the courtroom was a dispute where justice 
69 Author's emphasis. 
7
°Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 5Pet.l, 81.Ed.25 (1831). 
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fell victim to state and federal politics. Samuel Worcester and eleven other 
men working as missionaries in the Cherokee territory in New Echota were 
arrested and tried for illegally residing on Cherokee land. The state of Geor-
gia claimed that they had not obtained a permit from the state to do so, and 
so were in violation of laws protecting native American nations from uncon-
trolled contact with whites. Worcester and his colleagues were found guilty 
and sentenced to four years hard labour. Using Worcester as their example, 
the Cherokees took their case to the Federal Court claiming that Georgia's 
actions were unlawful because they were in direct violation of federal treaties 
made with the Cherokee nation. Marshall found for Worcester. He upheld the 
Cherokee's claim that they remained an independent and autonomous state, 
despite their inevitable dependence on the federal government and that the 
state of Georgia did not have the right to impose its laws in Cherokee lands. 
Ultimately, Marshall concluded, Samuel Worcester had been illegally tried and 
imprisoned. Marshall opined that 
The Cherokee nation, then, is a distinct community, occupying its 
own territory, with boundaries accurately described, in which the 
laws of Georgia can have no force, and which the citizens of Geor-
gia have no right to enter, but with the assent of the Cherokees 
themselves, or in conformity with treaties, and with the acts of 
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Congress. The whole intercourse between the United States and 
this nation, is, by our Constitution and laws, vested in the govern-
ment of the United States. 
Marshall ordered that the Worcester's judgement be reversed and annulled. 71 
Georgia's governor, George Gilmer and also President Jackson ignored 
Marshall's findings and the men remained incarcerated. The following year 
Wilson Lumpkin won governorship of Georgia. Faced with another political 
crisis-the nullification crisis72-Lumpkin sought to quickly and quietly put 
an end to the Worcester controversy. He offered to release Worcester and his 
colleagues if they agreed to a few minor concessions. Hoping to continue his 
crusade as a free man, Worcester accepted the governor's offer. However, the 
political momentum to remove the Cherokee could not be abated and three 
years later the process began to remove the Cherokee nation to the state of 
Oklahoma, in what came to be known as the Trail of Tears73 
71 Prucha, Documents of United States Indian Policy, pp.60-62. 
72The issue essentially evolved into a conflict between- several southern states (South 
Carolina and Georgia in particular) and the Federal Government over the protection and 
expansion of states' rights to include the ability to nullify federal laws that compromised 
states' rights. These states opposed Congress' attempts to impose tariffs on southern states 
in order to protect and promote northern industries; for a discussion of the Cherokee case and 
the nullification crisis see E. Miles, "After John Marshall's Decision: Worcester v. Georgia 
and the Nullification Crisis,'' The Journal of Southern History (1973), pp. 519-544. 
73W. McLoughlin, Cherokee Renascence in the New Republic (Princeton, 1986), pp.428-
451. 
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The Marshall trilogy established a precedent for Native American policy-
making and politics that continues to have an impact on issues involving na-
tive title. Marshall's findings in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia reflected the 
jurist's struggle to balance justice and the law. Marshall finally came to a de-
cision which demonstrated his talent as a jurist. At first his findings seemed, 
in the words of Professor Kent Newmyer, "insultingly paternalistic". How-
ever, as Newmyer also points out, Marshall's opinion was a reflection of a 
"record of two centuries of relations between Anglo-Americans and Native 
Americans ... [that] ... was full of unresolved tension between empowerment 
and dependency." 74 Hence, Marshall's conclusion that the Cherokee nation, 
like every other native American nation, had, in fact, evolved into a "domestic 
dependant nation'~ demonstrated a broader view of the place and role of native 
groups in north America. Centuries of trading, warring, treaty-making and 
land sharing had led to this. The reality was that the Cherokees were neither 
completely bound to, nor completely independent of, those Anglo-American 
governments with whom they were required to interact. 
Ultimately, Chief Justice John Marshall's judgements had little effect on 
the politics of race relations at the time. States' rights prevailed over native 
rights and the Cherokee found themselves exiled and powerless. However, the 
74Newmyer, John Marshall and the Heroic Age of the Supreme Court, p.446-7. 
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opinions to come from the Marshall trilogy came to have a significant impact 
on relations between native and colonising governments across the globe and 
far into the future. Where Marshall was successful was that he provided a legal 
context by which native nations who had lost any real military or economic 
autonomy could still maintain an element of political independence. They 
could claim a species of sovereignty that acknowledged native title even while 
being dependent on an external "guardian" government. To this end, native 
groups had and have been able to develop relations with their host govern-
ments that reflect the unique nature of their dependence, independence and 
interdependence. 
Chapter 3 
From Black Peace to Black War 
To my way of thinking, I have never been able to conceive that there 
was justice and equity on the part of the Europeans in seizing, in 
the name of their Governments, a land seen for the first time, when 
it is inhabited by men who have not always deserved the title of 
savages or cannibals which has been given them .... " 1 
Though the royal instructions to the early governors of Van Diemen's Land 
provided a pragmatic formula for developing harmonious relations with the 
Aborigines, precedents established during the first three decades of contact 
dictated that just the opposite would most likely result. This chapter will 
examine the nature of race relations from the settlement of Risdon Cove in 
1 Baudin to King, 23 December 1802, Historical Records of New South Wales, V (Sydney, 
1901), p.830. 
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September 1803 to the end of Governor William Sorell's tenure in April 1824 
to demonstrate that there was very little chance that the peaceful nature of 
race relations during the early years would or could endure and that war was 
almost inevitable. 
3 .1 First Contacts 
New Zealand Historian, James Belich, in his review of Reynold's Fate of a Free 
People asserts that the "Black Peace-twenty years of little violence and con-
siderable interaction-was as remarkable as the Black War." 2 Even a cursory 
examination of the events of the first fifteen years of settlement does, indeed, 
indicate that hostilities between Aboriginal and settler communities remained 
relatively confined and limited. 
Orders from London to the early explorers established a context in which 
friendly and conciliatory contact should and could be made. Indeed, as dis-
cussed above, the explorers were encouraged to negotiate with indigenous 
groups to occupy lands in a way that would be considered fair and equitable 
for all parties concerned. Cook, it will be recalled, was instructed to take 
possession of "convenient situations" only with the consent of the natives. 3 
2 J. Belich, "Black Peace, Black War", Review of Henry Reynolds' 'Fate of a Free People: 
A Radical Re-examination of the Tasmanian Wars', Meanjin (1995), p. 712. 
3King's instructions to Captain James Cook, 1772 in J.C. Beglehole (ed.), Journals of 
Captain James Cook on his Voyage, p.clxviii. 
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The early governors, too, were instructed to protect the Aborigines from 
some of the deleterious effects of settlement. Their royal orders were to 
to endeavour by every possible means to open an intercourse with 
the natives, and to conciliate their affections, enjoining all our sub-
jects to live in amity and kindness with them. And if any of our 
subjects shall wantonly destroy them, or give them any unneces-
sary interruption in their exercise of their several occupations, it 
is our will and pleasure that you do cause such offenders to be 
brought to punishment according to the degree of the offense.4 
While these orders to protect the "exercise" of the Aborigines "in their several 
occupations" hardly indicated a recognition of Aboriginal proprietorial rights 
to the land, let alone actual ownership of it, they did reveal an attempt to 
balance justice with Imperial colonial ambition. 
Implicit in the King's orders was the presumption that because certain 
Aboriginal activities were to be protected and because the majority of in-
digenous Australians were nomadic hunter/gatherers, then ultimately their 
movements throughout the land, if not their possession of it, also was to be 
protected. As such, it is instructive that such orders were formulated given 
4George III to Arthur Phillip, 25 April 1787, Historical Records of Australia, Ll, p.13. 
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that these very characteristics marginalised Aboriginal groups as Crown sub-
jects who enjoyed few, if any, rights as British citizens. 
The nature of Aboriginal nomadism, indeed, lay at the core of Britain's 
justification that the Australian continent was land unoccupied by a sovereign. 
This concept remained solid in colonial law and politics well into the nineteenth 
century. Governor David Collins' observations of the Aborigines as represent-
ing "mankind before it had united into a society" were made after a decade 
of contact. James Stephen's opinion that New South Wales was a "desert or 
uninhabited land" was formulated more than thirty years after settlement. 5 
As noted, the means by which Cook justified claiming New Holland as an 
uninhabited land came directly from the fact that as hunters and gatherers 
the Aborigines were deemed primitive and uncivilised and therefore unable 
to claim sovereignty over that land which Cook claimed in the name of the 
British king; and this tenet of English law remained inexorable throughout 
Australia's colonial history. 
5 John Thomas Bigge's recommendation to the House of Commons that the Aboriginal 
tribes of Australia must have "an unfettered range over a large tract of territory"-the 
very characteristic that deemed them uncivilized-was also made after 40 years of settle-
ment, though he also revealed a subtle change in perspective with his prophetic contention 
that without access to this 'unfettered range' "the black population will undergo a gradual 
diminution in proportion to the advances of the white population into the interior"; see 
Beaglehole, Journals of Captain James Cook, p.148; Stephen, Opinion re validity of statute 
20 George II', c.xix, pp.412-417; D. Collins, An Account of tfl,e English colony in New South 
Wales, p. 350-395; J. T. Bigge, Report of the Commissioner of Inquiry on the State of Agri-
culture and Trade in the Colony of New South Wales, House of Commons (13 March 1823), 
p.83. 
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An international focus provides a context as to the seemingly incongruous 
motivations guiding the policy makers in the Colonial Office. The orders 
relayed to the early lieutentant-governors reflected closely those incorporated 
by the Royal Proclamation of 1763 sent to the colonial governors throughout 
north America. The proclamation deemed that indigenous groups were to "live 
under our protection" ; that Native American groups "should not be molested 
or disturbed in the possession of such parts of our dominions and territories 
as, not having been ceded to or purchased by us, are reserved to them, or 
any of them, as their hunting grounds." The proclamation also established the 
Crown's exclusive right of pre-emption over Native American holdings. 
And whereas great frauds and abuses have been committed in pur-
chasing lands of the Indians, to the great prejudice of our interests 
and to the great dissatisfaction of the said Indians: In order, there-
fore, to prevent such irregularities for the future, and to the end 
that the Indians may be convinced of our justice and determined 
resolution to remove all reasonable cause of discontent, we do with 
the advice of our Privy Council strictly enjoin and require that no 
private person do presume to make any purchase from the said In-
dians of any lands reserved to the said Indians, within those parts 
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of our colonies where we have thought proper to allow settlement. 6 
This had ramifications that extended into the next century and throughout 
the British colonies. 
To be sure, the Royal Proclamation was created out of political necessity. 
Once Britain had defeated France in the Seven Years War, potential resistance 
from Native American groups now posed the greatest obstacle to British con-
trol over north America. The orders contained in the Royal Proclamation then 
were focused on placating Native American groups so that colonisation could 
continue with minimal resistance. 7 Nevertheless, despite its political under-
pinnings, the Royal Proclamation of 1763, like the King's orders to Governor 
Phillip, still provided for the protection of both the native peoples and their 
hunting grounds. 
However, though the royal orders to the governors of Van Diemen's Land 
had the Royal Proclamation as their precedent, the political situation was very 
different in Van Diemen's Land. Britain's principal motivation for formulating 
the various native policies laid out in the proclamation was to undermine 
France's position in north America by strengthening its alliances with the 
Native American nations. Britain did not need to do this in Van Diemen's 
Land. For a short time France took an exploratory interest in the region but 
6George III, By the King, a Proclamation, 7 October 1763 (London, 1763). 
7H. Zinn, A People's History of the United States, 1492-Present (New York, 1999), p.59. 
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retreated once New South Wales Governor Phillip Gidley King claimed it as 
a British territory. Thus, even before the arrival of the Lady Nelson there 
was no motivation to establish political ties with Aboriginal groups to help 
foster interdependence, such as had been developed between British settlers 
and Native American groups. 8 
Another reason that race relations failed to develop as colonial officials had 
hoped in Van Diemen's Land was that the earliest contacts between Aborigines 
and Europeans were frequently hostile and violent. Before 1803, relations 
between European and Aboriginal groups developed without the benefit of 
an official Aboriginal policy because European sealing and whaling groups-a 
fraternity who, in any event, had little regard for official colonial policy-had 
moved into the region before Van Diemen's Land was officially colonised.9 
Sealing and whaling vessels had frequented the north and east coasts of 
Van Diemen's Land since shortly after Matthew Flinders discovered seals on 
Preservation Island in 1796. A sealing community, comprised primarily of Eu-
ropean men and Aboriginal women from north and east coast bands, quickly 
developed. It was a harsh life for its members, especially its women. Most of 
8King to Napean, HRA, 1.4, pp.247-249. 
9see T. Jetson, "An Island of Contentment?: A History of Preservation Island", Tasma-
nian Historical Research Association, Papers and Proceedings, 43.1 (1996), pp.29-46; N.J.B. 
Plomley, The Sealers of Bass Strait and the Cape Barren Island Community, (Hobart, 1990); 
S. Murray-Smith, "'Beyond the Pale': The Islander Community of Bass Strait in the Nine-
teenth Century", Tasmanian Historical Research Association, Papers and Proceedings, 20.4 
(1973), pp.167-200. 
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the islands were rocky, barren and windswept. Sealing was labour-intensive 
and fraught with danger. The women did most of the work. Added to this was 
the violence that the women often had to endure. William Stewart, writing to 
the New South Wales colonial secretary in 1815, revealed that the sealers ob-
tained some Aboriginal women from the coastal tribes by force, keeping them 
as slaves and trading them amongst one another. Punishment for disobedi-
ence, he reported, often involved clubbings and whippings.10 When George 
Augustus Robinson made contact with a number of women in the islands fif-
teen years later, they relayed the same accounts. One woman recalled how she 
had been removed from her family as a child after her tribe had been raided 
by a group of sealers. She admitted to Robinson that 
the white men tie the black women to trees and stretch out their 
arms ... and then they flog them very much, plenty much blood, 
plenty cry ... Said some of the sealers beat the women on the heads 
with big sticks and make the blood run down the face, and cut 
them with knives." 11 
A number of sealers, themselves, verified these reports. They admitted to 
treating the women as chattels, punishing them harshly when the women did 
not comply with their wishes. James Munro of Preservation Island reported 
10Stewart to Campbell, 28 September 1815, HRA, III.2, pp.575-576. 
11Plomley (ed.), Priendly Mission, p.249. 
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that a sealer on Kangaroo Island "cut the flesh off the cheek of a black boy 
and made him eat it." John Anderson, living on Woody Island, told Robinson 
that "the sealers tied up a black woman to a tree and then cut the flesh off her 
thigh and cut off her ears and made her eat it." 12 It was not uncommon for 
sealers to kill Aboriginal women who proved defi.ant. 13 Nonetheless, because 
they proved indispensable to the community, the women eventually found their 
place and in time the culture became very much matriarchal. 
Early contact between Aboriginal groups and Vandemonian settlers on 
the Tasmanian mainland, on the other hand, established different precedents 
because Aboriginal and European groups did not develop an interdependence 
such as had evolved in the Bass Strait islands. From the start, contact was 
fraught with uncertainty. It was apparent to some even before settlement that 
a context for hostilities had been established by the way in which Britain had 
claimed the lands of New Holland. 
Until 1798 Van Diemen's Land was thought to be part of New Holland 
proper. With the discovery of the Bass Strait, Britain's claims to the southern 
island were suddenly much less certain. Consequently, having received word 
late in 1802 that a French vessel was exploring the waters off Van Diemen's 
12Plomley (ed.), Friendly Mission, p.357. 
13Plomley (ed.), Friendly Mission, pp.249; For a discussion of the sealers and sealing 
community in Bass Strait see Chapter 7. 
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Land, Governor King quickly dispatched the Cumberland to King Island off 
the north coast of Van Diemen's Land. Once there an English flag was planted 
and hoisted on the site where the crew of the French vessel Naturaliste had 
been camped. 14 Naturaliste 's captain, Nicholas Baudin thought the "childish 
ceremony was ridiculous,'' even more so because of the fact that in their haste 
to make their territorial claim the British sailors had hoisted the flag upside 
down. Baudin's criticisms did not end there. He was contemptuous of the way 
Britain had claimed New Holland with little regard to the rights of its native 
inhabitants. 15 In his letter to King he professed: 
[t]o my way of thinking, I have never been able to conceive that 
there was justice and equity on the part of the Europeans in seizing, 
in the name of their Governments, a land seen for the first time, 
when it is inhabited by men who have not always deserved the 
title of savages or cannibals which has been given them ... [N]ot 
only have you to reproach yourselves with an injustice in seizing 
their land, but also in transporting on a soil where the crimes 
and the diseases of Europeans were unknown all that could retard 
the progress of civilization, which has served as a pretext to your 
Government.16 
14King to Napean, HRA, l.4, pp.247-249. 
15Baudin to King, 23 December 1802, HRNSW, V, p.830. 
16Baudin to King, 23 December 1802, HRNSW, V, p.830. 
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Eventually this would also become apparent to numerous colonial officials and 
settlers. 
Figure 3.1: 
Navy Lieutenant John Bowen, 1180-1821; Image taken from 
http: //www.parliament .tas.gov.au/php/Bowen.htm. 
After a permanent British presence had been established with the arrival 
of the Lady Nelson under the command of Navy Lieutenant John Bowen in 
September 1803, tensions between the English and the Moomairremener band 
of Risdon Cove gradually developed. Initial contact was cordial and limited. 
Shortly after the new settlers erected their camps they were approached by 
a lone Moomairremener man. They offered him gifts and he perused them 
briefly before retreating, indicating that he did not want to be followed. Over 
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the next few months the Moomairremener made efforts to control the settlers 
activities along the eastern shore of the Derwent, particularly with respect to 
their hunting native game.17 
The arrival of Colonel David Collins in February 1804 with 308 convicts 
and and some fifty others, including settlers, led to an increase in tensions 
as greater numbers led to more frequent contact. To be sure, Collins, who 
assumed the authority over this small settlement, arrived in Van Diemen's 
Land with very different intentions. He hoped that amicable relations could 
be developed and that a species of tolerance could be established between his 
ragged band and the locals. He was aware that the Moomairremener might 
very well view the settlers as intruders. However, he did not feel a 1.'esponsibility 
to limit the spread of settlement nor to restrict the hunting of native game in 
order to ensure that the Europeans did not encroach on the lifestyles of the 
natives. 18 
Shortly before Collins assumed the administration of the colony, Aboriginal-
settler tension manifested itself. On 3 May 1804, nine months after the arrival 
of the Lady Nelson, a group of Moomairremener, reported to number between 
300 and 500, descended upon the cove, taking a kangaroo from a gamekeeper 
and surrounding a hut situated at a distance from the camp. Bowen was 
absent from the settlement, having left on a journey to the Huon River, so 
17Bowen to King, 20 September 1803, HRA, III.1, p.198, 221& 664. 
18Currey, David Collins: A Colonial Life, Chapters 7 & 14; A.G.L. Shaw (ed.), J. West, 
The History of Tasmania (Sydney, 1971), p.262; Ryan, The Aboriginal Tasmanians, p.73. 
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Acting-Commandant Lieutenant William Moore had been placed in charge. 
Moore sent three soldiers to disband the group at the hut and fired off a can-
non in an attempt to fend off those who had congregated around the camp. In 
·~ 
a panic the British soldiers fired at the group. One was slain instantly but oth-
ers who had been injured managed to_ escape, making it impossible for Moore 
to determine just how many had been killed. Eventually two other bodies 
were found. They were taken by Surgeon Mountgarrett, dissected, preserved 
in vats of salt, and then shipped to New South Wales. Two of the dead were 
the parents of a boy who Reverend Robert Knopwood later baptised as Robert 
Hobart May. The boy was shortly afterwards returned to his people. Never-
theless, a few days later the Moomairremener attacked a group of labourers 
from the settlement, Collins believed, as an act of retribution.19 
In his report to Collins, Moore affirmed his convictions that the Moomair-
remener's "design was to attack us." Their numbers and "own hostile appear-
ance," he reported, as well as an attack on a settler's wife and Moore's own 
servant, "convinced me of their intentions" to use violence. Their "appearance 
and numbers I thought very far from friendly." Though he ordered his soldiers 
"not to fire if they could avoid it," he reported that, ultimately they "found 
it necessary, and one was killed on the spot, and another was found dead in 
19Bowen to King, 20 September 1803, HRA, III.1, pp.238, 242-243 & 282. 
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the valley." 20 
Reports of the Risdon affair presented to the Aborigines Committee, con-
vened by Governor Arthur twenty-six year later to inquire into the deteriora-
tion of relations with the Aborigines, offered a number of alternative perspec-
tives on the incident. William Stocker and Robert Evans conceived that the 
-r 
Moomairremener had come down for a 'corrobbery'. 21 Reverend Knopwood 
thought that "our people went from the camp to attack the natives." 22 Edward 
White wondered if the Aborigines had been on a kangaroo drive. He wrote 
that he 
saw 300 of the natives come down in a circular form, and a flock 
of kangaroos hemmed in between them; there were men, women 
and children; they looked at me with all their eyes; I went down 
to the creek, and reported them to some soldiers, and then went 
back to my work; the natives did not threaten me; I was not afraid 
of them ... The natives did not attack the soldiers; they would not 
have molested them; the firing commenced about 11 o'clock; there 
were a great many of the Natives slaughtered and wounded.23 
20 Moore to Collins, 7 May 1804 in Collins to King, 20 September 1803, HRA, III.1, 
pp.242-43. 
21 Evidence of William Stocker & Robert Evans in Report of the Aborigines Committee 
in Arthur to Murray, 15 April 1830, CO 280/24, PRO Reel 244, pp. 427 & 429-430. 
22Evidence of Robert Knopwood in Report of the Aborigines Committee in Arthur to 
Murray, 15 April 1830, CO 280/24, PRO Reel 244, pp. 425. 
23Evidence of Edward White in Report of the Aborigines Committee in Arthur to Murray, 
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Collins' report to Governor King reflected how shocking the affair was 
to the small settlement. He worried that relations between the settlers and 
Aborigines would never mend. He thought there was 
... reason to fear that, from the vindictive spirit of these people, 
I may hereafter feel the unfortunate effects of them ... I well know 
that these indiscriminating savages will consider every white man 
as their enemy, and will if they have opportunity revenge the death 
of their companions upon those who had no share in the attack, 
but I shall make a point, if it ever is in my power of doing away 
the evil impressions, which by this and a former affair they may 
have received of our disposition towards them. 24 
While the affray, as Keith Windschuttle argues, might have been an isolated 
incident, having resulted from panic and confusion, some settlers still believed 
that it set the precedent for future race relations. Though not present at Ris-
don Cove, James Kelly, sometime sealer and whaler, and Habourmaster and 
Pilot at Hobart T~wn later suggested that "the attack at Risdon was the cause 
of all that happened afterwards." He gave evidence to the Aborigines Commit-
tee that the settlers at Risdon were "attacked suddenly and unprovokedly" by 
15 April 1830, CO 280/24, PRO Reel 244, pp. 427-429. 
24 Collins to King, 15 May 1804, HRA, III.1, p.238. 
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the Moomairremener who "wished to drive the whites out of the country." 25 
Regardless of this, Collins had his doubts about the band's hostile inten-
tions towards the settlers. Collins was naive neither about those who were 
reporting to him, nor the customs and behaviour of the Aborigines whom 
he was bound to protect. Certainly the inclusion of women .and children in 
the group indicated that they were probably in the area for a social gathering 
rather than a bloody confrontation. Nevertheless, upon receipt of reports from 
Moore and Collins, Governor King acknowledged that Moore was "compelled 
to fire on the natives, but I hope the measure you had in contemplation to gain 
their confidence has succeeded." After the settlement was moved to Sullivan's 
Cove in 1804, peace resumed again, though Aboriginal groups on the opposite 
shore continued to try to control the activities of colonists sent out to procure 
native game. 26 
Six months after the Risdon affray William Paterson was sent north to 
establish a settlement of 143 convicts and soldiers at Port Dalrymple on the 
Tamar River. Before Paterson's departure, King forwarded his orders to the 
25Evidence of James Kelly in Report of the Aborigines Committee in Arthur to Murray, 
15 April 1830, CO 280/24, PRO Reel 244, pp.420-424. 
26 Collins to King, 15 May 1804, HRA, IILl, pp.238-239, 242-243 & 281-282; Windschut-
tle, The Fabrication of Aboriginal History, pp.11-28; Ryan, The Aboriginal Tasmanians, 
p.75; 
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new lieutenant-governor. The instructions guiding relations with the Aborig-
ines were the same as those Collins had been sent upon receipt of his corn-
mission. Like Collins, Paterson was directed to conciliate the Aborigines and 
ensure, as far as he was capable, that settlement had as little impact on them 
as possible. 27 
Like the Moomairremener at Risdon Cove, the Leterremairrenener ·of Port 
Dalrymple did not immediately make contact. But when a group of about 
eighty finally visited Paterson's settlement the soldiers offered them gifts which 
they readily accepted. The Leterremairrenener tried to remove other articles 
from one of the soldier's tents, but when Paterson's men stopped them, they 
"retired peacably" [sic]. Paterson's hopes of a close acquaintance with them 
were soon dashed, however, when a group of Aborigines he supposed were from 
the same band returned to the settlement and, again, attempted to remove 
the contents of a tent belonging to a guard of marines. When the Aborigines 
threatened one of the sergeants, a marine shot at the group, killing one and 
wounding another. Paterson predicted that "this unfortunate circumstance I 
am fearful will be the cause of much mischief hereafter ... "28 
Paterson's subsequent instructions to his soldiers were very clear. He em-
phasised that they were to make efforts to encourage friendly contact with the 
27Instructions to W. Paterson, 1 June 1804, HRA, III.1, pp.590. 
28Paterson to King, 26 November 1804, HRA, III.1, pp.606-607. 
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Aborigines and under "penalty of the severest punishment" he warned them 
against any type of behaviour that would agitate them. Having been at Risdon 
Cove the previous year, Paterson and his solders were aware of what had tran-
' 
spired there. The difference with the Leterremairrenener, however, was that 
they already had a history with European sealers in the region. Brian Plom-
ley, thus, contends that the Port Dalrymple people seemed to have been more 
hostile than their southern counterparts. He suggests that their greater num-
bers, deeper encroachment by sealers into their hunting grounds and previous, 
often unfriendly, contact with these sealers, may have all been factors which 
predisposed the Leterremairrenener to be hostile and aggressive towards the 
Europeans.29 On the other hand, the few reports of contact between soldiers 
and Aboriginal groups that Paterson forwarded to Governor King over the 
next year indicates that those under Paterson's command apparently followed 
his instructions, for the meetings always ended amicably. 30 
3.2 Control, Competition and Collaboration 
In the years prior to George Arthur's arrival three colonial governors-David 
Collins, Thomas Davey and William Sorell-all made an impression on the 
29Plomley, Friendly Mission, p.23. 
30Paterson to King, 19 November 1804, 27 December 1804, 8 January 1805 & December 
1805 HRA, III.1, pp.609-610, 621, 629 & 649. 
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small colony of Van Diemen's Land. While in office each was forced to consider 
the burgeoning character of Aboriginal-settler relations. As greater numbers of 
Europeans encroached deeper into Aboriginal lands, each successive governor 
was required to pay closer attention to the interaction between the colonists 
and Aborigines. 
During Collins' tenure of Office, until his death in March 1810, there were 
relatively few encounters with Aboriginal groups, hostile or otherwise in the 
south, although the Risdon affray left an indelible mark on the early colonists. 
To the north, there was much more contact between Aboriginal and European 
groups because of the presence of sealers in the region. Though few con-
temporary records exist that chronicle the details of this contact, the sealers 
and Aborigines had developed an interdependence that dictated that contact 
remain frequent. 
In the south, on the other hand, it was decades before such a familiarity 
~! 
developed. For the most part when Aboriginal groups approached settlers 
it was in the outlying areas and for the purpose of controlling their hunting 
activities. The destruction that the hunters' dogs wreaked, however, was ap-
parently obvious from the start for the Aborigines did not hesitate to kill the 
creatures when they confronted hunting parties. 31 However, -it was four years 
31 Ironically, dogs later became very important to Aboriginal groups, who used them for 
protection against increasingly hostile colonists. Sometimes groups would have hundreds 
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Figure 3.3: 
J. W. Beattie's Col. David Collins, R.M. , Lieut.-Governor, 1896; Source: 
Allport Library and Museum of Fine Arts, State Library of Tasmania; image 
taken from http: //images.statelibrary.tas.gov.au. 
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Figure 3.4: 
J. W. Beattie's Col. Thos . Davey, R.M., Lieutenant Governor, 1896; Source: 
Allport Library and Museum of Fine Arts; image taken from 
http://images.statelibrary.tas.gov.au. 
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Figure 3.5: 
W. McCleod 's and J.W. Beattie 's Colonel Sorell., 1886 Source: Tasmanian 
Library, State Library of Tasmania; image taken from 
http: //images.statelibrary.tas.gov .au. 
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before a European was killed during one of these hostile encounters. 32 
In her article, "Culture Contact in the County of Buckinghamshire, Van 
Diemen's Land, 1803-11"33 historian, Marie Fels, argues that during the first 
decade hostilities between Aboriginal and settler groups were confined to corn-
petition for food resources. Even then it was not for another three years that 
the hunting of kangaroo by the settlers had a deleterious affect on the Abo-
riginal groups in the area. Settlers were forced to hunt kangaroo because 
administrative mismanagement and misfortune left the small colony close to 
starvation. The first and second hunting periods, which were carried out be-
tween September and December 1804, and July and October 1805, neverthe-
less, passed with little incident. 
The third hunting period, which lasted from April 1806 to March 1807, 
of dogs attached to their party; see for example, Plomley, AboriginalSettler Clash, pp.15, 
21, & 26; Hobart Town Gazette, 15 April 1828; Colonial Times, 4 May 1827; Arthur to 
Huskisson, 17 April 1828, HRA, III.7, pp.178184; Walpole to Arthur, 29 October 1830, 
CSO 1/324/7578, AOT Reel SLTX/AO/CS/117, no page numbers supplied; Hobart Town 
Courier, 29 May 1830; Plomley, Friendly Mission, pp.570-71; Report of the Aborigines 
Committee, 19 March 1830, in Arthur to Murray, 15 April 1830, CO 280/24, PRO Reel 244, 
p.435-453. 
32 An avid diarist, Reverend Knopwood providea the most comprehensive account of 
Aboriginal-settler contact during the earliest years of settlement in Van Diemen's Land; 
see M. Nicholls (ed), The Diary of the Reverend Knopwood, 1803-1838, First Chaplain of 
Van Diemen's Land (Hobart, 1977); Moore to Collins, 7 May 1804 in Collins to King, 20 
September 1803, HRA, III.1, pp.242-43. 
33M. Fels, "Culture Contact in the County of Buckinghamshire, Van Diemen's Land, 
1803-11", Tasmanian Historical Research Association, 29.2 (1982), pp.47-79. 
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finally produced some Aboriginal resentment as kangaroo stocks quickly dwin-
dled. Extreme weather conditions, exacerbated by Aboriginal firestick farm-
ing, drove the kangaroo inland. This forced the European hunters further 
afield and deeper into Aboriginal lands. Six conflicts were recorded, each in-
dicating that the Aborigines were attempting to deny the hunters their catch. 
Fels hypothesises that at this stage, "it appears to be not so much the presence 
of the invaders that Aborigines objected to, but the specific practice of taking 
food which they considered to be theirs." Fels concludes that, indeed, the first 
eight years of settlement were surprisingly peaceful given that competition for 
food had an almost immediate affect. 34 
Even with the presence of those three classes of colonists whom Arthur later 
pointed to as the main offenders against the Aborigines-the bushrangers, the 
convict stock keepers and the sealers-race relations remained relatively calm 
during the first two decades of settlement. This was the case because at this 
stage the activities of these groups did not threaten Aboriginal society and 
culture (though when violent encounters occurred they were often shocking 
enough to kindle enduring resentments in some bands). Fels notes that the 
bushrangers had the worst record of abuse. However, she argues that their very 
survival would have depended upon them remaining amicable with those tribes 
34M. Fels, "Culture Contact in the County of Buckinghamshire, Van Diemen's Land, 
1803-11"' pp.47-79. 
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with whom they would inevitably have come into contact. 35 Later reports, in-
deed, indicate that a number of bushrangers became intimately involved with 
Aboriginal groups and were actually aided in their cause by this association. 36 
As to the stock keepers, while they, too, gained reputations for their inhuman-
ity towards the Aborigines, in 1811 there were still too few of them to make 
a great impact. At that time only one stockyard, manned by a few convicts, 
had been established beyond New Norfolk. So, too, the small numbers of 
sealers operating in the south meant that .the impact of their presence on the 
southern bands would have been minimal. Moreover, generalisations about the 
bushrangers, stock keepers, 'and sealers seem to be unfairly damning given that 
none of these groups had the opportunity, even if they had the motivation, to 
inflict upon Aboriginal groups the violence and cruelty thought to have been 
carried out by them. 37 
Such was the peace that the colony enjoyed so that the early governors 
found few reasons to make reference to them in their correspondence with the 
Colonial Office. During his short sojourn Bowen reported that he had "not 
seen a single native yet." Those who had come across them found them "very 
shy and have since retired entirely from us." Bowen did not apprehend that 
35M. Fels, "Culture Contact in the County of Buckinghamshire, Van Diemen's Land, 
1803-11", pp.47-79. 
36see West, The History of Tasmania, p.625, fn.26. 
37Fels, "Culture Contact in the County of Buckinghamshire, Van Diemen's Land, 1803-
11"' pp.47-79. 
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"they would be of any use to us" and so dismissing the orders to " ... open 
an intercourse with the natives, and to conciliate their affections" he made no 
active efforts to seek them out, "thinking myself well off if I never see them 
again." 38 
Collins, too, had few problems after settlement was moved across the Der-
went River to Sullivan's Cove. Once settled on Mouhenemener land he had 
not "found the Natives of this part of New Holland inclined to come in our 
way ... at present we have not had any intercourse with them, which I do not 
much regret .... "39 Collins had been instructed by the Colonial Office that the 
colony should be settled in the "King's Peace", and that the Aborigines "and 
their property" should be treated and protected according to the same British 
laws that applied to the colonists. It was seven years, however, before Collins 
felt forced to publicly repeat these instructions. 40 
38Bowen to King, 20 September 1803, HRA, III.1, p.198; Orders to the New South Wales 
Governors, HRA, I.2, p.52. 
39Collins to King, 8 January 1805, HRA, III.1, p. 281; General Orders, 7 January 1805, 
HRA, III.1, p.529. 
40This does not suggest, however, that colonists were not alarmed by reports of Aboriginal 
attacks. Some were fully aware of continuing attempts by Aboriginal groups to control the 
movements and activities of the colonists. In 1807 Reverend Knopwood noted despairingly 
that the "natives have been very troublesome for a long time but not so desperate as 
lately ... The natives endeavour to keep the men and dogs in the vallies that they may throw 
stones at them which they do with great force and exactness." However, this demonstrates 
that continued attempts to control settler movements, rather than a desire to carry out 
acts of retribution against them, seems to have been the main focus of these Aboriginal 
activities; see General Orders, 7 January 1805, HRA, III.1, p.529; M. Nicholls (ed.), The 
Diary of the Reverend Robert Knopwood, 1803-1838, (Hobart, 1977), p.132; Report of the 
Aborigines Committee, 19 March 1830, in Arthur to Murray, 15 April 1830, CO 280/24, 
PRO Reel 244, p.435-453. 
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Indeed, not only did the Aborigines and settlers, for the most part, avoid 
hostile contact, some even managed to establish collaborative and cooperative 
arrangements for land and resource sharing. Beginning in 1808, an injection 
of settlers from Norfolk Island into the Coal River Valley, New Norfolk and 
Norfolk Plains saw settlement expand inland beyond the beachheads of Hobart 
Town and Port Dalrymple. At this stage, the number of convicts in the colony 
was still small and so labour was in high demand. Evidence exists that Abo-
riginal children were utilised occasionally as labourers, though no permanent 
or long term arrangements seem to have been secured.41 
Those who did form good relations with their Aboriginal neighbours found 
themselves in frequent contact with them. Mouheneenner and Moormair-
remener groups paid regular visits to Reverend Knopwood at both his Battery 
Point property, Cottage Green, and later his farm at Clarence Plains. Such 
was the regularity of their visits to Battery Point that in 1814 Knopwood was 
commissioned by Governor Davey to victual them with food supplies from the 
commissariat.M. Nicholls (ed), The Diary of the Reverend Knopwood, 1803-
1838, First Chaplain of Van Diemen's Land. 
For the Moormairremener Knopwood's residence on the eastern shore came 
41 see M. Monypenny, 'Going Out' and 'Coming In': Cooperation and Collaboration Be-
tween Aborigines and Europeans in Early Tasmania, unpublished Honours thesis, University 
of Tasmania, 1995; Ryan, The Aboriginal Tasmanians, Chapter 4. 
CHAPTER 3. FROM BLACK PEACE TO BLACK WAR 88 
to be regarded as a retreat. News of his generosity and goodwill reached other 
bands, too, who also made visits, camping at the bottom of his property 
and partaking of a variety of vegetables which Knopwood supplied from his 
extensive garden. His relationship with one group became so familiar that by 
1814 the clergyman was able to convince a number of young women to remain 
at his house long enough to have their portraits painted. 42 
While Knopwood was very aware of the worsening hostilities between the 
Aborigines and settlers, and maintained an active interest in the operations 
against them, still his relationship with the Moorairremener, in particular, re-
mained genuinely amicable. This may have been the case because Knopwood, 
even if unintentionally, had entered into a relationship with them that met 
all their criteria for equitable land and resource sharing. The trust that grew 
between them, thus, buffered their relationship against those hostilities that 
were developing around them. 
However, by 1814 some of these cooperative arrangements, especially those 
between the Aborigines and agriculturalists in the Coal River district, began 
to break down. In June that year Davey felt the need to publish a warning 
against the removal of Aboriginal children from their tribes: 
It having been intimated to the Lieutenant Governor that a very 
42M. Nicholls,(ed.), Diary of Robert Knopwood, pp.145, 182, 232 & 293-294; see also 
Mercury, 26 November 1874. 
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marked and decided hostility has lately been evinced by the natives 
in the neighbourhood of the Coal River in the attack they made 
upon the herds grazing in that district it is not without the most 
extreme concern he has learnt that the resentment of thes~ poor 
uncultivated beings, has been justly excited by a most barbarous 
and inhumane mode of proceedings acted upon towards them, viz, 
the robbery of their children!43 
Not everyone agreed with this interpretation. Many believed that by removing 
Aboriginal children from their families they were saving them from what would 
otherwise be their inevitable demise, that they were providing them with the 
opportunity to become civilised and Christianised.44 
Despite the efforts of the Aborigines to discourage such activities, forced 
removal of Aboriginal women and children from their bands developed as a 
theme of Aboriginal-settler relations. As early as 1806 Knopwood recorded the 
abduction of a child from Brown's River and even as late as 1830 settlers were 
43Report of the Aborigines Committee, 19 March 1830, in Arthur to Murray, 15 April 
1830, CO 280/24, PRO Reel 244, p.437. 
44In 1818 William Kermode of Hobart made an experiment of two Aboriginal boys who 
were found apparently abandoned outside New Norfolk. One of the boys died. The other, 
whom Kermode named George Van Diemen, was sent to England in 1821 to be educated. 
George remained in England until 1826 before he was sent back to Van Diemen's Land. 
Arthur, who by then was Governor of Van Diemen's Land, hoped that George, now a young 
man, could be employed as a government agent "especially with a view to the amelioration 
of his country men." Nothing came of the exercise, however, for George died in December 
1827; Plomley, Friendly Mission, pp. 475-476, fn. 278; Hay to Arthur, 14 March 1827 & 
Arthur to Hay, 14 March 1827, HRA, III.5. pp. 322-323 & p.607; 
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seeking permission from the colonial government to attach Aboriginal children 
to their households. 45 The sealers had long been accused of stealing women 
from coastal tribes and according to Ryan by 1817 at least fifty Aboriginal 
children were living with outlying settlers.46 
The removal of children became such a serious issue that by March 1819, 
Davey's successor, William Sorell, felt forced to act. He ordered the district 
constables in Pitt Water and the Coal River Valley to take an account of the 
number of children living with European families. In a public proclamation, he 
forbade the settlers from taking Aboriginal children into their homes, except 
if given specific permission by the parents. Those children who were found 
in th~ custody of colonists who could not justify their actions, he announced, 
would be removed to the "native" institution in Hobart Town.47 
45The roving party leader, John Batman, sought permission from Governor Arthur to 
adopt an Aboriginal boy who had been left behind after a bungled attempt to capture a 
Ben Lamond band. The boy was later baptised as Ben Lamond; see Nicholls, The Diary of 
the Reverend Robert Knopwood, p.99. 
46Ryan, The Aboriginal Tasmanians, p. 79. 
47Government Order, 15March1819, Hobart Town Gazette; L. Ryan, The Aboriginal Tas-
manians, p.78; Report of the Aborigines Committee, 19 March 1830, in Arthur to Murray, 
15 April 1830, CO 280/24, PRO Reel 244, p.438; Plomley, Friendly Mission, p.41. 
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3.3 Economic Development & Aboriginal Dis-
. possession 
The ability of both the Aborigines and settlers to accept and adapt to each 
another's presence in the early years was due primarily to the fact that for the 
first two decades the population and spread of settlement remained limited. 
Though the arrival of the Lady Nelson in September 1803 followed by the Cal-
cutta and her supply ship, the Ocean in February 1804 marked the permanent 
invasion of Aboriginal Tasmania, in January 1805 there were still less than 500 
Europeans in the small colony. The arrival of 700 Norfolk Island expatriates in 
1807 and 1808 changed this. In 1810 a further 1,100 colonists arrived in Van 
Diemen's Land and the arrival of the Indefatigable in 1812 injected 200 more 
convicts into the colony. In 1814 the population of Van Diemen's Land was 
still just under 2,000. By 1823 it had grown to over 10,000. Up until Sorell's 
departure from office in April 1824 the landing of twenty-nine convict ships 
brought another 4,177 prisoners to the island. As to the Aboriginal popula-
tion, contemporary statisticians estimated that at settlement they numbered 
around 7,000, though modern scholars conjecture that their numbers ranged 
anywhere from 4,000 to over 20,000.48 
48Ryan, The Aboriginal Tasmanians, pp.xx, xxii & 73-82; L. Robson, A History of Tasma-
nia, v.1 (Melbourne, 1983), pp.32-44; Statistical Returns of Van Diemen's Land or Tasmania 
from the Date of its First Occupation by the British Nation in 1804 to the End of the Year 
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During the first fifteen years of settlement the economy was supported by a 
mix of agricultural and pastoral activities. Most of the produce and livestock 
was supplied to the Colonial Government for victualling. The agricultural 
industries developed in those districts where the Norfolk Islanders had settled. 
Produce such as wheat, barley, peas, and potatoes49 were listed in the early 
statistical returns. Livestock reared in the colony included horses, cattle and 
sheep.50 
Pastoralism, however, soon replaced agriculturalism as Van Diemen's Land's 
most lucrative industry. An ideal climate, good grazing conditions, compara-
tively low costs and an abundance of land, allowed the industry to grow with 
relative ease. Soon Tasmanian wool became one of the most prized wools on 
the international market. 51 
1823 (Hobart, 1856), pp.3-11; West, The History of Tasmania, pp.29-78; R.M. Hartwell, The 
Economic Development of Van Diemen's Land, 1820-1850 (Melbourne, 1954), pp.31-54; C. 
Bateson, The Convict Ships, 1787-1868 (Glasgow, 1959), pp.306-321 & 326-329. 
49The harvesting of potatoes is of significance to the Aboriginal-settler story of Van 
Diemen's Land for various Aboriginal groups came to rely on the vegetable-a rich source 
of carbohydrates-as a staple, their traditional food sources having dwindled. 
50Robson, A History of Tasmania, pp.68-77; Ryan, The Aboriginal Tasmanians, 78; H. 
Hull, Statistical Survey of Tasmania from the Years 1816 to 1865, Inclusive (Hobart, 1866). 
51 The decline of the British wool-producing industries, combmed with an increase the 
quality and quantity in Germany's wool output led England's markets to falter. When 
Britain discovered that New South Wales and Van Diemen's Land were producing wool 
of equal, if not better, quality, than Germany, it reduced the duties on colonial imports 
and the German market was thus thwarted. By 1830 the Australian colonies led the world 
in its wool production. In the year Sorell left office 17,160 pounds of wool was exported 
to Britain and Europe; see Hartwell, The Economic Development of Van Diemen's Land, 
pp.31-54; Statistical Returns of Van Diemen's Land or Tasmania ... , pp.3-11; S. Roberts, 
The Squatting Age in Australia, 1835-1847 (Melbourne, 1975), pp.35-48; see also H. Carter, 
His Majesty's Spanish Flock: Sir Joseph Banks and the Merinos of George III of England 
(London, 1964). 
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With the growth of the pastoral industry came a change in nature of land 
alienation and utilisation. While the agriculturalists had taken up relatively 
small plots along the major water courses, the graziers moved further afield, 
establishing sheep runs throughout the midlands region. The agriculturalists 
were able to farm their relatively small plots of land intensively. The pas-
toralists, on the other hand, required much larger grants for their flocks. The 
majority of these grants were located throughout the central plateau. These 
undulating and grassy plains were the lands that the midlands bands had spent 
millennia establishing as kangaroo pastures. 52 
By 1820 Van Diemen's Land had close to 200,000 sheep. These kangaroo 
pastures, which provided the Aborigines with their main meat source were 
fundamentally altered by the introduction of such large numbers of sheep. 
Historians have variously viewed the development of pastoralism as facilitat-
ing both the rise and decline in the kangaroo population. Plomley argues 
that the establishment of farms and sheep runs would have caused a decline 
in kangaroo numbers, as the animals were dispossessed of their natural graz-
ing lands. Windschuttle, conversely, maintains that, if anything, the evidence 
indicates that British farming and grazing practises encouraged an increase 
52Hartwell, The Economic Development of Van Diemen's Land, pp.53-55; G. Frankland, 
Report on the Transactions of the Survey Department of Van Diemen's Land, from the 
Foundations of the Colony to the end of Colonel Arthur's Administration (Hobart, 1837), 
p.4. 
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in the population of native game. 53 Whether or not kangaroo numbers in-
creased or decreased, Aboriginal society was, nonetheless, disrupted by the 
development of land-based British industries. Because no other industries or 
institutions developed that allowed for the incorporation of Aboriginal groups, 
there existed few opportunities for them to adapt to the loss of access to their 
traditional lands. 
To be sure, the early agriculturalists employed Aboriginal labourers to farm 
their plots, but it was a piecemeal affair that often resulted in conflict rather 
than conciliation. No evidence exists that Aboriginal groups were systemati-
cally employed as agriculturalists and those who were recruited tended to be 
youths. With the influx of cheap and plentiful convict labour from Norfolk Is-
land future incorporation of Aboriginal groups into the agricultural industries 
was not again attempted. 54 
The sealers on the other hand effectively incorporated the Aborigines into 
53Plomley, Aboriginal/Settler Clash, p.18; Windschuttle, The Fabrication of Aboriginal 
History, pp.87-95. 
540ther experiments with employing Aboriginal labour also proved unviable in the long 
term. Edward Curr, who was an agent for the London-based Van Diemen's Land Company-
a pastoral company established in the north west of the colony-employed a number of young 
Aboriginal men as shepherds in 1830 when he found convict labour in short supply. This 
was a time, however, when hostilities were at their height and the Aboriginal and convict 
labour classes had grown very wary of one another. The youths stayed only briefly, likely 
feeling threatened and harassed by the convict stock keepers. See Plomley, Friendly Mission, 
pp.234. 
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their industries. Just as Native American labour became essential to the Span-
ish and British industries in north America, Aboriginal labour, especially fe-
male labour, became an integral part of the sealing, and later the mutton-
birding, industries in the Bass Strait communities. In the southern colonies 
of north America the Spanish utilised native labour in their mining and agri-
cultural industries. As with the Bass Strait sealers, many Spanish colonists 
took Native American women as wives or sexual partners, which also served 
to strengthen the ties between European and native groups. In the northern 
British colonies economic interdependence came in the form of trading al-
liances. As Britain struggled to maintain its political dominance over France 
in the region, trad~ with Native American groups was encouraged. Fur was 
the primary commodity traded. 55 
However, when private traders turned to illegal or fraudulent means to 
increase their profits, relations with their Native American trading partners 
often soured. Moreover, as interaction between the two groups became in-
creasingly intimate the Native American groups inevitably suffered as their 
cultural, social, political and economic traditions gave way to new European 
ones. Nevertheless, in the longer term, trade led to a greater incorporation of 
the two societies and as Native American groups adapted to new 'Yays they 
55J.P. Prucha, The Great Father, pp.11-21. 
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gained enough political and economical strength that Britain found it neces-
sary to recognise their tribal sovereignty so as to maintain their allegiances. 56 
In Van Diemen's Land proper no such opportunities for this style of inter-
dependence came to exist and, as a consequence, as race relations began to 
decline, so too did the colonial policy-makers' estimation of the value of such 
interaction with the Aboriginal groups. 
The year Sorell took office was a critical one in the decline of race relations 
in Van Diemen's Land. Ryan notes that there was a short lull during the 
middle of the decade because the Aboriginal groups who were most adversely 
affected by agriculturalism had disbanded, but by 1817 those who remained 
had formed loose alliances with one another and were joined by a number of 
Aborigines who had fled their white custodians.57 These groups came to be 
known by contemporary commentators as "tame mobs" and two of the most 
notorious members of these fraternities were Musquito and Black Tom. 
Musquito had originally been a member of the Broken Bay tribe in Sydney 
but, suspected of murdering several tribeswomen, was sent to Norfolk Island. 
Musquito was taken to Van Diemen's Land in 1813, probably with a group of 
Norfolk Island expatriates, and employed as a stockman and tracker against 
56J.P. Prucha, The Great Father, pp.11-21. 
57Ryan, The Aboriginal Tasmanians, p. 79. 
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the bushrangers. When he was not returned to Sydney as promised, he escaped 
and joined a band in the Oyster Bay region. Black Tom, likewise, had lived 
with Tom and Sarah Birch at Lovely Banks after having been taken from his 
people as a child. As a young adult he fled and joined Musquito.58 Nineteenth 
century historian, James Fenton described Musquito and Black Tom thus: 
... [They] had lived for many years with the English, acquiring a 
perfect knowledge of their ways, and becoming familiar with their 
language and household arrangements, again joined their coun-
trymen when they heard of the slaughter of their relatives. The 
natives, knowing thyir enemy so well, proved formidable foes .... 59 
Musquito and Black Tom now affiliated with the tame mobs, the Aboriginal 
bands of the east were in a position to begin in earnest their campaign to 
resist white settlement, though because of the nature of their guerrilla-style 
warfare, it would be a number of years before this would become apparent to 
the colonial administration. 60 
58For details of Black Tom's life and activities see Colonial Times, 10 & 17 November, 1 
December 1826, 20 April, 17 November 1827, 27September1828, Tasmanian and Australasi-
atic Review, 21 November 1828; James Ross to Simpson, 22 June 1828, CSO 1/316/7578, 
AOT Reel SLTX/AO/CS/114, pp.141-142. 
59J. Fenton, A History of Tasmania from its Discovery in 1642 to the Present Time 
(Hobart, 1884), p.102. 
60West, The History of Tasmania, pp. 267-8; Melville, The History of the Island of Van 
Diemen's Land, pp. 32-40; Report of the Aborigines Committee, 19 March 1830, in Arthur 
to Murray, 15 April 1830, CO 280/24, PRO Reel 244, p. 411 & 416; Plomley, Friendly 
Mission, pp.314-15; Ryan, The Aboriginal Tasmanians, p.101. 
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Though, during his time in office, Sorell did not predict what was to come, 
perceiving that Aboriginal-settler hostilities would remain confined by the 
piecemeal contact between the two groups, he was, nonetheless, not unaware of 
the potential for hostilities to spread and intensify. Two years into his tenure 
he issued a proclamation to the colony. He spoke about the long and sustained 
history of settler violence against Aboriginal groups. Though he did not fore-
see that war was imminent, he did prophetically warn the settlers that it was a 
very real possibility that the Aborigines would coordinate their efforts against 
them if the nature of race relations did not change. 61 The potential for worsen-
ing hostilities, Sorell admitted, had developed in large part from the "extension 
of the grazing grounds, and progressive occupation of the country" which he, 
nevertheless, had no intention of limiting. The governor, instead, called upon 
the colony to avoid, where possible, violent encounters and, more specifically, 
he forbade settlers from removing Aboriginal children from their families. To 
this end, Sorell felt that if harmony between the Aborigines and settlers could 
be fostered then the Aborigines could be conciliated, their acrimony assuaged; 
and the expansion of settlement could continue without interruption. 62 
61see Chapter 4 for a discussion of the Aboriginal-settler conflict in Van Diemen's Land 
that did, indeed, develop into war. 
62Government Order, 13 March 1819, Hobart Town Gazette; L. Mickleborough, Colonel 
William Sorell, Lieutenant-Governor of Van Diemen's Land 1817-1824: An Examination 
of His Convict System and Establishment of Free Settlement, unpublished Master of Arts 
thesis, University of Tasmania, (Hobart, 2002), p.189. 
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Consequently, wishing to encourage continued economic growth Sorell ac-
tively promoted the further development of the pastoral industries by liberally 
granting land. In the words of historian R.W. Giblin: "the man with some 
capital, apparent ability to use it wisely, and desirous of obtaining wide areas 
for his purposes, seldom applied in vain to the Minister." In the year preceding 
his untimely departure Sorell approved grants totalling nearly half a million 
acres of Van Diemen's Land most valuable grazing lands. 63 This was more 
than the combined total acreage granted since European settlement and, in-
deed, the largest amount ever granted in one single year in the history of Van 
Diemen's Land's. Arthur, who continued in Sorell's wake, managed to alienate 
less than 300,000 acres over four years between 1824 anq 1828.64 
Land was alienated by other means as well. Grazing leases and tickets 
63Such was Sorell's success that Giblin described the years immediately before his depar-
ture, as "the new era." Giblin claimed that these years "were the most important in the 
growth of the colony,'' A group of prominent settlers petitioning London for Van Diemen's 
Land's separation from New South Wales described the affiuence enjoyed during Sorell's 
administration: "[T]he increased tide of emigration, so wisely directed to its shores by Your 
Majesty's ministers, and bringing along with it so considerable an influx of capital, has 
infused an active spirit of agriculture and pastoral improvement, has enlarged the facili-
ties of trade, and stimulated commercial enterprise, and must necessarily tend to the rapid 
development of the great natural resources of the country;" see Giblin, The Early History 
of Tasmania, p.331 & 363; Memorial to His Majesty the King soliciting separation from 
government of New South Wales, 26 November 1824, HRA, III.4, p.579. 
64Giblin, The Early History of Tasmania, p.331; Memorial to His Majesty the King so-
liciting separation from government of New South Wales, 26 November 1824, HRA, III.4, 
p.579; S. Morgan, Land Settlement in Early Tasmania: Creating an Antipodean England 
(Cambridge, 1992), pp.165-169; P. Scott, "Land Settlement" in J.L. Davies (ed.), Atlas of 
Tasmania, (Hobart, 1965), pp.43-45; T. McKay (ed.), Index to Early Land Grants, VDL, 
1804-1823 (Hobart, 1994), pp.1-30; G. Frankland, Report on the Transactions of the Sur-
vey Department of Van Diemen's Land, from the Foundations of the Colony to the end of 
Colonel Arthur's Administration; Robson, A History of Tasmania, pp.106-118. 
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of occupation were issued to both free settlers and ticket-of-leave convicts 
who could demonstrate an ability and willingness to develop the land. In the 
earlier times when land was still plentiful it was a common practise by the 
agriculturalists to utilise plots adjacent to their own grants: While they grew 
their crops close to the river, on the lands behind the rivers, usually at the 
base of hills or mountains, they grazed their stock. The haphazard method 
by which boundaries were plotted and land claimed, and a poor system of 
recording claims meant that much more land was being utilised than officially 
recorded. 65 The consequences, then, for Aboriginal groups affected, was that 
these land alienation processes effectively set in stone their dispossession, even 
before it could be plotted on a map. 
Contemporary historian and newspaper editor, Henry Melville, described 
the state of affairs facing Arthur on his arrival, and some effects of this affluence 
on Aboriginal society: 
In this year [1824] the Aborigines of the island began to annoy the 
settlers to a degree that required some active measures of the Gov-
ernment to allay the outraged feelings of this ill-fated race of human 
beings. These poor bewildered creatures had been treated worse 
than were any of the American tribes by the Spaniards. Easy, 
65 R.M. Hartwell, The Economic Development of Van Diemen's Land, 1820-1850 (Mel-
bourne, 1954), p.54. 
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quiet, good-natured, and well-disposed towards the white-popula-
tions, they could no longer brook the treatment they received from 
the invaders of their country. Their hunting grounds were taken 
from them, and they themselves were driven like trespassers from 
the favorite [sic] spots for which their ancestors had bled, and had 
claimed by conquest ... In self-defence were these poor, harmless 
creatures driven to desperate means, their fine kangaroo grounds 
were taken from them, and thus they were in want of their custom-
ary food; and when every other means of obtaining a livelihood was 
debarred to them, necessity compelled them to seek food of their 
despoilers. 66 
Modern scholars perusing contemporary sources might be apt to compre-
hend that a "black peace" seemed to last until around 1823. The failure of the 
early governors to keep comprehensive records, combined with the absence of 
a colonial press (the Hobart Town Gazette and Southern Reporter only went to 
press in June 1816) meant that news and events were not recorded in the fre-
quency nor the detail which later became the norm, especially during Arthur's 
tenure. Consequently, with regard to Aboriginal-settler relations, one can 
only speculate upon their nature and frequency. Presumably the government 
66H. Melville, The History of the Island of Van Diemen's Land, from the Year 1824 to 
1835 Inclusive (London, 1835), pp.23-24. 
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orders and proclamations reflected a little. However, there would certainly 
have been much that was not reported to the colonial authorities. The lack 
of evidence of hostilities, thus, might suggest that the colony was enjoying 
peace. Indeed, the fact that Commissioner, John Thomas Bigge, reporting 
on the state of affairs in Van Diemen's Land in 1823 felt "there is not reason 
to presume that the black natives are numerous, or that they will [pose] any 
serious resistance to the extension of future settlements," demonstrates just 
this. 67 On the other hand, by 1823, the newspapers that were in operation 
were reporting the activities of Aboriginal groups now active throughout the 
pastoral districts, and the colonists had even come to know something of the 
Sydney Aborigine, Musquito, who led many of the raiding missions. A brief 
reference by Arthur to their activities shortly after his arrival in 1824 suggests 
that the new governor was certainly aware of the dangers that these groups 
potentially posed. In a letter to the Colonial Office, he noted in passing that, 
of late "the fears of the settlers have been much, and certainly justly excited 
by the late unusual hostile proceedings of the natives." Perceptive as Arthur 
was, however, it is unlikely that at this stage he could have predicted war.68 
Nonetheless, the conditions for war were ripe. So little was gleaned of 
Aboriginal society or culture during the first two decades that most colonists 
67J. T. Bigge, Report on Agriculture and Trade in New South Wales, p.83. 
68West, The History of Tasmania, pp.48, 563; Plomley, Aboriginal/Settler Clash in Van 
Diemen's Land; Arthur to Bathurst, 15 August 1824, HRA, III.4, p.162. 
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simply could not comprehend a people so very different from themselves. Con-
sequently, interaction when it occurred was fraught with uncertainty. Uncer-
tainty developed into fear which then evolved into hostility, and eventually 
deep and enduring acrimony. When amicable relations between colonists and 
Aboriginal group were established, they were piecemeal affairs that did not 
develop into permanent relationships. Furthermore, so self-sufficient was this 
convict colony that the need to permanently incorporate Aboriginal labour 
into the European industries that had been transplanted into Van Diemen's 
never arose. Moreover, there was no need to establish political relations with 
Aboriginal tribes because there were no foreign rivals to threaten Britain's 
claim to the colony. As a result, the Aborigines of Van Diemen's Land found 
themselves dispossessed of their lands and livelihood, yet unable to secure an 
alternative means of subsistence. Ultimately, this meant that it would only be 
a matter of time before those Aboriginal groups which had survived the first 
two decades of European colonisation began to resist it, rather than continue 
the futile attempt to adapt to it. 
_Chapter 4 
"The Quarrel of the Natives 
with the Europeans" 
The species of warfare which we are carrying out with [the Abo-
rigines] is of the most distressing nature: they suddenly appear, 
commit some act of outrage and then as suddenly vanish: if pur-
sued it seems impossible to surround and capture them .... '1 
When George Arthur assumed governorship of Van Diemen's Land in 1824 
he was about to face an insurgency which even a veteran soldier like himself 
could not have anticipated. The Aboriginal crisis of 1824-1831 was a campaign 
1Title quote: Arthur to Goderich, 10 January 1828, Historical Records of Australia, 
Resumed Series III.7, p.27; "species" quote: Arthur to Murray, 12 September 1829, HRA, 
Resumed Series III.8, pp.607-609. 
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against the settlers of the midlands and east coast defined by guerrilla tactics 
involving clandestine 'hit-and-run attacks'. British military responses, for the 
most part, 'combined traditional confrontation with similar attack-and-retreat 
strategies. By utilising this style of warfare Aboriginal guerrilla groups, despite 
diminished numbers and inferior weaponry, were able to endure for nearly a 
decade. 
This chapter will consider the nature of the guerrilla insurgency, conclud-
ing with a discussion of Arthur's experiences with this very different style of 
warfare. Theories of "just war" will be discussed to demonstrate how and why 
many people, both Aboriginal and European, felt that the Aborigines were 
justified in their destructive and deadly campaign against the colonists. How 
the Tasmanian Aborigines utilised guerrilla tactics will then be considered in 
order to show the very real threat that the Aborigines posed if not to coloni-
sation as a whole then, at least, to those Vandemonians who found themselves 
the target of Aboriginal hostilities. The phases through which the war pro-
gressed will then be reviewed to highlight the the changing motives of, and 
strategies employed by, the guerillas the guerrillas as their numbers dwindled 
and their campaign weakened. Finally Arthur's knowledge of guerrilla warfare 
gleaned from the experiences of Wellington against Napoleon in the Iberian 
Peninsula as well as his own with the bushrangers of Van Diemen's Land will 
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be discussed to place into perspective how his early experiences would guide 
his formulation of Aboriginal policies when it came time for decisive measures 
to be taken. 
4.1 Theories of Just War · 
Many prominent settlers in Van Diemen's Land in the 1820s and· 1830s were 
sympathetic to the plight of the Aborigines and their efforts against European 
encroachment onto their lands. Theirs was a campaign, these colonists felt, 
that was justified and legitimised by theories of how and why war could be 
fought, formulated by international jurists. Of particular note is the sixteenth 
century, scholar, jurist and statesman, Hugo Grotius, who came to be known 
throughout European intellectual circles for his theories of "just war". 2 
Grotius formulated theories of international relations that established a 
context for the development of an "international society." Known as the "father 
of international law", Grotius espoused the idea that nations are bound by 
morally defined values that guide their interaction with one another.3 Grotius 
recognised that he was theorising about a set of European nations, with their 
own specific moral and religious codes. Subsequently, he took care to outline 
2 
"Hugo Grotius" entry, Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy (London, 1998), p.185. 
3H. Bull, B. Kingsbury & A. Roberts (eds.), Hugo Grotius and International Relations 
(Oxford, 1990), pp.1-64; 'Hugo Grotius' entry, Routledge Encyclopedza of Philosophy (Lon-
don, 1998), p.185; "Hugo Grotius - Restatement of the Just Wa:r Doctrine", Peace Research 
Reviews (September 1978), pp.30-33. 
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the place of non-European nations and specifically native groups (especially 
those with whom European nations might come into contact) in relation to 
the European world. 
Grotius held that discovery did not negate the property rights of native 
groups. Regardless of the fact that they might be infidels, the land over which 
they presided was their own property and European powers making claims 
to these lands could not do so on the principle that the land was without a 
sovereign.4 One will recall that three centuries later Baudin drew precisely the 
same conclusions when he denounced the actions of Governor King in claim-
ing Van Diemen's Land as a British territory. (Indeed, Baudin felt that the 
injustices of the British actions were worsened by the fact that the Aborig-
ines of Australia, who it was long presumed by others were wicked, witless 
and lacking in religion, "have not always deserved the title of savages ... which 
has been given them .... "5) Grotius argued, then, that native peoples held the 
same rights to utilise the processes of war and peace to protect their prop-
erty (though he also recognised that how these rights should be upheld was 
subject to their own systems of law and order). To be sure, Christians and 
non-Christians, alike, if they were to go to war to protect their property rights, 
4Bull, Kingsbury & Roberts (eds.), Hugo Orotius and International Relations, p.45. 
5Baudin to King, 23 December 1802, Historical Records of New South Wales, 5, p.830. 
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were both bound to a set of morals and values-their rules of war-that de-
fined how they were to utilise violence and aggression to protect their rights. 
Grotius argued that war should only be utilised to achieve peace. He recog-
nised tbat there are basic natural rights to which every nation is entitled and 
that in the absence of a supra-national authority, war is often the only means 
to uphold these rights. Grotius felt that only three conditions justified the use 
of war: a nation could go to war to defend itself against another power; it could 
go to war to recover property; or it could go to war to inflict punishment. 6 
Ultimately, then, in line with Grotius' formula, a number of historians, both 
contemporary and modern, came to recognise that the Tasmanian guerrillas 
were justified in their war against the settlers. 
4.2 The Tasmanian Guerrillas 
The word "guerrilla" became a part of the English language in the first decade 
of the nineteenth century. It came into existence during the Napoleonic wars 
after the Duke of Wellington, in alliance with Spain and employing Spanish 
6H. Bull, B. Kingsbury & A. Roberts (eds.), Hugo Grotius and International Relations, 
pp.1-64; "Hugo Grotius" entry, Routledge Encyclopedza of Philosophy, p.185; "Hugo Grotius 
-Restatement of the Just War Doctrine", Peace Research Reviews (September 1978), pp.30-
33. 
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"guerrillas", successfully drove Napoleon's army out of the Iberian Peninsula.7 
The Oxford English Dictionary defines "guerrilla" warfare as "an irregular 
war carried on by small bodies of men acting independently." 8 The Macquarie 
Concise Dictionary more specifically defines "guerrilla" as "a member of a 
small, independent band of soldiers which harasses the enemy by surprise 
raids, attacks on communications and supply lines, etc .... " 9 Contemporary 
Tasmanian historian, Henry Melville, certainly saw the Aboriginal-settler clash 
as a guerrilla war. He charged the Aborigines, bushrangers and Arthur's own 
civilian roving parties with having carried out guerrilla campaigns. Henry 
Reynolds maintains that, indeed, these guerrilla campaigns had the significant 
effect of holding back frontier settlement.10 
Conversely, Keith Windschuttle argues that what occurred in Van Diemen's 
Land was not a guerrilla war because the Aborigines were not politically nor 
militarily organised (though Secretary of State, Earl Bathurst, certainly under-
stood that Aboriginal groups were capable of organising themselves politically 
and militarily and, indeed, as early as 1825 directed that Governors Darling 
7For a general discussion of the history, methods and aims of guerrilla warfare see L 
Gann, Guerrillas in History (Stanford, 1971), pp.2-3 & A.J. Joes, Guerrilla Warfare: A 
Historical, Biographical and Bibliographic Sourcebook (Westport, 1996). 
8 Oxford English Dictionary definitions: guerre: war; guerrilla, guerilla: 'diminutive of 
guerra war; Wellington specifically used the term in 1809 when he noted, "I have recom-
mended to the Junta to set ... the Guerrillas to work towards Madrid" (The Oxford English 
Dictionary (Oxford, 1989), p.923). 
9 The Macquarie Concise Dictionary, (Sydney, 1998), p.425. 
10Melville, The History of Van Diemen's Land; H. Reynolds, "The Black War: A New 
Look at an Old Story", THRA, Papers and Proceedings, 31.4, pp.1-8. 
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and Arthur "repel [their] aggressions ... as if they proceeded from subjects of an 
accredited state." 11 ) The Aborigines, Windschuttle claims, were merely raiders 
and looters looking to pilfer and murder for revenge. Moreover, they were not 
guerrilla combatants, he holds, because their raids were not made on enemy 
troops but on civilians and those carrying out the attacks were operating in ter-
ritories to which they had no "cultural, linguistic, tribal or kinship connections 
of any kind ... " Windschuttle states, the " ... Aborigines never developed any 
of the forms of organisation, command, strategy, intelligence or weapons sup-
ply that have been associated with genuine guerrilla warfare in other countries 
over the past two hundred years." He contends that the guerrilla warfare thesis 
is nothing more than an attempt by orthodox historians to impose "concepts 
derived from the political structure of the modern world ... with no cultural 
filter of any kind, onto the mental universe of a hunter-gatherer people." 12 
However, in proposing such an argument, Windschuttle has, himself, failed 
to consider the guerilla warfare thesis through a cultural filter. He has focused 
on the methods and motivations of European guerrilla warfare, rather than 
considering how and why it was utilised by native groups throughout history. 
It is true that the Tasmanian Aborigines most likely did not "spontaneously 
11 Arthur to Murray, 4 November 1828, HRA, III. 7, p.628. 
12K. Windschuttle, The Fabrication of Aboriginal History, p.102-103. 
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adopt ... a form of combat that was not a part of their existing cultural reper-
toire ... " as he has accused the "orthodox historians of Tasmania" of claiming. 
Rather they adopted a form of combat, with its associated organisation and 
strategies, that came naturally to small, mobile bands. 13 
Windschuttle argues that one of the reasons that those who led the hit and 
run attacks could not be considered leaders of a resistance guerrilla movement 
was because they were not members of the tribe that they were leading. How-
ever, others who have studied aboriginal military systems have shown that not 
all guerrilla leaders were necessarily tribal leaders. In his work, The Skulking 
Way of War, Patrick Malone considers the use of guerrilla tactics by native 
Americans during the early seventeenth century. Often-times native guerrilla 
warfare involved the formation of temporary alliances between tribes. The 
leader of the allied bands was usually a sachem whose authority was in effect 
only as long as it took to carry out their campaign. Their leadership was of-
ten temporary and heredity tended to play no part in the assumption of their 
new role. Their authority was determined primarily by the extent to which 
they could glean support from members of the tribe or tribes. 14 Leadership of 
Aboriginal guerrilla groups in Van Diemen's Land devolved to figures such as 
13The Tasmanian Aborigines employed just such guerrilla tactics, possibly because, as 
military historian Lewis Gann, speaking generally of this style of warfare, argues, "they come 
easily to ... nomadic people who lack the means to raise regular armies;" see Gann, Guerrillas 
in History, pp.2-3. 
14P. Malone, The Skulking Way of War (Baltimore, 1993), pp.9-32. 
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Musquito and Black Tom in a similar fashion, whose knowledge of white ways 
made them natural choices to lead the resistance campaign. 
Windschuttle also maintains that the Tasmanian Aborigines could not be 
considered guerillas because they lacked military organisation. Again, Wind-
schuttle takes too narrow a view of this style of warfare. He misses the point 
that one of the primary characteristics of this type of warfare is the limited 
goals of the hit and run assaults. The goal was to attack, ambush and then 
retreat very quickly. That there may have been no geographic pattern to their 
attacks did not mean that they were not militarily organised, just that they 
chose their targets based on different criteria. 
Moreover, Windschuttle's argument that this could not be considered war-
fare because the Aborigines targeted settlers rather than troops indicates that 
he misses a second important point-that settlers and settlement were the 
enemy. It was the outlying settlers, as Arthur himself lamented, who inflicted 
the most violence and bloodshed on the Aborigines. So retribution was due 
to those who caused the injury or who were associated with the cause of in-
jury, be they troops, convicts or free settlers. A closer perusal of the events of 
the Aboriginal-settler clash in Van Diemen's Land indicates that the Aborig-
ines of the midlands and east coast were, indeed, involved in guerrilla warfare 
which was so successful that the British troops, themselves, came to realise 
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the effectiveness of employing this style of battle.15 
Military historians and strategists have determined that a central aim of 
any guerrilla campaign tends to be the removal of an intruder from one's 
territory. Certainly this appears to have been one of the main aims of the 
Aborigines of Van Diemen's Land, though revenge, retribution and later, pro-
curement of food, were also important goals of the war. 
Many settlers understood that they were fighting over territory. In 1827 
residents along the Macquarie and Elizabeth Rivers lamented that "the mur-
ders that [the Aborigines] have committed are not so much the pursuit_ of 
private revenge as of a plan reconciled by them as a native for the extirpa-
tion of the white inhabitants with whom they doubtless consider themselves 
at war." 16 As late as February 1830, a land owner in the Clyde district, Isaac 
Sherwin, was told in no uncertain terms of his trespass. A group who had at-
tacked his property stood on an elevated rock on the opposite side of the river 
and cried, "parrawar! parrawar! go away you white buggers, what business 
have you here?" Settlers in the district certainly perceived that the Aborigines 
"viewed us as the intruders ... "17 
15See Chapter 5 for a discussion of Arthur's use of guerrilla tactics during the Aboriginal-
settler clash. 
16Memonalists to Arthur, 20 November 1827, CSO 1/316/7578, AOT Reel 
SLTX/AO/CS/114, pp. 72-75. 
17Plomley has determined that "parrawar" means 'throw', 'get away', 'go away'; seeN.J.B. 
Plomley, A Word-List of the Tasmanian Aboriginal Languages (Launceston, 1976); Sherwin 
to Arthur, 23 & 27 February 1830, CSO 1/316/7578, AOT Reel SLTX/AO/CS/114, pp. 
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The effectiveness of the Aboriginal campaigns led some to believe that 
they would, indeed, be forced from their grants. In November 1827 northern 
residents reported to Arthur that the alarm which had been created in the 
Launceston and Norfolk Plains districts threatened to cause the "abandonment 
of such property as is not in the immediate vicinity of an armed force .... " By 
1830, Bothwell Division Constable, Humphrey Howells, had concluded that 
the Aborigines were "the common enemy to civilisation." 18 
In response to declining numbers and the increasingly forceful counter-
measures of the colonial government, the aims of the guerrilla insurgents 
changed throughout the Aboriginal crisis. However the primary tactic they 
employed to attempt to achieve their goals remained consistent. Aboriginal 
groups used the element of surprise as the main tool in their arsenal against 
the enemy. They would make a hit-and-run attack on a property and/or its 
residents, quickly retreating into the wilderness so as to avoid a counter-attack. 
In February 1828 a horse belonging to a convict servant at St. Patrick's Plains 
was speared. It was reported that "no sooner had they perpetrated this act 
of cruelty than the natives fled (and were not seen either before or after the 
act)" .19 In September 1830 George Scott's house on the Upper Macquarie 
430-433 & 438-443. 
18 Cornwall County Residents Memorial to Arthur, 24 November 1827, Vicary to Arthur, 
16 August 1830, CSO 1/316/7578, AOT Reel SLTX/AO/CS/114, pp.72-75 & 564-565; 
Colonial Times, 5 June 1829. 
19 Clark to Burnet, 25 Februrary, 1828, CSO 1/316/7578, AOT Reel SLTX/AO/CS/114, 
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River was besieged and the cook was killed. "[T]he attack was so sudden," 
Scott wrote, "that the man was speared before they had any idea of a native 
even being near." 20 
Arthur's description of what the colonists faced illustrated how effective 
this style of campaign proved to be. "The species of warfare which we are 
carrying out with [the Aborigines]", he wrote to the Colonial Office, "is of the 
most distressing nature: they suddenly appear, commit some act of outrage 
and then as suddenly vanish: if pursued it seems impossible to surround and 
capture them .... " 21 The aptitude with which the guerrillas ran their cam-
paign, moreover, was not lost on the Executive Council. In August 1830 
its members reported that these "acts of warfare" are "proofs ... of the skill 
with which the natives have availed themselves of ... to make their hostile ap-
proaches unperceived, of their patience in watching for days the habitation of 
those whom they design to attack, and of the frightful celerity with which they 
avail themselves of any unguarded moment to fall upon the inmates ... "22 
A feature of the hit-and-run campaign, which often proved even more effec-
tive than physical violence was that of psychological warfare. The guerrillas 
pp.105-107. 
20Scott to Douglas, 30 September 1830, CSO 1/316/7578, AOT Reel SLTX/AO/CS/114, 
pp.652-654. 
21 Arthur to Murray, 12 September 1829, HRA, Resumed Series III.8, pp.607-609. 
22Extract from the Minutes of the Executive Council, 27 August 1830, in Arthur to Murray 
20 November 1830, CO 280/25, PRO Reel 245, p.400. 
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of Van Diemen's Land employed it well. Settlers reported feeling harassed 
and living in dread, the attacks having been "conducted with much cover and 
secrecy." So effective was this strategy that the anticipation of an attack for 
one convict servant was more distressing than the actual attack itself. Having 
lived in fear for so long, when, after a confrontation near Little Swanport, the 
government sawyer was "slightly wounded" , he was "so terrified that he ran 
off to Mr. Buxton's and was taken very seriously ill immediately on his arrival 
there and expired on the 16th from fever brought on by fright." The man, it 
was believed, was literally scared to death.23 
The Tasmanian guerrillas also took advantage of the terrain in which they 
were operating. They made use of the vulnerability caused by the isolation of 
the stock keepers and their huts. "The occupation of an industrious settler," 
wrote Captain William Clark in 1830, "generally detains him in his field or 
abroad with his cattle so that his house becomes an easy prey to the insidious 
attacks of these savages who will for days and weeks together watch a house 
which they have marked for plunder24 till they effect their purpose." 25 This 
23Bryan to Abbott, 2 July 1827; Simpson to Burnett, 13 March 1828, Torlesse to Vicary, 
15 February 1830, Aubin to Arthur, 18 September 1830; , CSO 1/316/7578, AOT Reel 
SLTX/AO/CS/114, pp.46-48, 122-124, 422-423 & 629-30. 
24 The Oxford English Dictionary tellingly defines 'plunder' thus: "to rob (a place or 
person) of goods or valuables by forcible means, or as an enemy; esp. as done in war or a 
hostile incursion; to pillage, rifle, ransack, spoil; to rob systematically (The Oxford English 
Dictionary, p.1084). 
25Clark to Burnett, 22 February 1830, CSO 1/316/7578, AOT Reel SLTX/AO/CS/114, 
p426-429. 
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willingness to wait patiently for the most favourable opportunity to make an 
attack allowed the guerrillas to gain a good knowledge of their adversaries. 
Settlers were often left feeling utterly vulnerable. Thomas Vicary wrote to the 
Governor noting that "the knowledge the natives have of the defenceless state 
of the house is very astonishing as they have invariably made their attacks on 
the departure of the means of defence." 26 The Aborigines had a good knowl-
edge of their enemy because, contrary to Windschuttle's claim that they did 
not utilise intelligence,27 they invested a great deal of time and energy observ-
ing their adversaries, coming to know their movements and habits intimately. 
As the Tasmanian guerrillas became more desperate their attacks on set-
tlers increasingly focused on the theft of European goods-what Reynolds has 
dubbed this "economic warfare" .28 In 1824 the Hobart Town Gazette reported 
that "a tribe of natives visited the shepherds' hut of Mr. Temple Pearson, 
which they robbed of every article they could carry off, and afterwards drove 
the whole of his flock of sheep into the river, where they commenced spearing 
and otherwise destroying them." 29 In February 1828, the surveyor, William 
26 Tasmanian and Australasiatic Review, 11 June 1830; Vicary to Burnett, 12 February 
1830, CSO 1/316/7578, AOT Reel SLTX/AO/CS/114, pp.404-405. 
27Windschuttle, The Fabrication of Aboriginal History, pp.122-130. 
28H. Reynolds; The Other Side of the Frontier: Aboriginal Resistance to the European 
Invasion of Australia (Ringwood, 1982), pp.86-87. 
-
29 Hobart Town Gazette, 24 April 1824. 
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Sharland, was "robbed of everything useful." 30 Since establishing a property 
at Oatlands, Thomas Hobbs' property was attacked no less than six times. 
"[No sooner do I see a prospect of getting some returns from the farm,'' he 
lamented, "than the natives come and rob me of all." 31 
On many occasions small supplies of ~ood stuffs, blankets and clothing 
were removed for later use by Aboriginal groups. At other times much larger 
quantities were rem'oved or destroyed and certainly, the offenders might have 
taken the provisions to stock-pile. However, such supplies would have been 
useless to groups constantly on the move. More likely, then, the removal and 
destruction of property probably indicates that they were trying to interfere 
with the settlers' livelihoods. 
Windschuttle argues that the Aborigines were not plundering huts as part 
of a guerrilla campaign but that their "principal reason for ... violence was 
their desire for British consumer goods" for which they had acquired a taste.32 
What Windschuttle fails to consider is why the Aborigines developed such a 
strong desire for British consumer goods. 
The foodstuffs that the Aborigines tended to take were bread, sugar and 
30 Tasmanian, 8 February 1828. 
31 Hobbs to Burnett 20 May 1830, CSO 1/316/7578, AOT Reel SLTX/AO/CS/114, 
pp.509-510; one may recall the famous utterings of the other, more philosophical Thomas 
Hobbes: life is "poor, nasty, brutish and short .... " 
32Windschuttle, The Fabrication of Aboriginal History, pp.122-130. 
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tea. These were foods that were easy to carry and consume on the move. More 
importantly, 'they provided an instant source of energy that the Aborigines 
would have desperately needed to stay mobile. Ultimately, they had acquired 
a taste for European foods such as bread, tea and sugar because they needed to 
supplement, or in many cases, replace their dwindling traditional food sources. 
Another strategy employed by Aboriginal groups involved restricting set-
tlers' movements. If the guerrillas were able to interrupt communication be-
tween settlements they could interfere with the settlers' ability to work their 
grants. Captain Torlesse wrote to Arthur in February 1830 describing such a 
case. "As to the natives", he lamented, 
I can assure you we all now feel too fearful of their being near us, 
that we never move without a gun. If the cart has to go to the mill 
or elsewhere we lose the services of one man at home, being obliged 
to send two, one as a driver, the other as a convoy. Mrs. Torlesse 
is uneasy if I were to go as far as the barn and even to that short 
distance I always carry a gun. The trouble and loss they have and 
will still cause us is quite harassing. 
In a postscript Torlesse sought permission to "exchange my grant at the Hollow 
Tree for one near Hamilton, Mrs. Torlesse being in a very uneasy state of mind, 
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our lives are daily in jeopardy." 33 
The skills which the Tasmanian guerrillas utilised allowed them to endure 
despite their decreasing numbers. They were able to resist the expansion of 
settlement, procure food supplies even ·when native sources had been depleted, 
and thus remain politically and militarily active. Melville described their ef-
forts well when in July 1830 he wrote: 
the attacks and depredations of the Aborigines on the white people 
of this Colony, and on stock-huts, remote o_nly a few miles from 
the townships and military stations assume a regular and alarming 
consistency, and evince on the part of the blacks a cunning and 
superiority of tactic which would not disgrace even some of the 
greatest military characters. 34 
4.3 Phases of War 
War between the Aborigines and settlers of Van Diemen's Land began in 
earnest around the time that Arthur assumed his commission as governor and 
lasted until the end of 1830 when the number of attacks dropped significantly. 
Until the end of 1829 the number of attacks each year where property owners 
33Torlesse to Arthur, 15 February 1830, CSO 1/316/7578, AOT Reel SLTX/ AO/CS/114, 
pp.422-423. , 
34 Colonial Times, 16 July 1830. 
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or their servants were killed always outnumbered those attacks where plun-
der was the primary motive. In 1830 this changed as the Aborigines found 
themselves almost completely reliant on European goods such as flour and 
blankets for survival, and thus forced to make plundering raids in order to 
procure them. By 1831 the efforts of Arthur's military operations against the 
Aborigines combined with Robinson's activities amongst them finally broke 
their resistance. 35 
During the first four years of war the efforts of the remnant tribes of the 
midlands and east coasts-the tame mobs-defined the nature of the guerrilla 
campaign. The midlands band that was headed first by Musquito and later 
by Black Tom was particularly well versed in European ways and carried out 
most of the raids against the settlers during the initial years of war.36 This 
set the tone for the rest of the war and allowed the guerrillas to begin their 
campaign in earnest. Arthur was aware of the d!'Lnger that the likes of Musquito 
and Black Tom posed and their capture remained a priority for him. When 
Musquito was captured in 1824, he was tried and found guilty of murder. 
The following year he and his associate, Black Jack, were hanged for their 
35Plomley, The Aboriginal/Settler Clash, pp.26-27. 
36Melville, The History of the Island of Van Diemen's Land, pp.32-35, 56-57. Wind-
schuttle argues that Musquito and Black Tom were little more than "black bushrangers." 
However, it is important to remember that those who led the raidmg parties, according to 
guerrilla war theorists, did not necessarily have to have tribal or even kinship ties to the 
group, nor did they require them to be recognised as leaders of the raiding parties who~e 
goals were limited and whose techniques were foreign the Europeans; see Windschuttle, The 
Fabrication of Aboriginal Histery, p.70. 
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crimes. The next year two others, Jack and Dick, were also captured, tried 
and hanged. Arthur hoped that the executions "may tend, not only to prevent 
the commission of similar atrocities by the Aborigines, but to induce towards 
them the observance of a conciliatory line of conduct .... " Black Tom was 
captured in November 1827. Rather than being tried and executed, however, 
he was housed in the prison at New Norfolk until he was attached to Gilbert 
Robertson's roving party in 1829. Arthur probably realised that the hanging 
of the first three might not have demonstrated a conciliatory line of conduct 
on his own part.37 
The early activities of the tame mobs reflected a desire to redress injustices 
suffered by their people. This is supported by data, however incomplete, that 
shows that for the first four years of the war the goal of most Aboriginal 
attacks seemingly was to maim or kill the property owners or their servants.38 
Anecdotal evidence also bears this out. In the Western Creek district James 
Cubitt found himself the victim of nine Aboriginal attacks over a five year 
period. Robinson noted in his diaries that Cubitt had massacred many and 
that he "kill[ed] the natives for sport." Norfolk Police Magistrate, Malcolm 
Laing Smith reported that "the natives have long vowed vengeance on [Cubitt] 
who has been a terror to them in that neighbourhood". During one attack, 
37 Hobart Town Gazette, 16 September 1826; Tasmanian and Australasiatic Review, 16 
November 1827. 
38Plomley, The Aboriginal/Settler Clash, p.26. 
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one man cried out to Cubitt, "we will have you yet." 39 
The deaths of 104 settlers during those revenge years finally moved Arthur 
to respond. Late in November 1827 he increased the military presence through-
out the midlands. He sent an additional twenty-six field police to the Western 
Creek to aid civil powers already stationed there. He issued a garrison order 
calling for magistrates, field police and the military to work together to pro-
tect the isolated settlement. Any effect that the augmentation of force had, 
though, seems to have been minimal, for as Police Magistrate, Peter Archer 
Mulgrave reported from Port Dalrymple: 
The strength of the country close to the cultivated districts ... renders 
it difficult to overtake the black natives and effectually drive them 
back without a much greater force than I am able to collect or 
having recourse to severities which I should not conscientiously 
justify.40 
39Cubitt resided with his fellow convict servant, Thomas Johnson, Johnson's Aboriginal 
wife, Dolly Dalrymple, and their two children. Johnson and Dolly found themselves targets 
for revenge because of their associat10n with Cubitt. Interestingly, Johnson was later granted 
a pardon by the government for Dolly's actions du.ring an attack. When their hut was 
surrounded, Dalrymple took Johnson's double-barrelled shot-gun, climbed into the loft of the 
hut and shot at the group until they retreated. She killed twelve of them in all; see Plomley, 
Friendly Mission, p.219, Colonial Times, 6 January 1826, 7 March 1828, 28 September 
1831; Hobart Town Gazette, 24 September 1831, Hobart Town Cou"er, 24 September 1831; 
N.J.B Plomley (ed), Jorgen Jorgenson and the Aborigines (Hobart, 1991), p.125; Journal 
of the Land Commissioners for Van Diemen's Land, 1826-28 (Hobart, 1962), p.80; Smith 
to Burnett, 7 September 1830, CSO 1/316/7578, AOT Reel SLTX/AO/CS/114, p.954-957; 
Murray to Arthur, 5 November 1830, CO 408/7, PRO Reel 290, p.83. 
4° Colonial Times, 26 January 1827; Plomley, The Aboriginal/Settler Clash, 26 & 56-58; 
Tasmanian and Australasiatic Review, 16November1827; Government Notice, Hobart Town 
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By the end of 1827 it had become clear that race relations would only 
worsen. Almost daily Arthur's office was receiving correspondence from set-
tlers throughout the colony who were suffering at the hands of Aborigines. 
The letter from William Walker of Breadalbane in December 1827 stood out 
for it was one of the very few that did not detail an account of an Aboriginal 
attack or slaying. Walker wrote to Arthur describing what he perceived was 
an Aboriginal spiritual site that he had happened upon during his travels. 
He explained that he was relaying the details of what he had discovered in 
the hope that if the colonial administration had a more intimate knowledge 
of Aboriginal society and culture in Van Diemen's Land then the cause of 
hostilities might be better understood, and more effective conciliatory policies 
could be implemented. Specifically, Walker hoped that "some kind of treaty 
or coming to an understanding with the natives" could be reached, "in order 
to prevent the frequent murders they commit." 41 
The year 1828 saw the war moving into its second phase as the Aborig-
ines began focussing their efforts equally on plunder and murder. Sixty-three 
reports of plunder were recorded-three times the number for 1827. Arthur 
Gazette, 29 November 1827; Mulgrave to Burnett, 17 December 1827, CSO 1/316/7578, 
AOT Reel SLTX/AO/CS/114, pp.84-85. 
41 Walker to Burnett, 20 December 1827, CSO 1/316/7578, AOT Reel SLTX/ AO /CS/114, 
pp.86-88;,Chief Justice John Lewes Pedder, of course, also made the suggestion, but not for 
another four years, by which stage the regrettable fate of the Aborigines was all but sealed 
(see Chapter 7 for a discussion of Pedder's suggestions for a treaty). 
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realised that this was the period that marked the beginning of a concerted fight 
for food. He wrote to the Secretary of State that the Aborigines "complain 
that the white people have taken possession of their country, encroached upon 
their hunting grounds, and destroyed their natural food, the kangaroo .... " He 
also understood the need to "afford them some temporary relief in food and 
clothing." 42 By 1831, though the Aboriginal crisis was nearing an end, still 
the Aborigines Committee noted the Aborigines' "thirst for plunder" and "the 
encreased [sic] desire manifested on the part of the Blacks to procure blankets, 
flour, tea, tobacco, fire arms and articles of dress." 43 
To Arthur's mind, the only long term solution was to establish "settled 
districts" and to eventually create a reserve for the Aborigines away from 
settlement. 44 However, in the short term, these boundaries served to merely 
exacerbate Aboriginal hostilities. By sanctioning a policy to harass and drive 
them from those districts in which they procured food, Arthur forced the 
inland tribes to adopt more desperate measures in order to access food and 
shelter. Nonetheless, the skill with which guerrilla groups were able to avoid 
capture by civilian and military parties who were scouring the bush meant 
42 Arthur to Goderich, 10 January 1828, HRA, Resumed Series III.7, p.28. 
43 Aborigines Committee Report, 24 October 1831 in Arthur to Goderich, 25 October 
1831, CO 280/30, PRO Reel 248, p.158. 
44 Arthur to Goderich, 10 January 1828, HRA, Resumed Series III.7, pp.26-29; Plomley, 
Aboriginal/Settler Clash, p.17 & 26; The establishment of settled districts and reserves will 
be discussed further in Chapter 5. 
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that, for a while at least, they were able to hold their ground. They were not 
driven out, but neither were they able to easily access traditional food sources. 
Hostilities, consequently, intensified. 
The year 1830 proved to be the most intense year of the war. However, 
though settlers and their convict servants continued to fall victim to Aboriginal 
attacks, the focus of the guerrilla campaign moved to plunder. Guerrilla groups. 
were forced to procure most, if not all, of their provisions from stock huts 
or properties. Their need for food, necessarily, became greater than their 
_need for revenge arni they adapted their raiding campaigns accordingly. In 
February 1830 Arthur described the situation that settlers faced. "[T]heir 
exploits in the pursuit of plunder have rendered them much more daring and 
robust .... and it is rather the apprehension that they may become still more 
formidable that makes me uneasy than any dread of their present prowess." 
Land Commissioner, Roderic O'Connor, also realised that "the natives are 
more anxious to plunder than to murder." The Aborigines Committee even 
recommended the destruction of the kangaroo "by hunting, shooting, or other 
means, within the limits prescribed to the natives" be prohibited. The Colonial 
Office supported the recommendation.45 
45 Arthur to Murray, 15 April 1830, CO 280/24, PRO Reel 244, p.405-406 & Roderic 
O'Connor, 17 March 1830 in Minutes of Evidence Taken Before the Committee for the 
Affairs of the Aborigines in Report of the Aborigines Committee in Arthur to Murray, 15 
April 1830, CO 280/24, PRO Reel 244, p.431; Report of the Aborigines Committee in Arthur 
to Murray, 15 April 1830, CO 280/24, PRO Reel 244, p.499; Plomley, Aboriginal/Settler 
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By the end of 1830 the efforts of military operations and those of G.A. 
Robinson began to have an effect. In 1831 the number of attacks dropped 
dramatically. The constant presence of armed colonists in districts that had 
once been the safe retreats of the Aborigines meant that Aboriginal groups 
were forced to remain constantly on the move. They could not access tradi-
tional food sources, nor could they make their annual migrations to the coast. 
They were kept on alert day and night by settler parties scouring the bush the 
members of which had begun to carry out their own surprise raids. Even· the 
use of dogs to alert sleeping groups of imminent danger was not always sue-
cessful. Hungry and cold, Aboriginal groups were forced to continually make 
raids for food and blankets. By the end of 1831 the Aboriginal war was all but 
over. The number of attacks reported dropped dramatically from 222 in 1830 
to just sixty-six by the end of 1831.46 Those who had not been killed by the 
military, roving parties or settlers carrying out their own punitive missions, 
had either died from European diseases or were about to surrender themselves 
into Robinson's custody and would soon be transferred to a reserve in the Bass 
Strait Islands. 
Ultimately, the Tasmanian guerrilla campaign failed because, as Gann ob-
serves of guerrilla warfare generally, 
Clash, pp.26-27. 
46Plornley, Aboriginal/Settler Clash, pp.15, 21 & 26. 
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... when all is said and done, [guerrilla wars] are only the weapon 
of the weak. They succeed only when the opponents' will to resist 
has already been worn down by other means, or if the partisans 
are supported by large foreign enemies.47 
The Tasmanians had neither of these advantages. 
4.4 The Peninsular War, the Bushrangers and 
Colonel Arthur 
Though to some the Aborigines proved a formidable foe who for a time seemed 
capable of threatening the very future of colonial Van Diemen's Land, in reality 
the Tasmanian guerrillas had little chance of succeeding against an invader 
with greater numbers, superior weaponry, and who were far more militarily 
organised. Moreover, that this enemy was also willing to learn and adopt those 
very skills which the guerrillas had used against them for so long, demonstrated 
a desire to effect a decisive victory. To be sure, Arthur arrived in Van Diemen's 
Land with knowledge, albeit academic, of guerrilla warfare. 
Because of battles recently fought and won in the Iberian Peninsula during 
the Napoleonic wars, British military leaders had become well aware of the 
47L. Gann, "Guerrillas and Insurgency: an Interpretative Survey,'' Military Rev~ew, 46.3 
(1966), p.59. 
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advantages that this mode of warfare offered. This would have been particu-
larly so of Arthur (though he did not actually serve in the Peninsula) who was 
in regular contact with senior officers throughout the colony such as Colonial 
Auditor, G.T.W.B. Boyes and Assistant Commissary General Moodie who had 
served in the war.48 
During the years 1808 to 1813 Britain, under the command of the fut_u..._,,__ ____ _ 
Duke of Wellington, Arthur Wellesley, formed an alliance with Portugal to 
defend the Peninsula against Napoleon's hegemonic designs there. With the 
use of regular troops in Portugal supported by small partisan forces, known 
as "guerrillos" in Spain, Wellington eventually won victory against Napoleon. 
Though Wellington's major victories in a number of regular battles such as 
Vittoria and Salamanca ensured that Napoleon was finally forced from the 
Iberian Peninsula altogether, the Spanish guerrillas, operating in their own 
. territories, played a central role in making a French presence in Spain and 
Portugal difficult to maintain. Finally, Napoleon was forced out and Wellesley 
returned home victorious and with a new knowledge of a very effective mode 
of warfare. 49 
48Moreover Arthur had access to a wealth of publications on the war; see for example: 
P.W. Buckham's Personal Narrative of Adventures in the Peninsula during the War, 1812-
1815 (London, 1827), & P. Chapman (ed), The Diaries and Letters of G.T. W.B. Boyes 
(Melbourne, 1985), especially Chapter 2, Peninsular Prologue. 
49D. Chandler, On the Napoleonic Wars (London, 1994), pp. 167-68 & 180; D. Gates, 
The Napoleonic Wars (London, 1997), pp.171-195. 
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Closer to home, a bushranging crisis had flared up shortly after Arthur's 
arrival which gave the governor the opportunity to experience guerrilla war-
fare first-hand. To be sure, the bushrangers had never been politically moti-
vated. They were not guerrilla combatants trying to overthrow the colonial 
authorities. Their sole objective was survival. Having, as historian Lloyd 
Robson describes, "found a hunting and a wandering life to their taste" ,50 
the bushrangers of Van Diemen's Land sought only to protect their hard-won 
freedom from colonial subjugation. However, their use of guerrilla tactics in 
their plundering raids certainly gave Arthur the opportunity to learn about 
the machinations of this style of warfare, even if he was not facing an adversary 
with political ambitions. 
Bushrangers had roamed the Van Diemen's Land hinterland since early 
settlement. A bandit sub-culture had developed during the administrations of 
Davey and Sorell, so much so that both governors found themselves facing a 
crisis. These self-proclaimed "gentlemen foresters" would use hit-and-run tac-
ties to steal sheep and cattle from outlying farms and properties. They would 
then trade the stolen stock for arms and ammunition. So prolific was bushrang-
ing during the early years that Robson argues that "Davey's administration 
continued in a state of virtual siege." 51 Historian, Hamish Maxwell-Stewart, 
50Robson, A History of Tasmania, 1, p.79. 
51 Robson, A History of Tasmania, 1, p.88. 
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conjectures that for a time bushranging became an integral part of the colonial 
economy.52 
The bushranger-s developed intricate networks of communication, relying 
on colonists-mostly convict servants-in the outlying districts to keep them 
informed. Settlers as distinguished as Reverend Knopwood and Edward Lord 
were even suspected of being involved with certain groups. So effective was this 
system that the bushranger Michael Howe, the "Lieutenant Governor of the 
Woods", was able to remain in regular correspondence with Governor Davey. 
The bushranging problem continued until 1827, ebbing and flowing, as bandit 
leaders were flushed out, captured, and replaced with new recruits. The taking 
of Howe in October 1818 led to the capture of the majority of the rest of the 
bushrangers who were still at large, and three months later the bushranging 
network had temporarily collapsed. However, when Matthew Brady and his 
gang escaped from Macquarie Habour in June 1824, the colony, this time 
under the administration of Arthur, was, again, faced with a bushranging 
crisis. Brady continued to prosecute marauding raids throughout the colony 
for the next two years. 53 
The bushranging gangs were able to endure because, like their Aboriginal 
52H. Maxwell-Stewart, The Bushrangers and the Convict System of Van Diemen's Land, 
1803-1846, unpublished PhD Thesis (Edinburgh, 1990). 
53see Robson, A History of Tasmania, p.79, Examination of E. Abbott, 8 March 1820, 
Examinations Taken Before John Thomas Bigge, The Commissioner of Enquiry, HRA III.3, 
p.265. 
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counterparts, they too survived under conditions, and employed tactics clas-
sic to guerrilla warfare. They were small, mobile conglomerates able to carry 
on their depredations whilst avoiding capture. In contrast to the Aborigines, 
however, the bushrangers found their greatest strength in the popular support 
they were able to muster. So celebrated was Brady that after his capture 
Brady's prison cell was over-run with visitors and Arthur even worried that 
his hanging would result in the convict's martyrdom. When Brady was still at 
large, his tenacity had awed Arthur. "[T]he skill and conduct of this extraor-
dinary man" wrote the Governor in April 1826, " ... baffled the united effort 
of the civil and military power for their apprehension." Arthur realised the 
tactical advantages Brady's gang enjoyed. "In addition to the natural facili-
ties of a mountainous country to an armed banditti," he wrote to the Colonial 
Secretary, 
there is such a combination and communication kept up between 
the bushrangers and the convict stock-keepers throughout the colony, 
that, whilst these miscreants acquire the most accurate informa-
tion of all the measures that are resorted to for their apprehension, 
their pursuers are misled and imposed upon by every device that 
can be practised. 54 
54Arthur to Bathurst, 11April1826, HRA, III.5, p.139. 
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Arthur considered that this crisis was serious enough to employ whatever 
force was required to end it. He utilised a number of counter-insurgency strate-
gies that ultimately ended bushranging as an institution. Davey had tried to 
flush out the bandits by offering rewards for their capture, by sending armed 
parties into the bush to hunt them down and then by declaring martial law 
against them. This was at least temporarily effective, but Macquarie, as Gov-
ernor in Chief, resented what he considered to be a usurpation of his authority 
and cancelled the order. 55 Sorell, however, was able to re-establish control for 
a time. Like Davey, he offered rewards for the capture of bushranging gangs. 
But he also stationed permanent military parties along routes known to be 
used by the bushrangers and limited th~ movements of free and convict alike, 
issuing passports and calling for weekly musters. In effect Sorell created a po-
lice state and it was under these conditions that Howe was eventually captured 
and law and order returned to the colony for a time at least. 56 
Arthur, though, was in a better position to end bushranging permanently 
and employed much harsher measures to achieve his aim. Van Diemen's Land 
had gained independence from New South Wales shortly after his arrival and he 
55 Macquarie's own offer of amnesty to those who surrendered allowed the groups in ques-
tion to simply give themselves up so as to avoid prosecution and then later to return to the 
bush; see Proclamation Relating to Bushrangers, in Macquarie to Goulburn, 12 May 1814, 
HRA, III.3, pp. 264-265. 
56Robson, A History of Tasmania, pp.79, 96-97; see also Examinations Taken Before John 
Thomas Bigge, HRA, III.3, pp.252-253, 263, 273-74, 315 & 318. 
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was able to make legally-binding rulings to effect law and order in the colony. 
Arthur's immediate response to bushranging, like Sorell's, was to augment 
the military. He requested and received an additional regiment from Sydney 
and then divided the colony into military districts in order to coordinate their 
activities. He also organised bushranger hunting parties led by the military. 
As mentioned, attached to one was Musquito who had been employed for his 
tracking skills. All of these schemes were implemented, as with the Aboriginal 
crisis, in an attempt to harass the bushrangers. 57 
Focusing on the colonists, Arthur also employed a number of tactics in an 
attempt to undermine the networks of popular support that the bushrangers 
established. In order to encourage colonists to disavow their loyalties to the 
bushrangers, Arthur also offered rewards for their capture or information lead-
ing to their capture. However, he increased it from £50 to 100 guineas (£105), 
as well as offering 300 acres of land for each bandit captured and released to 
the authorities. To the convicts, Arthur offered the incentive of a free pardon 
as well as a share of the monetary and land rewards. At the same time Arthur 
created some very effective disincentives towards taking to bushranging or col-
1 uding with known felons. He threatened to very publicly prosecute and hang 
anyone found collaborating with the bushrangers. Those outlaws whom he 
57see Robson, A History of Tasmania, pp.141-143. 
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captured were also hanged in front of large crowds, and their bodies were left 
on public display for weeks afterwards for the colonists to view and ponder 
over. Arthur hoped that this would serve as an example for others considering 
a similar lifestyle.58 
Arthur's final scheme, and the one which finally quashed bushranging 
gangs, was to release prisoners to infiltrate the groups. The rewards offered 
were so great that a number were convinced to join the gangs and then report 
their findings to the police. When Brady's location was reported, a military 
party managed to track him down and shot him. The injured bushranger man-
aged to esc·ape but was later found by the settler, John Batman, who took him 
into custody. 59 
The reaction of the colonial government to bushranging was far more se-
vere than it was to the Aboriginal crisis. Though Aboriginal groups were 
able to effect unremitting harassment on remote settlements for a much longer 
period, they were treated with far greater humanity than the bushranging 
gangs. Despite the fact that they inflicted greater injury and suffering upon 
larger numbers of settlers, only four were tried and hanged. In comparison, 
between the years 1807 and 1836, more than one hundred bushrangers were 
58 Arthur to Bathurst, 11 April 1826 & 3 October 1826, HRA, III.5, pp.138-141, 441-2, 
445-448. 
59Robson, A History of Tasmania, p.143. 
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executed for their crimes. 60 Indeed, when an Aboriginal group was found 
to have murdered Bartholemew Thomas, brother to Colonial Treasurer and 
Aborigines Committee member, Jocelyn Thomas, those involved were not ex-
ecuted, but instead removed to the Aboriginal establishment at Gun Carriage 
Island. 61 The difference between the Aborigines and the bushrangers was that 
the latter had the ability to garner the support of many colonists. The Abo-
rigines, on the other hand, were never regarded as a part of colonial society 
and, indeed, to most they were the enemy. However, the bushrangers were 
supported and aided, not only by convicts, but sometimes by their masters. 
To this end, these "gentlemen foresters" posed a much greater threat to law 
and order in the colony. 
Consequently, like his predecessors, Arthur felt it vital that bushranging 
be quashed completely and decisively. With the Aborigines, though, the issues 
were more complex. Once war was over Arthur needed to accommodate the 
Aborigines within the colonial setting, even if only on its fringes. In order to 
do this he realised that he must re-establish peace based on mutually satisfying 
arrangements, even if these arrangements were guided by principles of superior 
British rights. 
60H. Maxwell-Stewart, The Bushrangers and the Convict System of Van Diemen's Land, 
p.218. 
61 The murder of Bartholemew Thomas and his servant James Parker will be discussed 
further in Chapter 8. 
Chapter 5 
Conciliation by the Sword 
I cannot divest myself of the consideration that all aggression orig-
inated with the white inhabitants, and that, therefore, much ought 
to be endured in return before the blacks are treated as an open 
and accredited enemy by the government.1 
Lieutenant Governor Sir George Arthur arrived in Van Diemen's Land a 
strong and worthy candidate for the job of colonial penal administrator. As 
Superintendent of Honduras from 1812 to 1823, "Arthur's administration of 
Belize," in the words of biographer, S.W. Jackman "foreshadowed his entire 
career." His time there gave him experience as leader of a multi-racial, class-
! 
based society where British rule was not absolute. As British laws were not 
1 Arthur to Goderich, 10 January 1828, Historical Records of Australia Resumed Series, 
III.7, p.29. 
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enforceable in Honduras (even though British citizens constituted most of its 
upper white classes), Arthur was compelled to work around existing laws and 
social customs to effect reform. Unfortunately, he never acquired the art of 
diplomacy that would gain him public support, and this would continue to 
hound his career during future commissions in Van Diemen's Land and Upper 
Canada. 2 
Nevertheless, Arthur gained the respect and support of the Colonial Office 
in London which would ensure future career success. Arthur was guided by 
strong principles and a solid faith: "[M]y first consideration [is] to do my 
duty to His Majesty's Government" ... "I am the responsible servant of the 
government, and whatever the commands of that government are, it is my duty 
to obey them." .... 3 This was supported by an evangelical faith acquired early 
in adulthood and maintained solidly throughout the rest of his life. Bound to 
the latter was his humanitarian view on slaves and indigenous peoples that 
led him to adopt a position of protector and advocate, often in opposition to 
others under his command. The paternalism that underpinned his Aboriginal 
policies reflected the times in which he was living. Historian, A.q.L. Shaw 
28.W. Jackman, A Slave to Duty: A Portrait Sketch of Sir George Arthur, Bart, PC, 
KCH (Melbourne: 1979), p.38; A.G.L. Shaw, Sir George Arthur, bart, 1784-1854: Super-
intendent of British Honduras, Lieutenant Governor of Van Diemen's Land, and of Upper 
Canada, Governor of the Bombay Presidency '(Carlton, 1980). 
3 A.G.L. Shaw, Sir George Arthur, bart, p.59. 
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Figure 5.1: 
J.W. Beattie's Col. George Arthur, Lieut.-Governor, 1896. Source: Allport 
Library and Museum of Fine Arts, State Library of Tasmania; 
image taken from http: //images.statelibrary.tas.gov.au. 
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eloquently describes Arthur thus: 
High-handed because well-int_entioned, he was more concerned with 
reforming abuses than with protecting rights, particularly, if the 
latter seemed to conflict with his ideas of humanity .... Already 
manifest were many characteristics that were to appear constantly 
throughout his career-an almost incredible industry, strong im-
perial sentiments, a passion for approbation of his work from his 
superiors, a desire for the financial rewards which he was convinced 
he needed for the sake of his family, a strong dislike of opposi-
tion ... and an undoubted humanitarianism based on a deeply felt 
devotion to his Calvinist brand of Christianity. His views on what 
might be done for his subjects were, for his time, enlightened, and 
subject to due economy, he was more ready than most contem-
porary administrators to use p;overnment powers ,to put them into 
practice and to further the religious ideals he thought so impor-
tant. To the self-seeker, as to the libertarian, such qualities were 
often displeasing, but to the Colonial Office they seemed very sat-
isfactory, particularly when accompanied by the belief that, his first 
duty was to obey, not to evade, its orders (if he could not persuade 
141 
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it to change them) .... 4 
Arthur's commission in Van Diemen's Land was focused necessarily on the 
administration of a penal colony for transported convicts. The majority of 
his time was spent reworking a system which, if successful, would reform the 
misguided characters of the convicts through labour, discipline and religious 
instruction. Those who defied the system would find themselves in a prison 
cell at Port Macquarie, Maria Island or later, Port Arthur.5 As such, although 
he seemed as well trained as anyone could be for what was to come, the issue 
of race relations in Van Diemen's Land was not Arthur's primary concern. 
Nevertheless, from the very beginning of his tenure he was forced to pay close 
attention to the Aborigines of Van Diemen's Land. 
In January 1828 Arthur wrote to the Colonial Secretary, Viscount Goderich, 
describing the circumstances under which he had assumed power on 14 May 
1824: 
On my succeeding to the government I found the quarrel of the 
Natives with the Europeans, occasioned by an unfortunate step 
of the officer in command of the garrison on the first forming of 
4 A.G.L. Shaw, Sir George Arthur, bart, pp.59-60. 
5Port Arthur, and especially its 'model prison', was designed around principles estab-
lished by Jeremy Bentham aimed at reforming the mind through programs aimed at disci-
plining the mind and soul. 
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the settlement, was daily aggravated, by every kind of in]ury corn-
mitted against the defenceless Natives, by the stock-keepers and 
-
sealers, with whom it was a constant practice to fire upon them 
whenever they approached, and to deprive them of their women 
whenever the opportunity offered. 6 
By the time Arthur penned his reflections, he had been living with a guer-
rilla war for four years. Arthur had come to realise that, like his Aboriginal 
adversaries, he needed to systematise his approach to the problem. The final 
solution~an end to war and the conciliation of the Aborigines-was achieved 
through a dual strategy of increased force, later replaced by an active effort to 
make contact with the Aborigines on their terms. 7 However, force, tempered 
with humanity, was Arthur's first choice and his own employment of guerrilla 
tactics allowed him to eventually prevail. 
5 .1 Reserves 
The colonial newspapers agitated for the removal of the Aborigines from Van 
Diemen's Land for a number of years8 before Arthur raised it with the Colo-
nial Office because_ he was vehemently opposed to the idea. In a despatch to 
6Arthur to Goderich, 10 January 1828, HRA Resumed Series III.7, p.27. 
7Reynolds, Fate of a Pree People, pp.51 & 133; W. Townsley, Tasmania from Colony to 
Statehood, 1803-1945 (Hobart, 1991), p.31. 
8 Colonial Times, 17 November 1826, 26 January 1827, 23 February 1827 & 6 July 1827. 
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Colonial Secretary, Viscount Goderich, he wrote, "[n]othing short of the last 
necessity could tolerate so great an aggravation of their injuries, as they would 
unquestionably consider removing them from their native tracts." Arthur was 
convinced that the removal of some groups would merely lead to the inten-
sification of acrimony in others. Instead, trying to effect a separation which 
would allow the Aborigines to maintain their traditional modes of living, he 
proposed an alternative option: 
The measure which I am rather inclined to attempt is to settle 
the Aborigines in some remote quarter of the island, which should 
strictly be reserved for them, and to supply them with food and 
clothing, and afford them protection from injuries by stock-keepers, 
on condition of their confining themselves peaceably to certain lim-
its, beyond which if they pass, they should be made to understand 
they will cease to be protected. ' 
Arthur realised that there would be problems associated with confining a no-
madic people to such a small tract of land, but he believed that in the long 
term they could be weaned from their "migratory habits" as they settled into 
more civilised lifestyles. 9 
~g Arthur to Goderich, 10 January 1828, HRA Resumed Series, III.7, pp.28-29. 
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The idea behind creating reserves throughout the British colonies was based 
on the concept that indigenous peoples could be civilised and Christianised in a 
controlled setting and then incorporated into the European society. By placing 
Aboriginal groups on reserves they could be protected from the depravity of 
the worst features bf contact with the lower classes, whilst simultaneously 
being taught the skills of civilised society. This is what a later House of 
Commons Select Committee, called to gather evidence on the state of n~tive 
groups throughout the British colonies, would recommend for future British 
colonies. 10 
In north America, the management of nineteenth century native affairs was 
guided by similar separation policies. After many Native American nations had 
been dispossessed by continued and ever-expanding settlement in the east, the 
federal government concluded that the only real way to effectively separate 
the Native American groups from the settler populations was to accommodate 
the former on reserves. Consequently, treaties were concluded wl.th them to 
extinguish their native title and the various nations were accommodated on 
small parcels of land thereafter. In most cases the reserves were established 
within the tribes' original holdings. According to Prucha, the "goal was to 
10This committee released its findings in two reports in 1836 and 1837; see Report From 
the Select Committee on Aborigines (British Settlements) (with Minutes of Evidence, Ap-
pendix and Index), 7.538, 1836 & Report From the Select Co=ittee on Aborigines (British 
Settlements), 7.425, 1837. 
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ease the immediate conflicts between the two cultures and to prevent, as far 
as it was in their power to do so, the utter destruction of the weaker party." 11 
This, indeed, was Arthur's aim also. 
In the Australian colonies, on the other hand, the treaty process was never 
utilised. Rather reserves were merely created and Aboriginal groups were 
confined to them. Governor Lachlan Macquarie had created a number of 
reserves during his time in New South Wales, though his were meeting places 
where Aboriginal groups could access food and blankets. Continued hostilities 
between the Aborigines and settlers convinced Macquarie that the complete 
integration of black and white society was not feasible. Nonetheless, he made 
attempts to assimilate those whom he found receptive to European ways. At 
Parramatta in 1814 he created a "native institution" for Aboriginal children. 
Boys were taught the "mechanical arts" and girls were trained in domestic 
duties. To demonstrate his regard for his Aboriginal wards, Macquarie also 
held an annual "friendly meeting" where they were fed "good" English food 
such as roast beef, plum pudding and beer.12 
11 Prucha, The Great Father, p.317. 
12By 1824 Macquarie's successor, Governor Thomas Brisbane, was distributing gifts of 
pipes, tobacco, slops and blankets to the more aggressive Aboriginal chiefs in an attempt to 
dissuade them from continuing their hostile activities against the colonists; see Macquarie 
to Bathurst, 8 June 1816, 4 April 1817, HRA, I.9, pp.144-45 & 342; Brisbane to Bathurst, 
14 February 1824, Bathurst to Brisbane, 19 August 1824, HRA, 1.11, pp. 226 & 350. 
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Macquarie set aside two other plots of land at Middle Cove and Blacktown 
for a number of Aboriginal chiefs. He established a farm at George's Head for 
sixteen adults and built fishing huts for a group at Elizabeth Bay. He also, 
unsuccessfully, petitioned the Colonial Office to create a large reserve for the 
Aborigines. Governor Brisbane was more successful and in 1825 he was able to 
grant 10,000 acres of land to the London Missionary Society for the creation of 
a reservation near Tuggerah Beach Lake "for the improvement of the religious 
and civil condition of the Aborigines thereof." 13 
13Later in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries reserves in other Australian colonies 
eventually came to function as repositories for dispossessed Aboriginal groups. In South 
Australia and Queensland, in the words of north Queensland historian Noel Loos, reserves 
"aimed to be self-sustaining entities, which provided education, housing, medical care and 
employment for the Aboriginal 'inmates'." The pastoral and agricultural industries in both 
colonies relied on reserve Aborigines as a source of cheap labour. Though a strong humani-
tarian temperament brought about the establishment of Aboriginal missions by the various 
religious institutions, the increasing authority granted to the overseers by various pieces of 
legislation led to a situation where the welfare of the Aboriginal inhabitants soon became a 
secondary issue. Increasingly restrictive legislation, outlined in the 1897 Act, allowed over-
seers almost total control over the residents' life and liberties. Legally enforceable by-laws 
dictated everything from what apparel they could wear to how to care for their children. 
Though the legislation was protectionist in theory, for all intents and purposes, as Noel Loos 
suggests, "Aborigines and Torres Strait Islanders lost their legal status as British citizens 
and became, in fact, wards of the state." Moreover, the reserves having been established 
in an age of Darwinist theories of evolution, according to Loos, they "had first been seen 
as temporary expedients while the Aborigines died out." Finding that their occupants were 
not dying out, reserves became a control mechanism by which Aboriginal groups could be 
marginalised, existing as a liminal class of European colonial society; see J. Broadbent & 
J. Hughes, The Age of Macquarie (Carlton, 1992), pp.11, 32-33 & 84; R.H.W. Reece, Abo-
rigines and Colonists: Aborigines and Colonial Society in New South Wales in the 1830s 
and 1840s (Sydney, 1974), p.109 & 111; Macquarie to Bathurst, 8 June 1816, HRA, I.9, 
pp.144-45; T. Brisbane, "Deed of 'Irust to Aboriginal Mission", 8 February 1825, HRA, 
I.11, pp.512-514; Bathurst to Darling, 31 July 1825, HRA, I.12, p.46; J. Ritchie, Lachlan 
Macquarie (Carlton, 1986), pp.132 & 186.) P. Brock, "Pastoral Stations and Reserves in 
South and Central Australia, 1850s-1950s," Labour History, 69 (1995), p.106; N. Loos, "A 
Chapter of Contact", in H. Reynolds (ed.), Race Relations in North Queensland (Townsv11le, 
1993), pp.22, 27 & 29. 
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In Van Diemen's Land Arthur considered four locations for an Aboriginal 
reserve. They included the north-eastern corner of the island, the Tasman 
Peninsula, Maria Island and Bruny Island. Only on Bruny Island was one 
ever established. Robinson, later came to realise his mistake in not considering 
more seriously the north-east. Indeed he hinted at the idea that the Aborigines 
would have moved to the region voluntarily had something akin to a treaty 
been negotiated. "Had this country been known-and its qualities-at the 
early settling of the colony," he wrote, "and proper arrangements made with 
the natives here, they might have dwelt without molesting the whites; it will 
never be of use to the white people .... " 14 
A reserve on the Tasman Peninsula was never established because of the 
failure of Arthur's Black Line to push the eastern tribes into that district; and 
Maria Island was deemed unsuitable because it was considered too close to 
the settled districts. Robinson established a reserve on Bruny Island in April 
1829 but disease amongst its Aboriginal residents forced its closure less than 
a year later. 15 
14Plomley, Friendly Mission: The Tasmanian Journals and Papers of George Augustus 
Robinson, 1829-1834, p.388. 
15This will be discussed further in Chapter 5; Plomley, Friendly Mission, pp.105-106. 
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5.2 . Settled Districts 
Arthur's first active attempt at pacification was to try to push the Aborigines 
out of the "settled districts". Lamenting that "we are undeniably the first 
aggressors," Arthur was "convinced of the absolute necessity of separating the 
Aborigines altogether from the white inhabitants, and of removing the former 
entirely from the settled districts, until their habits shall become more civi-
lized." 16 Arthur felt that by separating the two groups, each could be protected 
from the other's hostility and violence. The settled districts would encompass 
the whole of the midlands and east coast, except for the north-east corner. 
On 15 April 1828, Arthur published a government proclamation which 
stated "that for the purpose of effecting the separation required, a line of 
military posts will be forthwith stationed and established along the settled 
districts". Within these districts, Arthur commanded, "the Aborigines shall 
and may not ... penetrate or in any manner, or for any purpose .... And I do 
hereby strictly command and order all Aborigines immediately to retire or 
depart from, and for no reason, or on no pretence ... to re-enter .... " The mili-
tary and civilians, alike, were "entreated" to resist the use of force against the 
Aborigines "except for necessary self-defence" and told that they would face 
prosecution if any such Aborigine "complain[ed] to some constituted authority 
16Proclamation Separating the Aborigines from the White Inhabitants, 15 September 
1828, in Arthur to Huskinsson, 17April1828, HRA Resumed Series, III.7, pp.178-184. 
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of any such misconduct, or ill treatment ... "17 
Arthur, however, realised that he could only achieve his intended goals by 
creating conditions satisfactory to those he was planning to dislocate. Noting 
that "the Aborigines wander over extensive tracts of country, without culti-
vating, or permanently occupying any portion of it," he concluded _that he 
could only end hostilities by "allot[ting] and assign[ing] certain specified tracts 
of land to the [Aborigines], for their exclusive benefit, and continued occupa-
tion." In the short term, moreover, nothing was to 
prevent the Aborigines from travelling annually (according to their 
custom) until their habits shall have been rendered more regular 
and settled, through the cultivated, or occupied parts of the island 
to the sea coast in ... on condition of their respective leaders being 
provided with a general passport .... 18 
Most importantly, Arthur realised his settled districts policy needed to have 
the support of Aborigines and so "a negociation [sic] with certain chiefs of 
Aboriginal tribes" was planned. 19 These negotiations, however, did not occur 
before force invariably became the primary means by which Arthur's orders 
17Proclamation Separating the Aborigmes from the White Inhabitants, 15 September 
1828, in Arthur to Huskinsson, 17 April 1828, HRA Resumed Series, III.7, pp.178-184. 
18Proclamation Separating the Aborigines from the White Inhabitants, 15 September 
1828, in Arthur to Huskinsson, 17 April 1828, HRA Resumed Series, III.7, pp.178-184. 
19Proclamation Separating the Aborigines from the White Inhabitants, 15 September 
1828, in Arthur to Huskinsson, 17 April 1828, HRA Resumed Series, III.7, pp.178-184. 
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were carried out.20 Nevertheless, supported by Secretary of State, Sir George 
Murray, who understood "the extremely difficult task of inducing [these] ig-
norant beings. : . to acknowledge any authority short of absolute force, partic-
ularly when possessed with the idea which they appear to entertain in regard 
to their own rights over the country .... "21 Arthur perceived the creation of 
the settled districts as the most likely means to peacefully separate them from 
the European population.22 
Arthur's "settled districts" scheme had a number of antecedents, some of 
which Arthur may well have been aware of from his time in British Hon-
duras. In 1796 the United States Congress concluded that a line was needed 
to separate settler land from Native American holdings. A provisional division 
of white and native American settlement had been first established with the 
Royal Proclamation of 17fi3 which deemed that lands west of the Appalachian 
mountains were off limits to white settlement. It was "Indian country for the 
Indian nations." While the concept of the line remained ineradicable, the line 
itself moved over time. Gradually it was pushed south and west as various Na-
tive American nations treated with the colonial governments exchanging their 
traditional homelands for the promise of annuities and alternative guaranteed 
lands to the west. When Arthur took power in Van Diemen's Land, the north 
20 Arthur to Huskisson, 17 April 1828, HRA, III. 7, pp.178-184. 
21 Murray to Arthur, 20 February 1829, HRA Resumed Series, III.8, pp.261-262. 
22 Arthur to Huskisson, 17 April 1828, HRA Resumed Series, III. 7, p.182. 
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American line followed the Red River from its mouth in the Mississippi Delta 
north to Lake SuperioL 23 
In New South Wales the notion of creating "settled districts" had also been 
considered. Judge-Advocate Atkins made the suggestion in 1807 and later in 
1816 Governor Macquarie had found it necessary to enforce military action 
against Aboriginal groups who had continued to attack colonists in the outlying 
settlements. When punitive military expeditions against the Aborigines failed 
to return peace to the colony Macquarie decreed that "no black native or body 
of black natives shall ever appear at or within one mile of any town, village or 
farm, occupied by, or belonging to any British subject, armed with any warlike 
or offensive weapon .... "24 
Additionally, the use of passports was attempted in north America, South 
Africa and New South Wales. In north America they were issued to white 
settlers who sought to trade with Native American groups. In South Africa 
and New South Wales passports were issued to indigenous groups who sought 
temporary access to the settled districts. Macquarie's 1816 proclamation, 
though expelling hostile Aborigines from settlement, allowed for those who 
were deemed "peaceful" and "inoffensive" to "be furnished with Passports or 
23Prucha, The Great Father, pp.24-25 & 315. 
24Atkins to King, 20 July 1805, HRA, I.5, p.503; Macquarie to Bathurst, 8 June 1816, 
HRA I, 9, p.142. \ 
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Certificates to that Effect, signed by the Government .... "25 A more recent 
precedent for Arthur was the implementation of a pass system by Governor 
Richard Bourke in South Africa the previous year. Its aim was to control 
the movement of Kaffir and Hottentot labour groups while at the same time 
protecting them from exploitation by their employers. The system was finally 
overturned because rather than protect them, it forced the Hottentots into an 
even more miserable state of bondage. 26 
5.3- Martial Law 
By Spring 1828 such was the tenor of hostilities that though Arthur had not 
yet "resign[ed] all hope of pacifying those angry feelings which are at present 
but too evident on both sides," he "felt the painful necessity of adopting some 
decided measures to suppress the encreasing [sic] spirit of resentment man-
ifested by the coloured inhabitants of this colony." On 1 November 1828, 
Arthur declared martial law in the settled districts, officially proclaiming that 
the colony was in a state of war. On 1 October 1830 he had extended martial 
law across the whole of Van Diemen's Land in order to carry out his Black 
25 Macquarie to Bathurst, 8 June 1816, HRA, I.9, pp.141-145; H. King, Richard Bourke 
(Melbourne, 1971), pp.109-136. 
26 Macquarie to Bathurst, 8 June 1816, HRA, I.9, pp.141-145; H. King, Richard Bourke 
(Melbourne, 1971), pp.109-136. 
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Line operations, though he never intended it as a licence for settlers to indis-
criminately slaughter Aboriginal groups. The "destruction of the Aborigines" 
was not his aim. Murray regretted Arthur's need to resort to such measures, 
but approved the proclamation nonetheless. He hoped that martial law would 
"not only secure the lives and property of the settlers, but benefit the na-
tives themselves". Murray entreated Arthur to repeal martial law as soon as 
possible. 27 
Four years previously, finding he had no other "legal intermediate powers to 
suppress the aggressions of the Aborigines," Sir Thomas Brisbane had declared 
martial law against Aboriginal groups in the Bathurst region after they had 
continued to attack settlers and their properties. Four months later Brisbane 
repealed the order "finding the measures, which have been adopted have had 
the desired effect; as, by the latest accounts, the hostile natives were hourly 
coming in to tender their submission and sue for peace and protection." 28 Sec-
retary of State, Lord Bathurst, endorsed Brisbane's actions by his subsequent 
instructions to Brisbane's successor, Darling (a copy of which Darling gave to 
Arthur). "[R]especting the manner, in which the native inhabitants are to be 
treated when making hostile incursions for the purpose of plunder", Bathurst 
wrote, 
27 Arthur to Huskisson, 17 April 1828, HRA, III.7, p.178; Murray to Arthur, 25 August 
1829, HRA Resumed Series, III.8, pp.587-588. 
28 Brisbane to Bathurst, 3 November 1824, HRA, I.11, pp.409-11, 430-31. 
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you will understand it to be your duty when such disturbances can-
not be prevented or allayed by less vigourous measures, to oppose 
force by force, and to repel such aggressions in the same manner, 
as if they proceeded from subjects of an accredited state. 29 
These instructions were portentous for they tacitly sanctioned the use of vio-
lence against native groups, even though general Imperial policy focussed on 
their protection and security. 
For Arthur the instructions, which he quoted precisely to the Executive 
Council, were especially significant because they ultimately guided the decision 
to implement martial law against the Aborigines of Van Diemen's Land.30 
With martial law having been effective in New South Wales, Arthur had 
a precedent to follow when he decided to impose it on the Aborigines of Van 
Diemen's Land. Support from the Colonial Secretary convinced him that he 
was right to follow this course of action. Murray's sanction was particularly 
important for, according to modern historian, John McMahon, the Manual of 
Military Law declared that martial law could be enforced only under excep-
tional circumstances. McMahon argues that although 
29Bathurst to Darling, 14 July 1825, HRA, I.12, p.21. 
30Though Windschuttle argues against the notion of an Aboriginal war in Van Diemen's 
Land, rt must be noted that Arthur's decision to declare martial law was based precisely 
on Bathurst's directions to treat the Aborigines as if they were at war against the colony; 
see Windschuttle, The Fabrication of Aboriginal History, pp. 95-111; Arthur to Murray, 4 
November 1828, HRA Resumed Series, IIl.7, pp.625-635. 
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the proclamation warned that common law still applied in martial 
law areas, except on military operations against the natives, it did 
protect whites from the rigours of common law when involved in 
any dubious killing of an Aborigine when on patrol." 31 
The letter of the law was put to the test when a Van Diemen's Com-
parry shepherd, Nathaniel Russell, killed an Aboriginal woman at Emu Bay 
in reprisal for an attack by her group on him and his companion, Richard 
Sweetling. The application of martial law in the district offered a loophole 
by which Russell, Sweetling and their overseer, Alexander Goldie, eventually 
avoided prosecution. 
On 21 August 1829 a party under the supervision of Alexander Goldie came 
across a group of Aborigines at Emu Bay. Upon being observed the group fled, 
but not before Russell "fired at one just as she was taking the scrub and shot 
her." She died after Richard Sweetling struck her from behind with an axe. 
Goldie took a second woman hostage. Van Diemen's Land Company manager, 
Edward Curr reprimanded Goldie severely. "That the killing of this woman 
31 McMahon notes that Governor Davey's proclamation of martial law against the 
bushrangers was annulled by Governor Macquarie and though Arthur's was never chal- . 
lenged he took pains to define the specific districts in which it was enforced; see Arthur 
to Murray, 4 November 1828, enclosures, 2-4; see J. McMahon, The British Army and 
the Counter-Insurgency Campaign in Van Diemen's Land With Particular Reference to the 
Black Line, unpublished Masters of Humanities Thesis, University of Tasmania, 1995, pp. 
26-27; Arthur to Murray, 4 November 1828, HRA, III.7, pp.625-635; Brisbane to Bathurst, 
3 November 1824, HRA, I.11, pp.409-411. 
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amounts to murder in a moral sense," he stated, "I have no doubt whatever, 
and as little that you are a guilty party accessory to the crime. What may be 
thought of it in a legal sense I do not know .... "32 
Curr, as District Magistrate, carried out the inquiry the followed the slay-
ings. Forwarding his findings to the Company's directors, he concluded that 
the "existence of martial law at the time the act was done, takes the case 
out of the rules to be found in the books which the Justices of the Peace are 
ordinarily provided with ... " He, thus, considered that 
the effect of proclaiming Martial Law to be to place the Natives 
against whom proclaimed, (no exception in this respect in favour 
of Women and Children) and if found within the limits specified 
in the Proclamation, beyond the pale and protection of the Law. 
That to destroy those against whom Martial law is proclaimed, 
ceases to be an offense [sic] against the civil Law .... "33 
Arthur could not "but feel the deepest and most poignant regret, that a Na-
tive Female should have been destroyed under the circumstances represented." 
He sent the correspondence that had passed between Government House and 
32Goldie to Curr, 16 September 1829, Curr to Goldie, 30 September 1829, Curr to Arthur, 
19 December 1829, in Arthur to Hay, 20 November 1830, C.O. 280/25, PRO Reel 245, pp.432 
& 476-477. 
33Curr to Arthur, 19 Decemb~r 1829, in Arthur to Hay, 20 November 1830, C.O. 280/25, 
PRO Reel 245, p.440. 
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the Van Diemen's Land Company to the Solicitor-General in Van Diemen's 
Land, Alfred Stephen, who, in the end, for want of information, could not 
form an opinion on whether or not a crime was committed. However, Stephen 
did "apprehend the effect of the Proclamation to be, certainly, to place the 
Aborigines, within the prescribed limits on the footing of open enemies to the 
King, in a state of actual warfare against him" and that "I think th~refore, 
that the Pursuit of the Natives by Mr. Goldie and his party, was lawful." 34 
While the proclamation of martial law allowed Goldie and his men to avoid 
potentially severe legal repercussions, it also demonstrated that the Tasma-
nian Aborigines, for all intents and purposes, did not enjoy the protection of 
His Majesty's laws. 
5.4 The Aborigines Committee 
In March 1830 Arthur established the Aborigines Committee, a group corn-
prised of colonial civil servants, clergymen and the colonial surgeon. It was 
chaired by Archdeacon William Broughton who was visiting from Sydney at 
the time. The committee's task was to "collect the most ample information, 
and to consider what measures it would be necessary to pursue .... "35 Charged 
34Stephen to Arthur, 3 February 1830, in Arthur to Hay, 20 November 1830, C.O. 280/25, 
PRO Reel 245, pp.434 & 462. 
35 All references to the findings of the Aborigines Committee, unless otherwise noted, are 
taken from the Report of the Aborigines Committee, 19 March 1830, in Arthur to Murray, 
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with obtaining "a connected view of the origin, progress, and existing char-
acter of [the Aborigines'] hostilities", the committee considered the evidence 
of numerous witnesses from throughout the colony. As well as Broughton, 
the committee was attended by Reverend William Bedford (who had replaced 
Knopwood as senior chaplain upon his arrival in Van Diemen's Land in 1823), 
Reverend James Norman (chaplain at Sorell), District Magistrate Peter Archer 
Mulgrave (who at various times had also held the positions of Superintendent 
of Schools and Chief Police Magistrate at Launceston), Dr James Scott (colo-
nial surgeon at Hobart Town), Samuel Hill (Port Officer and Superintendent 
of Colonial Marine in Hobart Town), Jocelyn Thomas (Colonial Treasurer and 
member of the Executive Council) and Charles Arthur, the governor's nephew. 
Charles Arthur was first employed as his uncle's private secretary and later as 
Barrack Master and colonial aide-de-camp. 36 
The Committee's first task was to call prominent landowners to present 
their perceptions of the Aboriginal crisis. As to who were first aggressors, 
opinions varied. Some considered that the stock keepers and sealers alone had 
caused the hostilities. Others concluded that it was settlement itself that had 
15 April 1830, CO 280/24, PRO Reel 244, pp.408-453. 
36It is interesting to note that James Ross, pressman and editor, who had as much knowl-
edge of the Aborigines as anyone, was not invited to join the committee. He had first hand 
experience living with Aboriginal groups on his "Hermitage" property and was able to report 
an amicable relationship with them; see entries for William Broughton, William Bedford, 
James Norman, Peter Archer Mulgrave, James Scott, Samuel Hill, Jocelyn Thomas and 
Charles Arthur in Australian Dictionary of Biography (Melbourne, 1966). 
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driven the Aborigines to their aggressions. The Risdon affray was recounted , 
on several occasions. A number of people recognised that the Aborigines had 
developed a "desire for European comforts" which had originated from those 
too-generous settlers who had kept the various bands supplied with provi-
sions. Some thought that the Aborigines were aware of the good intentions 
of the government and the more respectable settlers, and therefore it might 
be possible to open a conciliatory line of communication. James Cox agreed 
with Edward Curr who more perceptively believed that aggressions "have been 
kept up equally by both parties, chiefly from the impossibility of coming to an 
understanding as to the causation of hostilities." 37 
Suggestions were sought for solutions to overcome hostilities. William 
Barnes and Edward Frank proposed that Aborigines could be provided with 
gifts to distribute to their families, "to whom they will communicate what they 
had been told and how they had been treated." The latter, however, thought 
that the offering of gifts should be combined with force " ... to impress them 
with fear and then possibly the hand of amity will not be rejected". Captain 
Clark concurred, positing that "a system of coercion [sic] tempered with mercy 
should now commence ... the sword in one hand and the olive branch in the 
37 James Cox and Edward Curr in Answers given by settlers and others to certain 
questions submitted together by the Aborigines Committee, CSO 1/323/7578, AOT Reel 
SLTX/AO/CS/117, pp.351-354 & 360-378. 
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other. ... " Roderick O'Connor favoured the sword, making the robust sugges-
tions that "some of the worst characters would be the best to send after [the 
Aborigines]." Douglas Ibbens, O'Connor thought, ''with his double-barrelled 
gun", "would soon put an end to the eastern mob if he were employed." Refer-
ring to the north American experience, Edward Curr gave a most astonishing 
recommendation. "Savages have been civilized through the medium of their 
vices", he declared, 
. . . . The first part of the process has been to treat the savages to 
drink and smoke. (I do not mean that this has been done system-
atically.) Occasional indulgence soon grows into a habit. When 
their supply is stopped they begin to consider how they can renew 
it, and they soon understand that they can only have their wants 
supplied by giving an equivalent. This is the first dawning of trade: 
they procure skins that they may barter them for spirits and to-
bacco, and then the graduation from drunkenness to Christianity 
seems not very remote. 38 
Arthur hoped, rather, that if he offered rewards for the capture of Abo-
rigines, the settlers would be encouraged to take active measures to conciliate 
38 Answers given by settlers and others to certain questions submitted together by the 
Aborigines Committee, CSO 1/323/7578, AOT Reel SLTX/AO/CS/117, pp.360-378. 
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them. Ryan argues, however, that this policy merely served to encourage peo-
ple to engage in "black catching" .39 Two years previously Governor Darling 
had offered rewards for the capture of Aborigines who were carrying out attacks 
around Fort Wellington. Darling hoped to prevent further hostilities by taking 
certain individuals captive, hoping that if they were treated "with kindness 
and attention" they would then return to their people with a better impres-
sion of the settlers. In a more brutal experiment in north America rewards-or 
bounties-were offered for the scalps of Native Americans. Indeed, this Na-
tive American practice was adopted by settlers in New England when bounties 
were offered for the scalps of Maine's Penobscot Indians.40 Arthur's plan was 
much less lucrative. He offered £5 per adult and £2 per child but insisted that 
the individuals be taken into custody voluntarily and unharmed.41 
The Aborigines Committee presented its findings and recommendations to 
39Ryan, The Aborigines Tasmanians, p.102. 
40 Male scalps drew a bounty of £40 and female and children's scalps, £20; see J. Axtell 
& W. Sturtevant, "The Unkindest Cut, or Who Invented Scalping", William and Mary 
Quarterly (July 1980), p.452. 
41 It is interesting to compare the rewards offered for bushrangers as against those offered 
for Aborigines. Arthur's desire to temper with humanity all of his actions against the latter 
led him to limit the force with which he dealt with them. Arthur occasionally enjoyed the 
results for which he hoped. He endowed the reward of a conditional pardon to John Banfield, 
convict shepherd to the Police Magistrate, William Laing Smith of Whitefoord Hills, for his 
"firmness and coolness" in bringing in a group of Aborigines. Banfield convinced them to go 
with him by offering them bread and blankets. According to Smith, "he became so friendly 
with all three as to induce them to go opposum shooting with him, by which stratagem he 
led them to the military party stationed at Captain Moriarty's"; see Darling to Huskisson, 
28 August 1828, HRA, I.14, pp.350-351; Smith to Parramore, 28 September 1830, CSO 
1/316/7578, AOT Reel SLTX/AO/CS/114, pp.643-645; Smith to Burnett, 28 September 
1830, CSO 1/316/7578, AOT Reel SLTX/AO/CS/114, pp.639-642; Hobart Town Gazette, 
9 October 1830; Ryan, The Aboriginal Tasmanians, p.102. 
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the Executive Council on 19 March 1830. The committee concluded that the 
colony was in crisis. Chairman Broughton speculated that "the total ruin of 
every establishment is but too certainly to be apprehended unless immediate 
means can be devised for suppressing the system of aggression under which so 
many are at this time suffering .... "42 Though much attention was paid to the 
offensive activities and behaviour of the Europeans against the Aborigines, 
the committee ultimately concluded that it was "a lurking spirit of cruelty 
and mischievous craft" that motivated the most aggressive tribes. The "acts 
of violence on the part of the natives," the panel considered, should not be 
viewed simply as acts of retribution. Rather, they were the result of "a wanton 
and savage spirit ... impelling [the Aborigines] to mischief and cruelty .... "43 
The committee's recommendations combined increased force against Abo-
riginal aggression, with a greater sensitivity-despite the Abor~gines' "wanton 
and savage spirit"-to the causes of those hostilities. The "base and barbarous 
conduct which some [stock keepers and convict servants] have pursued towards 
the natives," the committee deduced, combined with the destruction of the 
Aborigines' "principal source of sustenance"-the kangaroo-had caused the 
42 Aborigines Committee Report, 19th March 1830 in Arthur to Murray, 15 April 1830, 
CO 280/24, PRO Reel 244, p.447. 
43 Aborigines Committee Report, 19th March 1830 in Arthur to Murray, 15 April 1830, 
CO 280/24, PRO Reel 244, p.440. 
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current crisis. Both activities needed to be checked and offenders severely pun-
ished. Realising, though, how effective the Aborigines had become against the 
settlers-especially those in outlying areas-more attention was paid by the 
committee to preparing settlers to better resist their Aboriginal assailants. The 
committee recommended that the sanctioned operations against the Aborig-
ines be better managed (using the magistrates in the various police districts), 
with access to resources such as ammunition increased. Moreover, those who 
were employed against the Aborigines needed to be "engaging leaders of higher 
qualification," regardless of their convict or settler station.44 
To encourage the Aborigines to, themselves, seek peace Arthur experi-
mented with picture boards to relay his message. He realised that he could 
not negotiate with them until he was able to communicate effectively with 
them. 
5.5 Picture Boards 
Arthur seems to have become intrigued by the idea of using pictures to commu-
nicate with the Aborigines when Surveyor General, George Frankland, wrote 
to him with the idea in February 1829. "I have lately had an opportunity of 
44 Aborigines Committee Report, 19th March 1830 in Arthur to Murray, 15 April 1830, 
CO 280/24, PRO Reel 244, pp.448-451. 
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ascertaining that the aboriginal natives of Van Diemen's Land are in the habit 
of representing events by drawings on the bark of trees," he wrote, 
and that the march of a certain party of Europeans over a country 
before unfrequented by us was found a short time afterwards drawn 
with charcoal on a piece of bark, by a tribe of natives who [had] 
been observed attentively watching their movements. The carts, 
the bullocks, the men, were distinctly represented, according to the 
exact number that really existed. 
In the absence of all successful communication with these unfortu-
nate people, with whose language we are totally unacquainted, it 
has occurred to me that it might be possible through the medium 
of this nev:rly discovered faculty, to impart to them to a certain 
extent, the real wishes of the government towards them, and I 
have accordingly sketched a series of groups of figures, in which I 
have endeavoured to represent in a manner as simple and as well 
adapted to their supposed ideas, as possible, the actual state of 
things (or rather the origin of the present state) and the desired 
~ermination of hostility. 
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The proposal which I venture to make is that, if Your Excell~ncy 
approves of the drawings, they should be multiplied, and being 
made on more durable materials, should be fastened on trees in 
those remote situations where the natives are most likely to see 
them .... "45 
Arthur sought Robinson's opinion on the likely success of such a venture. 
Robinson apparently encouraged Arthur, for an editorial in the Colonial Times 
four months later indicated that the Governor had the drawings commissioned 
so as "to be placed in the bush for the contemplation of the Aboriginal Inhab-
itants." However by September, Robinson feared that the venture would come 
to nothing: "The Governor might as well publish his proclamation to gum 
trees as to the blacks,'' he wrote, "for who was there to explain it to them?" 46 
45 At least fqur signboards and a number of lithographs still survive, housed in museums as 
far away as Cambridge and New York City. Debate exists about whether Governor Davey 
or Arthur was the original author. Anecdotal evidence exists that during Davey's time 
pictures were posted on trees around what is now Battery Point. However, Frankland's 
letter to Arthur and references to the lithographs in Robinson's journal, indicate that it is 
more likely that Arthur commissioned and distributed those illustrations which are housed 
in various museums today; see Frankland to Arthur, 4 February 1829, Tasmanian Archives, 
LSO 17 /1; K. Little, "A British Proclamation of Justice to the Tasmanians, 1815," Man: A 
Record of Anthropological Science, XLV, nos.1-18 (1945), p.1; J. Morris, "Notes on a Message 
to the Tasmanian Aborigines in 1829, Popularly called "Governor Davey's Proclamation to 
the Aborigines, 1816", Australiana, 10.3 (1988), pp.84-87; Melville, The History of the 
Island of Van Diemen's Land, pp.31-35; Plomley, Friendly Mission, p.92; The Mercury, 26 
November 1874; Hudspeth to Mitchell Librarian, 20 June 1947; Frankland Correspondence 
File, Tasmanian Archives; M. Hookey, Bobby Knopwood and His Times: from the Diaries 
of 1804-1808, 1814-1817 (Hobart, 1929), p.86. 
46 Colonial Times, 5 March 1830; Plomley, Friendly Mission, p.209. 
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Figure 5.2: 
Governor Davey 's Proclamation to the Aborigines, 1816; Source: 
Allport Library and Museum of Fine Arts; image taken from: 
http: / / images.statelibrary.tas.gov.au. 
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Arthur addressed this problem by presenting a copy of the hieroglyphic to 
the Stoney Creek chief, Umarrah, who was now attached to Robinson's mission 
party. The colonial newspaper, the Tasmanian, reported that 
[t]his sketch Numarrow prized very highly. He spoke of it repeat-
edly, and carried it with him when he went away. It is not there-
fore impossible but that he may yet intend to conciliate his sable 
brethren, rather than stimulate them, as has been apprehended, to 
fresh depredations. 47 
Arthur also sent boards to the commandant at Launceston, Major Abbott, 
who distributed them to Captain Welsh at Perth who had two Aboriginal boys 
living with him. He also distributed them to a party of western Aborigines 
who were being sent to Edward Curr at Circular Head to be returned to their 
people.48 
It is unclear where else the illustrations were hung, or who else was em-
played to distribute them. Certainly it is difficult to know how they were 
47 Tasmanian, 26 November 1830. 
48The three youths had originally been captured by Ro_binson and shipped to Launceston 
in order that Robinson could collect a reward for them. Arthur then ordered Abbott to 
return the three to Circular Head. They were: Pendowtewer from Robbin's Island, and 
Narrucker and Linemerrinnecer from Rocky Point. It is likely that at this point Arthur was 
engrossed in planning for the Black Line operation. Focussed on capturing the Big River 
people, Arthur seems to have wanted to demonstrate his good regard for those individuals 
and groups who appeared receptive to his conciliatory efforts. Though he was offering 
rewards for their capture, he was also inclined to return to their own people any who proved 
cooperative; see Tasmanian, 26 November 1830; Abbott to Burnett, 30 August 1830, CSO 
1/330/7578, AOT Reel SLTX/AO/CS/118, pp.159-160; Plomley, Friendly Mission pp. 108-
109 & 434. 
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interpreted. Fifty years later, historian, James Calder, was still scathing in his 
analysis of them: 
This masterpiece of picture writing is divided into four compart-
ments, in the two first of which the abstract idea of peace, friend-
ship and unity are represented, and justice-that is to say hanging-
in the other; but in all of them there is such a muddle of love and 
enmity, peace and war, that it would take a clearer head than mine 
to do justice to the design by description.49 
It is questionable whether the picture boards or the increased presence of 
armed colonists throughout the settled districts created the deeper impression. 
Certainly the existence of civilian roving parties, employed to gather up Abo-
riginal groups, communicated to them that Arthur was willing to use force to 
achieve his desired results. 
5.6 Roving Parties 
The roving parties were small groups of men employed to track~ and capture 
Aboriginal tribes. When fully established and organised these parties which 
were composed of civilians and convict servants were centrally administered 
49 Mercury, 25 November 1874. 
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by Oatlands District Magistrate, Thomas Anstey. They were led by the Chief 
District Constable at Richmond, Gilbert Robertson, convict field policeman, 
Jorgen Jorgenson and free settler John Batman who also employed a number 
of Sydney Aborigines as guides. McMahon describes the parties as "essentially 
bounty hunters ... [who] rather than reacting to r~ids ... maintained a harassing 
pressure on the Aborigines, driving them from place to place within their 
normally safe retreats." 50 
The roving parties were created in November 1828 when Robertson, with 
the assistance of Black Tom, employed as a guide in the Richmond district, 
captured five Stoney Creek tribe members near Swanport, including the promi-
nent tribal leaders, Jemmy and Umarrah.51 Robertson realised that Aboriginal 
resistance could only be broken if the guerrilla leaders were captured. He was 
convinced that 
it will be impossible to protect the white inhabitants from the 
outrages of those savages or to prevent the blacks from being sac-
rificed on every occasion to the revenge or barbarity of the stock 
keepers while there is a black native chief at large in the settled 
districts ... I do not conceive that it would be impossible to catch 
50McMahon, The British Army and the Counter-Insurgency Campaign in Van Diemen's 
Land, p.28. 
51 Umarrah's Aboriginal name was Kan.ne.her.largenner or Mole.te.he.er.lag.gen.ner. 
'Umarrah' seems to have been a corruption of Hugh Murray, the name of a settler from 
Campbell Town; see Plomley, Przendly Mission, pp.992 & 1002. 
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every native in the . settled districts within twelve months if the 
government would go to a little expense and trust the direction of 
the parties to the persons who are capable of making such a charge 
and will conscientiously perform the duty which they undertake. 
Robertson began to understand some of political machinations guiding the 
Aboriginal activists. To Arthur he declared: 
They consider every injury they can inflict upon the white men 
as an act of duty and patriotism and however much they may 
wreak the punishments which our laws inflict upon them, they 
consider the sufferers under punishment as martyrs in the conquest 
of their country. They effect a degree of foolish simplicity in their 
intercourse with the white inhabitants but they are in reality a 
shrewd, cunning race having ideas of their natural rights which 
would astonish most European statesmen. 52 
Though Robertson was convinced that Umarrah had the skills to negotiate 
peace with the colonial government, he was concerned at the chief's apparent 
lack of authority amongst the remnant tribes. 53 
52Robertson to Lesailly, 17 November 1828, CSO 1/331/7578,. AOT Reel 
SLTX/AO/CS/118, pp.168-177. 
53Robertson to Lesailly, 17 November 1828, CSO 1/331/7578, AOT Reel 
SLTX/AO/CS/118, pp.168-177; Arthur to Brigade Major, 2 January 1829, CSO 
1/317/7578; AOT Reel SLTX/AO/CS/115, pp.5-6;Tasmanian and Australasiatic Review, 
28 November 1828. 
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Arthur supported Robertson's scheme and on 2 January 1829 he was di-
rected to "take charge of a roving party of 10 or 12 men to be employed against 
the aborigines." Robertson was placed under the authority of the Brigade Ma-
jor and promised a salary of £150 per year. 54 
Soon after Jorgenson and ~atman were employed to lead parties. Jor-
genson understood their role was to "protect the settlements" and to force 
the various Aboriginal groups into a situation where they could be captured 
"without the parties in pursuit of them being compelled to shed' more human 
blood than should be necessary to bring them to a_sense of justice and moder-
ation." Jorgenson was probably the most thoughtful and capable of all of the 
roving party leaders. He had experienced the Aborigines in their own environ-
ment and had given the whole Aboriginal question much consideration, the 
conclusions of which he readily shared with Governor Arthur. Indeed, Arthur 
eventually developed and implemented a number of Jorgenson's suggestions 
(though he did not acknowledge them officially, or even privately in written 
correspondence, as being Jorgenson's ideas).55 
Though well-intentioned, the roving party scheme enjoyed little success 
54Robertson to Lesailly, 17 November 1828, CSO 1/331/7578, Reel SLTX/AO/CS/118, 
pp.168-177.; Arthur to Brigade Major, 2 January 1829, CSO 1/317/7578, AOT Reel 
SLTX/AO/CS/115, pp.5-6. 
55Two of these suggestions were 1) reserves to be established on Aboriginal lands in 
the north west of the colony and 2) cultural missionaries to be sent to live amongst the 
Aborigines and acclimate them to European ways. See Chapter 6 for a more complete 
discussion of Jorgenson's suggestions for the conciliation of the Aborigines. 
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and the reports that Anstey received reveal that about three times as many 
Aborigines were killed as were captured. 56 Certainly there is evidence that the 
roving party leaders were not the most suitable candidates for their positions. 
Robertson resented the fact that he had to answer to Anstey and he refused 
to collaborate with the other roving party leaders. He used his position for 
private profit, employing those under him to work his grants in the Richmond 
district. Likewise, Batman, at times seemed ill-equipped for his commission. 
In the words of contemporary historian, John West, he mingled "humanity 
with severity" . 57 
When Batman came across a band comprised of members of the Oyster 
Bay, Ben Lomond, Campbell Town and Stoney Creek tribes near his property 
early in September 1829 he shot most of them in a bungled attempt to carry out 
a reconnaissance of the group. He did, however, manage to take into custody 
a woman and a small child. The following morning he found eleven men and 
two women wounded and dying, three of whom he took back to his residence. 
However, finding "it quite impossible that [they] could walk and often trying 
them by every means in my power, for some time found I could not get them 
on I was obliged therefore to shoot them." A few weeks later he was able 
to capture a party of eleven alive, which included three women, two infants, 
56Plomley (ed.), Jorgen Jorgenson and the Aborigines of Van Diemen's Land, p.21; Ryan, 
The Aboriginal Tasmanians, p.102. 
57West, The History of Tasmania, p.281. 
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three boys, and two young men. The six adult males in the group managed to 
escape. Batman retained an infant boy and a young man. He christened the 
boy "Ben Lamond" and the young man he learnt was named Mungo. Both 
seem to have been sons of the Oyster Bay chief, Mannalargenna. Mungo was 
attached to a party led by John Danvers to act as a guide, tracking those who 
escaped.58 As Melville noted, Batman's clandestine methods for capturing 
Aboriginal groups were typical of the Aborigines' own hit-and-run tactics.59 
Conflicting forces were at work regarding the roving parties. Arthur en-
couraged the parties' efforts by augmenting the mi1itary along the settlement 
frontiers to hem in the Aborigines. But he still insisted that they were to be 
treated with humanity and kindness. A lack of accurate reporting leaves the 
true character of the roving parties difficult to define. To be sure, the roving 
parties did not act as humanely as Arthur entreated, and there were times 
when their aggression went unchecked. That Batman felt he could officially 
report the killing of an entire band suggests he realised that Arthur proba-
bly would probably not enforce the sanctions he had proclaimed against the 
needless killing and injuring of Aborigines. Outlying settlers, too, were pro-
tected by the blanket of martial law and also by the problems associated with 
58J. Calder, Some Account of the Wars, Extirpation, Habits &c., of the Native Tribes of 
Tasmania (1875), p.17; Jorgenson to Anstey, 18 June 1829, CSO 1/320/7578, AOT Reel 
SLTX/AO/CS/116, pp.275-278; Batman to Anstey, 7 September 1829, CSO 1/320/7578, 
AOT Reel SLTX/AO/CS/116, pp.142-146; Colonial Times, 17 February 1830. 
59Melville, The History of the Island of Van Diemen's Land. 
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collecting and verifying evidence against the guilty parties in question. 
The roving parties were disbanded in January 1831 after the Black Line 
operation, at which point there remained little further need for them. Arthur, 
too, had for a long time been "discouraged at the total want of success of all 
the parties who have been employed ... against the Aborigines .... " Jorgenson 
listed a number of reasons for the roving parties' lack of success60 and indeed, 
the two objectives he outlined at the commencement of the scheme were not 
achieved. The continued attacks on settlers indicates that the roving parties 
did not effectively protect the whole of the settled districts. However, other 
indirect success did come from the scheme. For Batman'~ part at least, the 
killing of one band and the capture of a second one drastically reduced the 
number of attacks on settlers in the Ben Lomond district. In the two years 
previous to Batman's employment as a roving party leader the number of at-
tacks had been gradually escalating. From February 1827 until late August 
1829 the district suffered seventeen attacks, as stock huts were raided and 
livestock speared. Eight convict servants were killed, five of them belonging to 
60Jorgenson listed these as: 1) the want of a comprehensive plan for the roving parties, 
2) a lack of discipline, 3) inveterate laziness, 4) the offer of indulgences to the convicts 
irrespective of success, 5) deceit practised by the roving party leaders, 6) the unwillingness 
of the black trackers to capture their fellow Aborigines and 7) attributing their lack of 
success to the skills of the Aborigines; see Anstey to Burnett, 15 December 1829, CSO 
1/320/7578, AOT Reel SLT/AO/CS/116, pp.55-57; Plomley (ed.), Jorgen Jorgenson and 
the Aborigines of Van Diemen's Land, p.25. 
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William Talbot of Fingal. After the capture of the band, hostilities eased con-
siderably. 61 More significantly, by attaching Aboriginal guides to the parties, 
an avenue of communication was opened between Arthur and the Aborigines. 
All of the Aborigines with whom Arthur had th~ opportunity to meet had 
been attached to roving parties. Later, these same individuals were attached 
to Robinson's "friendly mission" and played an integral part in bringing in the 
hostile eastern tribes. 
5. 7 The Black Line 
Arthur's final attempt at ending hostilities with the use of military force was an 
operation that came to be known as the "Black Line." The scheme combined 
conventional military strategies with guerrilla tactics. Arthur did not make 
his decision lightly to carry out the Black Line operations. For the desperate 
governor this was the final option in a scenario where the use of force, many 
believed, had become inevitable. After collecting information on the state of 
the colony's affairs from the various administrators under his command and 
seeking advice from the Executive Council, Arthur found himself forced to act 
against the Aborigines. 
61 Colonial Times, 9 February 1827 & 28 August 1829; Hobart Town Courier, 8 December 
1827, 12 April, 15 November, 13 December, 1828, 4 April, 16, 23, 30 May, 18 July, 28 
August 1829; Launceston Advertiser, 13 April 1829; Simpson to Burnett, 1 April 1828, CSO 
1/316/7578, AOT Reel SLTX/AO/CS/114, pp.137-138. 
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Letters from Major Douglas, Captain Vicary and Thomas Anstey all brought 
unwelcome news. Vicary wrote to Arthur from Bothwell regretting that "the 
measures which I have adopted for the security of this District have failed 
in their effect." Major Douglas reported that, far from being expelled from 
the settled districts, the Aborigines had kept him busy in the Jericho region. 
Late in August, Anstey revealed that "the natives have evinced towards the 
white inhabitants, during the last two days, a spirit of the most determined 
and rancourous animosity." Reporting on the death of Thomas Hooper, the 
Police Magistrate concluded that it is "my firm opinion, that the Aborigines 
are, now, irreclaimable and that the coming Spring will be the most bloody 
that we have yet experienced." 62 
However, at this time, presented with a surprising feat of conciliation by 
Robinson, Arthur was actually vacillating between conciliation or more war-
like measures. He struggled painfully with a decision he was being forced to 
make. The governor had long maintained that the Aborigines and settlers 
could coexist in his colony and he was apt to believe that he could effect such 
a result. In a final attempt towards this end he, again, entreated the colonists 
to develop friendly and conciliatory relations with the Aborigines. Finding 
62Vicary to Arthur, 16 August 1830; Anstey to Arthur 24 August 1830, CSO 1/316/7578, 
AOT Reel SLTX/AO/CS/114, pp.564-565, 591-594. 
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hope in the fact that "a less hostile disposition towards the European inhab-
itants has been manifested by some of the aboriginal Natives of this Island, 
with whom ... Mr. G.A. Robinson [has] succeeded in opening a friendly inter-
course", he entreated the Hobart Town Gazette readers to continue to foster 
"the good understanding which has thus happily commenced." Any "Aborig-
ines [who] appear without evincing a hostile feeling", he added, should not 
be restrained or captured but "after being fed and kindly treated ... shall be 
suffered to depart whenever they desire it." 63 
Two government notices that followed on 19 August, however, pointed to 
Arthur's increasing alarm about the current state of hostilities. Reiterating 
the recommendations of the Aborigines Committee, Arthur, in his first notice, 
commanded that "all settlers and others will strictly enjoin their servants cau-
tiously to abstain from acts of aggression against these benighted beings, and 
that they will themselves personally endeavour to conciliate them wherever it 
may be practicable." His second notice reminded the colonists that rewards 
would only be paid for those groups which were captured whilst "committing 
aggressions on the inhabitants of the settled districts" and where "every degree 
of humanity" and "all efforts for their conciliation" proved ineffective. Again, 
630rder number 160, Government Notices, Hobart Town Gazette, 19 August 1830. 
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Arthur entreated, intercourse with Aboriginal groups outside the settled dis-
tricts was to be non-violent and non-coercive, those "inoffensive natives" from 
the remote districts to be treated with kindness and "permitted to depart 
whenever they desire it." Arthur reiterated that he would prosecute anyone 
proven to have carried out "any wanton attack or aggression against the na-
tives." 64 
The murder of Hooper, however, forced Arthur to the decision that he 
was loath to make. On 24 August an emergency public meeting was called 
in Jericho. The townsfolk pleaded with the governor to reconsider his stance. 
The memorialists wrote of the "inexpressible alarm of the consequences of a 
government notice no. 161 at a time when the aggressions of the Aborigines 
are becoming daily more and more systematic and numerous." They could 
only conclude that 
Your Excellency must be deceived respecting the real state of the 
colony or must labour under a mistake as respects [our] situation. 
In bringing in a few inimical blacks-a distinct people from those 
in the interior and who have not had any intercourse with the 
European settlers-is no criterion to judge of the character of the 
Aborigines generally as a people and the events of the last week in 
640rder number 161, Government Notices, Hobart Town Gazette, 20 August 1830. 
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this district must convince Your Excellency of the necessity of the 
most energetic measures as well for the protection of the colonists 
as for the subjugation of the Aborigines. 
The Jericho residents hoped that "Your Excellency will adopt some measure 
to relieve the colonists from their present perilous condition.65 
In an attempt to placate these desperate colonists, Arthur published a 
third government notice. He explained that the "friendly disposition [which 
had been] slightly manifested by a tribe which had been hostile" had led him 
to the false hope that the same could be achieved with other hostile tribes. 
His anxiousness that th(} settlers should temper with humanity their actions 
against the Aborigines led him to publish the previous orders. Offering the 
colonists some latitude in their dealings against the most hostile Aboriginal 
groups, he explained that his previous orders were "not intended to relax in 
the most strenuous exertions to repel and to drive from the settled districts 
those natives who seize every occasion to perpetrate murders and to plunder 
and destroy the property of the inhabitants." Indeed, their conduct "proves 
that the utmost vigilance is necessary for the safety of every dwelling." 66 
Arthur instructed the police magistrates and settlers to remain alert and 
65Jericho memorialists to Arthur, 24 August 1830, CSO 1/316/7578, AOT Reel 
SLTX/ AO /CS/114, pp.599-601. 
66 Government Notice, no.166, Hobart Town Gazette, 27 August 1830. 
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keep a close watch on their servants' quarters and to ensure that their arms 
were kept in good working order, and always available. He reiterated that the 
inoffensive tribes to the west and south west were still exempt from the force 
of martial law "but it is not expected, much less required, that the settlers are 
calmly to wait in their dwellings to sustain the repeated and continued attacks 
of the tribes, who are manifesting such a rancorous and barbarous disposition 
as has characterised their late proceedings. They are, by every possible means, 
to be captured, or driven beyond the settled districts." 67 
The Executive Council supported Arthur. It described the Aboriginal hos-
tilities as "acts of warfare" and warned that if decisive measures were not 
taken against the Aborigines 
great numbers of [settlers] must either abandon their farms alto-
gether, or they must suspend for an indefinite time all their labours 
& [sic] occupations, and with their families and servants keep a 
continual watch under Arms round their Dwellings. In either case 
their ruin is inevitable. 
The Council declared that it was now "impossible ... to rely upon any 
demonstrations [the Aborigines] may make of a friendly nature, and how ab-
solutely necessary it is that the settled districts at least would be freed from 
67Minutes of the Executive Council, 27 August 1830, in Arthur to Murray, 20 November 
1830, C.O. 280/25, PRO Reel 245, pp.396-404. 
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their presence." Sadly, its members felt "little can be hoped from attempts to 
negotiate with, or to conciliate a people in so rude and savage a state as the 
Aboriginal natives of this island, who live in tribes independent of each other, 
and who appear to be without government of any kind .... " 
The Council concluded that "all endeavours to conciliate the Natives have 
failed" and advised that the 
time is now arrived when it has become absolutely necessary that 
some vigorous effort upon a more extended scale than has hither 
to been practicable should be made for expelling these miserable 
people forthwith from the settled districts ... The Council hopes 
and believes that if a sufficient force can be thus collected, the 
expulsion of the Natives may be effected at the expense of little 
bloodshed, and even if it should cost more lives than the Council 
anticipates, it is a measure dictated not less by humanity than by 
necessity since it is calculated to bring to a decisive issue a state 
of warfare which, if much longer continued, the Council fears will 
become a War of Extermination. 68 
The general consensus amongst the colonists was that Arthur should pro-
ceed with his proposed scheme. Benjamin Horn chaired a public meeting in 
68 Minutes of the Executive Council, 27 August 1830, in Arthur to Murray, 20 November 
1830, C.O. 280/25, PRO Reel 245, pp.396-404. 
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Hobart at the end of September. He lamented that hostilities were having 
an effect on the economic development of the colony and "[i]f therefore exter-
mination is necessary, horrible as is the alternative, I do not see what other 
means of protection exists." Alfred Stephen, speaking as a private citizen, 
rather than as the Solicitor-General, concurred. He noted that "the slaughter 
of the whites has been as indiscriminate as any which can be the result of the 
proposed operations-and I say, that as they have waged such a war upon the 
settlers you are bound to put them down." 69 
Anthony Fenn Kemp supported Arthur's scheme which, in theory, could be 
bloodless. However he felt, as Arthur did, that the colonists had been the first 
aggressors and that hostilities may have been worsened by the poor conduct of 
the military on the island. Joseph Tice Gellibrand, one time Attorney General 
in Van Diemen's Land, perceived that the campaign, itself, could be construed 
as "a war of extermination, for such I comprehend is th(;) declared object of the 
present operations, and that in its progress we will be compelled to destroy the 
innocent and the guilty." The distiller, James Hackett, wondered if more could 
not be done to attempt to conciliate the Aborigines. He thought it "a national 
disgrace ... that there are not "six persons in the whole colony who are able to 
communicate with the blacks in their native tongue." He wondered, "had we 
69 Colonial Times, 24 September 1830. 
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been a colony of Frenchmen how different a policy would have been adopted." 
However, these were the sentiments of three settlers who, for a other reasons, 
were critical of Arthur and his colonial policies. 70 
Arthur's final counter-insurgency effort against the eastern tribes was a 
call to arms in the colony. On 22 September 1830 he gave notice that "the 
community [was] being called to act en masse on the 7th October next for 
the purpose of capturing those hostile tribes of the natives which are daily 
committing renewed atrocities upon the settlers." The most hostile Oyster Bay 
and Big River bands were his focus. Arthur, nonetheless, remained committed 
to preserving the lives (and, to a degree, the lifestyles) of his Aboriginal wards. 
Seeking, "the least possible destruction of life,'' the governor hoped to drive 
them from the extremities of the settled districts into the Tasman Peninsula 
which was "well suited for the purposes of savage life, abounding in game." 
There, guarded by troops at Eaglehawk neck, the remnant Aboriginal tribes of 
70Indeed, Arthur was dubbed by his detractors the "benevolent despot." Their opposi-
tion to his Aboriginal policies were likely motivated by grievances they had earlier developed 
with the governor. Arthur had opposed a number of civil actions which, he feared, would 
compromise the effective administration of the penal institutions that he worked so hard to 
put in place. Three of Arthur's most vocal opponents were Kemp, Hackett and Gellibrand 
(Gellibrand lost his position of Attorney-General at the hands of Arthur). In March 1827, 
these men and others came together in an organised attempt to out-manoeuvre Arthur. A 
public meeting was called at the courthouse, minutes were taken and a petition sent to Lon-
don seeking representative government and trial by jury. The Coloma! Office responded with 
a moderate resolution. The Act of 1828 was passed which allowed for greater representative 
government. However, trial by jury was restricted to civil cases. Arthur ultimately retained 
effective control over his convict colony; see M.C.I Levy, Governor George Arthur: A Colo-
nial Benevolent Despot (Melbourne, 1953), Colonial Times, 24 September 1830; Robson, A 
History of Tasmania, pp.303-308. 
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Figure 5.3: 
Governor Arthur's "Black Line" Military Operations 
Against the Aborigines, August-September 1830. 
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Van Diemen's Land could live free of threat from the settlers of the colony. 71 
This "solution" -leaving them to their natural life and pursuits in a con-
tained and protected environment-was not dissimilar to what the United 
States government later attempted with removal of a number of southern Na-
tive American tribes to reserves established west of the Mississippi River-that 
natural landmark which defined the western frontier. 
71 Government Order Number 11, Hobart Town Gazette, 22 September 1830. 
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The Black Line was a three-phased operation composed of human cordons 
designed to drive the Aborigines towards the Tasman Peninsula. At the same 
time roving parties would scour the forests inside the Line, capturing any 
groups with whom they came into contact.72 The Black Line lasted from 3 
October until 25 November 1830. Almost 2,200 civilian and military person-
nel were recruited for the task. 550 were troops from the 63rd, 57th and 17th 
Regiments and approximately 700 were convicts and nearly 1000 were free 
settlers who had volunteered to assist. Representing almost 10% of the pop-
ulation, this really was the levee en masse by which it came to be described. 
Contemporary historian, John West, records that the troops carried one thou-
sand stand of arms, 30,000 rounds of ammunition and 300 pairs of handcuffs. 
In total, the operation cost the Colonial Officer approximately £30,000. The 
result was that two Aborigines were killed and another two injured. Official 
reports record the death of only one colonist. McMahon notes that the Black 
Line was "the largest warlike operation on the continent prior to the defence of 
northern Australia in 1942." Melville compared the Black Line to the Spanish 
Peninsula War, describing it as "a great war in miniature." 73 
72 Hobart Town Courier, 25 September 1830, supplement; For an analysis of the Arthur's 
Black Line operation see J. McMahon, The British Army and the Counter-Insurgency 
Campaigns and J. Connor, "British Frontier Warfare Logistics and the 'Black Line', Van 
Diemen's Land (Tasmania), 1830", War in History (2002), pp.143-158. 
73McMahon; The British Army and the Counter-Insurgency Campaign, pp. 2 & 59; 
Ryan, The Aboriginal Tasmanians, p.112; West, The History of Tasmania, pp.293-300; 
A.G.L. Shaw (ed), Van Diemen's Land: Copies of All Correspondence Between Lieutenant-
Governor Arthur and His Majesty's Secretary of State for the Colonies, on the Subject of the 
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The Black Line was designed to move south-west until each human cordon 
met and joined together to form a tight line of men stretching from Sorell 
to the mouth of the Sanspit River adjacent to Maria Island. From there the 
troops and civilians together would march towards the Tasman Peninsula. 
Though Arthur ordered troops along the Line to observe, but not to obstruct, 
the movements of the Aborigines, the roving parties were authorised to take 
prisoners. The troops on the Line were ordered to create as much noise and 
commotion as possible, firing blank bullets, lighting fires and shouting out to 
one another so that the Aborigines would be made aware of their presence 
and move forward accordingly. The use of blank ammunition was designed to 
harass and pressure the Aborigines (for they were not to know that the gun-
fire was harmless), whilst, at the same time, ensuring their safety. The roving 
parties, on the other hand, were ordered to clandestinely scour the scrub in 
front of the line capturing any Aborigines with whom they made contact. 74 
Though the orders to the roving parties, too, were not to harm their cap-
tives, that they were authorised to use live ammunition indicates that Arthur 
Military Operations Lately Carried on Against the Aboriginal Inhabitants of Van Diemen's 
Land. (Hobart, 1971), p.ix; Nominal Return of Civilians in the Division under the command 
of Lieutenant Murray, 17th Regiment, 20 November 1830, CSO 1/324/7578, AOT Reel 
SLTX/AO/CS/117, no page numbers supplied; H. Hull., Statistical Survey of Tasmania 
from the Years 1816 to 1865 inclusive (Hobart, 1866), p.3; Melville, The History of the 
Island of Van Diemen's Land, p.109. 
74McMahon, The British Army and the Counter Insurgency, pp.67 & 81. 
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was prepared to take some risks with Aboriginal lives. The very different na-
ture of the activities carried out by the cordon of men, as compared to the 
roving parties, demonstrates that Arthur sought to combine tradition~! British 
military tactics with guerrilla strategiei;; in order to effect his objective. In-
deed, it was only by utilising the latter that any prisoners were taken. On 
the evening of 24/25 October, 1830, Captain E.A. Walpole and his party cap-
tured a man and a boy. This was to be the only direct success to come out of 
this large and expensive operation. Walpole later described the events of the 
evening in his report to Arthur: 
I stationed half my party at Captain Glover's hut where the natives 
are in the habit of appearing and with the remainder went on 
the tiers to reconnoiter when about five miles from the hut before 
mentioned about 10 o'clock p.m. I heard the natives hunting and 
on going closer saw their dogs. I watched them for four hours and 
on convincing myself that they were settled for the night I returned 
for the rest of my party and in the evening placed them within 300 
yards of the natives where we watched until break of the day ... and 
crept to one of the natives without being perceived by the inmates 
until I caught one by the leg; there were five men in the hut and the 
other four rushed out through the back ... one however was caught 
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while jumping into the creek and two others shot ... 75 
As a means to drive the tribes of the east into the Tasman Peninsula the 
Black Line did not fulfil its objectives. , With the clear vision of hindsight, 
West noted that "the success of this plan could never have been considered very 
promising." Melville, a bitter critic of Arthur for a myriad of reasons, described 
it as "a master-piece of absurdity." Aboriginal groups within the human cordon 
were not forced south-westward but managed to pass back through the line at 
night using the soldiers' fires to guide the way. Their limited numbers, of which 
Arthur learned from Walpole's captives, allowed them to avoid detection. On 
26 November Arthur called the troops in, bringing an end to the Black Line 
operations. 76 
Though criticised by a few for his actions, the Black Line was far from 
a complete failure. It led directly to Robinson's successes and the "concilia-
tion" of two of the most openly hostile tribes in the east. In the Hobart Town 
Gazette of 11 December Arthur published a government order thanking the 
inhabitants of Van Diemen's Land for their diligent efforts. A group of promi-
nent landowners responded with high praise and thanks of their own. This was 
the first time since he had stepped ashore in May 1824 that Arthur was able 
75 Walpole to Arthur, 29 October 1830, CSO 1/324/7578, AOT Reel SLTX/AO/CS/117, 
no page numbers supplied. 
76West, The History of Tasmania, p.293 & Melville, The History of the Island of Van 
Diemen's Land, p.99; Walpole to Arthur, 29 October 1830, CSO 1/324/7578, AOT Reel 
SLTX/AO/CS/117, no page numbers supplied. 
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to draw together in solidarity the majority of the colonists of his small colony. 
His only critics were the lawyer, Thomas Gregson, a landowner at Risdon and 
the distiller Hackett, both of whom voiced their disapproval of Arthur's failed 
scheme. During a second town meeting called at the conclusion of the Black 
Line Gregson likened the military operation to attempting to harpoon a whale 
from the summit of Mount Wellington. Hackett "regretted that the task had 
not fallen into abler hands." 77 
Nonetheless, as a means of convincing both the settlers and the Aborigines 
that some sort of permanent peace pact needed to be concluded, the Black 
Line seemed to have had a decisive effect. Lyndall Ryan notes that "the 
Line achieved its objective in clearing the settled districts of the Aborigines." 
They were driven to spots within their various tribal lands where eventually 
Robinson "captured" them.78 Reynolds argues that an effect of the Line was 
to persuade "the survivors of war to consider a negotiated settlement" for they 
were not to know that this would not be a continuing operation. 79 This would 
have been reinforced when a group of settlers at Oyster Bay carried out a 
similar scheme the following October.80 To Plomley's mind the failure of the 
77 Hobart Town Gazette, 11 December 1830; Colonial Times, 31 December 1830. 
78Ryan, The Aboriginal Tasmanians, p.112; 
79Reynolds, Fate of a Free People, p.51. 
80Gordon to Burnett, 19 October, Meredith to Burnett, 21 October, Fordyce to Burnett, 
25 October, Aubin to Burnett & Meredith to Burnett, 27 October, Meredith to Burnett, 
28 October, Smith to Burnett, 29 October, Francis to Burnett, 31 October, Arthur to 
Meredith, 20November1831, CSO 1/316/7578, AOT Reel SLTX/AO/CS/114, pp.994-995, 
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Line was an advantage to the Aborigines 
... because it made the idea of conciliation less objectionable to 
the settlers and therefore helped to promote the work that was 
really begun in March 1829 when Robinson made the first friendly 
contacts with the natives since the French explorers had visited 
them.81 
Ultimately, though, Arthur's success against the eastern Aborigines may 
be attributed primarily to two factors. Firstly, his counter-insurgency forces 
used both traditional and guerrilla tactics to overpower the enemy. Secondly, 
the eastern bands were weakening both physically and psychologically. How-
ever, at that stage many colonists still feared that Aboriginal hostilities would 
continue in earnest, for it was not apparent that, for all intents and purposes, 
the eastern tribes had already lost the war. 
1001-1002, 1015-1047. 
81 Plomley, Friendly Mission, p.32. 
Chapter 6 
Conciliation by the Olive 
Branch 
Can we wonder. .. at the hatred they bear to the white inhabitants? 
This enmity is not the effect of a moment. Like a fire burning un-
derground, it has burst forth. This flame of Aboriginal resentment 
can and ought only to be extinguished by British benevolence. We 
_should fly to their relief. We should make some atonement .for 
the misery we have entailed upon the original proprietors of this 
land ... 1 
When Arthur's use of force and coercion against the Aborigines appeared 
1G.A. Robinson quoted in Plomley, Fhendly Mission, pp.202-203. 
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to be proving futile he turned to the approach he had been advocating since his 
arrival. Through compromise and the effecting of mutually satisfying arrange-
ments for land sharing he hoped' that he could convince the Aborigines of Van 
Diemen's Land to_end their decade-long war with the colonists. He realised 
that this was possible only if he had the means by which to communicate with 
those with whom he wished to nego~iate. Much attention has been paid to the 
efforts and achievements of European conciliator George Augustus Robinson, 
however, he was not the only person to play an important role. Aboriginal 
women from the eastern Bands facilitated initial contact with the band that 
remained. This chapter will discuss the efforts of these agents in returning 
peace to the colony. 
For an agent to be effective, the individual had to have specific skills and 
experience that could facilitate communication between the Aborigines and 
the Colonial Government. This meant having a knowledge of both language 
and culture. As Arthur may well have been aware, from his time in British 
Honduras, the United States Congress had utilised such individuals in the 
late eighteenth century. As Prucha notes, north Americans were sent out to 
"reside among the Indians ... [and] ... civilise [them] by means of agriculture 
and domestic arts." In general terms they were employed "to impress upon 
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[the Indians] the government's desire for peace and justice." 2 This is what 
Arthur hoped his agents would also do. 3 
To be sure, Arthur's Aboriginal policies had always been focussed on this 
end. The military were entreated, wherever possible, to open "a conciliatory 
intercourse and arrangement with the tribes." Public notices and proclama-
tions always called for colonists to "communicate" the wishes of the govern-
ment to the Aborigines wherever possible. "Any natives who may surrender, 
or be captured," he informed the colonists, should then "be treated with hu-
manity and tenderness." Arthur's offers of rewards were an attempt to encour-
age settlers to "effect a successful intercourse with any tribe .... "4 However, 
the nature of Aboriginal-settler contact made it very difficult to effect such 
an intercourse. The use of sanctioned force against Aboriginal groups hin-
dered attempts to develop a peaceful association. How Arthur's alternative 
schemes differed was that they allowed for contact under conditions that were 
not threatening or harassing, and also where the Aboriginal group in question 
could retain an element of control over its destiny. His first such scheme in-
valved the employment of Aboriginal women as ambassadors for the Colonial 
2Prucha, The Great Father, pp.160-,163; Shaw, Sir George Arthur, bart, Chapters 1-3. 
3Arthur to Cox, 13 October 1830, CSO 1/324/7578, AOT Reel SLTX/AO/CS/117, no 
page numbers supplied. 
4Instructions to the Military Officers, 3 November 1828, in Arthur to Murray, 4 Novem-
ber 1828, HRA, III.7, p.635; Proclamation Separating the Aborigines from the White In-
habitants, 15 April 1828, in Arthur to Huskisson, 17 April 1828, p.182; Instructions from 
Brigade-Major to Captain Walpole, 30 September 1828, in Arthur to Murray, 15 April 1830, 
& Government Order, 25 February 1830, C.O. 280/24, PRO Reel 244. 
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Government. 
6.1 Aboriginal Ambassadors 
In March 1830 Arthur approved the release of a group of women from the 
"native asylum" attached to Robinson's Hobart residence so that they could 
rejoin their people in the north east. The suggestion had first been made by 
Dr James Scott who conceived that 
a party composed of 5 or 6 natives of New South Wales with a few of 
the natives (partly civilized) now in Hobart Town who could speak 
their language and persuade them to come in with an intelligent 
man to conduct them would be the means of bringing in all those 
now in the island. 
When Richard Sterling, overseer of the asylum, proposed a similar plan in 
February 1830, Arthur put it to the Aborigines Committee. 5 
The Aborigines Committee supported the proposal and Arthur ordered 
that the women in the asylum "should be allowed to join their tribes on the 
north side of the island with a view of endeavouring to conciliate and point 
5Scott to Aborigines Committee, 13 March 1830, "Answers Given by Settlers and Others 
to Certain Questions Submitted Together by the Aborigines Committee", CSO 1/323/7578, 
AOT Reel SLTX/ AO /CS/117, pp.315-317; Sterling to Aborigines Committee, 23 February 
1830, CSO 1/330/7578, AOT Reel SLTX/AO/CS/118, pp.97-98. 
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out to them the kind treatment they have experienced from the whites." Like 
Macquarie, who had made varied attempts to conciliate the Aborigines of New 
South Wales, Arthur hoped the northern tribes would be convinced by this 
show of humanity to end their depredations against the settlers. Trinkets 
would be provided as a symbol of Arthur's genuine desire to placate them. 
Sterling consulted the women and, naturally, found them more than willing 
to "return to their former mode of life and place of nativity." He took great 
pains to explain to them that the 
white men were solicitous to hoist the flag of peace, and to unite 
in brotherly Christianity with the blacks generally, not only them-
selves but any black coming to this asylum would be treated with 
every kindness and be provided with provisions and clothing, with 
which they promised to make their countrymen acquainted. 6 
It is not clear whether their briefly absconding from the asylum before prepa-
rations were complete was a result of miscommunication or a very keen will-
ingness to be on their way. 7 
As mentioned, the women were members of the band that had been cap-
tured by Batman in September 1829. Batman had transferred them first to 
6Arthur to Burnett, 4 & 5 March 1830, CSO 1/317/7578, Reel SLTX/AO/CS/115, 
pp.154-156. 
7Sterling to Aborigines Committee, 23 February 1830, CSO 1/330/7578, AOT Reel 
SLTX/ AO /CS/118, pp.97-98. 
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Campbell Town, and from there they were sent to Oatlands to be inspected 
by Anstey and then onto Richmond, where they were housed in the jail. The 
women and children were later sent to Hobart. The young men whom Batman 
had captured joined Robinson on his expedition to Port Davey. With them 
were Umarrah and Black Tom, who had also been held at Richmond jail when 
not attached to Robertson's roving party. 
The deaths of the majority of women and children at the asylum meant 
that from the original sixteen who had been housed there, only six women and 
three children were eventually released. Only three would reach Robinson. 
They were Kubmanner from the Stoney Creek tribe, Luggenemenener from 
Ben Lomond and Karnebutcher from the Campbell Town district. They were 
members of three of the most active guerrilla groups in the settled districts. 
Late in March, the asylum was closed and the women were taken to Launceston 
by Sterling. On 5 April they were returned to Batman. 8 
Batman decided to send the women out with his Aboriginal guides from 
Sydney, · Pigeon and Crook. 9 He instructed them to · explain to their peo-
ple "as much as possible the wishes and friendly feeling of the government 
8 Plomley, Friendly Mission, p.110; Robinson to Arthur, 20 November 1830, CSO 
1/318/7578, AOT Reel SLTX/ AO /CS/115, pp.43-44. 
9Pigeon and Crook were later rewarded by the governor for their efforts. Arthur granted 
each of them 100 acres; see Hobart Town Gazette, 18 September 1830 & 25 September 1830. 
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towards them .... " The women he made "understand if any white people ill-
treated them that the government would have them punished." Batman also 
dispatched a number of parties to the surrounding properties to inform resi-
dents that the women were in the area, and to avoid contact with them. Armed 
with "passports" which Arthur hoped would give them free passage, Batman 
sent them on their way. A week later the Sydney guides returned alone, the 
women having absconded. Batman was nonplussed: "I am now at a loss to 
know what to think of this wretched race of people." 10 
In the meantime the band of six who had avoided capture by Batman 
the previous September continued to attack settlements along the South Esk 
River. Early in November 1829 they robbed one of William Talbott's servant 
huts. The following March they attacked Henry Gee's hut at Piper's River, 
and murdered his stockman, James Sprangle. Late in April they harassed a 
servant attached to Mr. Massey. 11 
Meanwhile, now effectively free, the women dispatched by Batman sepa-
rated into two groups. One group moved off to join their kin at Oyster Bay. 
The other was captured at Henry Gee's on 15 May. Arthur Maynes, Gee's 
servant, arrived at the police station in Launceston a few days later to collect 
10Batman to Anstey, 12 & 15 April 1830, CSO 1/320/7578, AOT Reel SLTX/ AO /CS/116, 
pp.182-183 & 192-193. 
11Batman to Anstey, 21 September 1829 & 12 April 1830, CSO 1/320/7578, AOT Reel 
SLTX/AO/CS/116, pp.pp.182-183 & 146-147. Hobart Town Gazette, 26 September 1829, 
Colonial Times, 26 March 1830. 
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a reward for capturing one of the women and her child. The Hobart Town 
Courier reported that the women had arrived at Gee's "where they had no 
doubt gone to procure provisions, believing their brass passports would have 
protected them from violence." 12 Instead Maynes, Gee and a second convict 
servant named John Miles assaulted the women before killing two of them and 
their dogs. 13 
In all likelihood the assault was carried out in reprisal for the death of James 
Sprangle the previous March. However, Maynes, Miles and Gee may have 
attacked the women fearing that they themselves were about to be ambushed. 
Settlers in the district had been attacked before by a group who had used 
women as decoys. In December 1827 two women arrived at William Talbott's 
hut presumably on a reconnaissance mission. After determining that only two 
men were in the hut, the women retreated and a band of 150 rushed the hut. 
Had their notably unreliable muskets failed to fire on this occasion, Talbott's 
men would have been overwhelmed by their assailants. 14 
N onetheiess, Arthur felt little sympathy for Gee and his men this time 
and ordered that the incident be investigated and warrants were issued for 
12The newspaper report was incorrect in this regard for Batman recorded in his diary 
that the women had discarded their passports shortly after they absconded from his guides; 
see A. Campbell, John Batman and the Aborigines (Malmsbury, 1987). 
13 Hobart Town Courier, 29 May 1830; Jones to Arthur, 22 May 1830, CSO 1/330/7578, 
AOT Reel SLTX/AO/CS/118. 
14 Hobart Town Courier, 8 December 1827. 
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their arrest. When Maynes tried to collect his reward he was interrogated by 
Launceston Police Magistrate, William Lyttleton. Maynes claimed the women 
were armed and about to escape from the hut when. he apprehended them. 
He was denied the reward to which he felt entitled and, indeed, was lucky to 
escape prosecution. Colonial Secretary, John Burnett noted sardonically that 
"the reward this man seems to me to merit is the small island at Macquarie 
Habour." 15 
Launceston Commandant Major Abbott refused to release the women back 
into Batman's custody and it was only after Arthur personally intervened that 
they were once again returned to the roving party leader. The plan now was 
that Batman should "build a hut to the east of Ben Lomond ... and there p9st 
his party secreting their arms and appearing about as little as possible ... From 
this hut the women and Sydney Blacks were to make excursions for two or three 
days together lighting fires to attract the notice of the tribe and endeavouring 
to open a communication with it." Mannalargenna's son, Mungo, would be 
retrieved from Danvers to assist the women.16 
15Deposition of Arthur Maynes, Launceston, 20 May 1830, CSO 1/330/7578, AOT Reel 
SLTX/AO/CS/118, pp.136; Lyttleton to Burnett, 24 May 1830, CSO 1/316/7578, AOT 
Reel SLTX/AO/CS/114, pp.511-512; Batman to Anstey, 24 May 1830, CSO 1/320/7578, 
Reel SLTX/ AO /CS/116, pp.195-197; Burnett to Mulgrave, 28 May 1830, CSO 1/317 /7578, 
Reel SLTX/AO/CS/115, pp.167-168. 
16Simpson to Burnett, 1 June 1830, CSOl/320/7578, AOT Reel SLTX/AO/CS/116, 
pp.74-76. 
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Contact was never made even though the band that had been at Oyster Bay 
had "again directed their movements into this quarter." During August their 
fires were spotted at Break O'Day and Gideon's Bottom. They harassed ser-
vants attached to Thomas Massey at Ben Lamond and to Joseph Bonny near 
Perth. Late in September they killed three men assigned to Major William 
Gray of Avoca. They plundered the hut of guns and blankets. By now Batman 
was convinced that only a fully coordinated operation such as the Black Line 
operation that Arthur was actually planning would have any success against 
the various bands active in the settled districts.17 
The minimal military presence in the northern districts concerned some 
property owners. The Launceston Advertiser criticised Arthur for concen-
trating his efforts in the Buckinghamshire county, leaving the northern county 
defenceless against Aboriginal attacks. Cox, whose property, Clarendon, stood 
on the banks of the South Esk River, took matters into his own hands and 
sent parties to scour the bush to the north east of Ben Lamond. Arthur rep-
rimanded him severely for his initiative.18 
Arthur explained that the tribes in that district had not been nearly as 
hostile as those Oyster Bay and Big River bands to the south which the Black 
17Batman to Burnett, 30 August 1830, CSO 1/316/7578; AOT Reel SLTX/AO/CS/114, 
pp.607-610; Hobart Town Courter, 2 October 1830. 
18 Launceston Advertiser, 25 October 1830; Cox to Arthur, 11 & 13 October 1830, CSO 
1/324/7578, AOT Reel SLTX/AO/CS/117, no page numbers supplied. 
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Line was targeting: "it appears to me therefore extremely important first to 
attempt conciliation with them and as the period has not expired within it 
the wom~n who were sent out by Mr. Batman had undertaken to bring in 
their tribe." Furthermore, Arthur was concerned that the presence of armed 
men might compromise Robinson's conciliatory work with the tribes in that 
region. Arthur hoped that the women and their people would eventually make 
contact with Robinson and, acting as liaisons and emissaries, bringing them 
together. 19 
Meanwhile, the Black Line was having its affects, though none for which 
Arthur had planned. Having moved back through the human cordon, on 
16 October two women and nine men, including Mannalargenna, arrived at 
Kingston, exhausted and starving. They had attempted to head for Hobart 
to take shelter at the asylum there but the movements of the Black Line had 
forced them in a northerly direction. 
Umarrah and his band had also retreated north where they made attacks 
along the Tamar, North Esk and South Esk Rivers. 20 Most likely convinced by 
the women that Batman would protect them, the group retreated to Kingston 
where they knew they would also be safe from Umarrah, as well as the Black 
19 Arthur to Cox, 13 October 1830, CSO 1/324/7578, AOT Reel SLTX/ AO /CS/117, no 
page numbers supplied. 
20 As will be discussed in Chapter 8 one of the most gruesome attacks was carried out 
on Captain Bartholemew Thomas and his overseer James Parker. Thomas was brother to 
Aborigines Committee chair and colonial treasurer Jocelyn Thomas. 
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Line volunteers. As a result of the pressure brought to bear by the armed 
and hostile colonists, instead of uniting agains~ the colonists, Mannalargenna 
and Umarrah focussed their animosity on one another, and several members of 
each band had been killed in the resulting hostile confrontations. That Man-
nalargenna sought protection from Batman-the man who had killed eleven 
of his people-indicates something about the influence of the women, not to 
mention the strain of their current living conditions.21 
Late in the evening of 22 October, Mannalargenna's group fled. They 
took with them knives and dogs, but left behind all of the food, blankets and 
clothing with which Batman had supplied them. They alffo left behind Mungo. 
Over the next week they plundered huts along the South Esk River from Major 
William Gray's property at Avoca to Talbott's property at Fingal. There, 
Talbott's men, Davis and MacDonald, managed to shoot two of the group. 
One was killed on the spot, but the other was pursued by MacDonald to the 
river. His gun misfiring the first time, one of the Aboriginal men turned and 
cried, "you white bugger, your piece no gopd." _Upon fi~ing again, MacDonald 
was more successful, and shot the man dead. The rest of the band fled towards 
the coast. 22 
21 Gray to Arthur, 17, 19 & 23 October 1830, CSO 1/330/7578, AOT Reel 
SLTX/ AO /CS/118, pp.690-700. 
22 Gray to Burnett, 1 & 11 November 1830; Batman to Frankland, 18 November 1830, CSO 
1/316/7578, AOT Reel SLTX/AO/CS/114, pp.714-717 & 724-744; Hobart Town Courier, 
13 November 1830; Launceston Advertiser, 15 November 1830. 
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The eastern bands were now divided into three groups, each with members 
from the midlands and east coast tribes. Two were led by Mannalargenna and 
Umarrah and the third by the Big River chiefs Montpeilliatter and Tonger-
longerter. Montpeilliatter and Tongerlongter headed to the mountains behind 
the Ouse River. U marrah remained to the north of Launceston and Man-
nalargenna moved to George River. Throughout November members mem-
bers of Mannalargenna's band gradually made contact with Robinson. They 
had good reason for "coming in" for the young men taken from Richmond jail 
the previous March and now attached to Robinson's expedition party were 
Mannalargenna's tribesmen. Of the seventy-four Aborigines that Robinson 
would transfer to Swan Island at the end of the month, only four were women 
and three were those whom Arthur had released from the asylum, Kubmanner, 
Luggenemenener and Karnebutcher. The other one was an old sealing woman, 
Peacock.23 
6.2 George Augustus Robinson 
. . 
In the event conciliation was to derive not just from the efforts of Kubmanner, 
·Luggenemenener and Karnebutcher, but also from those of George Augustus 
Robinson. On 4 March 1829 an advertisement appeared in the Hobart Town 
23Ryan, The Aboriginal Tasmanians, p.112; Robinson to Arthur, 20 November 1830, CSO 
1/318/7578, AOT Reel SLTX/AO/CS/115, pp.216-230. 
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Gazette and the Hobart Town Courier. The notice read: 
In furtherance of the Lieutenant Governor's anxious desire to ame-
liorate the condition of the Aboriginal inhabitants of this territory, 
His Excellency will allow a salary of fifty pounds per annum, to-
gether with rations, to a steady person of good character, who can 
be well recommended, who will take an interest in effecting an in-
tercourse with this unfortunate race, and reside upon Brune Island, 
taking charge of the provisions supplied for the use of the Natives 
of that place.24 
205 
This was the first time that Arthur had instigated his much-contemplated 
plan to establish an Aboriginal reserve. Arthur received nine applications, but 
the one sent in by Robinson caught the governor's attention and Robinson was 
offered the position. 
Robinson's story is that of a lower class British subject hoping, like many 
others, to better his lot in the colonies. He was a remarkable, self-educated 
evangelist whose occupation as a bricklayer afforded him little opportunity 
to rise beyond the working classes. Though his mechanical skills were highly 
desirable in a burgeoning colony, Robinson sought a more prominent social 
status. He saw the position of "store keeper" as his opportunity to advance. 
24 Hobart Town Gazette, Hobart Town Couner, 7 March 1829. 
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However, while he achieved great success in his various roles as Aboriginal 
"protector" and "conciliator,'' he was never able to win favour with his Euro-
pean contemporaries (a fact that advocates and critics, alike, agree upon). 25 
Historians variously vilify and praise Robinson. Focusing on his charac-
ter, historian, Karl von Stieglitz, describes Robinson thus: "small, conceited 
and pompous, pretending to a classical education which he did not possess, 
he alienated people with his bumptious manner and assumption of superior 
intelligence." 26 Modern historian, Cassandra Pybus portrays him as "an un-
educated artisan, with no recognizable position" in Van Diemen's Land soci-
ety. 27 Windschuttle paints him as a man guided solely by the desire to become 
wealthy at the hands of a desperate colonial government.28 Viviennne Rae-
Ellis, who condemns Robinson as "a liar and a cheat, a man of little honour", 
summarily dismisses those achievements lauded by the likes of historians Brian 
Plomley and Henry Reynolds. "Robinson's true achievement is the admirable 
record of Aboriginal life to be found in his travel journals. By contrast,'' Rae-
Ellis writes, "his reputation as the friend of the Aborigine was a creation of 
25see C. Pybus, "History as Myth: G.A Robinson and the Tasmanian Aborigines", Over-
land, no.111 (1988), pp.48-49 & N.J.B. Plomley's G.A. Robinson entry in Australian Dic-
tionary of Biography, 2, pp.385-387. 
26K.R. von Steiglitz, A History of Oatlands and Jericho (Launceston, 1860), p.19. 
27Pybus, "History as Myth", p.48. 
28Windschuttle, The Fabrication of Aboriginal History, Chapter 7. 
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Figure 6.1: 
Gauci, M., Ackermann & Co's G.A. Robinson Esqe., Chief Protector of the 
Australasian Aborigines and the pacificator of the Aborigines of Van 
Diemen's Land, c.1850. Source: Allport Library and Museum of Fine Arts, 
State Library of Tasmania; image taken from URL: 
http://images.statelibrary.tas.gov .au. 
CHAPTER 6. CONCILIATION BY THE OLIVE BRANCH 208 
Robinson's imagination, designed solely to advance his own careers." 29 
Plomley and Reynolds, on the other hand, view Robinson very differently. 
Plomley describes "the friend of the Tasmanian aborigines" as a "hard-working 
and public-spirited man" who never lost sight of the concept that "all men are 
born equal but suffer from inequality of opportunity." Quoting extracts from 
the manuscript of a book Robinson never completed, Plomley expands upon 
this theme: "The rights of the original inhabitants," wrote Robinson, "were 
never thought of. Might overcame right and the original possessors of the 
soil became, not free men, but slaves under the force of war .... "30 Draw-
ing from- examples-throughout Robinson's long history with the Aborigines 
in Van Diemen's Land and beyond, Reynolds characterises him as the "best 
known humanitarian in the Australian colonies" who genuinely believed that 
the "Aborigines were the legitim-ate owners of the soil." 31 
There is no doubt that Robinson was a very arrogant man who sought to 
be as wealthy as the colonial government would make him. However, that he 
remained so active with the Aborigines and so vocal about their land rights, 
' 
often to the disdain of the very people whose acceptance he was seeking, and 
even after the government had made him rich, indicates that Robinson was 
guided by motivations other than merely financial. 
29V. Rae-Ellis, Black Robinson: Protector of Aborigines (Melbourne, 1988), p.xix & 82. 
30Plomley, Friendly Mission, pp.11, 14, 52 & 936. 
31 Reynolds, This Whispering in our Hearts, p.47. 
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Robinson's evangelical bent quickly won him favour with the governor and 
allowed him to begin his unique career in Van Diemen's Land. That Robinson 
was an active Christian w4ose stalwart faith guided him through life, being 
of the firm belief that the Aborigines must be civilised and Christianised, 
impressed the like-minded Governor considerably. Robinson's commitment to 
the Aborigines, he later noted, stemmed from the fact that "the welfare of 
this unfortunate race will ever be a paramount object in my mind." 32 His 
application reflected this: 
Having observed in the Courier ... that it is your Excellency's anx-
ious desire to ameliorate the condition of the aboriginal inhabitants 
of this territory and ... .feeling a strong desire to devote myself to 
the above cause and believing the plan which Your Excellency had 
devised to be the only one whereby this unfortunate race can be 
ameliorated-that as the degraded Hottentot33 has been raised in 
32Plomley, Friendly Mission, p.89. 
33The Hottentots were a pastoral people of southern Africa who, along with Cape slaves 
and other native groups, represented thE} labouring classes in colonial South Africa. The 
Hottentots lived in miserable conditions. for they were the lowest paid iabour group. in the 
colony. They could not receive a competitive price for their labour for a pass system kept 
them confined to specific districts. If they were found outside their districts they were 
punished as vagabonds. Unlike the slave classes, they were often so impoverished that they 
became indebted to their employers who would hold their children accountable for the debt. 
Legally, too, they held a liminal position in society. Unlike the slave classes, they were 
not protected by masters, and had little chance of obtaining a favourable hearing before 
the courts because of their race. In the late 1820s Governor Sir Richard Bourke - later to 
become governor of New South Wales-reformed the pass laws so as to allow the Hottentots 
greater rights as free persons of colour; see: H. King, Richard Bourke; H. King, "Richard 
Bourke and His Two Colonial Administrations: a comparative study of Cape Colony and 
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the scale of being-and the inhabitants of the Societies Islands are 
made an industrious and intelligent race, so likewise by the same 
exertions may the inhabitants of this territory be instructed with 
these impressions I beg to offer myself for the situation ... I wish to 
devote my self entirely to these people .... 34 
Though Robinson was somewhat misguided about how to best advance 
the Aborigines' cause, at this stage he was the only hope they had, for he was 
in the position to facilitate communication between them and the Colonial 
Government. His position effectively evolved into that of an agent to the 
Aborigines. 35 
New South Wales," Royal Australian Historical Society Journal, 49.5 (1964), pp.360-375; 
'Richard Bourke' entry in Australian Dictionary of Biography. 
340ne may recall here the thoughts of Lord Monboddo who theorised that it was the the 
"destiny of man" to "cultivate those aspects of his nature which distinguish him from the 
animal and vegetable creations" so as to "attain a state as close as possible to that of the 
'divine intelligences'. Robinson's mission, it seems, might realise in practice those theories 
which Monboddo, and others, had made popular; see Dixon, Course of Empire, pp.17-
18; Robinson to Arthur, 16 March 1828, CSO 1/321/7578, AOT Reel SLTX/AO/CS/116, 
pp.30-32. 
35Government agents were also later employed in other Australian colonies to manage 
racial conflicts. Towards the end of the 1880s increased Aboriginal resistance to settlement 
around Queensland's Atherton Tablelands began to concern the Tinaroo Progress Asso-
ciation. The answer was found in a constable and tracker by the name of Hansen who 
was transferred to Atherton in order to deal "with the Black question without using severe 
repressive measures." Hansen trekked through the Tablelands' rainforest with an Aborigi-
nal assistant who acted as interpreter and guide. He soon discovered that the locals were 
plundering settlers' homes because they were literally starving. Hansen requested that the 
government provide them with rations and then directed the group to where they could 
procure them. The settlers, too, supplied liberal amounts of flour, sugar, tea, beef, tobacco 
and sweet potatoes. With Hansen's intervention other groups "came in" and were provide 
for by the government and local settlers; see N. Loos, Invasion and Resistance: Aboriginal-
European Relations on the North Queensland Frontier (Canberra, 1982), pp.88-117. 
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Though the notion of sending a government agent to live amongst Aborig-
ines had been contemplated already, Robinson was the first to be employed 
for such .a task. J orgen Jorgenson, the roving party leader, had elucidated his 
proposals for just such a scheme in a lengthy letter sent to Arthur in Febru-
ary 1828. He advised that "we must seek [the Aborigines] in their forests, we 
must accustom them to behold us, and converse with us without restraint." 
Likely referring to one of the ochre mines in the territory of the North tribe, 
Jorgenson suggested a reserve be established within the Van Diemen's Land 
Company grant for it "is a grand place of rendezvous for the natives." Jor-
genson considered the location ideal also because between it and the settled 
districts lay the Western Tiers, which would serve to "check on all the move-
ments of the natives towards the inhabited and cultivated parts of the island." 
Like the reserve on Bruny Island it, too, would be separated from the settled 
regions of the colony. Jorgensen described his plan: 
In this very place I would propose to construct a strong and com-
pact hut: one superior, and five other individuals, to reside in this 
dwelling. The superior should be a man of singular humanity and 
penetration, and guided by those nobler considerations which are 
not common to ordinary minds .... The white men should be taught 
to traverse the country without endeavouring too early to promote 
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any intercourse with the blacks: go to and fro seemingly inattentive 
to what was passing around them; avoid all offensive conduct, and 
if attempts were made to attack them, they should retreat and not 
if attempts were made to attack them; avoid all offensive conduct, 
and if attempts were made to attack them, they should retreat 
and not discharge a shot till it was clearly demonstrable that no 
other means were left to escape .... [E]very thing should be tried to 
soothe the natives, and to convince them that from this party they 
could have nothing to fear .... Reciprocal kindnesses would produce 
reciprocal good-will, and gradually some intercourse would be es-
tablished; when once established the principal object would be at-
tained, all the rest would be speedily, and we should see our black 
brethren hold out the olive branch to our view.36 
212 
It must be remembered, too, that Police Magistrate, James Simpson, had 
outlined a similar plan when instructing Batman on how best to make con-
tact with the Ben Lomond band in June 1830. However, as-will be recalled, 
Batman's female guides absconded before he was able to implement it. 
Jorgenson acknowledged that 
the plan may by some be deemed extravagant and inconsistent ... but 
36Plornley, Jorgen Jorgenson and the Aborigines, pp.35-36. 
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after all, of the numerous schemes which have been advanced rel-
ative to the natives, is there a single one which could be carried 
into execution with the slightest probability of success?37 
Arthur would later come to rely on the success of this one to put a final end 
to war. 
6.2.1 Store Keeper & Protector 
On 29 April 1829 Robinson arrived at Missionary Bay on Bruny Island, where 
he marked out 500 acres for an Aboriginal reserve. Over the next few months 
he supervised the construction of his "village". He spent a great deal of time 
learning the customs and language of the Bruny Island people. He found them 
flexible and adaptable, though learning anything of the dead was difficult, for 
he discovered it was taboo to speak of them.38 
37Plontley, Jorgen Jorgenson and the Aborigines, p.36. 
38Knowing this, it is possible to gain some sense of the rancour which the Aborigines felt 
for the settlers. In September the previous year the settler, Robertson, was surrounded in 
his hut at the South Esk River by a group of twenty Aborigines. For seven hours they called 
out using "the most approbacious language and threats" and called "upon a man who was 
murdered by the Aborigines about six months before." In November the stock-keeper, James 
Stanton, was violently beaten by a group who "during [that] time ... continued calling on the 
dead man by name and laughing about it." This was a taboo which had endured amongst 
tribes in other Australian colonies as well; see Simpson to Burnett, 4 September 1828 & 
Williams to Burnett, 24 November 1828, CSO 1/316/7578, AOT Reel SLTX/AO/CS/114, 
pp.155-156 & 196-198; see also H. Ling Roth, The Aborigines of Tasmania (Hobart, 1968), 
pp.61-63. 
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Robinson translated words from English into the Bruny Island vocabu-
lary39 and carried out religious instructions in the local language. Though the 
translations were rough, Robinson knew that it was vital that he was able 
to communicate with the Bruny Islanders in their own tongue so he could 
gain their trust. More importantly, even a working knowledge of the language 
allowed him to act as a liaison between the Aborigines, with whom he was 
residing, and the colonial government, by whom he was employed. 
The importance of the interpreter in colonial-Aboriginal relations cannot 
be overstated. In north America interpreters were vital because they were of-· 
-
ten the only link between the Native American tribes and the frontier settlers. 
However the great shortage of such skilled individuals meant that their talents 
were in high demand and the skills they developed allowed them to vie for 
high-ranking positions in the Indian Office. They needed to be highly skilled 
because, as historian Yasuhide Kawashima notes, "[o]nly those who were thor-
oughly familiar with the customs and traditions, as well as the languages, of 
both cultures were able to translate accurately and effectively." The variety 
of languages spoken by the numerous tribes, additionally, meant interpreters 
usually had to be multi-lingual. Moreover, the job of interpreter carried added 
39Though Robinson always planned on writing a book about the Tasmanian Aborigines 
and was to include a chapter on their language the only written record of it is scattered words 
recorded throughout his journals; see for example Plomley, Friendly Mission, p.61 where he 
records words translated from English from a sermon preached to the Bruny Islanders. 
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responsibilities because these "forest diplomats," as they came to be known, 
" ... were actually field representatives of the colonies in their dealings with 
the Indians. They were required not only to translate one language to another 
but simultaneously to serve as messengers and diplomatic agents to the Indian 
country, often for extended periods of time." 40 In time, Robinson would come 
to act in this capacity as best he could. 
However, Robinson was the not the sole bearer of these responsibilities. 
He was aided greatly by his mission guides and, indeed, they played the role 
of diplomat and emissary far more effectively than Robinson. Indeed, in the 
United States the majority of interpreters were native American. It made sense 
to employ indigenous guides for they would have knowledge and experience 
about those with whom they were dealing, and could more easily earn their 
trust. Those who joined Robinson were particularly valuable for not only 
were they familiar with the groups to whom they were travelling, but most 
of them had previously had dealings with settler groups and were, therefore, 
more able to understand the motivations that lay behind much of Robinson's 
behaviour. Consequently, both Robinson and his Aboriginal guides, like the 
north eastern women, would come to act very much as the "forest diplomats" 
. 
40Y .. Kawashima, "Forest Diplomats: the Role of Interpreters in Indian-White Relations 
on the Early American Frontier," American Indian Quarterly (1989), pp.1-14. 
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of the American experience and literature.41 
As an agent to the Aborigines and a Christian, Robinson felt it his duty to 
stop the frequent visits of the Bruny Island women with the local sealers and 
whalers. On several occasions he sent them letters "reprobating their conduct 
in the severest manner for suffering the men in their employ to cohabit with the 
aboriginal females at Adventure Bay." 42 He found such wanton sexual contact 
reprehensible. "The conduct of these parties" he wrote, "in harbouring a 
plurality of aboriginal females who were arriving fast to a state of comparative 
civilisation, making them subservient to their own carnal appetites, is too 
aggravated to be passed over with impunity." 43 
However, the southern coastal bands had long been associated with these 
European groups. They had been a part of the southern whaling and seal-
ing activities from before permanent European settlement. Robinson's most 
41 Kawashima, "Forest Diplomats", pp.3-5; Reynolds points to a tradition of employ-
ing Aboriginal guides for both exploration and political negotiation that evolved in other 
Australian colonies later in the century: "The professional guides came from the 'settled' 
districts and were usually permanent members of the exploring parties in question ... Their 
expertise derived both from ancient Aboriginal traditions and from experience gained in 
contact with Europeans ... The professional guides retained important aspects of traditional 
bushcraft-they could track, hunt, find water-but their skills had been generalised in such 
a way that they could be utilised in any type of country, often very different from their 
original homelands which had nurtured the expertise in the first place. They were also lin-
guists with a number of dialects at their command and were well versed in the protocol of 
Aboriginal diplomacy ... Added to these attributes were skills learnt from the Europeans-
a working knowledge of English [and] familiarity with white man's weapons which often 
developed into marksmanship of a high order;" see H. Reynolds, With the White People 
(Ringwood, 1990), pp.18-19. 
42Plomley, Friendly Mission, p. 79. 
43Plomley, Friendly Mission, pp.72 & 79. 
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faithful guide, Trugernanna, had been involved with them since childhood. 
Though three family members had been violently attacked and killed by 
whalers, and her sister kidnapped, until Robinson removed her from them, 
Trugernanna remained active amongst the sealing and whaling communities 
based around Adventure Bay. Such was her knowledge of the European culture 
that she became one of Robinson's most important guides. She certainly 
became one of his most intimate associates. 44 
Disease and a high mortality rate created havoc at the establishment. From 
the outset Robinson watched many of those whom he was trying to nurture and 
protect die from chest infections. Whole families fell victim, sometimes dying 
within days of each other. By September 1829 twenty-two of the thirty-six 
Bruny Islanders under Robinson's care were dead.45 
Disease epidemics amongst Aboriginal groups were not confined to Van 
Diemen's Land. Smallpox had decimated Aboriginal communities throughout 
New South Wales. As early as 1790 Governor Phillip observed the devastating 
affect it was having. He estimated that half of the Aboriginal population of 
Botany Bay had fallen victim to it.46 
44Ryan, The Aboriginal Tasmanians, p.126; Reynolds, Fate of a Pree People, pp.139-43. 
45Plomley, Friendly Mission, p.77. 
46Phillip to Sydney, 13 February 1790, HRA, I.l, p.159. 
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Figure 6.2: 
Benjamin Duterrau's Truggernana, a native of the southern part of V.D. 
Land & wife to Woureddy, was attach'd to the mission in 1829, 1835, Source: 
Allport Library and Museum of Fine Arts; image taken from: 
http://images.statelibrary.tas.gov .au. 
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Disease was one of the first and most destructive legacies endowed to Abo-
riginal groups by European contact, and in Van Diemen's Land it had a far 
greater effect on Aboriginal attrition rates than war or the loss of women. From 
the time of the French explorations contact was intimate enough for viral and 
bacterial infections to be transmitted. As Reynolds has noted, Robinson and 
Wybalenna catechist, Robert Clark, both of whom had witnessed the decline 
and death of numerous Aborigines in their care, had discovered how lengthy 
and destructive this legacy of disease had really been. Clark had been told by 
his Aboriginal patients that "entire tribes of natives had been swept off ... [by] 
a sudden attack of disease which was general among the entire population 
previous to the arrival of the English." As Robinson travelled throughout Van 
Diemen's Land he discovered numerous instances of tribes which had long 
been extinct.47 Permanent settlement served merely to intensify this deathly 
trend. Sexually transmitted diseases which left many Aboriginal women infer-
tile, moreover, had the additional affect of decreasing the number of children 
born to subsequent generations. 
Not all diseases were life-threatening. Skin conditions that caused ulcer-
ation and itching, ultimately leaving its victims scarred by pockmarks, grew 
increasingly common as contact with Europeans spread. By 1819 Governor 
47Reynolds, Fate of a Pree People, pp.184-185; Plomley (ed.), Friendly Mission; see for 
example, pp. 179, 225, n.7, 226, n.35, 388, 469, n.240, 889; Robinson to Burnett, 6 August 
1831, CSO 1/318, Reel SLTX/AO/CS/115, pp.45-51. 
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Sorell realised that Aboriginal groups in the vicinity of Hobart required medical 
attention. A temporary hospital was established at Fisk's Mill and the Gov-
ernment Surgeon, Edward Luttrell, treated individuals for dysentery and "cu-
taneous" disorders, "to which they are more or less liable." In 1829, Arthur's 
private secretary, William Parramore, in a letter home wrote how the Abo-
rigines were "covered in leprosy." Henry Widowson commented on the "most 
loathsome ulcerated sores" which he observed the Aborigines to have suffered. 
During his mission to Port Davey Robinson chronicled the discomfort that 
these disorders inflicted on the Aborigines: "I have seen these poor creatures 
in the greatest torment and scratching themselves as if they would tear the 
flesh, the blood trickling down their naked bodies." Robinson's empathy only 
deepened when he, himself, fell victim to a "cutaneous infection" after shar-
ing his bed with his mission guides and their dogs. Such was his distress at 
the itch and pain from the infections that at one point he recorded in his 
journal: "Would sooner face a thousand hostile natives than have this horrid 
infection." 48 One wonders whether the presence of such unsightly skin condi-
tions had an affect, even subconsciously, on those who so fervently sought the 
Aborigines' expulsion from the island. 
48Sorell to Luttrell, 7 December 1819, HRA, III.2, p.750; W. Parramore, The Parramore 
Letters... (Epping, 1993), p.60; H. Widowson, Present State of Van Diemen's Land ... 
(London, 1829), p.192; Plomley, Friendly Mission, pp. 141 & 964-967. 
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Still enthusiastic, despite the various difficulties he continued to face, Robin-
son reported his progress to Arthur early in June. He felt it important that 
children be separated from their parents and transferred orphan children to 
the prisoners' hut where he tutored them almost exclusively in English. To 
Arthur he wrote: they '!appear to be destined by providence as a foundations 
upon which the superstructure of Your Excellency's benevolence is hereafter 
to be erected ... rousing them from that torpid inactivity which they have so 
long slumbered." 49 Their separation from the adults would also have helped 
to limit their exposure to infection. 
A group of nine Port Davey people visited the mission early in July. Finding 
sickness and death they quickly departed, but not before a number fell ill. 
Nonetheless, the visit encouraged Robinson to further consider an idea he had 
raised with Arthur about the possibility of leading an expedition to the west 
coast. Having learnt a little of their language and having earned their trust, 
Robinson would lead a group along the west coast, making contact with the 
various groups there, for "it is only by such an undertaking" he wrote to Arthur 
"that Your Excellency's humane intentions to the aborigines can possibly be 
made known." 50 
Robinson was aware that the south eastern Aborigines were desperate to 
49Plomley, Friendly Mission, p.62. 
50Plomley, Friendly Mission, pp.62-63. 
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leave the place where disease and "dire mortality" was so prominent. Their 
way of limiting the spread of disease was to isolate the sick. Those who fell 
ill were left to die or recover on their own and the place where the illness 
appeared was abandoned. 51 The Bruny Island mission, consequently, would 
have been a horror scene for them. Robinson would have come to understand 
that the only way he could continue to build a relationship with these people 
was to abandon the mission and move off with them. 
Arthur encouraged Robinson to embark on the expedition which he hoped 
would "effect an amicable understanding with the aborigines in that quarter, 
and through them, with the tribes in the interior. .. ". 52 He wrote to Robinson 
requesting that the men and boys from the band whom Batman had captured 
and sent to Richmond be transferred to Bruny Island. Robinson resisted, wor-
ried that the addition of new, possibly hostile, personalities to his group would 
threaten the positive dynamics that had been established between himself and 
the Bruny Island people. 
Robinson spent December and January making arrangements for the expe-
dition. Included in his preparations was the purchasing of trinkets to distribute 
amongst the Aborigines. He also wrote to the Aborigines Committee suggest-
ing that it provide him with a number of dogs for his Aboriginal guides. On 
51 Plomley, Friendly Mission, p.65. 
52Plomley, Friendly Mission, p.89. 
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Christmas Eve, Robinson visited Government House where he spoke with the 
governor about distributing his picture boards during his travels. The six con-
victs selected to accompany Robinson were Alexander McGeary, Alexander 
McKay, Samuel Hopkins, John Tunnicliffe, John Simpson and William Stans-
field. On 31 January 1830 Robinson gathered together his party for chapel 
service one last time before heading off to Port Davey. His "congregation" of 
twenty-nine included thirteen Aboriginal guides. 53 
Nine of his guides would remain with Robinson throughout the entire expe-
dition providing him with vital assistance on his overland march along the west 
coast. There were three women: Trugernanna, Dray, Pagerly, and six men-: 
Woorredy, Umarrah, Kickerterpoller, Trepanner, Parwareretar and Robert. 
Woorrady, Trugernanna and Pagerly were Bruny Island natives while Dray 
was from the Port Davey area. This meant that each would be invaluable 
as trackers and guides, having an intimate knowledge of the west coast and 
its people. Indeed, Dray would be the link between Robinson and her peo-
ple in that region. Umarrah, Kickerterpoller (the Aboriginal name to which 
Black Tom had reverted), Trepanner, Parwareter and Robert were valuable 
additions to the group for they all had previous associations with Europeans, 
having spent extended periods of time with different colonists. That they were 
53Plomley, Friendly Mission, pp.92, 95-96. 
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from the northern and eastern tribes was an additional benefit for these were 
regions to which the mission members would eventually head. 54 
Such was the importance of this expedition that Arthur sought advice from 
the Aborigines Committee about the idea of "suspending, during the period 
of Mr. Robinson's mission, the proclamations of martial law, and whether 
simultaneous attempts of a similar nature would probably be attended with 
success in different parts of the island." 55 
The Committee replied that its members were "unanimously of opinion 
that the operations of martial law should be suspended during the period of 
Mr. Robinson's peaceful mission ... Your Committee respectfully and most 
earnestly recommend that all the armed roving parties shall be called in until 
the success or otherwise of Mr. Robinson's mission shall have been ascer-
tained." 56 However, a drastic increase in the number of Aboriginal attacks 
during February57 may have convinced Arthur to reassess this option because 
martial law was never suspended. Instead Arthur published several govern-
ment orders again entreating the colonists to persevere in their attempts to 
conciliate the Aborigines. While Robinson continued his expedition, Arthur 
54see Plomley, Friendly Mission, Section I.2 (The Port Davey Mission). 
55 Aborigines Committee to Parramore, 30 January 1830, CSO 1/316/7578, AOT Reel 
SLTX/ AO /CS/114, pp.396-397. 
56 Aborigines Committee to Burnett, 2 February 1830, CSO 1/319 /7578, Reel 
SLTX/AO/CS/116, pp.2-6. 
57From nine in January to thirty in February 1830; see Plomley, Aboriginal/Settler Clash, 
p.26. -
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Benjamin Duterrau's Woureddy, a Wild Native of Brune [sic.] Island one of 
Mr Robinson's most faithful attendants attach'd to the mission in 1829, 1835, 
Source: Allport Library and Museum of Fine Arts, State Library of 
Tasmania; image taken from: http//images.statelibrary.tas.gov.au. 
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hoped that he could, with persuasion and the use of managed force, contain 
hostilities in the settled districts. 
Robinson's appointment and activities in the colony over the next few years 
were unique in several ways. This was the first time that a reserve had been 
established. It was the first time that a colonial government representative 
lived with an Aboriginal group as an intermediary between the colonial gov-
ernment and the Aborigines; and it was the first time that anyone had gained 
an understanding of their various cultural traditions and habits. Moreover, 
this experiment was unique because of the attitudes that guided Robinson. 
While he was adamant that the Aborigines should be raised along the scale of 
humanity by being converted to Christianity, he was sure also that they had 
been the true victims in this territorial war. Most significantly, and in contrast 
to official Imperial policy, Robinson believed that, indeed, this was Aboriginal 
land upon which they all trod and that the colonisers of Van Diemen's Land 
had a responsibility to acknowledge this. Something of Robinson's feelings 
and thoughts can be gleaned from a passage in his unfinished manuscript. 
Had the founders of the colony acted wisely-leaving justice out 
of the question-done unto these poor people as they would have 
been done unto, treated them as fellow creatures and as fellow 
subjects, all would have been well and this dire calamity would 
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not have happened. But they had acted otherwise and had treated 
them not only with harshness, indifference and neglect but with 
the grossest injustice; and this unfortunately had been the leading 
principle in founding colonies, not only by the English but by every 
civilized nation on the face of the globe. It was the rule and not 
the exception ... The rights of the original inhabitants were never 
though of. Might overcame right and the original possessors of the 
soil became, not free men, but slaves under the force of war ... 58 
6.2.2 An Alternate Path to Peace 
227 
When Robinson set out on his mission to Port Davey he headed away from the 
epicentre of Aboriginal-settler hostilities that were daily worsening. He went 
west instead of east because the aim of this initial mission was to establish a 
context for later peace negotiations between those warring Aboriginal groups 
of the midlands and east and the Colonial Government. His initial objective 
was quite simple. His immediate goal was to 
arrive at a correct estimate of the numerical strength of the abo-
riginal population and to become acquainted with their moral and 
political character so as to facilitate the means of conferring with 
58Plomley, Friendly Mission, p.52. 
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them and making known throughout the whole of their districts 
to the tribes severally the humane and benevolent intention of the 
Lieutenant Governor towards them. 
His longer term vision was that this expedition would be 
the forerunner of some future operation either as regard the tran-
quillizing of the aborigines generally or their entire removal from 
the island, conceiving at the same time that no permanent mea-
sures could be well carried into effect until a thorough knowledge 
of the original inhabitants had been obtained, a groundwork which 
had hitherto remained so long enveloped in obscurity.59 
228 
By heading west Robinson -could make contact with those groups least af-
fected by settlement. Later, should these contacts be successful and as he 
moved closer to the settled districts, he might build on these successes to also 
establish positive relations with the more hostile tribes of the midlands. As 
the reputations of several eastern bands worsened it seems likely that neither 
Robinson nor his guides desired golng directly to them. That members of 
Robinson's group were from the Port Davey region was, presumably, also a 
factor motivating Robinson to head west instead of east. 
59 Plomley, Friendly Mission, p.224. 
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Robinson's strategy during this preliminary mission, then, was to combine 
fact-finding and strategic manoeuvring to effect lasting peace. During the 
early stages of his journey he would learn as much as possible about the culture 
and society of the western tribes, also providing them with the opportunity 
to determine his intentions, and through him, the intentions of the colonial 
government. He would become familiar with the dialects of his mission guides 
so that he could later negotiate with the more hostile groups to whom they 
would eventually venture. All of this was made achievable as Robinson's bush 
skills developed while he learned to track, forage for food and generally survive 
as a gatherer-nomad, with, eventually, much increased physical stamina. 
On 1 February 1830 Robinson set off by boat from Hobart with a party 
of twenty nine. Over the next eight months they travelled more than a thou-
sand miles,60 via the coast, from Recherche Bay to Launceston. Robinson 
suffered severe itch, sometimes agonising pain, occasionally was left lost and 
abandoned, and once woke to find his trousers on fire, but the expedition 
continued because he kept his objectives clear in his mind. 
Landing at Recherche Bay, he began his overland journey on foot two days 
later. Robinson realised what a formidable task he was undertaking and that 
60Robinson to Arthur, 29July1830, CSO 1/318/7578, Reel SLTX/AO/CS/115, ppl0-25. 
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he was forging ahead into new frontiers and unknown territory (both politi-
cally and geographically). While a penal settlement had been established at 
Macquarie Harbour the wilderness around the penitentiary had not been ex-
plored or surveyed (indeed, Port Macquarie was chosen as the site for a prison 
because of its isolation in the impenetrable wilderness). As such, with over 
450 kilometres of wilderness lying between Recherche Bay and Port Macquarie, 
Robinson was taking on an immense challenge and was, for all intents and pur-
poses, placing his life in his party's hands. However, he remained confident, 
believing that his Aboriginal associates "would not allow me to want." 61 
Progress was slow at first as the party followed native tracks through dense, 
very wet, mosquito-infested rainforest. Moreover, problems making contact 
with two supply boats meant that Robinson often found himself short of pro-
visions. During his journey around the southernmost part of the coastline he 
found no evidence that tribes were still inhabiting the region. Their numbers 
had been diminished by European diseases and !nter-tribal hostilities.62 
On 16 March 1830, almost six weeks after they had set out, Robinson 
spotted his first "smoke". It had been made by a Ninene band. Robinson sent 
a number of his guides after the band and that evening the guides returned to 
61 Robinson to Arthur, 29 July 1830, CSO 1/318/7578, Reel SLTX/ AO/CS/115, pp.10-25; 
Plomley, Friendly Mission, p.114. 
62Plomley, Friendly Mission, p.277. 
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report that they had made contact. They told Robinson that they had "made 
the Port Davey people understand the nature of [Robinson's] mission· to them, 
and said the Port Davey natives was anxious I should come to them in the 
morning." The following morning Robinson went to the group and "seated 
myself amongst them and gave them biscuit and also distributed amongst 
them beads, ribbons etc." When the menfolk eventually joined the group he 
"[d]istributed ribbons, buttons, knives, looking glasses etc with which they 
were highly pleased." 63 
During his travels north Robinson came into contact with more Port Davey 
bands and each time distributed amongst them small gifts of food and trinkets. 
In time he came to realise that the presence of his convict assistants as well as 
the guns he had brought with him, caused more harm than good. Consequently 
he discarded the arms and made sure that the convicts remained at a distance 
from the party. Robinson also realised that his female guides were far more 
skilled negotiators and so he always employed them to make first contact. 
Trugernanna, he found, was his most loyal and talented escort. 
Robinson discovered force was completely ineffective in this setting. He 
could not make the local bands with whom he had come into contact remain 
with him involuntarily any more than he could force his guides to stay at his 
63Plomley, Friendly Mission, pp.131-133. 
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side. So Robinson changed his strategy, allowing his party the freedom to come 
and go as they pleased. When Umarrah, one of his most important guides, 
decamped, Robinson, expecting to reunite with him later in the expedition, 
focussed on the bonds that they had forged. "The conduct of Umarrah up 
to the time of his leaving the Expedition", Robinson reported to Arthur, "is 
beyond any praise I can bestow." 64 
This man and ... [Parwareretar and Trepanner] that has [sic] gone 
with him, were my only companions for near three weeks ... the 
whole of which time they evinced a disposition to render me ev-
ery affection in their power. Each of them carrying a knapsack, 
constructing my break wind at night etc. and although we had to 
subsist nearly the whole time on a little wheat meal I never heard 
them complain. Indeed the whole of the aborigines accompanying 
the expedition have rendered essential service to the undertaking 
and far exceed any encomium that I can bestow upon them.65 
It was not until word came of Umarrah's campaign of plunder and pillage in the 
settled districts during Robinson's time with the sealers that the conciliator 
realised how important it was to have Umarrah close by and allied with him. 
The Stoney Creek chief proved to be a formidable guerrilla leader in the north. 
64Robinson to Arthur, 29 July 1830, CSO 1/318/7578, Reel SLTX/AO/CS/115, p.21. 
65Robinson to Arthur, 27 July 1830, CSO 1/318/7578, Reel SLTX/AO/CS/115, p.21. 
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Robinson continued north along the coast making brief contact with new 
groups, recording party size and membership, distributing gifts and then mov-
ing off again. While he felt assured that his guides were growing ever more 
loyal he did recognise what a formidable task he had assumed. He understood 
a little of what he must overcome in order to gain the confidence of those with 
whom he was seeking contact: 
0! God, what has filled these poor unoffending people with such 
dire apprehensions! Can I imagine for a moment that the white 
man, my fellow man, has murdered their countrymen, their kindred 
and their friends, has violated their daughters, and has forcibly 
taken away their children under the pretext of taking care of them? 
Yes, it is only too true. Regardless of all laws, human or divine, 
they have imbued their hands in the blood of these poor unoffend-
ing people. 66 
Members of the Aborigines Committee concurred. Some felt that the convict 
stock keepers, those "lawless and desperate characters" of the colony were the 
instigators of hostilities. The Committee called on the colonists to remember 
"those rights of ordinary compassion to which, as human beings, and as the 
66Plomley, Friendly Mission, p.155. 
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original occupants of the soil, these defenceless and ignorant people were justly 
entitled." 67 
In June Robinson met with Joseph Fossey, a Van Diemen's Land Company 
surveyor and spent the next four days touring the Company's Woolnorth prop-
erty. There he learnt of the hostilities between local Aboriginal groups and 
the Company shepherds. He vowed that " ... if I could ascertain any unlawful 
violence was used against them and I could procure evidence, I [would be] 
determined to bring the delinquent before a judicial court." 68 
Robinson spent the last weeks of June and the first weeks of July moving 
throughout the islands off the north west coast. His aim was to meet with 
the island tribes and any sealers who had taken up residence with Aboriginal 
women on the islands or along the coast. Robinson was eager to make his 
presence known, though dubious about the reception he would receive. His 
preconceived ideas about their moral characteristics clouded his judgement. 
He considered "it would be the greatest act of humanity to take them [the 
Aboriginal women] out of the hands of their enemies [the sealers]" and noted 
in his journal that "I am anxious to proceed towards the more settled districts 
and these first steps can only be viewed as preparatory, though more has been 
67Report of the Aborigines Committee, 19 March 1830, in Arthur to Murray, 15 April 
1830, ·co 280/24, PRO Reel 244, p.437. 
68Plomley, Friendly Mission, p.176. 
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accomplished than I could positively have anticipated." At this stage Robinson 
had planned to go to the Big River tribe first and then later to head to the 
sealers in the Furneaux group. Arthur's Black Line operations, however, led 
him to change-his plans and so he set sail for the islands.69 
On his way to Emu Bay at the end of June Robinson spent a few days 
at Circular Head with Edward Gurr. There he had met three north west-
ern Aborigines: brothers from the Pairrehehoinne band of Robbins Island, 
Tunneminnerwate (Peevay) and Pendowtewer, and a young woman from the 
Peerapper band of West Point, Narrucer. Though he had been reluctant to 
remove anyone from their territories, news of Arthur's offers of rewards led 
Robinson to send his boat back to Robbins Island to collect the three: Pen-
dowtewer, N arrucer and Peevay. 70 Pendowtewer and N arrucer were sent to 
Launceston but Robinson attached Peevay to his expedition party.71 
Robinson arrived at Emu Bay on 28 July where he stayed with the store-
keeper before leaving to meet the Captain George Robson, superintendent of 
the Van Diemen's Land Company establishments at Hampshire and Surrey 
69Plomley, Friendly Mission, pp. 180 & 319. 
70Plomley considers this the beginning of the "commercialisation" of Robinson's mission, 
for he put aside strategies for conciliation and amelioration in consideration of monetary 
reward; see Plomley, Fhendly Mission, p.235, fn.132. 
71 For further discussion on the role that Peevay played in Robinson's mission see Ian 
McFarlane's unpublished PhD thesis, Aboriginal Society in North West Tasmania: Dispos-
session and Genocide, University of Tasmania, 2002, especially Chapter 5. 
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Hills. Robinson sp~nt his time at Emu Bay reading and responding to corre-
spondence. One of the letters he sent out was a preliminary report to Arthur 
describing his experiences to date. "In prosecuting the objects of my mission 
I have endeavoured," he wrote, 
lst: to effect reconciliation. I have endeavoured to impress upon 
the minds of the Aborigines your Excellency's anxious desire to 
ameliorate their condition. 
2nd: [I] have endeavoured to check that hostile feeling so apparent 
on the part of the whites against the blacks by assuring them that 
any outrages committed upon the Aborigines will meet with your 
Excellency's displeasure. 
In the course of my enquiring I find that (in most instances) the 
whites have been the aggressors and some cruel misfortunes have 
been committed. 72 
In a letter to his patron, Reverend William Bedford, he wondered: 
Had this attempt been made some few years ago I have not hes-
itation in saying that ere this a most perfect system might have 
been established and our communication kept up with every abo-
riginal throughout the island. At present I am of the opinion that 
72Robinson to Arthur, 29 July 1830, CSO 1/318/7578, Reel SLTX/ AO /CS/115, pp.10-25. 
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all those aboriginal natives inhabiting the settled districts should 
be removed, for although tranquillity on the part of the aborigines 
be restored, yet such is the character of the men who are employed 
in the interior in shepherding, that at every opportunity fresh out-
rages would be perpetrated and the poor defenceless aborigines 
would be goaded on again to retaliate ... 73 
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While Arthur was organising his military campaign in Hobart, Robinson 
left Emu Bay intending to head for the Great Western Tiers. On his travels 
through the Hampshire Hills, the Surrey Hills, St. Valentine's Peak and Mid-
dlesex Plains, Robinson detected his first signs of the true nature of colonial 
relations .in the interior. Aboriginal-settler relations were anything but am-
icable in the country to the north of Cradle Mountain. The Van Diemen's 
Land Company had alienated much Aboriginal land and the influx of convict 
servants and gra:ziers, as well as the ever-present sealers, created tension and 
hostility between settler and Aboriginal groups. Robinson was particularly 
concerned for his safety because he was entering territory where the notable 
female guerrilla leader, Walyer, who had been dubbed the "Amazon", had led 
particularly brutal assaults on settlers and convicts. Walyer had developed a 
reputation in the north amongst European and Aboriginal groups alike. Loyal 
73Plomley, Friendly Mission, p.235, fn.132. 
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to no-one, she had led raids against both groups. Robinson would later capture 
her and remove her to Swan Island but in the meantime she found refuge with 
the sealers with whom she had found refuge. Such was Walyer's wrath and so 
deep was her desperation that, according to Robinson, "she was not only to be 
dreaded by the whites, numbers of whom had been massacred by her, but she 
was a terror to all the natives she came in contact with .... " 74 Robinson was, 
thus, equally as nervous about the dangers he faced from hostile Aboriginal 
groups, as he was from the men of the Van Diemen's Land Company. However, 
despite his concern about Walyer and her band, his empathy lay with her and 
her people. Robinson reflected in his journal. 
Their wrongs are handed down from generation to generation. How 
then can we wonder at their committing outrages upon the white 
inhabitants? Who is there to avenge their wrongs? The children 
have witnessed the massacre of their parents and their relations car-
ried away into captivity by these merciless invaders, their country 
has been taken from them and the kangaroo, their chief subsistence, 
have been slaughtered wholesale for the sake of paltry lucre. Can 
we wonder then at the hatred they bear to the white inhabitants? 
74Plomley, Friendly Mission, pp.295-297. 
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This enmity is not the effect of a moment. Like a fire burning un-
derground, it has burst forth. This flame of Aboriginal resentment 
can and ought only to be extinguished by British benevolence. We 
should fly to their relief. We should make some atonement for 
the misery we have entailed upon the original proprietors of this 
land ... The most wanton cruelties have been practised upon them 
and who is there to whom they can make their grievance known? 
Till lately no steps was taken to ameliorate their condition." 75 
On 2 October 1830, Robinson arrived at Launceston, his first mission corn-
pleted. By then he had already decided to undertake an expedition to the 
sealers residing in the Bass Strait Islands. He soon learned that the Black 
Line was about to begin "and that there was nothing more for me to do, 
that they was now going to catch all the natives by driving them to Tas-
man's Peninsula." 76 Less than a week later Robinson began preparations for 
his next journey. With the aid of Mannalargenna and his kinswomen, Kub-
manner, Karnebutcher and Luggenemenener, whom Robinson would shortly 
meet, there was every reason that the next expedition would prove successful. 
75Plomley, Friendly Mission, pp.202-203. 
76Ploniley, Friendly Mission, p.224. 
Chapter 7 
Robinson and the Bass Strait 
Sealers 
.... before his Honour could concur in the advice of the rest of the 
Council, he wished it to be ascertained whether some treaty could 
not be made with these people ... 1 
From King Island, off the north west coast of Van Diemen's Land, across to 
the Furneaux group in the east the islands of the Bass Strait were the seasonal 
billets of gangs of men who were landed on the islands to hunt seals for their 
fur and oil during the early decades of the nineteenth century. Comprised 
1Chief Justice John Lewes Pedder quoted in Minutes of Executive Council, 23 February 
1831, in Arthur to Murray, 4 April 1831, CO 280.28, PRO Reel 247, pp.436-437. 
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of British, American, French and Russian operations, sealing at this time was 
very much an international interest. Eventually the islands became permanent 
homes for some. As the region and the industry attracted convict absconders 
and others seeking to remove themselves from control by the colonial institu-
tions in Van Diemen's Land and New South Wales, small island communities 
evolved. When the seal population began to decline these men, with their 
Aboriginal partners, turned to mutton-birding to maintain a livelihood.2 By 
the time George Augustus Robinson arrived in the islands the Bass Strait 
community had subsisted for almost three decades. As he soon discovered, it 
was the relations that the sealers had developed with the Aborigines of the 
north and east coasts which allowed the community to endure. 
An examination of Robinson and the Bass Strait sealing community re-
veals the paradox that was the Bass Strait Islands. These islands ultimately 
proved to be both a prison and a refuge for the various Aboriginal groups 
who found themselves there. The government-sanctioned reserves, though 
designed to protect and nurture the Aborigines-albeit as future Christians-
ultimately came to be prisons for them. Conversely, those Aboriginal women 
2T. Jetson, "An Island of Contentment? A History of Preservation Island", Tasmanian 
Historical Research Association, Papers and Proceedings, 43.1, 1996, pp.29-46; N.J.B. Plom-
ley, The Sealers of Bass Strait and the Cape Barren Island Community (Hobart, 1990); S. 
Murray-Smith, "'Beyond the Pale': The Islander Community of Bass Strait in the Nine-
teenth Century", Tasmanian Historical Research Association, Papers and Proceedings, 20.4 
(1973), pp.167-200. 
/ 
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who were often taken from their tribes by the sealers and removed to the 
islands and kept as prisoners and chattels eventually assumed the role of over-
seers of a burgeoning Aboriginal community and culture. To place in context 
how these paradoxes came to exist, this chapter will consider Robinson's efforts 
with the surviving north-eastern groups, his time with the Bass Strait seal-
ers, and Lieutenant-Governor George Arthur's seemingly incongruous dealings 
with each. 
§ 
During September and October 1830, with the Black Line in progress, 
Robinson focussed his efforts on those bands still in the north. Though Arthur 
clung to the idea of an Aboriginal reserve in Van Diemen's Land proper, he 
nevertheless supported Robinson's efforts to investigate possible sites in the 
Bass Strait islands because he realised that the removal of the Aborigines 
from the colony was becoming inevitable. While Arthur was reluctantly pon-
dering the reality of Aboriginal exile, in the United States, President Andrew 
Jackson was making historic strides towards dispossessing five south eastern 
Native American nations. Winning the presidency in November 1828 on a cam-
paign focusing on this end, Jackson was able to convince Congress to quickly 
pass removal legislation and soon afterwards the "Five Civilized Tribes" -the 
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Cherokee, Chickasaw, Choctaw, Creek and Seminole-found themselves fac-
ing exile on reserves in what later would become the state of Oklahoma. For 
the Cherokee nation what would result would be the exodus of 6,000 of their 
people from Georgia and Arkansas in a journey which came to be known as 
the "Trail of Tears." 3 
The difference between the removal of the native American tribes and the 
removal of the Aborigines of Van Diemen's Land came down to choice. The 
native American tribes had the choice to remain on their traditional lands. If 
they chose to stay they would be treated as American citizens. They would 
not receive the special benefits and protection that those who moved to the 
reserves were promised. If they wanted to remain on their traditional lands 
they would be required to purchase them from the state, because once the 
removal bill was passed the lands became the property of the state. 
On the other hand, for the Aborigines of Van Diemen's Land, there was 
no such opportunity to choose to stay. For all intents and purposes, they were 
enemies of the state. Though Arthur, like Jackson, had espoused a protection-
ist policy, in reality he could not protect the Aborigines from the activities 
of the outlying colonists any more than he could protect the colonists from 
the activities of the Aborigines. Moreover, even if Arthur was able to put an 
3Prucha, The Great Father, p.207; W. McLaughlin, Cherokee Renascence in the New 
Republic (Princeton, 1986). 
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end to the hostilities, the Aborigines still would not have the ability to sustain 
their traditional livelihoods. There simply was not enough space for pastoral 
and hunter/gather industries to coexist. Thus, with almost no opportunity 
for Aboriginal incorporation into colonial industries, there remained no choice 
but to accept removal. 
A second major difference between what happened in north America and 
what happened in Van Diemen's Land was the size of the reserves created 
and the size of the populations being removed to them. Tens of thousands 
of Cherokee went to Oklahoma where their reservation covered hundreds of 
thousands of acres. As a result, they were able to preserve their culture. The 
Aborigines who were removed to Flinders Island faced a very different fate. 
Flinders Island was a scant 1,400 square kilometres in size. The population 
never exceeded 123 Aborigines and those who did survive the onslaught of 
disease were in no position to attempt to adapt their traditions and customs 
to their new lifestyles. Their lives and lifestyles were rigidly controlled by their 
European overseers who actively discouraged the Aborigines from partaking of 
their customs and traditions. Moreover, even if the Flinders Island Aborigines 
could adapt their traditions, there was no new generation to carry on their 
culture. None of the babies born to the reserve Aborigines survived beyond 
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childhood.4 As such, the future of the Aboriginal culture of Van Diemen's 
Land fell to the sealing communities who inhabited the islands surrounding 
Flinders Island. 
7.1 Robinson and the Northeastern Tribes 
At the beginning of October 1830 Arthur sent Robinson off ''with boats, 
presents for the natives and whatever you may judge necessary to further 
the object of your expedition." 5 The next twelve months would prove a great 
challenge. Though Robinson would find the Oyster Bay and Stoney Creek 
Tribes cooperative, locating a suitable site for a reserve was a different matter 
altogether. He would have to move the mission to several different locations 
before he found one he thought suitable for the long-term accommodation of 
the Aborigines. However, his greatest difficulties would come from the sealers 
who effectively resisted Robinson's attempts to remove their women and break 
up their communities. Robinson was often nonplussed by Arthur's ambiguous 
attitude to this issue. 
Robinson and his party set out from Launceston for Cape Portland on 8 
October 1830. They travelled overland while two vessels sailed along the coast 
carrying their supplies. At the Cape, Robinson established a base camp from 
4Ryan, The Aboriginal Tasmanians, pp.182-194. 
5Frankland to Robinson, 7 October 1830, in Plomley, Friendly Mission, p.435, fn.6. 
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Figure 7.1: 
Benjamin Duttereau's Tanleboueyer, a Native of the District of Oyster Bay 
and the Wife of Manalargena was Attach'd to the Mission in 1830, 1830, 
Source: -Allport Library and Museum of Fine Arts, State Library of 
Tasmania; image taken from http://images.statelibrary.tas.gov.au. 
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where he travelled to the various islands and along the north east coastline. 
Robinson took with him Kickerterpoller, Pagerly, Peevay, Timmy, Truger-
nanna and Worraddy. In addition, two sealing women, Jumbo (Bulyer) and 
Sall (Tanleboneyer), joined him at Launceston. A~ the command of Launce-
ston Police Magistrate, William Thomas Lyttleton, Bulyer and Tanleboneyer 
had been taken from the islands by James Parish prior to Robinson's arrival.6 
On 1 November 1830 Robinson made contact with Mannalargenna, accompa-
nied by Karnebutcher and Kubmanner, near Eddystone Point. He presented 
the chief "with a few baubles" and in response he "saluted me with a kiss-
probably he had heard the white people kiss." 7 
Though Mannalargenna welcomed contact with Robinson and though his 
band had every reason to remain with the mission party, Robinson was still 
fearful that they would abandon him . "[I] now disclosed to them in ample 
terms," he wrote, 
the whole purport of my visit, made known the military plans that 
were in operation against them and the desire of the government 
to benefit their condition. I then described to them the nature 
60ne of the vessels was commanded by Captain John Welsh. In August 1830 Arthur 
published a government notice acknowledging that both Welsh and Robinson "have suc-
ceeded in opening a friendly intercourse" with the Aborigines. Welsh was superintendent 
of vessels at Launceston and most of his dealings with the northern Aborigines were as a 
result of this employment; see Plomley Friendly Mission, pp. 246, 436, fn.6; Government 
Notice 160, 19 August 1830, Hobart Town Gazette. 
7Plomley, Friendly Mission, pp.26_0-263. _ 
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and formation of the Line ... and further informed them that the 
mighty enemy who were at that time engaged in capturing their 
,countrymen to the southward would shortly appear in formidable 
array in front of their own territory ... I then made known to them 
my intention of visiting the islands in the straits and the determi-
nation of the local government to emancipate the female aborigines 
who were kept there in a state of subjugation by the sealers ... I 
proposed to them to accompany me to Swan Island as a place of 
security and to remain there whilst I repaired to the islands re-
ferred. 8 
Robinson noted that "in reply to this preamble they complained in bitter terms 
of the injuries to which they and their progenitors had been exposed through 
the medium of the whites, and seemed to fully appreciate the sympathy I 
expressed on their behalf." He was confident that he had the full support of 
Mannalargenna and his group.9 
During this expedition Robinson collected a total of fifty-eight Aborigines 
from the islands and the east coast. Some had been captured by settlers 
and roving parties, but the majority were women retrieved from the sealers. 
8 Robinson to Burnett, 24February1831, CSO 1/318/7578, Reel SLTX/AO/CS/115; see 
also Plomley, Fhendly Mission, pp.438-9, fn.44. 
9Robinson to Burnett, 24February1831, CSO 1/318/7578, Reel SLTX/AO/CS/115; see 
also Plomley, Fhendly Mission, pp.438-9, fn.44. 
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Later, six of the women were returned to the sealers. Apart from the taking 
of Peevay, Pendowtewer and Narrucer from Robbins Island the previous July, 
this was the first instance where Robinson actually took Aboriginal groups 
into custody. Ryan considers that Robinson's mission to the sealers was the 
point where he changed from "conciliator to captor." 10 
Mannalargenna was certainly the most important individual to join Robin-
son's mission to this point. As an eastern chief he could prove pivotal in nego-
tiating with the sealers. He had been associated with them since boyhood. He 
was familiar with European ways and, as a tribal elder, he held the respect and 
reverence of his people. Mannalargenna's alliance with Robinson was vital for, 
as Ryan notes, his was the first group Robinson had met where the members 
had been active against the settlers. 11 
Robinson found that most of the north eastern groups with whom he came 
into contact were eager to join him. Moreover, his own guides seemed willing 
to accept the terms he offered them for peace and security. Ryan argues 
that this was the case because a mutual dependence had developed between 
them. 12 However, the ease with which Robinson was able to make contact 
and negotiate with new groups was also facilitated by the fact that most of 
the Aborigines he now met had kinship ties with one or more of his guides. If 
10Plomley, Friendly Mission, pp.355-6; Ryan, The Aboriginal Tasmanians, p.145. 
11Gray to Arthur, 23 October 1830, CSO 1/316/7578; AOT Reel SLTX/AO/CS/114, 
pp.691-695; Ryan, The Aboriginal Tasmanians, p.149. · 
12Ryan, The Aboriginal Tasmanians, p.159. 
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Figure 7.2: 
Thomas Back's Mannalargenna, a Chief of the Eastern Coast of Van 
Diemen's Land, 1831, Source: National Library of Australia; 
image taken from http: //nla.gov.au/ nla.pic-an6428961. 
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they were not related by blood, they at least were bound by traditional tribal 
associations. 
On 15 November the rest of Mannalargenna's band joined Robinson's party 
on Swan Island. Luggenemenener was with them. This group had separated 
from Mannalargenna shortly after leaving Batman's Ben Lamond residence. 
Recognising Kickerterpoller, Luggenemenener convinced her companions to 
join Robinson's guides and return to Swan Island.13 
A week later Robinson returned to the coast leaving his convict servant, 
James Parish, to travel to the sealers to collect more women. Parish made 
two trips to the islands in December, during which time he collected eleven 
more women. Robinson now focussed on capturing Umarrah. 14 Arthur en-
couraged Robinson's efforts, noting his "pleasure at [Robinson] procuring the 
13The six were all from the north east: Luggenemenener (Ben Lomond), Terlanderreen-
ner (Ben Lomond), Trueermermarmlenener (Ben Lomond), Pundootternoonnenner (Ben 
Lomond), Woreterlettelarnnenne (Piper's River) and Tillarbunner (Piper's River). 
14Ryan notes that at the commencement of the mission there remained only four groups 
in the east: Walyer's remnant band was at Port Sorell-though the "Amazon", herself, had 
returned to the sealers; the Big River people were at Fingal Bay; and Umarrah led one of 
the two groups who were moving throughout the George Town district. Now that Man-
nalargenna was with R?binson, Umarrah's was the onlY. band ~till, unaccounted for in the 
north east. During this time Umarrah had murdered servants belonging to James Scott, Ma-
jor William Gray, Captain Robert Stewart, the settler James Gildas, as well as Bartholemew 
Thomas and his servant James Parker. The eleven women included Pollerrelberner (Juded), 
Pollerwotteltelterrunne (Margaret) and her child, Tarenootairrer (Tibb), Weybermuenin-
ner (Tekartee), Woreterpyeerternanne (Jock), Wottecowwidyer (Wot), Nickerumpowwer-
rerter(Little Mary), Nollawollaker (Little Kit), Plownneme (Pangem), Tarrenorerer (Wa-
lyer, later named Mary Ann) and Woretermoteteyer (Bung); see Plomley, Friendly Mission 
p.479; Ryan, The Aboriginal Tasmanians, p.150; Lyttleton to Burnett, 18 October 1830; 
Gray to Burnett, 19, 23, 24 October 1830, CSO 1/316/7578, AOT Reel SLTX/AO/CS/114, 
pp.690-715. 
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natives" and "satisfaction at the intrepidity and the discretion which [he] had 
evinced ... "15 
Robinson decided in early December that he would return to Hobart to 
discuss with Arthur the details of his plans for a permanent Aboriginal estab-
lishment in the islands. He met with the governor on 19 January 1831. This 
was the first opportunity since the conclusion of the Black Line that Arthur 
and Robinson had to discuss his expedition. Now that military force against 
the Aborigines had taken its course Arthur was ready to put his full weight be-
hind Robinson's conciliatory mission. A government notice dated 19 February 
1831 proclaimed 
The Lieutenant-Governor, having had under consideration the re-
port of the Aborigines Committee of the 4th instant, detailing the 
proceedings of Mr. G.A. Robinson, on his Conciliatory Mission to 
the Aborigines, with a view of opening an amicable intercourse and 
friendly communications with the whole of the black population of 
this island, feels great pleasure in notifying, by public order, that 
Mr. Robinson has, in the opinion of the Committee, accomplished 
in a great measure the objects of his missions, and that in so doing 
15Burnett to Robinson, 23 November 1830, CSO 1/321/7578, AOT Reel 
SLTX/AO/CS/114, pp.123-124; see also Plomley, Friendly Mission, pp.289 & 441, 
fn.71. 
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he has manifested the most daring intrepidity, persevering zeal, and 
strenuous exertion.. . . The success which has already attended the 
conciliatory measures adopted by Mr. Robinson in his intercourse 
with the Aboriginal natives will, it is most sincerely hoped by the 
Lieutenant-Governor, be the means of inducing other inhabitants 
to embark in the same useful cause, and it will always afford his 
Excellency great pleasure to reward with equal liberality and ex-
ertions which may prove as beneficial to the community, and the 
Aboriginal Natives themselves.16 
Robinson was rewarded with an increase in salary to £250 per year, a bonus 
of £100 and a grant of 2,560 acres of land.17 
Having convinced the Aborigines Committee that Gun Carriage Island 
would be the most suitable site for a mission, Robinson transferred seven 
Aborigines who were in custody in Hobart to Swan Island. On 16 March 
the entire Swan Island camp, consisting now of fifty-one Aborigines, including 
four who ·had been transferred from Launceston and a sickly child who had 
been handed over by a group of sealers, were shipped to Preservation Island. 
They would remain there until the resident sealers of Gun Carriage Island had 
departed. 18 
16 Hobart Town Gazette, 19 February 1831. 
17 Hobart Town Gazette, 19 February 1831; Plomley, Friendly Mission, p.319 & 451. 
- -
18Four of the seventeen were Robinson's guides who had accompanied him from-the east 
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The Executive Council, whose members included Lieutenant Colonel Patrick 
Logan, Secretary Burnett, Governor Arthur and Chief Justice Pedder, met 
in February 1831. The members were satisfied that Robinson's mission was 
proceeding well. Robinson had assured them that he was confident of the pos-
sibility of "effecting the voluntary removal of the entire black population, by 
holding out to them the inducements of food, clothing, and protection of the 
government from the aggressions of sealers and bushrangers." This promise 
of protection, the Council felt, could only be fulfilled if the reserve was some 
distance from the mainland. Robinson agitated strongly for this measure. He 
did 
not think the natives could now be induced to retire altogether from 
the settled districts and occupy the unlocated parts of the island, 
or that a negociation [sic] to that effect could now be accomplished 
through their chiefs; nor could the natives be restrained from at-
tacking the white people, or be bound to confine their excursions to 
the unsettled parts of the island, even if arrangements were made 
) 
by the government through their chiefs to secure them in such situ-
ations from the encroachments of the settlers and stock-keepers. If 
their chiefs were to promise to conform to such arrangements, and 
coast: Woorrady, Trugernanna, Kickerterpoller and Pagerly; see Plomley, Friendly Mission 
pp.317-319 & 324. 
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to engage themselves to prevent further aggressions on the part of 
their tribes, he does not think the promises would be attended to 
by the tribes, as the chiefs have not sufficient power over them to 
enforce obedience.19 
Robinson's recommendation for Gun Carriage Island was accepted, it being 
eleven leagues20 from the coast. A vessel made available to supply provisions 
and guard the island would further ensure the settlement's safety and iso-
lation. In the colony, existing tribes would be gathered up and transferred 
to the reserve. Settlers in the interior would be protected by "small armed 
parties ... stationed in the most remote stock-huts, but ... the roving parties 
should be discontinued." 21 
Significantly the only recorded opposition in the Council to this proposal 
came from the colony's chief legal officer, Chief Justice John Lewes Pedder. He 
felt that more should be done before the Aborigines were exiled permanently. 
Contrary to Robinson who felt that the islands could provide completely for 
19Minutes of Executive Council, 23 February 1831 in Arthur to Murray, 4 April 1831, CO 
280/28, PRO Reel 247, pp.427, 430-431. 
20 55 kilometres. 
21 Minutes of Executive Council, 23 February 1831, in Arthur to Murray, 4 April 1831, 
CO 280/28, PRO Reel 247, p.428; In 1826 Captain John Welsh, superintendent of marine 
at Launceston, made a similar suggestion regarding the establishment of a penal settlement 
on Cape Barren Island. In an inquiry into the sealing industry, Welsh thought that Van 
Diemen's Land and the islands of the Bass Strait could be better protected by manning 
Cape Barren Island with a small force of soldiers, an assortment of "the most depraved 
convicts" and arming it with a "small armed vessel"; see L. Murray, An Account of the 
Whaling and Sealing Industries of Van Diemen's land to 1850, unpublished Honours Thesis, 
University of Tasmania, 1972. -
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the Aborigines, Pedder worried that they would be despondent. "[H]owever 
carefully these people might be supplied with food", he lamented 
Figure 7.3: 
Chief Justice John Lewes Pedder, Source: Archives Office of Tasmania, 
30/280; image taken from http://www.foundingdocs.gov.au. 
they would soon begin to pine away when they found their situ-
ation one of hopeless imprisonment, within bounds so narrow as 
necessarily to deprive them of those habits and customs which are 
CHAPTER 7. ROBINSON AND THE BASS STRAIT SEALERS 257 
the charms of their savage life. 22 
"He meant", the Executive Council recorded in its minutes, "their known love 
of change of place, their periodical distant migrations, their expeditions in 
~ 
search of game, and their unbounded liberty of which they have hitherto been 
in the enjoyment." 23 
Pedder believed that Robinson had, in effect, demonstrated that "more 
could be attainable" and 
before his Honour could concur in the advice of the rest of the 
Council, he wished it to be ascertained whether some treaty could 
not be made with these people, by which their chiefs should engage 
for their tribes not to pass certain lines of demarkations which 
might be agreed upon, and that it should be proposed to them to 
allow an European agent to reside with or accompany each tribe.24 
Pedder "thought such agents would most materially contribute to maintain any 
amicable engagement of this sort which might be concluded ... [S]uch agents 
would serve the double purpose of protecting the natives on the one hand, and 
22Minutes of Executive Council, 23 February 1831 in Arthur to Murray, 4 April 1831, CO 
280.28, PRO Reel 247, pp.436-437. 
23Minl!tes of Executive Council, 23 February 1831 in Arthur to Murray, 4 April 1831, CO 
280.28, PRO Reel 247, pp.436-437. 
24Minutes of Executive Council, 23 February 1831, in Arthur to Murray, 4 April 1831, 
CO 280.28, PRO Reel 247, pp.436-437. 
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of checking any disposition towards hostility on their part on the other .... "25 
Pedder's position was remarkable for he was the only colonial chief justice 
in Australia to propose that a treaty be negotiated with an Aboriginal group. 
To be sure, his knowledge of the Aboriginal situation in Van Diemen's Land 
was solid. Pedder played an integral role in the shaping of legal precedent as 
it applied to Aboriginal issues in Van Diemen's Land. He heard several cases 
involving Aborigines both as victims and as defendants (indeed, his very first 
case in Van Diemen's Land involved the slaying of an Aboriginal man) and 
his membership on the Executive and Legislative Councils meant that he was 
privy to -every decision Arthur made regarding Aboriginai policy.26 
Arthur, nonetheless, had reluctantly come to the conclusion that there 
was "no hope of establishing any permanent goo,d understanding" with the 
Aborigines who maintained a presence in the settled districts. To Murray, he 
finally admitted that exile-his earlier categorical rejection of such a solution 
notwithstanding27-was now the only answer, for he could not ensure their 
25Minutes of Executive Council, 23 February 1831, in Arthur to Murray, 4 April 1831, 
CO 280.28, PRO Reel 247, pp.436-437. 
26J.M. Bennett, Sir John Pedder: First Chief Justice of Tasmania (Hobart, 1977); P.A. 
Howell, Pedder entry, D. Pike (ed.), Australian Dictionary of Biography, v. 2 (Melbourne, 
1967), pp.319-320; Decisions of the Nineteenth Century Tasmanian Superior Courts, Di-
vision of Law, Macquarie University and the School of History and Classics, University of 
Tasmania, http://www.law.mq.edu.au. 
270ne will recall his despatch of January 10 1828 to Colonial Secretary Goderich in which 
_ he expressed his grave concerns that his Aboriginal wards "would be exasperated to the 
last degree to be banished altogether from their favourite haunts;" see Arthur to Goderich, 
10 January 1828, HRA, III.7, p.27; Arthur to Murray, 12 September 1829, HRA Resumed 
Series III.8, pp.607-609, 
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safety against certain groups of settlers. He did not feel that the Aborigines 
could be induced to remain within the prescribed limits of a reserve. Moreover, 
he felt that though the "respectable class of settlers" would observe the terms 
of a treaty, their "servants, runway convicts, stock keepers and all that class 
of character, who, being free by servitude, are under no special control" would 
most likely not. To this end, he finally felt forced to support the plan for an 
off-shore reserve, "for even if they should pine away," he lamented, 
in the manner the Chief Justice apprehends, it is better that they 
should meet with the death in that way whilst every act of kindness 
is manifested towards them, than that they should fall a sacrifice 
,to the inevitable consequences of their continued acts of outrage 
upon the white inhabitants. 28 
The irony was that the Aborigines who did survive were those who were liv-
ing in the communities that the colonial government had shunned. Wybaleena, 
.~he reserve on Flinders Island where Robinson's Aborigines would eventually 
be accommodated, came to be in essence a prison for them. They found 
themselves in exile, the vague promises made to them about their returning to 
their homelands never being honoured. In response, they forged new lives, as 
Reynolds describes with "adaptability and resourcefulness" and were able to 
28 Arthur to Murray, 4 April 1831, CO 280/28, PRO Reel 247, pp.423-424. 
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maintain their Aboriginal identity and remain politically active and passion-
ate. 29 Nonetheless, as more and more of their people succumbed to respiratory 
disease, death and despondency remained a central theme of life on the reserve. 
Moreover, it quickly became apparent to the Aborigines that they would never 
again return to their homelands. Wybaleena, thus, ultimately proved to be a 
prison for many of the Aborigines of Van Diemen's Land who found themselves 
exiled there. 
The Aborigines who remained attached to the sealing community, on the 
other hand, survived and prospered. Because they had the opportunity to 
adapt their traditional customs in ways that gave -their lives meaning, the 
Aboriginal sealers, though their lifestyles were far from easy, did not suffer 
the despondency of their Flinders Island kin. Moreover because the majority 
of them were women there was the opportunity for subsequent generations to 
carry on their legacies. These women and their progeny eventually assumed 
the role of custodians over a new Aboriginal society and culture in the Bass 
Strait islands. As. a consequence the sealing communities of the Bass Strait 
islands eventually became the refuge for the Tasmanian Aborigines that neither 
Flinders Island nor Van Diemen's Land would never be. 
§ 
29H. Reynolds, Fate of a Free People, p.189. 
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With the fate of the eastern tribes thus cemented, the Executive Council 
reconvened in March 1831 to discuss long term options for the Aborigines of 
Van Diemen's Land. As Robinson's reports to the governor's office contin-
ued to chronicle his successes with the Aborigines, the council surmised that 
ambassadorial excursions to the tribes of the west coast would undoubtedly 
prove effective. The plan was for a negotiated agreement for their removal. 
Ambassadors to the Aborigines could, the Council suggested, 
confer with the hostile tribes, and explain the humane and kind 
disposition of the -government towards them, with the assistance 
of such natives as may be depended upon, and, if possible, negoti-
ate with their chiefs either to proceed to the establishment, or to 
bind themselves to commit no further outrage on the condition of 
receiving food and clothing, and protection from all aggression.30 
The Council concluded that the 
time for negociation [sic] is peculiarly favourable, because it is evi-
dent that the mobs who were so lately encompassed on the occasion 
of the general expedition have been exceedingly alarmed, and have 
not since committed any outrages; it is therefore highly probable 
30Minutes of Executive Council, 14 March 1831 in Arthur to Murray, 4 April 1831, CO 
280.28, PRO Reel 247, p.444. 
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that they may be more favourably disposed for conciliation than 
heretofore. 31 
7.2 Robinson and the Sealers 
Robinson's conviction that the sealing community must be dismantled was 
guided by a number of motivations. Plomley argues that Robinson was driven 
by the realisation that "the activities of the sealers were the most important 
cause of ill-feeling against the whites in the northern part of the island." 32 
However, both Arthur and Robinson had other reasons for wanting to disperse 
the sealers. 
For Arthur, the existence of sealing communities in the Bass Strait was dis-
turbing because, in the words of scholar Stephen Murray-Smith, its members 
"displayed a determined genius in evading the imperatives of a higher author-
ity in any form." As the chief executive of a convict colony, concerned to effect 
order and humanity, it was "an affront ... that a no man's land existed, and 
even more that it was a place of resort for those who wished to live beyond the 
pale." 33 The sealers did, indeed, live beyond the pale. They did not live the 
31 Minutes of Executive Council, 14 March 1831 in Arthur to Murray, 4 April 1831, CO 
280/28, PRO Reel 247, p.445. 
• 
32Plomley, Friendly Mission, p.436, fn.6. 
33S. Murray-Smith, "Beyond the Pale: The Islander Community of Bass Strait in the 
Nineteenth Century", THRA Papers and Proceedings, 20.4 (1973), pp.168 & 171-2. 
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structured, Christian lives of cultured English citizens. They lived in a harsh 
environment and they were dependent on industries that were unsustainable 
over the long term. In choosing to isolate themselves, they relinquished access 
to the support that being a member of a colonial society presupposed, when 
their industries began to decline. Physically, too, their lives were difficult and 
dangerous. They lived on small, windswept islands often isolated for months 
on end, relying on ships passing through for many of their provisions. Their 
interaction with Aboriginal bands and their atrocities against the women ex-
emplified the brutality that came to define their lives. Abhorrent as this was, 
what was more abhorrent to those observing the sealing fraternity from the 
colonies was the fact that much of the same brutality was carried out by the 
likes of convicts and other settlers within the confines of the colony itself, and 
there seemed little anybody could do to prevent such behaviour. As such, as 
historian Tim Jetson points out, the "sealers [became] a convenient scapegoat 
for a society eager to shed its frontier image." 34 
For Robinson, the existence of the sealing community was deplorable for 
more personal reasons. This was a group that undermined his authority and 
threatened the tenuous control he had established over the Aboriginal bands 
along the north and east coasts. As justification for seeking to disband the 
34T. Jetson, "An Island of Contentment? A History of Preservation Island", p.35. 
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fraternity, he highlighted the wretched treatment by the sealers of the Abo-
riginal women whom he sought to emancipate from a state of slavery. In the 
introduction to his never-completed book Robinson wrote, 
[t]hence it became apparent that they were an indolent and an 
iniquitous people who were occupying the land of the crown and 
were carrying on a sort of slave trade which reflected the highest 
odium on themselves as men who aspired to the name of Christians 
and further tended to subvert the best devised measures of the 
Colonial Government on behalf of-the unprotected aborigines. 35 
Robinson's depiction of the Aboriginal women as victims highlights not 
only an underlying agenda to present himself as a saviour of sorts but also 
his naivety about the nature of their relations with the Bass Strait sealers. 
Certainly there were women living with the sealers who had been removed 
from their people and kept in the islands against their will. However, there 
were others, as Robinson soon learned, who chose to stay even when offered 
the opportunity to rejoin their kin.36 
This would come to haunt him when faced with the sealer James Munro 
35Plomley, Friendly Mission, pp. 279 & 431, fn.l. 
36see Memo on Condit10n of Native Women in the Straits, circa 1830, Bedford Papers, 
1823-1843, MLA76, CY Reel 1768; Plomley, Friendly Mission, p.297; Evidence of James 
Kelly in Report of the Aborigines Committee, 19 March 1830, in Arthur to Murray, 15 April 
1830, CO 280/24, PRO Reel 244, p.421. 
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who utilised his deeper, more intimate knowledge of the northern and eastern 
Aborigines of Van Diemen's Land to outwit Robinson. Munro had developed 
knowledge of the Aborigines of Van Diemen's Land before they fell into cri-
sis. He knew them when they were not being hunted and harassed and, as 
such, unlike Robinson, he would have come to know not only the complexity 
of their traditional culture and society, but the intricacies of their political 
and diplomatic customs. His relations with them developed, as Ryan notes, 
to the point where they became mutually dependent on one another. 37 As 
such, he knew the Aborigines not as passive recipients of the goodwill of a 
condescending, patronising overseer, but as engaging, adaptable participants 
in a cross-cultural relationship. Moreover, Munro's relations with the various 
women with whom he cohabited over many years were necessarily much more 
intimate than those that Robinson had formed with his mission guides. As 
their role as cultural custodians in what would become very much a matriar-
chal community developed, Munro would have understood that, though the 
initial decision to have them join the sealing community might not have been 
theirs, later, when Robinson gave them the option to leave their island homes, 
the choice of whether to go or stay certainly was. 
§ 
37Ryan, The Aboriginal Tasmanians, p.67. 
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Though Robinson's convict servant, Parish, had been the one sent to the is-
lands to collect women from the sealers, Robinson realised that he would have 
to eventually seek an audience with them himself and so on 9 November 1830, 
he set out to for the islands. Robinson took the sealing woman, Jumbo, with 
him. Parish had removed Jumbo from the sealer, James Munro before Robin-
son's arrival in the islands. Munro was one of the three sealers Robinson would 
shortly meet with. The other two were Charley Peterson and his namesake, 
George Robinson. Though old and frail, Munro proved a formidable adversary 
for Robinson. Charley Peterson, on Gun Carriage Island, and George Robin-
son, on Woody Island were also elderly men. George Robinson was a sailor 
who had settled in the islands around the beginning of the century. Both had 
Aboriginal women living with them. 38 
During several visits during October and November, G.A. Robinson in-
formed the sealers that the colonial government had instructed him to remove 
the women but, aware of their age and infirmity, he allowed one woman, Ploor-
ernelle, and her child, to remain with the sealer, Robinson, on Woody Island. 
Robinson removed Mannalargenna's sister, Toogernuppertootenner. The two 
women attached to Charley Peterson, Smoker (Tencotemanener) and Isaac 
(Woreterlokekoteyer), appeared eager to join Robinson. Neither Peterson nor 
38Plomley, Friendly Mission, p.268-74 & 1014-15, ; R.M. Fowler, The Furneaux Group, 
Bass Strait, A History (Canberra, 1980), p.190; H. O'May, Sealers of the Bass Strait (Ho-
bart, 1959), p.20; Jetson, "An Island of Contentment?", pp.29-46. 
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Robinson attempted to stop the conciliator from taking their women. How-
ever, Munro and the sealer, Edward Mansell, were not so willing to concede 
I 
to Robinson's demands and took active steps to thwart his efforts.39 
When Robinson arrived in the islands he.found a community permanently 
based there. The sealing community was relatively self-sufficient, drawing 
its livelihood at this stage from sealing and later from mutton-birding. Its 
members had built homes and established gardens and had developed their own 
style of law and order. A chain of command had evolved. Munro maintained 
considerable status amongst the menfolk. Possessing "considerable influence 
over the other black women", Mother Brown (Pleenperrenner), wife to John 
Smith, appeared to be the matriarch of the islands. Nevertheless, despite 
the island community being well-established, Robinson, believing that he had 
Arthur's full support to do so, felt confident that he could and should dismantle 
it.40 
Robinson was always concerned about his lack of command over the seal-
ing community and so petitioned the governor for greater authority in the 
islands. He was thus sworn in as a Special Constable there and early in March 
1831 Arthur sent him specific instructions on how to conduct himself with the 
39Plomley, Friendly Mission, pp.245-74. 
40Plomley, Friendly Mission, p.270-272, 285, & 333-334. 
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sealers. Robinson was instructed to investigate the nature of the island corn-
munities, removing to Swan Island any women who did not specifically consent 
to remain. The governor informed him that if he met with resistance he would 
be "justified in using force to accomplish the object," though the Governor 
remained adamant that if the women "are not disposed to accompany you, 
you are not to interfere any further." 41 
Robinson returned to the islands on 19 March with notices for the sealers. 
The residents of the Furneaux group were ordered to quit the islands and to 
"deliver up" those Aboriginal women currently residing with them. Robinson 
threatenec:J. that failure to do _so would have legal repercussions. 42 
Up to this time the sealers had passively resisted him by hiding their women 
and avoiding contact, but once Robinson appeared to have the colonial govern-
ment's sanction to remove them, the sealers took decided measures to redress 
the situation. On 21 March 1831 Munro and Mansell left for Hobart to ex-
pedite the process. They sent a petition to Arthur requesting that Munro be 
41 Burnett to Robinson, 3 March 1831, CSO 1/318/7578, Reel SLTX/ AO /CS/115; Plom-
ley, Friendly Mission, pp 449-50, fn 114. 
42Robinson's notice to the sealers read: "All persons sealers and others will hereby take 
notice that it is the determination of His Majesty's Colonial Government not to permit any 
residence upon or resort to any of the islands in these straits unless by express written licence 
to be obtained for this purpose ... All persons therefore sealers and others residing upon or 
resorting to any of the islands are warned by me to quit those islands which are solely the 
property of the Crown ... Such persons therefore who are found residing upon or resorting 
to any of those islands after this notice are trespassers and will be expelled accordingly." 
Robinson to Burnett, 24 February 1831, CSO 1/318/7578, Reel SLTX/AO/CS/115; see also 
Plomley, Friendly Mission, pp. 449, fn.114; 452, fn.132. 
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allowed to remain on Preservation Island and that Bet Smith (Merunnertat-
teyanne) be returned to her husband, Thomas Beedon. Arthur requested that 
John Montagu, Clerk of the Legislative Council, meet with Munro. 
On 29 April 1831 Munro presented his case to Montagu. Munro admitted 
that he was not supportive of Robinson's scheme to remove the Aboriginal 
women from the sealers to a reserve on Gun Carriage Island. He argued that 
the island was not a suitable site for such an establishment. He considered that 
it would be too difficult to access and too small for a permanent settlement to 
be built there. He worried that the Aborigines would become sickly and suffer 
"either from the confinement of the island or from fretting .... "43 
However, if there were no alternatives, Munro suggested a possible solution 
would be to give the mission residents access to Cape Barren Island also. 
He argued that, having a circumference of eighty or ninety miles, the island 
would be large enough for the Aborigines to maintain traditional lifestyles. 
He advised that "if they could be allowed to roam about and hunt on that 
island and return to the Establishment on Gun Carriage Island as they pleased, 
without the fear of being taken away .... they would be happy and contented." 
Indeed, Munro conjectured that in time "they would be more happy than being 
left in Van Diemen's Land." Mum:o also argued that it would be "impolitic" 
43Statement made to the Clerk of the Councils of April 1831, by Mr Munro of Preservation 
Island, 29 April 1831, CSO 1/330/7578, AOT Reel.SLTX/AO/CS/118, pp.210-212. 
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to simply remove the women from the sealers. He maintained that most would 
not leave of their own accord because of the length of time that they had lived 
in the islands. He thought it a better idea to allow them to remain and to 
employ them as agents to the western bands, for they "might induce whole 
tribes to accompany them to the Establishment." He suggested, too, that if the 
sealers were allowed to stay in the islands they would most likely volunteer their 
services in capturing the last of the west coast tribes. Without the assistance 
of both the Aboriginal women and the sealers, he asserted, further attempts by 
Robinson to bring in the western tribes would, in all likelihood, prove futile. 44 
Arthur ordered the Aboriginal women released back to the sealers.45 
Not for the first time, Arthur found himself in a difficult position. In 
accepting Munro's petition, he necessarily angered and frustrated Robinson. 
However, though Munro lived amongst an underclass abhorred by the colonial 
authorities, Arthur found him to have "always conducted himself with pro-
priety." Munro had been transported to Sydney in 1799 where he served a 
seven year sentence before being freed by servitude in 1806. Munro had been 
a sealer in the straits since the early 1820s and throughout his time there had 
had several women attached to his household. Dubbed, "King of the Eastern 
Straits" the sealer had developed a reputation for his "cool judgement and 
44Statement made to the Clerk of the Councils of April 1831, by Mr Munro of Preservation 
Island, 29 April 1831, CSO 1/330/7578, AOT Reel SLTX/AO/CS/118, pp.210-212 
45Plomley, Fhendly Mission, pp.457-60, fn.166. 
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natural stability." By the time of his visit to Montagu he had established a 
lifestyle not completely deplorable to the authorities. He was settled on Preser-
vation Island and raised crops and livestock which he traded with ships passing 
through. Plomley notes that as a young man Munro had been known to be 
forceful and brutal with Aboriginal women, though by the time Robinson met 
him he was an elderly man who was, by his own admission, only "looking for 
contentment." 46 
When he determined that it was necessary to seek an audience with the gov-
ernor, Munro proved to -be a consummate diplomat. He appealed to Arthur's 
humanitarian and evangelical nature, noting that while Jumbo lived with him, 
he had taught her to read and instilled in her the Christian faith. Though she 
had no children by him, she raised two orphaned children under his care, one 
of whom he had brought with him to Hobart Town. Munro had the child recite 
scripture to Montagu.47 All of this would have affirmed for Arthur that the 
sealing community was not all barbarity and savagery. Furthermore, he would 
have been aware that without the sealers' support, the future of an Aboriginal 
establishment in the islands-indeed a future of any kind for the Aboriginal 
people of Van Diemen's Land-was under threat. When a despatch arrived 
46Plomley, Friendly Mission, pp.1014. 
47Statement made to the Clerk of the Councils of April 1831, by Mr Munro of Preservation 
Island, 29 April 1831, CSO 1/330/7578, AOT Reel SLTX/AO/CS/118, pp.210-212; see also 
Plomley, Friendly Mission, pp.457-60, fn.166. 
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from Secretary of State Murray in May rebuking Arthur for the " ... indelible 
stain upon the character of the British Government" which the Aboriginal 
crisis "could not fail to leave ... " the governor was only more inclined to find 
a solution. The timeliness of Munro's solution, in light of Murray's admonish-
ment, presented Arthur with the opportunity to allay the colonial secretary's 
fears. That it undermined Robinson's position with the sealers was ultimately 
of secondary importance to the governor.48 
Arthur, thus, reprimanded Robinson for the way he had handled himself 
with the sealers. He noted that Robinson had "removed the native women 
.very contrary to their wish from the sealers and to their very great distress." 
He warned that "[o]f all things you must avoid distressing the feelings of these 
women or it is impossible you can expect they will co-operate or afford any 
assistance." Arthur then repeated Munro's proposals: 
Constable Monroe represents that if the sealers who have long been 
living with the native women and have children by them are still 
permitted to live with them, that they will readily co-operate in 
any expeditions of a friendly nature, and there seem to be reason 
to conclude that the natives will hold intercourse with the sealers 
more readily than any other persons. 
48Plomley, Fhendly Mission, pp.457-60, fn.166; Murray to Arthur, 5 November 1830, CO 
408/7, PRO Reel 290, pp.80-81. 
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Arthur instructed Robinson to return Bet Smith to Beedon. He was at pains 
to convince Robinson of the absolute necessity of gaining the sealers' support: 
"For while the women remain distressed,'' he maintained, 
it is impossible to anticipate that either the women, or the sealers, 
will make themselves useful in endeavouring to tranquillize any of 
the hostile tribes, or will induce them to migrate to the asylum 
provided for them on Gun Carriage Island.49 
Arthur advised Robinson that it "is obvious that this arrangement will re-
quire a great deal of discretion on your part, and much forbearance." He 
noted, though, that "the object [is] to temporise with the natives and to con-
ciliate them by any and all possible means." Arthur instructed Robinson to 
make known to the sealers that "if they are successful the Government will 
confer rewards upon them and make such regulations for the protection of 
their occupation in the straits as will be conducive to their future comfort 
and benefit." As to Robinson, he commanded the conciliator to "endeavour, 
at once, to engage their services in proceeding to the main to co-operate with 
you in producing a friendly feeling on the part of the hostile tribes." 50 
Munro had won this round and Robinson was intensely aggrieved at be-
ing undermined by the sealer's efforts. Robinson did not feel that, given his 
49 Plomley, Friendly Mission, pp.457-60, fn.166. 
50Plomley, Friendly Mission, pp.457-60, fn.166. 
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reputation, Munro was deserving of such consideration by Arthur. He felt the 
sealers could not be trusted and he certainly did not think it appropriate to 
return the women to their "state of drudgery and bondage." 51 
However, realising that he needed to remain diplomatic, in his reply to 
Arthur he stated that the Government's ability to conciliate the Aborigines 
seems in a great measure to depend upon the assistance that would 
be derived from those females who have been initiated with civilised 
habits and who are therefore fully sensible of the superior comforts 
concomitant thereupon ... the idea which generally prevails [is] that 
the sealers are more accessible to the aborigines than any other 
class of white people ... 52 
On 6 June Robinson met again with a group of sealers. To Arthur he 
reported that 
I held to such who promised to take an active part in promoting 
the benevolent views of government an expectation of meeting with 
sure and proportionate rewards, as a further inducement for the 
sealers to act energetically on the enterprise they are about to be 
engaged in. I allowed them the principle of their native women, in 
51 Plomley, Fhendly Mission, pp.457-60, fn.166. 
52Plomley, Fnendly Mission, pp.457-60, fn.166. 
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doing which I found it expedient to use much finesse in order to 
cope with the different characters of these peculiar people ... 
Smoker, Isaac, Jude, Margaret, Mother Brown and Bet Smith were returned 
to the sealers Munro, Beedon, Maynard and Anderson. 53 
That Arthur gave an assurance that the sealers could remain in the islands 
with their women-folk indicated a political judgement as to the importance 
of the sealers' support. It was a difficult concession for Arthur to make given 
that he was effectively condoning the existenc,e of a community whose members 
represented the antithesis of his evangelical ideals. However, it more tellingly 
demonstrated his struggles with an ambivalence towards the Aborigines that he 
found himself developing. However, the rebuff from Murray served to reinforce 
Arthur's fundamental desire to ensure, in any way possible, a means by which 
the Aboriginal people of Van Diemen's Land could survive. That their survival 
was taking precedence over their cultural prosperity was a conclusion that 
Arthur was quickly moving towards, though loath to accept. 
Ironically, though, by allowing the sealers to remain in the islands, Arthur 
had, inadvertently, facilitated the survival of an Aboriginal culture in Van 
Diemen's Land. Patterns of interaction between sealers and Aboriginal groups 
developed to the point where the sealing fraternity became incorporated into 
53Plomley, Friendly Mission, pp 457-60, fn.166. 
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the political economy of the various coastal Aboriginal bands. On a personal 
level, the development of relationships between Aboriginal women and indi-
vid ual sealers meant that many of the latter were also incorporated in the 
kinship systems of the various bands. 54 
Even though violence and force were features of sealer-Aboriginal contact, 
and this contact eventually led to the break down of the social and political 
organisation of the northern tribes, the two groups did manage to establish 
relations based on a mutual dependence which would see the community en-
dure. Aboriginal groups, and specifically Aboriginal women, quickly became 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
involved in the sealing industry. The women were sought for sexual liaisons 
as well as for their skills as sealers, fishers, divers and mutton-birders. On 
land they were also accomplished small-game hunters. Their inclusion in the 
sealing industry, consequently, helped it to remain viable even though, as early 
I 
as 1810, it was in decline. The contribution of their manual labour, as well 
as their sexual and reproductive services, meant that the sealing communities, 
--if not-sealing itself-,--would sur-vive;- Indeed,- so lucrative was the industry to 
both New South Wales and Van Diemen's Land early on, and so vital were 
the women to its continuation that some historians maintain that their inclu-
sion contributed directly to the development of the fledgling economies of both 
54see K.M. Bowden, Captain James Kelly of Hobart Town (Melbourne, 1964); J. S. Cump-
ston, Kangaroo Island, 1800-1836 (Canberra, 1970), p~.7-12. 
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colonies. 55 
Early twentieth century ethnologist Norman Tindale dates the beginning 
of what would become the new Tasmanian AboriginaL community from 1815. 
At this time there were twenty-three people who lived permanently on various 
islands of the Furneaux group. There were nine European sealers, nine Aborig-
inal women from Van Diemen's Land, four Aboriginal women from mainland 
tribes and one Maori woman.56 By 1847 this number had grown to fifty in-
dividuals living as members of thirteen families. By 1890 the community had 
expanded to 110, the majority of whom were children.57 
The various families lived on Gun Carriage, Woody, Clark, Long, Tin Ket-
tle, Cape Barren, Preservation and Hunter Islands. In keeping with the tradi-
tional Aboriginal lifestyle, however, they were a mobile community who moved 
throughout the islands as the mutton-birding seasons dictated. Ryan notes 
that the Bass Strait islanders observed public and private seasons. During the 
public season families would congregate together to celebrate the end of the 
. - -
mutton-birding season. During the private season they would separate into 
55see Ryan, The Aboriginal Tasmanians, Chapter 3; V. Matson-Green & T. Harper, 
"Palawa Women: Carrying the Burdens and Finding the Solutions", Aboriginal Workers, 
69 (1995), pp. 65-67. 
56N. Tindale, "Growth of a People: Formation and Development of a Hybrid Aboriginal 
and White Stock on the Island os the Bass Strait, Tasmania, 1815-1949" (Launceston, 
1953), p.4. 
57Ryan, The Aboriginal Tasmanians, p.222 & 230. 
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family units and return to their various island residences. 58 The lives of the 
Bass Strait islands reflected the incorporation of both Aboriginal and Euro-
pean traditions. This was a community who focused on the Aboriginal ethics 
of cooperation and reciprocity in order to survive and prosper. Mutton-birding 
was a difficult and laborious occupation. It required the involvement of every 
community member. Moreover, because there were only a few rookeries the 
whole community needed access to the birds and their eggs without fear of 
trespass. This was not an occupation that would allow for exclusivity and 
competition amongst the families. 
The Bass Strait community also drew on European knowledge and experi-
ence to survive. When dealing with the colonial government and its officials, as 
Munro's meeting with Montagu exemplified, the most politically savvy were 
recruited to represent the community. When threatened by groups such as 
missionaries, land speculators and the government itself, the community would 
turn to those members who had the greatest experience dealing with colonial 
authorities-usually the European men. 59 
§ 
Robinson, who proved the most serious threat to the sealers, was not going 
58Ryan, The Aboriginal Tasmanians, p.225. 
59Ryan, The Aboriginal Tasmanians, p.228-229. 
CHAPTER 7. ROBINSON AND THE BASS STRAIT SEALERS 279 
to concede to them so easily. He, thus, played down Arthur's proposals to 
co-operate with them and because neither Robinson nor the sealers were, in 
reality, prepared to compromise with one another, Munro's suggestions were 
never acted upon. Instead, Robinson's continuing arrogant and superior atti-
tude further alienated the sealers, while their own disingenuousness served to 
justify Robinson's position. 
The failure of Robinson's diplomacy in his mission to the sealers is reveal-
ing. While his relationship with the Aborigines continued to develop, with the 
sealers he was never able to breech the gap. Regardless that Robinson had a 
real opportunity to utilise a kinship network which had been three decades in 
the making, his own notions failed him. Ultimately the issue was that Robin-
son was always the outsider. He was a representative of a colonial regime 
which this community sought to shun. Moreover, his preconceived ideas about 
the sealers and their activities set him further at odds with the community. 
Robinson found his time with the sealers his greatest challenge because he 
was dealing with a community that was vulnerable and therefore aggressively 
protective of its land and people. The Bass Strait community had evolved 
as an off-shoot of a colonial system within which its members had no place. 
As such, it could enjoy none of the colony's protective devices, such as a 
government-sanctioned legal system. The efforts of Munro and his associates, 
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thus, were focused on securing' the future of a small, isolated community that 
could not survive without its people and its territory. 
To this end, as with the Aboriginal-settler clash, the struggle between the 
sealers and Robinson, too, was focussed on land and resource access. The 
bloody clashes that characterised Van Diemen's Land race relations for two 
decades were the result of competition for the land. The land had social, 
economic, political and spiritual significance for both societies. Neither could 
endure without it. Modern historian, Shayne Breen, holds that for the indige-
nous societies of Van Diemen's Land especially, 
[c]ontrol of the land enabled them to maintain control of their own 
destiny. Control of the land enabled them to be empowered as a 
society, to survive and prosper in their own place, to be vital and 
co-operative with their neighbours. Dispossession largely destroyed 
the Aboriginal capacity for self-determination ... 60 
Robinson's presence in the islands represented the same threat to the seal-
ers. While he eventually reached a tacit, though tenuous, land sharing agree-
ment with the sealers, in Van Diemen's Land proper, as Arthur had so reluc-
tantly come to accept, no such arrangement could be established. To this end, 
60s. Breen, Place Power and Social Law, Unpublished PhD thesis, University of Tasmania 
(Hobart, 1998), p.19. 
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the next expedition-to the Big River people-would be focused on convincing 
this group to voluntarily relinquish something that was at the heart of their 
identity. Consequently, negotiating for their removal would prove a challenge 
of a higher order. 
Chapter 8 
The Conciliation 
The chiefs assigned as a reason for their outrages upon the white 
inhabitants that they and their forefathers had been cruelly abused, 
that their country had been taken from them and their wives and 
daughters violated and taken away, and that they had experienced 
a multitude of wrongs from a variety of sources. They were willing 
however to accept the offers of the government and they placed 
themselves under my protection accordingly.1 
While the Executive Council discussed options for the future of Van Diemen's 
Land's Aboriginal population, Robinson spent the months of March to June 
1831 organising the administrative details of running an isolated reserve on 
1G.A. Robinson quoted in N.J.B.Plomley, Friendly Mission: The Tasmanian Journals 
and Papers of George Augustus Robinson, 1829-1834 (Hobart, 1966), p.571. 
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Gun Carriage Island. The future of the establishment appeared bleak from 
the start, and before long its inmates became disillusioned. The mortality rate 
rose quickly and boredom and despair set in. 2 The island had a shortage of 
fresh water and its unsheltered harbour made it difficult for supply boats to 
land. By July it seemed inevitable that an alternative location would need to 
be found. 3 Arthur approved Robinson's proposal to survey Flinders Island. 
However, still retaining the idea of a mainland reserve, he also suggested that 
Robinson might also consider George Town as a location for an establishment.4 
Robinson sent his convict servants to investigate Flinders Island while he 
returned to Eddystone Point to resume his search for Umarrah. Accompanying 
him were Kickerterpoller, Pagerly, Worraddy and Trugernanna. Robinson was 
comforted by the fact that "all my people are sanguine as to my ultimate 
success in conferring with the natives and I myself feel much confidence." 5 
2By June 1831 twelve reserve inmates had died, mostly from lung complaints. (Plomley, 
Friendly Mission, p.461, fn 171). 
3Maria Island, which housed a convict penitentiary, was also briefly considered by the 
Aborigines Committee as a site for an Aboriginal establishment. However, this option 
was discarded primarily because the island was too close to the coast and the Committee 
feared that as the Aborigines began to pine away they would seek their escape from the 
island; see Report of Aborigines Committee, 28 September 1831, CSO 1/319/7578, Reel 
SLTX/AO/CS/116, pp.70-79. Moreover, though not raised as an issue, escape would have 
been further motivated by the fact that the island was in Oyster Bay country and, therefore, 
very familiar to many of those who would be housed there. 
4Burnett to Robinson, 25 June 1831 in Plomley, Friendly Mission, p.467, fn.232; n.b. all 
direct references to the expedition to the Big River People for this chapter, where specific 
page numbers are not supplied may be found in Plomley, Friendly Mission, pp.481-586. 
5Plomley, Friendly Mission, p.366. 
CHAPTER 8. THE CONCILIATION 284 
Though he travelled throughout the region from George Town to the east 
coast, and found evidence of Umarrah's presence, Robinson failed to locate 
the chief. This disturbed him as the re-attachment of Umarrah to the group 
would have meant linkage with the last of the northern groups still active in the 
settled districts. Though its location might change, still he would have a per-
manent Aboriginal reserve established somewhere in the Bass Strait islands, 
with most, if not all, the sealing women safely accommodated there. Most im-
portantly one of Van Diemen's Land's most dangerous guerrilla leaders would 
be in his custody. 
8.1 Robinson the Negotiator 
On 1August1831, Robinson returned to Swan Island from where he travelled 
to Cape Portland. Mannalargenna was retrieved from Gun Carriage Island 
to help track the Stoney Creek chief. Robinson also wanted to begin negoti-
ations with his most senior guides so that when he finally made contact with 
Umarrah, he had a network of support already established. 
Despite his trepidation about meeting Umarrah, Mannalargenna was eager 
to join Robinson for the reserve had become a place of despair. Robinson 
was receptive: "I anticipate very favourable results and trust in God I may 
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be able to establish that intercourse whereby a friendly communication may 
be opened and maintained throughout the whole Aboriginal population." 6 
Robinson was careful to receive an assurance from Mannalargenna that he 
would not abscond. On 6 August he explained his plans to the chief. 
When the Executive Council met the previous March its members formu-
lated a number of recommendations for Robinson. The Council advised that 
any Aborigines in custody in Hobart, Launceston and on Swan Island were 
to be transferred to a more permanent establishment on a different island 
in the Bass Strait. It proposed that "an embassy should again be sent to 
the tribes inhabiting the Western country, and ... blankets and food should be 
given them." The Council, though, "entertained no hope of establishing any 
permanent good understanding" with the eastern tribes. 7 Thus, Robinson's 
charge was 
to confer with the hostile tribes, and explain the humane and kind 
disposition of the government towards them, with the assistance of 
such natives as may be depended upon, and, if possible, negociate 
[sic] with their chiefs either to proceed to the establishment, or to 
bind themselves to commit no further outrage on the condition of 
6Plomley, Friendly Mission, p.394. 
7 Minutes of Executive Council, 14 March 1831 in Arthur to Murray, 4 April 1831, CO 
280/28, PRO Reel 247, pp.440-445. 
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receiving food and clothing, and protection from all aggression. 8 
Robinson misrepresented the intention of the Executive Committee's rec-
ommendations and instead, 
informed [Mannalargenna] in the presence of Kickerterpoller that 
I was commissioned by the Governor to inform them that, if the 
natives would desist from their wonted outrages upon the whites, 
they would be allowed to remain in their respective districts and 
would have flour, tea and sugar, clothes &c given them; that a 
good white man would dwell with them who would take care of 
them and would not allow any bad white man to shoot them, and 
he would go with them about the bush like myself and they could 
hunt. 
Mannalargenna was, obviously, "much delighted" and in the style of north 
American treaty-making customs the chief ratified the agreement with gifts of 
swans' eggs. 9 
Negotiating was a continuing process between Robinson and his guides. 
Mannalargenna had his own set of conditions to which Robinson realised he 
must agree. Mannalargenna and Kickerterpoller stated that they would only 
8Minutes of Executive Council, 14 March 1831 in Arthur to Murray, 4 April 1831, CO 
280/28, PRO Reel 247, p.444. 
9Plomley, Friendly Mission, p.394. 
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assist Robinson if their country-woman, Tencotehermanener (Smoker), was 
retrieved from the sealers. This placed Robinson in a precarious position 
for Smoker had been sent back to the sealer John Riddle after Munro had 
petitioned Arthur for her return. Robinson's guides, however, 
took the opportunity on this as on other occasions to remind me 
that I had deceived them in allowing the sealers to take away the 
women again, and wanted to know why [they] were not put in gaol 
for killing the natives. 10 
By now, both Mannalargenna and Kickerterpoller had come to know Robin-
son well. They understood the hierarchical nature of colonial government but 
thought themselves equal to the governor whom they insisted they must meet. 
Furthermore, they recognised the recurring imperfections of the justice system 
and sought to challenge them. Able to produce witnesses to the murder of 
an Aboriginal man, they demanded that the sealers Edward Mansell, John 
Riddle, Thomas Tucker and Jack Williams be tried for murder. Robinson 
promised that he would arrange a meeting with Arthur to discuss, at least, 
the possibility of retrieving Smoker. 
On the afternoon of 29 August 1831 near Noland Bay, Mannalargenna 
emerged from the bush leading a party of about fifteen, including Umarrah. 
10Plomley, Friendly Mission, p.403. 
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The group comprised survivors from the Stoney Creek, Port Dalrymple and 
Oyster Bay Tribes. Three others remained in the bush but would soon join 
Robinson's party. Umarrah had been separated from Robinson for fifteen 
months and the conciliator was greatly relieved to have him rejoin the mission 
guides. The Big River bands who were now in the lakes region of the midlands 
were the only guerrilla groups left. 11 
Robinson and Umarrah were wary of one another. Umarrah made sure 
that he justified his absence to the Conciliator. Robinson was acutely aware 
that he must work hard to keep Umarrah as an ally. Now that Robinson 
had attached to his mission two of the most influential Aboriginal leaders 
on the island he needed to remain diplomatically astute. Robinson listened 
carefully to their concerns, knowing that he represented their only voice in a 
hostile colony. They complained to him "of the outrages which [have] been 
committed upon them and their progenitors, and in bitter terms complain of 
their women having been stole[n] from them, and how white man would like 
black man to steal white woman[?]" 12 
Aware of the shifting political dynamics within the group now that Umar-
rah was present, and desperate to keep the group satisfied, Robinson hastily 
11 Plomley, Friendly Mission, p.415; Ryan, The Aboriginal Tasmanians, p.155. 
12Plomley, Friendly Mission, p 415; Ryan, The Aboriginal Tasmanians, p.155. 
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made a second promise. "I made known to them the wish of the govern-
ment: that if they would not spear white men they might remain and hunt ... " 
Robinson gave Umarrah and his new associates presents of beads, buttons and 
blankets as inducements to remain with him. Umarrah and Mannalargenna 
reciprocated with gifts of kangaroo and possum meat. At the same time there 
was a power struggle ensuing between U marrah and Mannalargenna. When 
one chief presented a gift to Robinson, the other hastily matched it with a 
more impressive one. Relations between the two had always been tenuous 
and now they were involved in a contest to win Robinson's favour. For them, 
Robinson represented their only opportunity to emerge from their war with 
the settlers with any semblance of a future. 13 
Robinson decided to make his way back to base camp to rendezvous with his 
boat. While Umarrah's people were to be shipped to the islands, Robinson's 
guides, Mannalargenna, Umarrah, Woorrady, Pagerly, Trugernanna, Kickert-
erpoller, Sall, Timmy from Cape Portland and Peevay, were to head south 
towards the midlands and Big River country. Now that Robinson had nego-
tiated an agreement with his guides, and had reunited with Umarrah, he felt 
this part of his mission was complete: "my mind is comparatively at ease now 
I have succeeded and the people are with me." 14 His next challenge was the 
13Plomley, Friendly Mission, p.415; Ryan, The Aboriginal Tasmanians, p.155. 
14Plomley, Friendly Mission, p.421. 
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conciliation of the Big River people. 
8.2 The Launceston Conference 
Early in September Arthur learnt that an Aboriginal band had gruesomely 
murdered Captain Bartholomew Thomas, brother to Aborigines Committee 
chair and colonial treasurer, Jocelyn Thomas, and Captain Thomas' overseer 
James Parker. Thomas and Parker were killed near Thomas' property at 
North Down by a band made up of Big River, Oyster Bay and Port Sorell 
tribe members. After giving the band tea and bread, Thomas and Parker 
had gone with a few them to attempt to meet with the rest of their party. 
Shortly afterwards a nuinber of the group turned on the men, attacking them 
and clubbing them with their own guns, and then spearing them until they 
were dead. Upon discovering Thomas and Parker missing, Thomas' wife sent 
a number of other servants out to search for the men. Two weeks later the 
bodies were found badly mutilated and decomposing.15 
Jocelyn Thomas later requested that Robinson collect all the information 
he could regarding the activities of "these wretched savages, to whom every 
kindness was shewed." Robinson later discovered (and concealed) the fact that 
15Correspondence to Colonial Secretary, CSO 1/316/7578, AOT Reel SLTX/ AO/CS/114, 
pp.948-986. 
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Umarrah had been attached to the band that had slain Thomas and Parker, 
though he had not been with them when the actual murders took place.16 
The slayings of Thomas and Parker received much publicity and stirred up 
resentment amongst many colonists who had long advocated for removal of 
the Aborigines. A subsequent inquest into the murders found that they had 
been 
treacherously murdered by the three black natives now in custody, 
aided and assisted by the residue of the tribe to which they had 
belonged known by the name of the Big River Tribe, during the 
most friendly intercourse whilst endeavouring to carry into effect 
the conciliatory measures recommended by the government.17 
Despite the outrage manifested throughout the colony by the murders, 
·Arthur did not put the Aborigines on trial, but instead sent them to the 
temporary Aboriginal reserve on Gun Carriage Island. Windschuttle argues 
that reasons for not prosecuting the offenders were not "due to any non-legal 
conciliatory policy but because all the evidence against them had come from 
16Umarrah, it will be recalled, rejoined Robinson on 29 August 1830. Thomas and 
Parker were not killed until 1 September; see Correspondence to Colonial Secretary, CSO 
1/316/7578, AOT Reel SLTX/AO/CS/114, pp.948-986; Plomley, Friendly Mission, pp.423, 
426, 429, 455, 471, 476, 511, 551-2. 
17Verdict of Inquisition into the Deaths of Captain Thomas and His Overseer, 
James Parker in Correspondence to Colonial Secretary, CSO 1/316/7578, AOT Reel 
SLTX/AO/CS/114, p.986. 
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native witnesses and it was not possible in the Van Diemen's Land courts to 
use their testimony. "Cases of this kind,'' Windschuttle maintains, "would 
have failed in court under the prevailing rules of evidence." 18 
However, legal issues surrounding rules of evidence were the least of the 
Governor's worries. Arthur was concerned to bring a conclusive end to war 
.and at this point little would have been achieved from what would be the very 
public prosecution and inevitable hanging of those put on trial for the murders. 
The colonists would be placated but the Aborigines had already been handed 
a death sentence with their impending exile. Moreover, though Robinson was 
confident that he would finally make contact with the Big River and Oyster 
Bay tribes, at this stage they were still at large. With members of these tribes 
amongst those who had killed Thomas and Parker, Arthur would have been 
concerned to avoid antagonising them. To this end, supported by an Aborig-
ines Committee report subsequent to the murders in which Chairman Thomas 
did not call for the prosecution of his brother's murderers, Arthur maintained 
his conciliatory stance and sought nothing more than the immediate removal 
of those accused of the deaths of Thomas and Parker. 
Nonetheless, the murders constituted the final blow for the governor who 
was growing increasingly defeated by the seeming futility of his conciliatory 
18Windschuttle, The Fabrication of Aboriginal History, p.220. 
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efforts. Not only had the attacks been gruesome and apparently unprovoked, 
the victims were two colonists who were sure they had established the precise 
style of relationship that Arthur and the Aborigines Committee had encour-
aged of the colonists. However, chastened by his utter lack of success in using 
force to achieve his goals, instead of assuming the role of a military man, the 
governor turned to his evangelical principles to find a solution. Arthur decided 
that there was nothing else to do but to meet Robinson and the mission guides 
in person to consider "the present situation of the Colony with reference to 
the continued outrages of the Aborigines ... and their attacks upon defenceless 
persons in various parts of the Colony." 19 Batman, who had helped coordinate 
the efforts of the women who Arthur had released from the Hobart asylum in 
March 1830, was also asked to attend. 20 
Informed that Arthur had set out for Launceston to have an audience with 
Mannalargenna and his people, Robinson's party made its way to meet him. 
That Arthur went to Launceston to meet personally with Robinson and his 
guides demonstrates the importance the governor now placed in negotiating 
with the Aborigines a peace accord which both sides could and would honour. 
Plomley argues that ever-expanding settlement, combined with the spread of 
disease were two other factors involved in Robinson's success in conciliating 
19 Arthur to Goderich, 25 October 1831, CO 280/30, PRO Reel, 248, p.175-. 
20 Arthur to Burnett, 12 October 1831, CSO 1/317 /7578, Reel SLTX/ AO /CS/115, 
pp.471-480. 
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the Aborigines. 21 However, the significance of a process of peace negotiations 
that now involved Arthur personally cannot be overstated. 
Arthur headed north from Hobart, Batman west from his property at Ben 
Lamond, and Robinson south from the coast to Launceston where Arthur, 
Batman, Robinson and the mission Aborigines met over two days on 6 and 
7 October. Most of what was discussed pertained merely to the logistics of 
co-ordinating Robinson's travels. However, such was Arthur's distress at the 
murders of Thomas and Parker that the governor was prepared to consider 
any reasonable arrangement which would ensure an end to hostilities. Conse-
quently, several significant determinations came from the meeting that demon-
strated the necessity that Arthur now felt that Robinson's mission succeed. 
However, it was clear that Arthur (if not Robinson) still clung to the idea 
that the Aborigines may, in some manner, be accommodated in Van Diemen's 
Land. 
Arthur reported in the minutes of the meeting the details of what had 
been discussed. He noted that Robinson felt "unabated confidence in the 
ultimate success of inducing the hostile Natives to place themselves under 
his protection in the asylum provided for them in the Straits." As will be 
recalled, an Aboriginal "asylum" had been established at Robinson's residence 
21 Plornley, Friendly Mission, pp.421 & 481. 
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in Hobart. It had been created as a temporary measure, implemented until a 
more permanent solution to the Aboriginal-settler problems could be found. 
That Robinson and Arthur referred to the establishment in the Bass Strait 
Islands as an "asylum", which by definition was supposed to be "a secure 
place of refuge, shelter, or retreat" 22 underscores the dilemma that Arthur 
was facing. He wanted desperately to protect the Aborigines but he also knew 
that in removing them there was a real possibility that he would be facilitating 
their demise. In referring to the Bass Strait reserve as an 'asylum', Arthur 
seems to be suggesting that there lingered a hope that the Aborigines could 
possibly be returned to Van Diemen's Land some time in the future. 
Other points of discussion also indicated Arthur's continued hope that there 
may be some way to accommodate at least some of the Aborigines in Robin-
son's care in the colony. Arthur approved what for all intents and purposes 
constituted a reserve near Campbell Town for the mission Aborigines-"a 
kind of home for 'Manna Langanna', 'Eumarrah' and the rest of the Natives 
who form Mr Robinson's party, and whom he considers perfectly conciliated". 
Arthur ordered huts erected and food and clothing supplied from the com-
missariat. The governor also agreed that Mannalargenna's daughter would 
be retrieved from John Riddle and transferred to Campbell Town to join the 
22http://dictionary.oed.com/ (cited October 2005). 
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chief. 23 This was clearly a victory for Mannalargenna. He had successfully ne-
gotiated with Arthur, through the agency of Robinson, and the governor had 
acquiesced. Furthermore, though Arthur had agreed to establish a temporary 
reserve in Campbell Town for reasons of convenience, nevertheless for the chief 
this meant that he would be back in familiar country. 
The agreements that Arthur had reached with the mission guides would 
have later implications for Robinson's success with the Big River and Oyster 
Bay tribes. When Robinson's guides finally made contact with the tribes they 
negotiated the terms of their surrender based not only on pledges made by 
Robinson and Arthur, but also the history that they had with them. Thus, 
when Arthur fulfilled his promise to retrieve Mannalargenna's daughter from 
the sealers, the mission Aborigines would have assumed that he would fulfil 
his other promise to establish a reserve for them at Campbell Town. To the 
Aborigines already in exile, there was scant evidence that they would remain 
in the islands permanently. Reserves established on Swan and Gun Carriage 
Islands several months earlier, as well as the early one on Bruny Island, had 
all been quickly abandoned. The mission guides may well have reasoned that 
once the Big River and Oyster Bay tribes had been brought in, the reserve on 
Flinders Island reserve would be moved to Campbell Town. 
23Arthur to Burnett, 12 October 1831, CSO 1/317/7578, Reel SLTX/AO/CS/115, 
pp.471-480. 
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Consequently, as Reynolds argues, when negotiations with the Big River 
and Oyster Bay tribes finally occurred, it seems likely that they would have 
been agreeing to their temporary removal to Flinders Island, rather than ceding 
permanent title to their lands. 24 Thus, for the Oyster Bay, Big River and 
mission Aborigines the verbal treaty25 that Reynolds maintains was later made 
on the banks of Lake Echo was, indeed, merely the conclusion of negotiations 
with Mannalargenna that Robinson had begun in August and that Arthur had 
continued in Launceston a month later. 
8.3 The Search for the Big River Tribe 
At the conclusion of Arthur's visit to Launceston, Robinson's party set off for 
Campbell Town from where they would journey into the heart of Big River 
country in search of the elusive resident tribe. Attached to the group were 
Richard, or Black Dick, who had lived with James Brumby at Norfolk Plains, 
Woolayterpineyer, sister to a Big River member and future wife to Umarrah 
(Woolayterpineyer had been captured in the settled districts and housed in 
the Launceston prison before her release to Robinson), and Lacklay, or Little 
Jemmy. The expedition would prove arduous for everyone involved. Robinson 
24Reynolds, Fate of a Pree People, pp.152-6. 
25Reynolds, Fate of a Pree People, p.199; see below for a discussion of Reynolds' argument 
that what was concluded with the Big River and Oyster Bay tribes was a verbal treaty. 
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realised the significance of the expedition and drew from it a new motivation: 
"knowing the weight of responsibility that rests upon me I am resolved to 
allow no circumstance to hinder or obstruct me in my labour". 26 
Robinson and his guides maintained a cohesive working relationship be-
cause, as Ryan notes, they had become mutually dependent on one another. 
Robinson's guides needed him because he was their only shield against the 
many hostile colonists and military in the region. They had told him numer-
ous stories about raids carried out on Aboriginal groups, convincing Robinson 
that he was, indeed, in enemy country. Robinson, similarly, needed his guides 
to direct him through their country, to track the Big River and Oyster Bay 
people and to supply native foods when European provisions were out of reach. 
Most importantly, they were his link to his quarry. They would track, make 
contact, and broker a deal with the Big River people. Robinson would not 
even be present until negotiations were complete and the Big River people 
had agreed to "come in." Robinson made sure he was surrounded by his al-
lies. There were thirteen guides attached to the expedition, as well as seven 
convict servants, plus Robinson and his son, George. That almost matched 
the total number of Big River people for whom his party was searching. 27 
Having met with Arthur in Launceston, Mannalargenna, U marrah and the 
26Plornley, Friendly Mission, p.486. 
27Ryan, The Aboriginal Tasmanians, p.154. 
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other mission guides would have realised that, indeed, Robinson's position 
in the colony was nowhere near as significant as the man they had gone to 
see. After the mission had arrived in Launceston, Robinson had gone to meet 
Arthur as he approached "the entrance of the town", the governor's arrival 
had been heralded by the firing of guns, and an entourage was sure to have 
accompanied the chief executive of the colony. All of these displays of reverence 
would have indicated to the Aborigines that, indeed, Arthur was the individual 
who would ultimately determine their fate. As such, it is very probable that 
they realised that any promises made by Robinson would only be acted upon 
with Arthur's approval. Robinson, however, was not so naive as to allow his 
guides to assume control over the mission and worked to ensure that they 
would not collude against him. 
He employed Mannalargenna and Woolayterpineyer as his principal guides. 
As their tribes faced increasing dispossession, Mannalargenna and the Big 
River people had become intensely antagonistic towards one another. Man-
nalargenna clearly considered the Big River people as the enemy. Woolay-
topinneyer was a Big River woman, now betrothed to Umarrah. Her kinship 
ties, as well as her alliance with Umarrah, combined to set Woolaytopinneyer 
and Mannalargenna at odds with one another. Moreover, that Umarrah was 
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such a leading figure amongst his people meant that, by default, he also as-
sumed a central role in the mission. The three guides would effectively check 
one another's behaviour. 
The mission members were not passive recipients of Robinson's orders. 
They employed their own strategies to attempt to manipulate both Robinson 
and one other. The women sought to curry Robinson's favour. On several 
occasions Woolaytopinneyer guided him to spots where the Big River tribe 
had concealed stolen weapons and ammunition, hoping that this would please 
him. Sall brought him presents of native bread. 
Umarrah also sought to impress Robinson. He told the conciliator, you 
"must tell the Governor U marrah was a good man and how he would find [all 
of] the natives." Umarrah had become adept at manipulating those Europeans 
with whom he was variously involved. Both Arthur and Robinson were aware 
that he was responsible for the deaths of a number of settlers, and Robinson 
was aware that he had been closely associated with the group that had slain 
Thomas and Parker, yet he nevertheless avoided the harsh hand of European 
law by making himself indispensable to the government when needed. During 
this mission he established himself as Robinson's ally. He charmed Robinson 
while, at the same time, manipulating the other guides for his own ends. 
Mannalargenna, on the other hand, used different tactics. He was belligerent 
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and antagonistic, making threats to try to control the expedition members. 28 
Despite the power struggles between Robinson and his guides, he consulted 
them on all the decisions he made, knowing that they had a superior knowl-
edge not only of the country through which they were travelling but also the 
people they were seeking to find. As Robinson moved west, they became more 
anxious. They were moving into hostile territory and were afraid, not only of 
the settlers, but also of the Big River people themselves. Robinson, himself, 
felt some of this fear, as he worried that his party would be mistaken for those 
he was tracking. 
In early November Robinson's party headed for Lake Echo where they spot-
ted smoke from Big River fires. Robinson tried to usher them onward but they 
hesitated. Two days later Robinson sent Kickerterpoller and Umarrah to lead 
the party out in quest of their quarry. Robinson was extremely apprehensive. 
"I long to know the result of their mission with the Lairmairrener [Big River] 
nation" he noted, "and earnestly pray God they may have got them and sue-
ceed in bringing them to me. I long to be with them and know not how to 
act." 2.9 
They returned to report their failure. Robinson was not surprised, con-
fessing, "I did not expect they would succeed, as there appeared a great want 
28Plomley, Friendly Mission, p.491; Ryan, The Aboriginal Tasmanians, p.158. 
29Plomley, Friendly Mission, p.517. 
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of perseverance among them." Robinson's party spent the next two months 
following the group at a distance. The Big River people let the expedition 
guides know their whereabouts but avoided contact until they felt ready to 
join Robinson's party.30 
As the end drew near, the expedition party became increasingly anxious. 
Robinson was fully cognisant of the significance not only of this mission but of 
the entire Aboriginal-settler experience to date: "I reflected on the precarious 
nature of my mission, the peculiar character of the people I was in quest, 
the dire consternation they had infused into the minds of the settlers; all the 
wrongs done to the blacks were alternately engaging my thoughts." 31 
Anxiety and stress began to manifest itself towards the end of November. 
<:. 
Umarrah and Mannalargenna began quarrelling with one another. It was only 
with the greatest diligence that Robinson managed to stop Umarrah from 
absconding. Though Mannalargenna was vital to the mission, he had become 
unreliable. Umarrah and Woolaytopinneyer, Robinson realised, were his only 
dependable sources of information. Mannalargenna was now useful only as a 
guide, and no longer as an agent. He would be obliging in the forceful capture 
of the Big River people if they resisted, but could not be employed to negotiate 
their voluntary surrender. 
30Plontley, Friendly Mission, p.517. 
31 Plomley, Friendly Mission, p.526. 
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A letter from the Colonial Secretary received by Robinson on 26 December 
1831 served to increase tensions amongst Robinson's group. The Governor 
was eager that Robinson complete this mission as soon as possible and rep-
rimanded him for not doing so more quickly: "His Excellency is exceedingly 
anxious that you should fall in with the [Big River] tribe, and it appears to 
him very extraordinary that the aborigines who accompany you experience 
so great a difficulty in leading you to their haunt .... "32 Robinson related 
Arthur's sentiments to his guides in the hope that they would become more 
diligent. Mannalargenna offered to proceed alone with just the men in the 
party. Robinson refused, knowing that they would be more likely to abscond, 
but if they were genuine and made contact, Woolaytopinneyer, in particular, 
would need to be there to negotiate with her kin. 
"Not a moment was now to be lost,'' wrote Robinson on 28 December. His 
guides had spotted the Big River people at Bashan's Plains and Robinson's 
servant, Joseph Platt, fired his gun to inform the rest of the party. The 
consequences of Robinson's words and actions did not matter now to him. He 
was desperate to end this expedition and ushered his people on with a promise 
he would not keep: "I urged them on and told them the Governor only wanted 
me to get to the Big River tribe and then our troubles would be over, we 
32Burnett to Robinson, 23 November 1831 in Plomley, Friendly Mission, p.583, note 89. 
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should not have to go after any more and they could hunt" and to this he 
noted, "the people evinced eagerness to go after the natives, which shewed (if 
such a circumstance was necessary) their sincerity to their duty." 33 
Over the next two days the mission guides tracked the Big River people 
to Lake Echo. On 30 December Robinson sent out Woorrady, Kickerterpoller, 
Umarrah, Timmy, Lacklay and Woolaytopinneyer to a fire about two miles 
to the west, giving "them all the counsel I was able." Mannalargenna stayed 
with Robinson. Robinson followed his six guides at a distance and shortly 
afterwards Umarrah returned confirming that they had spotted Big River fires. 
Woolaytopinneyer had recognised her brother's foot prints. Robinson decided 
to set out for the group the next morning. Again he reminded his guides "the 
Governor only wanted me to get to the natives and then we had done." 34 
At sunrise on New Year's Eve 1831, Robinson sent out a party of seven to 
again search for the Big River people. They made contact with their quarry 
north west of Lake Echo. They were the remnants of the Big River and 
Oyster Bay tribes and consisted of sixteen men, nine women, one child and 
over one hundred dogs. They were led by the chiefs Tongerlongerter and 
Montpeilliatter. Robinson described the events of those few days in his official 
report to Arthur of 25 January 1832: 
33Plomley, Friendly Mission, p.567. 
34Plomley, Friendly Mission, p.569. 
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Having encouraged my aboriginal companions ... part of them hav-
ing promised to act faithfully towards me and to abide by whatever 
instructions I might give them, I was naturally lead to hope that 
the time would soon arrive when this arduous and harassing under-
taking would be terminated ... I succeeded on the 31 December in 
effecting a friendly communication with those sanguinary tribe[s] .35 
When Robinson first sighted the group he was unsure how negotiations with his 
guides had progressed. The "warlike attitude" of the Big River and Oyster Bay 
people worried him until he saw some of his own party with them. However, 
when the Big River women "lifted up their hands three times" demonstrating 
"the signal of peace" and "the blacks rushed towards each other", Robinson 
was assured that all was well. 36 
Robinson approached those whom he assumed were the chiefs "and shook 
hands with them." He "then explained in aborigines' dialect the purport of 
my visit amongst them. I invited them to sit down and gave them some 
refreshments and selected a few trinkets as presents which they received with 
much delight." 37 
Before ushering them from their lands for the last time, Robinson spent 
time with the Big River people, learning something of their plight: 
35Plomley, Friendly Mission, pp.570-71. 
36Plomley, Jorgen Jorgenson and the Aborigines of Van Diemen's Land, p.113. 
37Plomley, Friendly Mission, p.570. 
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Figure 8.1: 
Benjamin Duterrau's The Conciliation, Source: Tasmanian Museum and Art 
Gallery; image taken from URL: http://www.foundingdocs.gov.au. 
The chiefs assigned as a reason for their outrages upon the white 
inhabitants that they and their forefathers had been cruelly abused, 
that their country had been taken from them and their wives and 
daughters violated and taken away, and that they had experienced 
a multitude of wrongs from a variety of sources. They were willing 
however to accept the offers of the government and they placed 
themselves under my protection accordingly. 38 
38 P!omley, Friendly Mission, p.571. 
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Reynolds argues that what occurred between Robinson, his mission guides 
and the Big River and Oyster Bay people on the banks of Lake Echo that fate-
ful January day constituted a verbal treaty. He points to a modern Canadian 
court case, Regina v. Sioui39 to establish the context in which he maintains 
the Tasmanian treaty should be considered.40 
In 1990 the Sioui tribe were charged with violating certain regulations of 
the Parks Act of 1977.41 The tribe's defence rested on the claim that they were 
exempt from these regulations because they were "practising certain ancestral 
customs and religious rights" which been confirmed by the terms of a treaty 
their people had negotiated with a British brigadier in 1760. The case became 
focused on whether or not a treaty had, in fact, been concluded. As Reynolds 
quotes, in finding for the Sioui the Supreme Court of Canada held that 
[i]n determining whether or not a particular document is a treaty, 
a liberal and generous attitude, heedful of historical fact, must be 
employed. If, then, a valid treaty is found to exist, that treaty 
must in turn be given a just, broad and liberal construction.42 
The court pointed to two key determinants of whether or not a document is 
a treaty: capacity and authority. Did the Indian tribe have the capacity to 
39 Regina v. Sioui, 70 DLR (4th), 427; 1990. 
40Reynolds, Fate of a Pree People, p.199. 
41 Parks Act, R.S.Q. 1977, c.P-9. referenced in Regina v. Sioui. 
42 Regina v. Sioui, 70 DLR (4th), 427; 1990. 
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negotiate a treaty, and did they have reason to believe that those with whom 
they were treating were authorised, as representatives of the British Crown, 
to conclude a treaty with them? In the case of the Canadian tribe the court 
found that both conditions existed and, as such, found for the Sioui.43 
Both of these conditions also existed in Van Diemen's Land. There were 
individuals present at the "conciliation" who clearly had the authority to nego-
tiate on behalf of their people. Though the tribes were a conglomerate of dis-
possessed bands, the newly formed bands retained their hierarchical structure. 
Mannalargenna, Tongerlongerter and Montpeilliatter, thus, retained their au-
thority as tribal elders and chiefs as well as their capacity to negotiate on 
behalf of their people. 
The Aborigines also had every reason to believe that those with whom 
they were negotiating held the appropriate authority. After Mannalargenna 
had been granted an interview with Arthur he would have had no doubt that 
Robinson held the appropriate authority to act on the governor's behalf. More-
over, the importance of the negotiations was verified by the length of time it 
took to finalise them. The Lake Echo meeting was merely the conclusion of 
negotiations that had begun six months earlier when Robinson had discussed 
his directives from the Executive Council with Mannalargenna. A month later 
43 Regina v. Swui, 70 DLR (4th), 427; 1990. 
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Arthur made Mannalargenna similar offers. For the mission guides, the goal of 
the Lake Echo meeting would have been to convince the Big River and Oyster 
Bay tribes to agree to a compact, the details of which they had already been 
confirmed. 
In the case of negotiations between Robinson and the Tasmanian Aborig-
ines capacity and authority, thus, were plainly apparent. However, the funda-
mental difference between the Lake Echo meeting and the Sioui treaty was, as 
Reynolds points out, that the Lake Echo negotiations were never committed 
to paper. 44 By this time, the importance that such written documentation 
had come to have, meant that the Crown would never have acknowledged, let 
alone ratified, a verbal treaty. One the other hand, for a people such as the 
Aborigines of Van Diemen's Land whose history and culture was based on oral 
traditions, the only kind of treaty would have been a verbal one. 
§ 
Robinson proceeded to Bothwell from where he sent word to Government 
House of his success. On their journey to Hobart the Big River chief, Montpeil-
liatter, sent off a number of women to collect some guns that were concealed in 
a hollow tree trunk. One of the muskets belonged to Captain Thomas. Robin-
son suggested that Montpelilliatter should present the weapons to the governor 
44Reynolds, Fate of a Pree People, p.199. 
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as a gesture of his commitment to future peace. Robinson then promised the 
chief a conference with the governor who, Robinson assured him, "will be sure 
to redress all their grievances." 45 
The arrival of Robinson and his entourage was reported by all of the colo-
nial newspapers in Van Diemen's Land. The Colonial Times wrote, "a more 
grotesque appearance we have seldom witnessed, than the arrival of these 
natives ... These men, it is said, were bent upon spearing His Excellency, pro-
vided he did not grant them the redress they were seeking." 46 The Hobart 
Town Courier reported that 
they walked very leisurely along the road, followed by a large pack 
of dogs, and were received by the inhabitants on their entry into 
town with the most lively curiosity and delight. Soon after their ar-
rival they walked up to the Government house, and were introduced 
to His Excellency ... They are delighted at the idea of proceeding 
to Great Island, where they will enjoy peace and plenty uninter-
rupted ... The manner in which these natives were conciliated is no 
less remarkable than it is creditable to Mr. Robinson.47 
On 21 January 1832, in a public notice Arthur announced that 
45Plomley, Friendly Mission, pp.570-574. 
46 Colonial Times, 11 January 1832. 
47 Hobart Town Courier, 14 February 1832. 
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Mr. G.A. Robinson, having rendered a very important service to 
the whole community, in conciliating and bringing into Hobart-
town, the Oyster Bay and Big River Tribes, The Lieutenant Gov-
ernor has directed the great satisfaction he feels at Mr. Robinson's 
success to be thus publicly expressed. 48 
The celebrations that ensued on the lawns of Government House were a 
novelty for the Hobart residents and Aborigines alike. It is instructive that 
rather than be treated as open enemies, the Big River and Oyster Bay tribes 
were welcomed and their presence celebrated. Though they, and their now-
dead kin, had held the colony at bay for eight years, still they were allowed to 
move through the streets of Hobart free of an armed entourage. Rather than 
feeling the full force of the prison island's military and police presence, the Big 
River and Oyster Bay tribes were welcomed into Hobart Town by the curious 
townsfolk. 
On 14February1832, the Hobart Town Courier reported that the Big River 
people were "delighted at the idea of proceeding to Great Island, where they 
will enjoy peace and plenty uninterrupted" 49 Though the prevailing attitude 
amongst the colonists was that the expatriation of the Tasmanian Aborigines 
48 Hobart Town Gazette, 21 January 1832. 
49 Hobart Town Courier, 14 February 1832. 
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may have in fact been "an act of mercy" 50 both Robinson and Arthur regretted 
deeply this pyrrhic victory. 
Wasting no time writing to London to report Robinson's success, Arthur 
urged the Colonial Office to learn from the mistakes made in Van Diemen's 
Land. "As the [new] Colony of Western Australia,'' he wrote, 
must be exposed to all the evils which have befallen Van Diemen's 
Land from the opposition of the Aborigines ... I submit to your 
Lordship that one of the very first measures adopted in that Colony 
should be to establish a friendly understanding which should be 
consistently persevered in spite of any outrages the Natives may 
commit .... 51 
What did Arthur mean by "friendly understanding" ? In light of state-
ments he would lately make about treaties, he might have been implying that 
something akin to a treaty with the Western Australian Aborigines should be 
attempted. More likely, though, he was suggesting simply that efforts be made 
at the very beginning of colonisation to ensure that the Aborigines understand 
the affects and to secure their approval of plans for settlement. Arthur had 
come to realise how important it was that the Aborigines have a true corn-
prehension not only of the colonial government's intentions towards them, but 
50West, The History of Tasmania, p.310. 
51 Arthur to Goderich, 7 January 1832, PRO Reel 250, CO 280/33, p.9-11. 
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their own role in effecting cooperative and equitable arrangements for land 
and resource sharing. 
The whole Aboriginal crisis and, even more so its eventual solution, weighed 
heavily on Arthur's mind for years to come. The Governor was finally forced to 
admit that Murray's predictions had been accurate. The crisis would leave a 
stain on the history of Van Diemen's Land. Arthur's unprecedented statements 
about the need for treaties with other Aboriginal groups reflected this regret. 
Indeed, two years later he lamented that, 
undoubtedly, being reduced to the necessity of driving a simple 
but warlike, and, as it now appears, noble minded race, from their 
native hunting grounds, is a measure in itself so distressing, that 
I am willing to make almost any prudent sacrifice that may tend 
to compensate for the injuries that government is unwillingly and 
unavoidably the instrument of inflicting. 52 
John Batman's later ultimately abortive treaty, concluded with the Duttegalla 
Aborigines of Port Phillip in June 1835, seems to have been an attempt to make 
the prudent sacrifice that Arthur would never have the opportunity to. 
52Arthur to Hay, 24 September 1832, CO 280/35, PRO Reel 252; Arthur to Goderich, 6 
April 1833, CO 280/41, PRO Reel 254; Arthur to Spring-Rice, 27 January 1835, CO 280/55, 
PRO Reel 262. 
Chapter 9 
The Batman Treaty 
... [T]he object of my visit was to purchase from them a tract of 
their country .... 1 
In December 1834, three years after his Launceston meeting with Governor 
Arthur, G.A. Robinson and the mission guides, John Batman invited John 
Helder Wedge, Anthony Cottrell, Henry Arthur and William Jardine Sams 
to join his family on a three day excursion to watch the sunrise from the 
summit of Ben Lamond. It was during this expedition that Batman proposed 
to the group his plan to settle Port Phillip as a sheep-grazing district. Batman 
formed a cooperative with these men to finance the scheme. Other influential 
colonists were also invited to take part. One of the most prominent was J.T. 
1 Batman to Arthur, 25 June 1835, in Arthur to Spring-Rice, 4 July 1835, CO 280/58, 
PRO Reel 264, p.35. 
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Gellibrand who was asked to create the group's constitution. A letter from 
Batman to Gellibrand the following May indicated that Batman planned to 
take possession of land in the Port Phillip district through "a treaty with the 
natives for the purpose of obtaining a tract of land .... "2 This would be the 
first and only time in Australia's history that a treaty of any sort with an 
Aboriginal group had or would be attempted. The significance of Batman's 
activities at Port Phillip lay in the motivations behind negotiating the treaty, 
which reflected the impact that had been made by the Aboriginal crisis in Van 
Diemen's Land. 
John Batman was not the only person to contemplate the move across 
the Bass Strait. As land in Van Diemen's Land became scarce, interest in 
the Port Phillip district increased. There, squatters were moving beyond the 
settlements to take up Crown land to raise sheep and cattle. Port Phillip 
caught the eye of some Vandemonians with just these ambitions. Batman's 
eagerness to set sail was fuelled partly by the activities of others with similar 
schemes in mind. The Hentys had already settled 'at Portland Bay where they 
had established a whaling station. Indeed, John Helder Wedge worried that 
Henty's plans would infringe on those of the Association's and wrote to Arthur 
in September 1834, "warning" the governor that the family was planning to 
2 C. Billot, John Batman: The Story of John Batman and the Founding of Melbourne 
(Melbourne, 1979), p.73; A. Campbell, John Batman and the Aborigines (North Fitzroy, 
1987), pp.65-66. 
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Figure 9.1: 
John Batman: free settler, roving party leader and treaty-maker; Source: 
image taken from http: //www.eps.vic.edu.au/history/ john%20batman.htm. 
obtain large tracts of land "under the pretence of a treaty with the Aborig-
ines .... " Wedge wrote that "if the speculation now on foot prevail , large tracts 
of the most valuable country will get into the hands of a few individuals, and 
remain unimproved wastes, occupied by a few herdsmen and shepherds" (the 
very designs which the Vandemonian association was contemplating). 3 John 
3T he Hentys were the first "squatters" to take up land in the district. They settled at 
Portland Bay before official approval was given by the Crown. Eager toe tablish themselves, 
they were prepared to settle as squatters , hoping that the colonial government of New South 
Wales would eventually grant or sell them the land; see M. Bassett, The Hentys: An Aus-
tralian Colonial Tapestry, [Melbourne, 1962], p.291- 292; M. Bassett , "Governor Arthur and 
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Pascoe Fawkner, the Launceston pressman, was Batman's other immediate 
rival.4 
9.1 The Port Phillip Association 
Originally known as the "Geelong and Dutigalla Association" the Port Phillip 
Association members were essentially wealthy squatters who had all held no-
table positions in the colonial government of Van Diemen's Land. Gellibrand 
the Opposite Coast", Tasmanian Historical Research Association, Papers and Proceedings, 
2.5 (1953), pp.83-94; Wedge to Arthur, 18 September 1834 in Bassett, "Governor Arthur 
and the Opposite Coast"; A. Campbell, John Batman and the Aborigines (Malmsbury, 
1987), p.65. 
4Fawkner sought to settle in the Port Phillip district because of the difficulties he had 
faced in Van Diemen's Land. He seemed to attract trouble and his anti-establishment 
attitudes often found him at odds with authority. As owner and editor of the Launceston 
Advertiser it was almost inevitable that he would clash with Arthur, as earlier the Governor 
openly and actively opposed a free press in his convict colony. When Batman set off from 
Launceston early in May 1835 Fawkner had already purchased the schooner Enterprise and 
was awaiting its arrival from Sydney. Its delay, however, allowed Batman to depart before 
Fawkner. Fawkner asked Batman if some of his servants could travel with him, but Batman 
refused. Fawkner then sought a passage with the Sally Anne which was heading for the 
Hentys at Portland Bay but insurance restrictions forced the captain from diverting his 
route. The Enterprise finally arrived and set sail on 27 July 1835. Fawkner found himself 
again delayed by administrative obligations and was landed at George Town. The crew, 
however, proceeded to Western Port, Fawkner's original destination, but found the location 
unsatisfactory. They moved off to Port Phillip and surveyed the banks of the Yarra River. 
They decided on a site above the falls, thirteen kilometres upstream, which today is the 
central business district of Melbourne. The pressman and his family finally set sail for 
Port Phillip on 25 September 1835. Three weeks after their arrival Fawkner had completed 
the building of a sod hut. Over the next few months, while the Port Phillip Association 
set about establishing their sheep pastures, Fawkner made plans for creating the site for a 
future settlement; see A. Campbell, John Batman and the 'Aborigines, p.68; C. Billot, "The 
Founder of Melbourne: Was it Batman or Fawkner?", Royal Historical Society of Victoria, 
55.3 (1984), p.14; A.G.L. Shaw, A History of the Port Phillip District: Victoria Before 
Separation (Melbourne, 1996), p.55-56. 
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had been the Attorney-General until he was dismissed under a cloud of con-
troversy in 1826. 5 Sams had been the Launceston Sheriff. Wedge was the 
Assistant-Surveyor. James Simpson was Police Magistrate at Campbell Town. 
Henry Arthur was the governor's nephew and Collector and Landing Surveyor 
for the Customs. Thomas Bannister was a Justice of the Peace and had been 
the Private Secretary to Arthur. John Thomas Collicot was the Post Master 
General. Anthony Cottrell was a constable and Poundkeeper and had led a 
roving party. Such was Batman's eagerness to establish himself that he had 
made his first visit to Port Phillip before the Association was even fully es-
tablished. Indeed it was only after his return that Gellibrand drew up the 
Association's constitution. 
The Port Phillip Association was a land speculation company whose forma-
tion, its members hoped, would help legitimise their somewhat questionable 
land claims. The Association came into being on 29 June 1835. Over the 
next year it planned to ship 1000 sheep from Van Diemen's Land to Port 
Phillip. Batman and Wedge, along with their servants, would superintend the 
5Gellibrand, who had been a lawyer in London before emigrating to Van Diemen's Land, 
was appointed in 1823 as the first Attorney-General. He was dismissed for alleged mis-
conduct. Shaw questions whether his dismissal was justified, though he does argue that, 
despite his "ability and legal acumen" his appointment was unfortunate given his lack of 
"judgement and commonsense"; see entry for Gellibrand in ADB, A.G.L. Shaw, "Some 
Officials in Early Van Diemen's Land", THRA Papers and Proceedings, 14.4 (April 1967), 
pp.131-132; T. Bezzant, "South Arm with Particular Reference to the Gellibrand Family" 
in The Knopwood Historical Lectures: A Pioneer History of the Derwent's South Eastern 
Shore (Hobart, 1988), p.81; J. Bonwick, John Batman: the Founder of Victoria, C. Billot, 
John Batman and the Founding of Melbourne. 
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scheme until each member could finalise his business in Van Diemen's Land 
and move to Port Phillip. Swanston, Gellibrand and Simpson were voted the 
Association's trustees. 6 
Something was known of the Port Phillip district and its surrounds before 
Batman set sail, for in 1803 Colonel David Collins had stopped there briefly 
in his search of the southern ocean for a suitable site for a penal settlement. 7 
Collins named the site where he settled "Sorrento" and he and his Lady Nelson 
passengers remained there for three months before abandoning it. A lack 
of water, a poor timber supply, and a dangerous harbour forced Collins to 
continue his search for a suitable site for a permanent settlement. The Derwent 
River would be his next port of call.8 
Shortly before Collins abandoned Sorrento a group of twenty convicts es-
caped. Twelve were recaptured, one was shot and the rest were lost. William 
Buckley was the only one left behind who survived. He lived for the next 
thirty-two years with the Wathaurung bands of Port Phillip. Buckley made 
his reappearance shortly after Batman returned to Van Diemen's Land. Bat-
man had left behind seven Sydney Aborigines and three servants to begin 
erecting huts and building sheep enclosures, as well as to keep secure their 
6Shaw, A History of the Port Phillip District, p.50-51. 
7Later in 1824 the explorers Hamilton Hume and William Hovell also led expeditions in 
the region. 
8 Shaw, A History of the Port Phillip District, pp.12-15 & 33-37. 
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newly acquired land holdings. On 6 July 1835 Buckley approached one of 
Batman's party. His imposing height and unsavoury appearance added to the 
men's shock when he approached them. Alexander Sutherland found him 
naked except but for a rug of kangaroo skins thrown round his 
shoulders and over his hairy chest; behind him his hair fell in long 
unkempt masses, and in front a widespread beard was tossed in 
brown tangles. His bushy eyebrows overhung the shadows wherein 
there glanced a pair of small, suspicious eyes; his forehead, low and 
brown with exposure, and his turned up nose were both marked 
deeply with the scars of small-pox. 9 
Wedge later described him as "a most awfully savage-looking fellow." 10 
9.2 The Port Phillip Settlement and the Bat-
man Treaty 
Batman arrived at Port Phillip on 29 May 1835, and immediately began his 
search for local Aboriginal groups. He spent several days exploring the area 
9J. Bonwick, The Wild White Man and the Blacks of Victoria (Melbourne, 1863), pp.1-
16. 
10J. Bonwick, The Wild White Man and the Blacks of Victoria (Melbourne, 1863), pp.1-
16; Shaw, A History of the Port Phillip District, p.55; H. Anderson, "The Prudent Pardon: 
Batman's Party at Indented Head, 1835", Victorian Historical Journal, 47.3 (1976), pp. 
231-8. 
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before he made contact with a band. Finding their camp recently vacated, he 
left gifts behind to demonstrate his good intentions towards them, and then 
set off after the band. Realising that they must have observed the arrival of 
his ship and fled, he tracked them at a distance, giving them time to grow 
used to his presence. Eventually he came into contact with a group of women 
and children who possibly had been left behind to observe Batman and to 
act as liaisons for their band. Batman sent his Sydney guides forward to 
speak with the women. Apparently they were able to communicate enough 
through signals and mimes to convince the women to allow Batman to escort 
them back to their camp. As was the European custom, upon arrival he 
presented them with "blankets, tomahawks, knives, scissors, looking glasses, 
and ... affixed round the necks of each woman and child a necklace." Batman 
then returned to his vessel and allowed the women to make their way back to 
their people.11 
Evidently aware of local protocol which called for Batman to then keep 
his distance from the group, the explorer spent the next five days surveying 
the land and he "abstained from intruding upon them, leaving the interview I 
had had with the women to have it's full effect upon the tribes before I visited 
them again." On the seventh day, Batman set out to again make contact with 
11Batman to Arthur, 25 June 1835, in Arthur to Spring-Rice, 4 July 1835, C.O. 280/58, 
PRO Reel 264. 
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the resident tribe and came across a man with his wife and three children: "To 
this distinguished royal chieftain of the prairies", he wrote in his journal, "I 
gave one pair of blankets, handkerchiefs, beads, and three pocket knives .... "12 
Batman assumed that, though from a different tribe, this group had already 
learnt of him. The man escorted the explorer to where he would make contact 
with a group of men who, he understood, were the chiefs of several local 
tribes. 13 
Like Robinson's guides on the shores of Lake Echo, Batman's Sydney guides 
began preliminary negotiations with the group, leaving Batman to wait at a 
distance until the time was appropriate for him to join the proceedings. His 
guides attempted to explain the object of Batman's visit and his intentions 
towards them. He then joined the group and those he assumed to be the 
chiefs indicated that he should escort them to their camp where they would 
join the women and children. This, Batman interpreted as "the strongest 
demonstration of peace and confidence." He was then introduced to the rest 
of the tribe which numbered fifty-five. He stayed with them that night and 
throughout the next morning. During that time he 
fully explained to them that the object of my visit was to purchase 
12 The Settlement of John Batman in Port Phillip from His Own Journal (Melbourne, 
1856), p.19. 
13 The Settlement of John Batman in Port Phillip from His Own Journal. 
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from them a tract of their country14 . .. I also explained my wish 
to protect them in every way, to employ them the same as my 
own natives, and also to clothe and feed them, and I also proposed 
to pay them an annual tribute in necessaries, as a compensation 
for the enjoyment of the land. The chiefs appeared most fully to 
comprehend my proposals, and much delighted with the prospect 
of having me to live amongst them. I then explained [to] them the 
boundaries of the land I wished to purchase ... On the next day the 
chiefs proceeded with me to the boundaries, and they marked with 
their own native marks the trees which were at the corners of the 
boundaries, and they also gave me their own private mark, which is 
kept sacred by them ... After the boundaries had been thus marked 
and described, I filled up, as accurately as I could define it, the land 
agreed to be purchased by me from the chiefs, and the deed when 
thus filled up was most carefully read over and explained to them 
by the two interpreters, so that they most fully comprehended it's 
purport and effect. I then filled up two others parts of the deed, so 
as to make it in triplicate, and the three principal chiefs and five of 
the subordinate chiefs, then executed each of the deeds, each part 
14 Author's emphasis; the full historical significance of Batman's recognition of a the Abo-
rigines' proprietary right to the land is discussed below. 
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being separately read over, and they each delivered to us a piece 
of the soil for the purpose of putting me in possession thereof, and 
understanding that it was a form by which they delivered to me 
the tract of land. 15 
Batman noted that the chiefs "insisted upon my receiving from them two 
native cloaks and several baskets made by the women, and also some of their 
implements of defence .... " 16 
Batman, in fact, concluded two treaties-the "Melbourne" treaty and the 
"Geelong" treaty. The former was for 500,000 acres, which covered the greater-
Melbourne area as well as the western arm of Port Phillip, including what is 
now the city of Geelong. The latter was for 100,000 acres, which covered 
the Bellarine Peninsula, then known as Indented Head. A master-copy of each 
deed had been drawn up by Gellibrand prior to Batman's departing and copies 
made by Batman's servant, William Todd, at Indented Head. 17 
The treaties were designed around the simple feudal system of land transfer 
called feoffment. Drafts describing the transaction were prepared with space 
left for the names of the purchaser and the vendors, a description of the land 
15Batman to Arthur, 25 June 1835, in Arthur to Spring-Rice, 4 July 1835, CO 280/58, 
PRO Reel 264, p.35-36. 
16Batman to Arthur, 25 June 1835, in Arthur to Spring-Rice, 4 July 1835, CO 280/58, 
PRO Reel 264, p.35-36 & 39. 
17R. Harcourt, "The Batman Treaties", Victorian Historical Journal, 62.3 (1991), p.85; 
Shaw, A History of the Port Phillip District, p.47. 
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being transferred, and the form and quantity of goods being offered as pay-
ment. The purchaser was the Port Phillip Association. The vendors were 
the three principal chiefs, three brothers all by the name of Jagajaga, and 
the chiefs of the Dutigalla tribe of the greater-Port Phillip district: Bungaree, 
Yanyan, Moowhip and Momuarmallar. Payment consisted of large quantities 
of clothing, bedding, kitchen-ware, tools, and food. These they would continue 
to supply to the local tribes on an annual basis. 
The land being transferred included "all that tract of country situate and 
being at Port Phillip running from the branch of the river at the top of the 
port about seven miles from the mouth of the river forty miles north east 
and from thence west forty miles across Indmoo Downs or plains from thence 
south-south-west across Mount Vilumanata to Geelong Harbour and contain-
ing about five hundred thousand more or less acres .... " As part of the transfer 
process one of the Aborigines with whom Batman was negotiating gave him 
a handful of soil, for under the feoffment system of land transfer the transac-
tion was not complete until something from the land, which symbolised the 
entire commodity being purchased, was physically handed from the vendor to 
the purchaser. The following day Batman, as he noted in a letter to Arthur, 
toured the boundaries of his 600,000 acre claim and marked the corner limits 
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of his newly-acquired holdings. 18 
The location of the actual site where the treaty was signed, on the banks 
of a river which the speculator named "Batman Creek", remains unclear. It 
is difficult to trace Batman's movements for a map of his journey, drawn 
up by Wedge only after his return to Van Diemen's Land, is not to scale, 
does not correctly identify all of the geographical features of the area and 
does not always follow Batman's description of his journey as detailed in his 
journal. Several scholars have studied Batman's journal and the contemporary 
maps drawn up by Wedge and a number of different possible locations have 
been determined. James Bonwick claims that Batman's Creek was actually 
Merri Creek. James Blackburn and Henry Gyles Turner argue that the treaty 
was signed on the banks of the Plenty River, about three miles north of the 
junction of the Plenty and Yarra Rivers. J. Stuart Duncan places Batman 
in Thomastown. Alistair Campbell can only conclude that Batman made 
his famous transaction on the banks of the Darebin Creek near Norris Bank 
Reserve.19 
18Campbell, John Batman and the Aborigines, p.99; Treaty between John Batman and 
the Port Phillip chiefs, 6 June 1835 in Arthur to Spring Rice, 4 July 1835, C.O. 280/58, 
PRO Reel 264. 
19 Campbell, "Discovering Batman's Port Phillip Exploration", Victorian Historical Jour-
nal, 62.3/4 (1991/1992), p.98-106; J. S. Duncan, "John Batman's Walkabout", Royal His-
torical Society of Victoria Journal, 57.2 (1986), pp.1-12. 
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The boundaries of Batman's 600,000 acre purchase from the Port Phillip 
Duttigalla tribes; Source: A. Campbell, "Discovering John Batman's Port 
Phillip Exploration", Victorian Historical Journal, 62.3 (1991/1992), p.100. 
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Figure 9.3: 
J.W. Burtt 's depiction of Batman concluding his treaty with the Duttigalla 
Aborigines. Source: State Library of Victoria La Trobe P icture Collection; 
image taken from: http: //www.foundingdocs.gov.au. 
9.3 Official Responses to the Batman Treaty 
Once Batman returned to Van Diemen's Land he wrote to Governor Arthur 
with the details of his recent activities. He explained some possible implica-
tions of the treaty for the colonial government. He noted that his previous 
experience with Aboriginal groups had led him to believe that there was "a 
favourable opportunity of opening a direct friendly intercourse with the t ribes 
in the neighbourhood of Port Phillip." Batman felt that as a native of the 
colony of New South Wales he had a special association with the Aborigines . 
He was careful to add that 
by obtaining from them a grant of a portion of that territory upon 
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equitable principles, not only might the resources of this colony be 
considerably extended, but the object of civilization be established, 
and which, in process of time, would lead to the civilization of a 
large portion of the Aborigines of that extensive territory. 20 
Arthur was quick to respond. He seemed highly pleased with Batman's ef-
forts, perceiving that "justice and humanity alike require as a preliminary in 
the occupation of every new country." Arthur, nevertheless, was hesitant to 
acknowledge that Batman now held a legitimate right to the 600,000 acres in 
question. About to be recalled from Van Diemen's Land, Arthur was careful to 
appear to his superiors in London completely proprietorial in all of his official 
activities. Consequently, he noted-regrettably, for he had long hoped to have 
Port Phillip established as an annexed colony of Van Diemen's Land-that the 
district was outside the jurisdiction of his government, Collins having claimed 
it for New South Wales in 1803. "His Excellency," wrote Colonial Secretary, 
John Montagu 
would, therefore, only observe that the recognition of the rights 
supposed to have been acquired by the treaty into which you have 
entered with the natives, would appear to be a departure from 
20Batman to Arthur, 25 June 1835 in Arthur to Spring Rice, 4 July 1835, C.O. 280/58, 
PRO Reel 264. 
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the principle upon which a parliamentary sanction, without refer-
ence to the Aborigines, has been given to the settlement of South 
Australia, as part of the possession of the Crown. 21 
On 26 August 1835 governor of New South Wales, Sir Richard Bourke, pub-
lished a proclamation officially declaring Batman's treaty null and void. The 
land, he proclaimed, though unsettled, still lay within the limits of British 
sovereignty and, as such, a treaty with the Aborigines could not be considered 
legitimate. Therefore, 
all persons who shall be found in possession of any such land .... 
without the licence or authority of His Majesty's Government ... will 
be considered as trespassers, and liable to be dealt with in a like 
manner as other intruders upon the vacant lands of the Crown 
within the said colony. 22 
Montagu sent a letter to Batman personally explaining the government's po-
sition. He repeated the message of the proclamation, though he did reiterate 
Arthur's approval of "the regard expressed for the welfare of the aboriginal 
natives .... "23 
21 Montagu to Batman, 3 July 1835, Historical Records of Victoria, 1 (Melbourne, 1981), 
pp.10-11. 
22Proclamation by Governor Bourke, 26 August 1835, HRVic, p.13. 
23Montagu to Batman, 3 July 1835, HRVic, p.10-11. 
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Bourke's failure to sanction Batman's treaty must be placed in context. 
His dealings with the indigenous peoples of South Africa demonstrated his 
genuine interest, albeit a patriarchal one, in promoting their welfare. Upon 
his appointment as Governor of New South Wales in 1831, his interest turned 
to the Australian Aborigines. Indeed, in his first despatch to Arthur from 
Sydney he wrote: 
I shall be glad to learn that the native tribes are in a greater state 
of tranquillity than has lately prevailed. The management of those 
people has I fear become a matter of great difficulty, and is likely 
to increase as more of the land is granted to settlers from foreign 
parts, unless some regular allotments can be made to the tribes in 
which they would be satisfied. 24 
However, that Bourke vetoed Batman's treaty reflected his obligation to up-
hold and effect Imperial policy rather than an opposition to the spirit of the 
treaty itself. 
A despatch from the newly appointed Secretary of State, Lord Glenelg, 
the following April stated clearly the Crown's position. Glenelg began: "I 
approve of the course which you have hitherto pursued on this subject, and 
especially of your Proclamation maintaining the rights of the Crown to the 
24Bourke to Arthur, 17 December 1831, in Arthur to Horwick, 19 January 1832, C.O. 
280/33, PRO Reel 250. 
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soil on which these new settlements have been effected." Indeed, Glenelg was 
deeply concerned that Britain's colonial dominions be protected against the 
threat posed by activities such as those of the Port Phillip Association: 
Although many circumstances have contributed to render me anx-
ious that the Aborigines should be placed under a zealous and 
effective protection, and that their rights should be studiously de-
fended, I yet believe that we should consult very ill for the real wel-
fare of that helpless and unfortunate race by recognising in them 
any right to alienate to private adventurers the land of the colony. 
It is indeed enough to observe that such a concession would subvert 
the foundation on which all proprietary rights in New South Wales 
at present, rest, and defeat a large part of the most important 
regulations of the local government. 25 
Henry Reynolds maintains that the issue of the legitimacy of the Batman treaty 
arose directly from a precedent established by the Royal Proclamation of 1763. 
"The critical legal point in question", Reynolds argues, "was not whether the 
Aborigines had anything to negotiate with but the long-established principle 
that only the Crown could extinguish native title." 26 Simply put, Batman, 
25 Glenelg to Bourke, 18 April 1836, Historical Records of Australia, I.18, p.379. 
26H. Reynolds, "Native Title and Historical Tradition", B. Attwood (ed), In the Age of 
Mabo: History, Aborigines and Australia (St. Leonards, 1996), p.29. 
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as a private citizen, had not been authorised by the Crown to treat with the 
Duttigalla people. As will be recalled, Chief Justice John Marshall had ad-
dressed this very question in Johnson v. Mcintosh in 1823 and found that only 
the Federal Government held the right to dispose of Native American lands. 
Reynolds holds that in Port Phillip the same was true. "The government's 
rejection of the treaty", Reynolds thus holds, 
was strictly in accord with the law of the period. It did not turn 
on the question of whether the Aborigines had any form of native 
title. It wasn't a question of the ability of the Port Phillip clans 
to sell their land but rather the inability of Batman to purchase it 
when confronted with the Crown's exclusive right of pre-emption. 27 
Batman, however, still had Arthur's sympathies and though his treaty 
held no weight with the government, his interest in the Port Phillip district 
led Arthur and Bourke to consider options for managing the inevitable settle-
ment of the region. Arthur forwarded Batman's letter to the Colonial Office. 
He reiterated that the Port Phillip Association's claim was not valid for the 
reasons he had detailed to Batman. Arthur noted, moreover, that even if the 
colonial government had failed to take possession of the district, the political 
organisation of the Duttigalla tribes made questionable their claims to it: 
27Reynolds, The Law of the Land, pp.127-128. 
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It appears also, from a comparison of the descriptions given by 
Messrs Howell, and Hume, and from Mr. Batman, that they had 
met with several tribes in the same district who distinguished it 
by different names, a circumstance which would render the original 
ownership doubtful, even were it true in contemplation of law, 
that a migratory savage tribe, consisting of from perhaps 30 or 40 
individuals, roaming over an almost unlimited extent of country, 
could acquire such a property in the soil as to be able to convey it 
so effectually as to confer to the purchasers any right of possession 
which would be recognised in our courts of law.28 
Nonetheless, this did not preclude the settlement of the district within the 
guidelines of law and government regulations. To placate Batman, Arthur 
thought that a "liberal grant of land" might be appropriate.29 Ever-growing 
interest in the district led Arthur to perceive that there was some urgency in 
making clear the position of the colonial government regarding jurisdiction over 
the land. The Hentys had their whaling station at Portland Bay; the Fawkners 
were erecting buildings at Port Phillip; and the Port Phillip Association had 
already invested thousands of pounds in preliminary plans to transport sheep 
to the district. This all added to Arthur's concern that the colonial government 
28Arthur to Spring Rice, 4 July 1835, HRVic, pp.11-12. 
29 Arthur to Spring Rice, 4 July 1835, HRVic, pp.11-12. 
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should act quickly to develop a policy regarding the occupation of the Port 
Phillip district. 
Bourke concurred. Now that the colonial government was unable to check 
the flow of emigration, it was forced to act. To Bourke's mind, the challenge for 
the government lay in turning "to the best advantage a state of things which 
it cannot interdict." 30 There were several reasons for establishing government 
in Port Phillip. Law and order needed to be established so as to control the 
activities of the settlers. Moreover, the revenue which was sure to flow from 
new enterprises and industries would be advantageous both for the colonial 
and Imperial governments. The main obstacle was that Port Phillip was so 
far distant from Sydney. 31 
With regard to Batman and the Port Phillip Association, Bourke felt that 
their removal from Port Phillip would achieve little. Bourke realised that the 
Port Phillip Association had already incurred considerable expense and would 
resist attempts to be ousted from the district. Therefore, it would be more 
reasonable to establish conditions under which the Association would take 
up its sheep runs. Bourke felt that the land, instead, should be surveyed and 
marked so that Batman and others could legitimately and legally purchase the 
land from the Crown. The "gradual introduction of the various institutions of 
30Bourke to Glenelg, 10 October 1835, HRVic, p.15-19. 
31Bourke to Glenelg, 10 October 1835, HRVic, p.15-19. 
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society," Bourke perceived could then naturally occur.32 
Bourke's attitude was influenced by other issues which were running par-
allel to the Aboriginal question. The activities of the land speculators at 
Port Phillip were part of a much larger phenomenon of settlement. While 
the powers-that-be in London fervently sought to concentrate settlement, the 
seeming boundlessness of the land's bounty beyond the frontiers began to draw 
the colonists away from the coastal settlements into the interior. These lands 
were, the colonial authorities continued to point out, still Crown lands, and 
therefore those who settled (and developed) them were, at best, temporary 
residents, protected by no tenure system; and at worst trespassers who could 
be legally removed. This group came to be known as "squatters." 33 By the 
time Port Phillip came to be settled the squatter movement had begun in 
earnest.34 
32Bourke to Glenelg, 10 October 1835, HRVic, p.15-19. 
33The term "squatter" had Vandemonian origins. It came from the activities of ticket-
of-leave convicts who took up runs stocked with sheep "probably acquired by the most 
exceptional means"; see Government Order, Hobart Town Gazette, 15 March 1828 
34The inequality of the colonial class system also encouraged squatter activity: "The lower 
classes objectmg to the feudalistic structure that had emerged,'' writes modern historian 
Michael Roe, "simply placed themselves on small holdings, sometimes legally by purchase 
or lease, but usually without any man's permission. Precisely the same argument that 
appealed to the larger stockholders applied on a small scale to these men. Land was there 
for the taking, and the Government could not remove everybody!" Squatters felt they had 
a clear justification for their actions, argues Roe, "[u]ntil squatters drove forth their sheep, 
the land had been entirely unproductive; this new movement introduced civilization and 
converted the wilderness into wealth." Indeed, the settler, John Cotton, went so far as to 
claim that "[t]hose persons who first reclaimed the land from a state of barrenness, the 
persons who first turned the forest land to their own use, have surely a far better title to 
the soil than the Queen of England, or any other body." While this flew in the face of 
claims of possible Aboriginal rights to the land, it held to the fundamental tenet by which 
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The colonial government quickly found that it could not, in reality, check 
the outward movement of this new landed group. As a result, it could only 
attempt to control squatter activities. During the 1830s and 1840s Bourke 
and his successor Sir George Gipps introduced several schemes to try to keep 
a check on settlement. Licensing systems were introduced to both regulate 
and procure income from settlement, as well as to deal with the increasingly 
problematic issue of worsening Aboriginal-settler hostilities. So when Bourke 
heard of Batman's arrival at Port Phillip, he was faced with both the squatting 
issue as it applied to this newest settlement, as well as the Aboriginal question, 
the Australian colonies had been claimed in the first instance, that it was a " ... a desert 
or uninhabited land." Though the colonial government would never accept the extremity 
of Cotton's claims, it could easily embrace those of the early squatters, as expressed by 
Roe. The evolution· of the nature of the squatting fraternity also aided its eventual legal 
sanction. At its inception squatters comprised the lowest antipodean classes. According to 
historian Stephen Roberts, they were viewed as "the chief menace to legitimate settlement." 
They were "regular camp-followers of any movement that had pastoral expansion as its 
goal. They harassed the stock-owners and cor;tspired with their servants, they rendered 
property and at times even life uncertain .... " Coming mainly from convict stock they were 
viewed with the utmost opprobrium. However as the more respectable classes of settler 
came to recognise that there was wealth to be had from these vast and bountiful lands, 
and themselves took up sheep runs beyond the frontier, attitudes towards the squatting 
movement began to change. From the mid-1830s the word "squatter" came to have more 
positive connotations and "with a somewhat startling rapidity, the word, from symbolizing 
the dregs of the populace, came to denote the respectable and enterprising settlers who 
had extended their activities from the freehold lands to the wider fields beyond, and sent 
their stock out into the Government 'bush'." Consequently, in 1835, the likes of Batman 
and Fawkner, both of whom were convict progeny, as well as the more respectable Henty 
family, were held in a degree of esteem, despite the fact that they were, for all intents 
and purposes, trespassing on Crown lands; see S. Roberts, The Squatting Age in Australia, 
1835-1847 (Melbourne, 1975); M. Roe, Quest for Authority in Eastern Australia, 1835-
1851 (Melbourne, 1965), p.61; J. Cotton, "The Correspondence of John Cotton" in Roe, 
Quest for Authority, p.61; J. Stephen, Opinion re validity of statute 20 George II, c.xix, in 
Bathurst to Brisbane, 7 October 1822, HRA, IV.l, pp.412-417. 
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upon which Batman had added a new dimension.35 
9.4 Popular Responses to the Batman Treaty 
While Batman and his colleagues received a generally positive response from 
the governments of New South Wales and Van Diemen's Land, the colonial 
press in Van Diemen's Land was ambivalent about Batman's activities. Be-
mused, the Cornwall Chronicle described Batman as the "Tasmanian Penn." 36 
Dr. James Ross, editor of the Hobart Town Courier, a liberal minded settler 
who had enjoyed a positive experience with the Tasmanian Aborigines, seemed 
generally supportive of Batman's activities at Port Phillip. His editorial corn-
ments noted that the measures to bring the district "into a productive state" 
were to be applauded. He also thought it wise that Batman made a "compact" 
with the Aborigines whom he believed were "the original owners of the soil." 
Indeed, Ross proclaimed: "Happy had it been for Van Diemen's Land if the 
same step had been taken with the aborigines of it on its first settlement by 
the English." Ross perceived that one positive effect would be that the colo-
nial government was now obliged to carry out active measures to protect and 
conciliate the Aborigines in that district. 
35Shaw, A History of the Port Phillip District; Roberts, The Squatting Age in Australia, 
pp.69-92. 
36 Cornwall Chronicle, 13 June 1835; This is in reference to the Quaker, William Penn. 
See Chapter 2 for a discussion of Penn's amicable relations with the Delaware Tribe. 
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Ross ended the editorial on a humorous note, facetiously claiming to have, 
himself, negotiated a similar treaty with the Bruny Island chief, Woorredy. 
Fawkner's paper, the Launceston Advertiser, published a copy of the editorial 
several weeks later. "A nod ... is as good as a wink to a blind horse ... ," Ross 
wrote, 
and we are happy to say, that we yesterday took advantage of the 
hint (seeing those large sums of money which our kind contempo-
raries are every week giving us, is never yet forthcoming), and did 
ourselves the pleasure to wait upon the aboriginal chief Woureddy 
when the following conversation and arrangement took place be-
tween us:-
'Good morning, Mr. Woureddy, I hope I have the honour to see 
your Majesty in good health?' 
The powerful chief gave his reply with an assenting smile. 
'You are King, I believe, of all the western part of this island and 
hold possession from your noble ancestors of those fertile tracts of 
600,000 acres more or less, lately visited by Mr. G.A. Robinson 
and Mr. Surveyor Sharland?' 
A significant nod. 
'Now that you are going to Flinders Island and Port Phillip with 
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Mr. Robinson and the rest of your friends and relations you will 
have no objection to sell me your full right and title to that portion 
of your dominions?' 
A significant nod. 
'I do not expect you to name your price, as you are not yet quite 
perfect in the English language, but I will name it for you. Here 
is a basket of Brown's River potatoes, a roll of tobacco, 6 pipes, 
a blanket, a dozen loaves of bread and a dead kangaroo-are you 
content?' 
(I thought I could not lose much at this price, though the land I be-
lieve is not very rich, and rather out of the way-neither did I wish 
to impose upon the King-I mean King Woureddy-by offering 
him any thing less.) His Majesty, like Jupiter or Olympus, again 
nodded, and the whole of the western country, tiers, plains, rivers, 
gum trees and all, fell into my possession, and I hereby give Mr. 
Roadknight, Sir John Owen, Mr. Edward Lord, wild cattle and all, 
due notice to decamp, as all trespassers from this time forth will 
be proceeded against according to law. I then proceeded to have 
the conveyance, duly drawn up in triplicate, on which Woureddy 
with proper regal and pomp and dignity, shaking a portion of the 
340 
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grease and red ochre out of his pendant locks, impressed it first 
with the palm of his hand and afterwards with his foot. I then 
hastily gathered up the parchment, which I thus ratified under 
his sable Majesty's naked hand and foot, to be registered at Mr. 
Beamont's office.37 
341 
Not everyone was so supportive of Batman's activities. The Colonial Times 
published an editorial from "J.J." (possibly Jorgen Jorgenson) who listed a 
number of objections to the scheme. The author worried that something akin 
to the sealing or early squatting fraternities could develop which ''would be 
injurious to the best interest of the British people and colonists." The writer 
conjectured that it would form a 
depot, exempt from the control of government as a receptacle for 
runaway convicts and all other desperate characters, who would 
flock to Port Phillip, endangering the peace and property of the 
colonists, becoming buccaneers and forming themselves into bands 
of robbers on land without means of restraining their depredations. 
The author was also concerned that the Port Phillip Association would take 
advantage of the opportunity to establish a monopoly in the district which 
would be "injurious to the interests of any community" for it would "give a 
37 Hobart Town Courter, 26 June 1835 (reprinted in Launceston Advertiser, 2 July 1835). 
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wrong channel to the supply of labour, and lay the foundation of a hateful 
oligarchy." 
As for the Aborigines, the editorialist thought Batman's claim illegitimate 
because "the chiefs of a small Aboriginal tribe cannot by any natural right, 
inherent in himself, dispose of land, which, in justice and fairness, ought to 
be handed down to the posterity of such tribe .... " Moreover, he contended, 
even if the chief had been sanctioned by his tribe to dispose of the land, his 
sovereign claim to it was still questionable. This was the case, he argued, 
because 
it has been recognised by the universal consent of all civilized na-
tions that the earliest discoverers of a region exercise the right of 
proprietorship over it, provided such region is found in state of 
nature, uncultivated and unproductive, and of scarcely any util-
ity either to the Aborigines or their fellow creatures .... Hence the 
claims, on the part of Great Britain, on the sovereignty of her 
Australian Provinces are just. 38 
This was the view that justified the manner by which New South Wales and 
Van Diemen's Land had been colonised. As will be recalled, Colonial Office 
legal counsellor, James Stephen, articulated the official position of the British 
Government to its claims on New Holland a decade and a half earlier when he 
wrote that "the colony was acquired neither by conquest nor cession, but by 
38 Cornwall Chronicle, 13 June 1835; Colonial Times, 21 & 28 July 1835. 
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the mere occupation of a desert or uninhabited land." 39 However, as Reynolds 
purports, with the settlement of Port Phillip, the tide of legal opinion had 
begun to turn. Though, at settlement, Britain had secured sovereignty over 
the land, still, explains Reynolds, 
the rights of the Crown as against Batman rested not on the doc-
trine of terra nullius but on its rights of pre-emption of the native 
title .... The land remained in the possession of the Aborigines by 
right of prior occupation up until the time that the Crown chose 
to exercise its exclusive right to extinguish the native title. 40 
No longer did legal opinion support the notion that a necessary condition of 
colonisation was the complete abolishment of Aboriginal rights to the land. 
9.5 The Authenticity of the Batman Treaty 
In his publication, John Batman and the Aborigines, historian Alistair Camp-
bell points to various reasons why the Batman treaty, regardless of its political 
legitimacy, was fraudulent. Campbell lists a number of practical issues he has 
with Batman's description of what happened. He argues that it would have 
been impossible to traverse the boundaries of the 600,000 acres in question 
39J. Stephen, Opinion re validity of statute 20 George II, c.xix, in Bathurst to Brisbane, 
7 October 1822, pp.412-417. 
40Reynolds, The Law of the Land, pp.130-131. 
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in the short time suggested by Batman so that each corner could be marked. 
Furthermore the negotiation of the Geelong deed was not finalised with the 
symbolic passing over of a handful of soil, Campbell holds, and so the second 
deed was not complete, and therefore was invalid. A full description of the 
land purchased was not entered on either deed, and so again, they were not 
complete and therefore, not valid. As for the chiefs' 'X', marked to repre-
sent their signatures, Campbell maintains that they had to have been entered 
by someone else for it was "inconceivable that Batman could have persuaded 
eight unrehearsed Aborigines in a few hours to have drawn the marks with 
the neatness and penmanship shown in the documents." Moreover he holds, 
that the documents which remained free of smudges or other marks indicates 
that the deeds could not have been handled under the conditions described by 
Batman for such damage would have been unavoidable.41 
Campbell also argues that the tribes with whom Batman negotiated did 
not have the authority to sell the lands in question because they were the 
dominion of at least five tribes, not the two that Batman recorded in the 
treaty deeds. Moreover, according to Wedge the Port Phillip tribes did not 
have chiefs and so none of those present at the negotiations had the authority 
to act on behalf of their clans. 42 
41 Campbell, John Batman and the Aborigines, p.105-6; Shaw, A History of the Port 
Phillip District, p.47. 
42 Campbell, John Batman and the Aborigines, pp.101 & 106. 
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Others dispute this second point. Diane Barwick has mapped the various 
nineteenth century Victorian clans and their heads and has identified that five 
of the eight treaty signatories were chiefs of Melbourne clans. Moreover, she 
explains, 
a clan-head had effective authority within his own group and was 
considered its rightful representative in external affairs. All clan-
heads were men of distinguished achievement; certain of them were 
so eminent that their wishes were obeyed by all clans comprising a 
-(w)urrung [common linguistic group] and their religious authority 
was acknowledged far beyond the region. 43 
Campbell also argues that language differences between the Port Phillip 
and Sydney Aborigines meant that the two groups could not effectively corn-
municate with each other. The Port Phillip clans would not have understood 
what Batman and his guides were proposing. Batman could not even learn 
the correct names of the three brothers with whom he was negotiating the 
Melbourne deed. 44 
Nonetheless, it is indisputable that negotiations, however disparate their 
43D. Barwick, "Mapping the Past: an Atlas of Victorian Clans, 1835-1904", Aboriginal 
History 8.2, 1984, pp.107-108. 
44 Campbell, John Batman and the Aborigines, p.106. 
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interpretation, were carried out. Barwick thus suggests how the Victorian Abo-
rigines' may well have interpreted the events of 6 June 1835. "John Batman's 
1835 'treaties' with the leaders of the clans near Melbourne" she explains, "are 
an example of how permission for temporary access was granted in a ritual 
exchange of gifts and formal presentation of tokens (soil, plants, water food) 
symbolising the owners' hospitality." 45 
Historian Richard Broome, likewise, maintains that for the Victorian Abo-
rigines (the Kulin) the negotiations with Batman would, indeed, have been 
authentic: 
Certainly the communications of ideas would have been difficult 
between the parties despite the presence of Batman's Aboriginal 
guides from Sydney. Certainly the Kulin had no notion of land sales 
and would have rejected such an idea if they did understand the Eu-
ropean's desires .... [However] Batman's overtures, complete with 
Aboriginal negotiators, gifts and conciliatory gestures, fitted into 
Aboriginal conceptions of negotiations. While they may appear to 
us as victims of a poor deal, in their terms they were landowners 
who it seems freely chose to give a small band of strangers access 
to land in exchange for some tempting items .... 46 
45D. Barwick, "Mapping the Past", p.107. 
46R. Broome, "Victoria", Ann McGrath ( ed), Contested Ground: Australian Aborigines 
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Ultimately, though, for Bourke and Arthur the authenticity of Batman's 
deeds was moot because their immediate concern was to ensure that settle-
ment, having now begun, progressed with an element of law and order. To this 
end, Batman and his associates were not forced to defend the legitimacy of 
the treaty deeds but were focused more on presenting their claims in a manner 
which would be accepted by the New South Wales and Van Diemen's Land 
governors. 
To help justify the legitimacy of their land claims the Port Phillip Associ-
ation, thus, noted that its primary aim in purchasing land from Port Phillip 
Aborigines was to form "an extensive pastoral establishment" there. The land 
surpassed all of Batman's hopes. "I never could have imagined it possible that 
so fine a country existed on the face of the globe", he wrote, "gentle hills, 
plains, and downs, on which 5,000 sheep might have been allowed to feed with 
little trouble to the shepherd." In his journal he wrote of the land surrounding 
the Yarra River: "this will be the place for a village." He detailed the plans of 
the Port Phillip Association in a letter to Arthur, noting that its officials ex-
pected to export at least 20,000 breeding ewes from Van Diemen's Land which 
would be managed by "married men of good character." The settlement would 
also have attached to it a man of the cloth who would preserve "due order and 
Under the British Crown (St Leonards, 1995), p.126. 
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morality" .47 
However, it seemed that Batman's true intentions were never to establish 
a village or town. Indeed, he gave his servant Gumm a "written authority to 
warn off all persons found trespassing on the land I had purchased from the 
natives." Moreover, his efforts to drive from the district Fawkner's family and 
servants demonstrated further that he wished his Association to have exclusive 
access to the land. While this may have aggrieved Fawkner, a positive result for 
the Aborigines was, as Shaw notes, that for a short time at least while settler 
numbers remained limited, a check was kept on frontier violence. Regardless 
of these results, Batman was aware (made so, some say, by the politically-
astute Gellibrand) that efforts to demonstrate that he wished to establish a 
settlement would help strengthen his cause with the colonial government.48 
Batman's activities with the Aborigines, it has been argued, were also car-
ried out to promote his commercial ambitions. A.G.L. Shaw asks: were the 
Port Phillip Association members "only trying to gain support from the hu-
manitarian lobby in Britain by covering their commercial plans with a philan-
thropic cloak?" However, Batman's activities at Port Phillip and the language 
he used in his correspondence with the colonial government demonstrates that, 
47Batman to Arthur, 25 June 1835, p.39; The Settlement of John Batman in Port Phillip 
from his own Journal, p.14; Shaw, A History of the Port Phillip District, p.47. 
48 The Settlement of John Batman in Port Phillip from his own Journal, pp.22-23; C. 
Billot., "The Founder of Melbourne: Was it Batman or Fawkner?", pp.10-21; Shaw, A 
History of the Port Phillip District, p.47. 
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far from being guided solely by selfish interests, he held to some quite unique 
views for his time. Though the humanitarian movement had strong advocates 
in London and the various colonial governments, much opinion towards the 
Aborigines in the mid-1830s still relegated them to a position where they re-
quired the protection of a paternalistic colonial power who had full rights to 
the lands upon which they had settled. Batman's treaty, which questioned 
both of these views, and which had at its core a recognition of Aboriginal 
land rights, therefore placed him well beyond even the most liberal minded 
advocate .. 
Moreover, in his correspondence with Arthur, Batman admitted that he 
thought the Duttigalla people to be "the real owners of the soil." He stated 
that "my object has not been possession and expulsion, or what is worse, 
extermination, but, possession and civilization .... "49 This was extraordinary 
given that every phase of settlement throughout the Australian colonies had 
been guided by the principle that the European settlers had the legal and moral 
right to the land. The efforts and activities of the squatters merely reinforced 
this tenet. Furthermore, that implicit in the settlement of Van Diemen's Land 
was that the whole island had become a British possession which necessarily, 
though tacitly, led to the expulsion (and almost, at times, extermination) of its 
49Batman to Arthur, 25 June 1835, in Arthur to Spring Rice, 4 July 1835, C.O. 280/58, 
PRO Reel 264, p.37; Shaw, A History of the Port Phillip District, p.47. 
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Aboriginal peoples-a process with which Batman was intimately involved-
rendered even more remarkable Batman's claims. Consequently, Batman's 
treaty with the Port Phillip Aborigines effectively denied that there existed no 
sovereign powers on the Australian continent. As such, it contradicted every 
principle by which colonialism had evolved. 
However, while the motivations behind and implications of Batman's treaty 
may remain a source of debate, what is clear is that Batman had established 
the context for the peaceful settlement of the Port Phillip district (in the 
earliest days at least). He reported that his men had fed and clothed up to one 
hundred natives at a time and had supplied them with rations on a daily basis. 
When food stocks ran low the Aborigines reciprocated, supplying Batman's 
people with native fruits and vegetables. Batman perceived that the "habits 
of industry" in which the Aborigines had been occupied demonstrated that 
"if no unforeseen obstacles occur, a gradual system of civilisation will obtain." 
Batman also recognised the great benefit that Buckley's presence offered. He 
was able to explain "to the several chiefs our motives and intentions in settling 
amongst them and the consequences which might arise from any aggression 
on their part." He also explained that any ill-treatment on the part of white 
men towards them, if reported to the heads of the establishment, would meet 
with its proper punishment. They apparently understood, and "promised 
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conformity." 50 
Such was Batman's confidence that his treaty had set the stage for peaceful 
race relations to follow that in a letter to Montagu in November 1835, he 
avowed that 
[i]n fact, however sanguine I may previously have been as to the 
complete success of the undertaking, I feel now infinite reason to 
be much more so; and doubt not but the settlement now formed 
will be useful, not only to all immediately concerned, but to the 
mother country as well as to this colony. 51 
Gellibrand reiterated this message in a letter to Arthur the following April. 
"I am firmly impressed,'' he wrote, "with the opinion that the foundation may 
be laid at Port Phillip for spreading the truths of Christianity through the 
whole continent of New Holland." Gellibrand was confident that the civilisation 
and Christianisation of the locals were attainable. 52 
Wedge was also convinced that if some specific measures were introduced 
which aimed to protect and placate the Aborigines then amicable relations 
could be maintained. His dealings with several Aboriginal groups led him to 
50Batman to Arthur, 23 October 1835, HRVic, pp.33-34. 
51 Batman to Montagu, 30 November 1835, HRVic, pp.35-36. 
52Gellibrand to Arthur, 13 April 1836, HRVic, p.24. 
CHAPTER 9. THE BATMAN TREATY 352 
develop some surprisingly modern views. He would hold to these views long af-
ter relations had deteriorated. Five years after initial settlement Wedge wrote 
to Lord Russell with a strategy for how best to conciliate the Aborigines of 
Port Phillip. Wedge conceived that the scheme could be funded from "a por-
tion of the money realized by the sale of Crown lands" which he felt was more 
than equitable for "the natives have an undoubted claim upon the land .... " 
This was later recommended as policy during the settlement of S;wan River in 
Western Australia. 53 
Though the Port Phillip Association's efforts with the Duttigalla Aborig-
ines have been perceived by some as political manoeuvring designed to impress 
the colonial government, they may not have been completely disingenuous. 
Though Batman had a complex and not always conciliatory history with the 
Aborigines still he had come to know more about them than most. Wedge, too, 
as a surveyor in Van Diemen's Land, had taken a keen interest in them and 
53Wedge outlined a specific plan for the civilisation of the Port Phillip locals. He thought 
that settlers might be induced to conciliate and befriend the locals if land was offered in 
exchange for the domestication of those individuals upon whose land they resided. Fol-
lowing Arthur's lead, he recommended the establishment of reserves which would offer the 
Aboriginal groups a place of safe retreat where they could access food and other provisions. 
The offermg of gifts would symbolise the colonists' continuing good will. Their civilisation 
could be promoted through education. The young could be placed m school and the adults 
encouraged to grow fruit and vegetables. This they could then trade with one another. 
Superintendents could be placed on the reserves to act as overseers and protectors. Many 
of these same schemes had been proposed by the authors of a Select Committee Report 
published in June 1837. The Committee's recommendations followed those suggestions that 
Arthur had proposed for the protection of Aboriginal groups in the new colonies of South 
Australia and Western Australia; see Wedge to Russell, 18 January 1840, HRA, I.10, pp.487-
489; Report from the Select Committee on Aborigines (British Settlements) (Britain, 1837), 
p.83. 
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had demonstrated his knowledge of their society and culture. Both had had 
various dealings with different groups during their time in Van Diemen's Land. 
Consequently, at the very least, Batman and Wedge seemed to know enough to 
quickly become acquainted with the Duttigalla people. They would certainly 
have been aware, having lived through the Aboriginal crisis in Van Diemen's 
Land, that had the Duttigalla people turned hostile, they could potentially 
prove to be very formidable opponents to settlement. 
Marie Fels places the activities of Batman, as the guiding spirit behind 
the Port Phillip Association, into broader perspective, arguing that Batman 
should be given credit for his activities amongst the Victorian Aborigines, 
and in particular for his efforts in negotiating a treaty with them. "From the 
perspective of Aboriginal/European relationships,'' she argues, 
it doesn't matter that [Batman] was there illegally; nor does it 
matter that he had no authority to enter into such an arrange-
ment; nor that his map is unintelligible in terms of boundaries and 
distances, nor that he falsified his written account. Nor even do 
his pious stated intentions matter. The simple fact is that whether 
by accident or cultural sensitivity, he made an agreement with the 
six clan heads who had the right and the authority to speak for 
CHAPTER 9. THE BATMAN TREATY 354 
the land, and they kept to their word. 54 
Thus, though race relations did not always remain so amicable, Batman's 
early efforts had some uniquely positive consequences. Indeed, Fels makes the 
bold claim that Batman's "treaty was the single most important fact in the 
relatively peaceful land grabs of Port Phillip district." She notes that "the 
fundamental principle of Aboriginal society was the principle of reciprocity,'' 
that keeping one's word was the natural state of affairs, and that Batman (and 
Fawkner) abided by these social mores long enough for personal, friendly and 
mutually satisfying relations to develop. 55 
Fels observes that there were no killings during the first year of settlement 
partly because, she perceives, the Duttigalla people were paid the respect 
that their status afforded them. But more importantly, though the British 
authorities did not recognise the treaty, because the Aborigines did "there was 
virtually no trouble within the area covered by the terms of the treaty." The 
treaty was a rental deed which Batman and his colleagues honoured. In short, 
she argues, "the second time around the Vandemonians found themselves in 
a contact situation, they got it right. The harsh Tasmanian experience led 
directly to the initially calm encounter at Port Phillip." 56 
54M. Fels, "Congruencies and Contradictions in Aboriginal-European Relations in Van 
Diemen's Land and Port Phillip", Bulletin for the Centre for Tasmanian Historical Studies, 
3.2 (1991/92), p.74. 
55Fels, "Congruencies and Contradictions ... ", p. 75. 
56Fels, "Congruencies and Contradictions ... ", p.75. 
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Certainly, the peaceful race relations that immediately followed the settle-
ment of Port Phillip were hardly different in character from what had occurred 
in New South Wales and Van Diemen's Land. Likewise, the increase in racial 
conflict and hostilities reflected the growth and spread of European settlement. 
Nevertheless, there were two fundamental differences between the settlement 
of Port Phillip and the settlements of New South Wales and Van Diemen's 
Land. The first difference was that the European settlers were able to im-
mediately communicate with the Aborigines through the agency of William 
Buckley. 
From the outset William Buckley proved invaluable as a liaison between 
the Aboriginal and European groups. In the words of Batman, " ... he has been 
the medium of successfully establishing between us and the natives an under-
standing, which, without his assistance, could never have been effected to the 
extent it has been." 57 Though his lowly tribal status meant that he had little 
leverage when it came to negotiating the terms of the treaty, his services as in 
interpreter proved essential to the squatters to whom he was able to provide 
information regarding the native inhabitants. So vital was Buckley to Bat-
man's success with the Aborigines of Port Phillip that Wedge, who eventually 
became friendly with Buckley, petitioned Arthur to pardon him, for "I have 
57Batman to Montagu, 30 November 1835, P. Jones (ed), Historical Records of Victoria, 
Foundation Series, 1 (Melbourne, 1981), p.21. 
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no hesitation in saying that through him there is every probability of making 
permanent the friendly intercourse that was commenced by Mr. Batman .... " 
Though Arthur was unsure of the legal implications of his decision he, never-
theless, issued the pardon being "guided by a sense of the extreme importance 
of avoiding any collision between the natives and the Europeans." 58 
The second difference was that Batman and his men understood what the 
Aborigines would require of them, if they were to remain on their lands and 
were willing to fulfil their commitment to sharing the land and its resources. 
Batman and his entourage not only had a good knowledge of Aboriginal so-
ciety and culture, but more importantly had a keen understanding of what 
could occur if the place of the Aborigines in a new European settlement was 
not properly considered. Having, as Fels notes, experienced the harsh reality 
of race relations gone bad, Batman and his fellow settlers took great pains 
to develop amicable relations with the Aborigines. Evidence of how quickly 
and successfully Batman was able to establish just such relations with the 
Port Phillip Aborigines soon emerged. Barely five months after Batman had 
concluded his treaties he was able to report that relations between his men 
and the local tribes at the various settlements he had established were "pro-
gressing in a way beyond my most sanguine expectations." 59 When his men 
58 Anderson, "The Prudent Pardon ... ", pp.231-8. 
59Batman to Montagu, 30 November 1835, HRVic, Foundation Series, p.21. 
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at the Indented Head station exhausted their rations, the local tribe fed them 
until new stocks arrived. At the Melbourne settlement, Batman was able to 
report that relations between his men and the locals were equally as satisfy-
ing. 60 Ultimately, though, Batman was able to control neither the spread of 
settlement, nor the nature of race relations because others, who were not part 
of his initial "colony" began to arrive. Consequently, nothing would come of 
his early successes and the treaties he had negotiated with the Aborigines of 
Port Phillip. 
§ 
If the settlement of Port Phillip and the consequences of Batman's treaty 
with the Duttigalla people are viewed as an epilogue to the Tasmanian story, 
as Fels maintains, the Vandemonians involved certainly seemed to have applied 
some lessons learnt from their experiences on the opposite shore. But what of 
the treaty itself? In hindsight, it is clear that the New South Wales government 
would never had recognised a treaty between the Aborigines and a private 
group of land speculators. As to an official treaty, negotiated on behalf of and 
later ratified by the colonial government, despite the fact that legal opinion 
might not have held Port Phillip to be terra nullius, nevertheless the Colonial 
Office stopped short of considering negotiating with the Aboriginal groups of 
60Batman to Montagu, 30 November 1835, HRVic, Foundation Series, pp.20-21. 
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the region as though they were sovereign nations. 
But for the Port Phillip Association members (and others who followed) 
the treaty, legitimate or otherwise, was a means by which initial settlement 
could proceed relatively smoothly. To be sure, Batman could have simply 
set up camp as the Hentys had at Portland Bay and he may or may not 
have encountered trouble with the local tribes. As the squatting movement 
gained political momentum Batman and his associates would have probably 
acquired legal title to the lands upon which they now resided, especially given 
that Arthur supported their venture. One way or another there seemed good 
reason to believe that the efforts of the Port Phillip Association would bear 
fruit. To this end, that Batman went to the effort and expense to either 
negotiate, or create the illusion of negotiating a treaty with the Duttigalla 
people, demonstrates that more than mere commercial ambition motivated 
him and his associates. A mindset was beginning to develop which recognised 
that the indigenous peoples of Australia might just deserve the recognition that 
they had rights to those lands which the early colonists sought so desperately 
to possess themselves. 
Across the Tasman Sea, the Maori of New Zealand had always enjoyed just 
such recognition and five years later the Treaty of Waitangi was negotiated. 
The difference between the Australian and New Zealand treaties was that the 
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latter was formulated by, and had the sanction of, the British government. It 
was a document designed to establish guidelines for race relations between all 
British settlers and all Maori tribes, not just one group of land speculators 
and the tribes in the district over which they had designs. Most importantly, 
the Treaty of Waitangi, unlike the Batman Treaty, secured the right of pre-
emption for the British government, thus ensuring that the British government 
maintained control over activities and developments in the newly established 
colony, especially as they related to relations with the Maori. 
Chapter 10 
The Treaty of Waitangi: An 
Australian Legacy? 
Every effort ... ought to be made to come to an understanding with 
the natives ... before operations are commenced by the emigrants, 
otherwise some cause of offence may unfortunately arise not less 
detrimental to the interest of the latter than subversive of the fu-
ture goodwill, without which it will be impossible to prevent long 
continued warfare .... 1 
On 5 February 1840, five years after Batman's treaty with the Duttigalla 
Tribes of Port Phillip, the newly installed Consul and Lieutenant Governor 
to New Zealand, William Hobson, negotiated the Treaty of Waitangi with the 
1 Arthur to Spring-Rice, 27 January 1835, CO 280/55. PRO Reel 262, p.60. 
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northern chiefs of New Zealand. The treaty represented the change in attitude 
that had been evolving over the past decade towards native land rights in the 
Pacific. Most who new anything of the Maori acknowledged that they were 
"advanced" enough to be able to claim rights to their lands and territories. Yet 
London's decision to annex New Zealand by way of a treaty still demonstrated 
that much progress had been made. The unrelenting efforts of a select few 
in New South Wales and London-humanitarians to the last-had finally met 
with results. In the years since the removal of the Tasmanian Aborigines the 
humanitarian movement had shifted its focus from the slavery question to 
issues relating to the treatment of native groups in other parts of the British 
empire. With New Zealand not yet colonised and missionaries already working 
amongst Maori groups there, a few influential activists realised that here was 
a chance for the Colonial Office make some significant policy changes. This 
could be one colony where the successful accommodation and conciliation of 
the native tribes might be achieved. 
There were a number of factors that led the Colonial Office to determine 
that Britain needed to establish an official presence in New Zealand. Edward 
Gibbon Wakefield was hard at work with his colonisation schemes.2 He had al-
ready established a settlement in South Australia, and he had publicly declared 
2See P. Temple, A Sort of Conscience: The Wakefields (Auckland, 2003). 
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that New Zealand was his next goal. There was a slight concern, too, about 
French interest in New Zealand.3 Moreover, as contact between Pakeha4 and 
Maori groups increased, those who had already become involved with Maori 
groups-namely British missionaries-grew increasingly concerned about the 
nature of the contact. Pressure from missionary organisations both in New 
Zealand and Britain finally forced the Colonial Office to intervene. The pri-
mary question for Whitehall was how to establish a system of law and order 
in New Zealand without jeopardising Maori land rights. 
This chapter will consider the efforts of a number of British officials and 
. ecclesiastics-most of whom had been involved in or affected by the crisis in 
Van Diemen's Land-who were ultimately able to influence official Colonial 
Office thinking enough to convince policy-makers that the only means to ensure 
that Maori rights were protected was through the treaty-making process. 
Though the Treaty of Waitangi offered the opportunity for race relations 
in New Zealand to evolve upon principles of fairness, justice and mutually 
consensual land-sharing practises, ultimately it did not become the panacea 
3Baron C de Thierry to Bathurst, 2 December 1823, Historical Records of New Zealand, 
v.1, pp.614-618; Bourke to Glenelg, 9 September 1837 in Stephen to Backhouse, 12 De-
cember 1838, Correspondence with the Secretary of State Relative to New Zealand, British 
Parliamentary Papers, 3, p.9. 
4The word 'Pakeha', whose origins date to before 1815, is a Maori term referring to a 
"white" person from England visiting or settling in New Zealand. It has been adapted in 
modern times to describe fair-skinned, non-Maori New Zealanders; see J. Ranford, 'Pakeha', 
Its Origin and Meaning, URL: http://maorinews.com, referenced October 2005. 
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for race relations that Governor George Arthur had hoped an Australian treaty 
might. This was the case because, as with the Batman treaty, the Treaty 
of Waitangi was, as modern philosopher, Robert Goodin describes, "deeply 
flawed both substantively and procedurally". 5 
Modern historians have highlighted a number of issues that plagued the 
Treaty of Waitangi from its very inception. Most fundamentally, as historian, 
Claudia Orange argues, the meaning of the Treaty was hardly clear for the 
Maori. Orange maintains that, indeed, "[i]t is scarcely possible to speak of a 
single Maori understanding; there was a variety of understandings" . 6 
Issues of translation were the primary issue. Those who interpreted and 
rewrote the Maori version of the treaty, missionaries Henry Williams and 
his son Edward, were not trained translators. With little time to complete 
their task and lacking the knowledge of the Maori language that was required, 
they subsequently recast and simplified the original English text. This led to 
confusion and misunderstanding as specific English words and concepts were 
replaced with general Maori terms that did not necessarily convey the true 
meaning of the English text. For example, as Orange notes, Article Two of 
the treaty confirms full and exclusive Maori possession of their lands. In the 
Maori text, the word "rangatiratanga", which translates to "chieftainship" or 
5R. Goodin, "Waitangi Tales", Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 78.3 (2000), p.312. 
6 C. Orange, The Treaty of Waitangi (Wellington, 1987), p.4. 
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Maori sovereignty, is used to describe these rights. In using this word, Orange 
explains, the Maori might have been led to perceive that "their sovereign rights 
were actually being confirmed in return for a limited concession of power." 7 
Moreover, the Maori version of the treaty did not emphasise certain key 
issues required for the Maori to truly comprehend what they were signing. As 
Orange argues, in the Maori translation of Article Three in which "Her Majesty 
the Queen of England extends to the Natives of New Zealand Her royal protec-
tion and imparts to them all the Rights and Privileges of British Subjects" too 
little emphasis was given to the fact that, ultimately, the British government 
sought to secure absolute sovereignty over the whole of New Zealand.8 
As a result, many Maori believed they were signing a document that es-
tablished a type of joint citizenship.9 They believed that British subjects 
would be governed separately and that the Maori and Pakeha would coexist 
as two polities. Indeed, Robson's initial plan was to separate the Maori and 
Pakeha, establishing law and order within the British enclaves, and protecting 
the Maori tribes from incursions into their territories. Historian, Paul Moon, 
thus, maintains that "any serious historian would shudder at claims that the 
Maori knew they were ceding the right to govern the country in perpetuity, to 
7 0range, The Treaty of Waitangi, pp.41-42. 
8 0range, The Treaty of Waitangz, pp.43. 
9P. Moon, "Three Historical Interpretations of the Treaty of Waitangi 
(1840)", The Electronic Journal of Australian and New Zealand History, 
[http://www.jcu.edu.au/aff/jostpru/newcastle/moon.htm] (1999), p.24. 
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the Crown." 10 
Another serious issue was authority. Moon argues that the Maori chiefs 
did not have the authority to cede their lands to the British. The chiefs did 
not own the territories over which they presided. The lands were the dominion 
of the tribe as a whole, with individuals accorded access based on their place 
in the hierarchy of the tribe. In order to cede sovereignty of their territories 
each chief would have to secure the approval of every member of his tribe. So 
even if the chiefs fully comprehended the terms of the treaty and agreed to its 
terms, they were in no position to sign away the rights to lands over which 
they, as individuals, did not hold sovereignty.11 
Procedurally, too, there were flaws. As the pressure to secure the signatures 
of the many hundreds of Maori chiefs intensified, Hobson turned to a policy of 
gifts-for-signatures and the missionaries were sent to out with "such presents 
as may be required ... and placed at your disposal." 12 More significantly, when 
in May 1841, New Zealand was proclaimed an independent British colony and 
the Crown officially assumed full sovereignty over New Zealand, no attempt 
at securing a Maori mandate for such an extension of sovereignty was sought 
and not a single Maori signature was collected. 13 
10P. Moon, "Three Historical Interpretations of the Treaty of Waitangi (1840)", p.24. 
11 P. Moon, "Three Historical Interpretations of the Treaty of Waitangi (1840)", p.16. 
12Hobson to Williams, 23 March 1840, quoted in Moon, "Three Historical Interpretations 
of the Treaty of Waitangi (1840)", p.12. 
13Moon, "Three Historical Interpretations of the Treaty of Waitangi (1840)", p.6. 
CHAPTER 10. THE TREATY OF WAITANGI: AN AUSTRALIAN LEGACY? 366 
Despite all the issues that plagued and continue to plague the Treaty of 
Waitangi, it nevertheless offered something that the Aborigines of Australia 
never had. The "spirit" of the treaty, if not the treaty itself, established a 
context by which Maori and Pakeha could define themselves. In the words of 
Orange, 
when the ambiguities of the agreement became apparent and doubts 
about its legal status arose, it would be this 'spirit' of the treaty 
that would sustain a sense of Maori expectation and Pakeha obli-
gation that treaty promises should be kept. 14 
10.1 George Arthur 
In Fate of a Free People, Henry Reynolds argues that "[Governor George] 
Arthur's earnest advocacy of the need for treaties was probably an important 
influence on the decision of the Colonial Office to negotiate the Treaty of 
Waitangi with the Maori chiefs in 1840 as a prelude to the settlement of New 
Zealand." 15 At the end of the Aboriginal crisis in Van Diemen's Land Arthur 
made it a priority to work to ensure that other Australian colonies did not 
suffer the same fate that his did. Just one week after the remnants of the Big 
140range, The Treaty of Waitangi, p.59. 
15H. Reynolds, Fate of a Pree People, p.122. 
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River and Oyster Bay bands had been removed to Flinders Island he wrote to 
the Secretary of State, Viscount Goderich, to attempt to impress upon him 
the gravity of his concerns. He stated that in the new colony of Swan River 
in Western Australia a concerted effort to "establish a friendly understanding 
[with the] natives" needed to be attempted. He advised that agents-who 
must develop a good understanding of their languages and customs-should 
be sent to reside amongst the local tribes to act as liaisons between the colonial 
government and the Aborigines. Most importantly, Arthur declared, 
the utmost care should be taken to make them presents (the most 
trifling will satisfy them) for whatever land is taken possession of 
by the British Settlers, for as each tribe claims some portion of 
Territory which they consider peculiarly their own, they should be 
in some formal manner satisfied for bartering it away, a negotiation 
which they perfectly comprehend. 
He admitted that "had this system been early adopted in Van Diemens Land, 
many deplorable consequences, I have no doubt, would have been averted." 16 
Arthur's regret was deep and enduring. In September 1832, he wrote to 
James Stephen's predecessor, Permanent Undersecretary Robert Hay. Arthur 
had heard of Wakefield's plans for settling South Australia and was concerned 
16 Arthur to Goderich, 7 January 1832, CO 280/33, PRO Reel 250, pp.9-12. 
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that too little attention had been given to potential consequences for future 
race relations there. He knew that to be effective, policies had to be in place 
before settlement commenced. He lamented that in his own colony the formal 
negotiation of a compact of peace with the Aborigines had not been attempted. 
"It was a fatal error in the first settlement of Van Diemens Land", he admit-
ted, "that a treaty was not entered into with the natives, of which savages well 
comprehend the nature." Again he pointed to the need to offer "compensa-
tion for the territory they surrendered and-no matter how trifling ... " for he 
realised that 
had adequate laws been from the very first, introduced, and en-
forced for their protection, His Majestys Government would have 
acquired a valuable possession, without the injurious consequences 
which have followed our occupation, and which must ever remain 
a stain upon the colonisation of Van Diemens Land.17 
In January 1835 the governor, again, felt the need to prod the Colonial 
Office to consider something akin to a treaty in the Australian colonies. The 
first settlers were about to arrive in South Australia and he was concerned that 
unregulated settlement would have calamitous results. In a letter to Goderich's 
successor, Spring Rice, he wrote, 
17 Arthur to Hay, 24 September 1832, CO 280/35, PRO Reel 250, pp.226-32. 
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[e]very effort ought to be made to come to an understanding with 
the natives of Southern Australia before operations are commenced 
by the emigrants, otherwise some cause of offence may unfortu-
nately arise not less detrimental to the interest of the latter than 
subversive of the future goodwill, without which it will be impos-
sible to prevent long continued warfare .... 18 
Arthur reiterated his regret: 
On the first occupation of [Van Diemen's Land] it was a great 
oversight that a treaty was not, at that time made with the natives, 
and such compensation given to the chiefs as they would have 
deemed a fair equivalent for what they surrendered; a mere trifle 
would have satisfied them, and that feeling of injustice which I 
am persuaded they always have entertained, would have had no 
existence.19 
Shortly before departing for Upper Canada where he would begin an appoint-
ment as Lieutenant-Governor, Arthur made one last plea to his superiors. In 
a letter to now Secretary of State, Lord Glenelg, he admitted that a number 
of decisions he had made regarding the management of Aboriginal-settler re-
lations during the early part of his tenure in Van Diemen's Land had been 
18 Arthur to Spring-Rice, 27 January 1835, CO 280/55, PRO Reel 262, pp.56-63. 
19 Arthur to Spring-Rice, 27 January 1835, CO 280/55, PRO Reel 262, pp.56-63. 
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based on poor advice and his own failure to fully consider the long-term con-
sequences of his decisions. "On the first occupancy of Van Diemen's Land", 
he wrote in July 1837, 
a very injudicious course of proceeding was followed towards the 
natives and I deeply lament to acknowledge that being incapable of 
forming any opinion of my own based upon experience and being 
perplexed with the adverse opinions of others I fell into some very 
wrong notions in the early part of my government from which very 
injurious consequences resulted. 20 
Arthur's words did not fall on deaf ears. He had an interested audience 
in London. There were a number of staunch humanitarians operating in the 
Colonial Office at the time who welcomed his suggestions-any suggestions-
that might improve the lot of the native peoples in the British colonies. The 
Colonial Office listened carefully to what Arthur had to say and sought his 
advice on the management of race relations in the Australian colonies. His 
suggestions put forward to various Colonial Office officials were perused and 
acted upon. Glenelg sent copies of the governor's despatches to the South Aus-
tralian commissioners. Arthur's correspondence was also submitted to Thomas 
20 Arthur to Glenelg, 22 July 1837, CO 280/84, PRO Reel 282, pp.265-71. 
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Fowell Buxton who in 1836 who headed what would prove to be a very influ-
ential select committee established to consider the plight of Britain's native 
wards-the Select Committee on Aborigines (British Settlements). 21 When 
considering the treaty question, the select committee scrutinised Arthur's let-
ters to the Colonial Office. 22 
While Arthur was never able to convince the Colonial Office to negoti-
ate treaties in the Australian colonies, suggestions he had made that con-
tained elements of the treaty-making tradition were, nonetheless, readily re-
ceived. When Arthur proposed to Glenelg the idea of employing Aboriginal 
protectors-whose role was akin to Indian agents of north America-in the 
mainland colonies, the Secretary of State acted on it. 23 
To be sure, Arthur's efforts alone might never have been enough to chal-
lenge the very solid principle that Australia was "a desert or uninhabited 
21 The findings of this committee will be discussed below. 
22 All of Arthur's correspondence with the Secretaries of State concerning Aboriginal policy 
were published by the House of Commons (Paper 259) in 1831 [A.G.L. Shaw later published 
these as Van Diemen's Land: Copies of All Correspondence Between Lieutenant-Governor 
Arthur and His Majesty's Secretary of State for the Colonies, on the Sub3ect of the Military 
Operations Lately Carried on Against the Aboriginal Inhabitants of Van Diemen's Land 
(Hobart, 1971)]; Arthur's letter to the Colonial Office in January 1835 was forwarded to the 
South Australian Colonization Commission who, as will be discussed, were urged to consider 
very seriously the Aboriginal issue before the new colony was settled. The removal of the 
Aborigines of Van Diemen's Land was also discussed in the 1836/1837 Select Committee 
Report on Aborigines (British Settlements). A series of letters of correspondence between 
Arthur and the Colonial Office were also published in an appendix, Arthur's call for a treaty 
to be negotiated in South Australia being the first; [Report From the Select Committee on 
Aborigines (British Settlements) (with Minutes of Evidence, Appendix and Index), BPP, 
7.538, 1836 and Report From the Select Committee on Aborigines (British Settlements), 
BPP, 7.425, 1837]. 
23This will be discussed in detail below. 
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land." 24 Moreover, the circumstantial evidence at best provides a tenuous link 
between Arthur's legacy with the Aborigines of Van Diemen's Land and the 
Colonial Office's decision to negotiate the Treaty of Waitangi. Nevertheless, 
Arthur's was yet another voice joining to the growing number of voices calling 
for the use of treaties and treaty-making traditions as devices for recognising 
native land rights in the Pacific. 
§ 
Arthur's pleas to the Colonial Office highlight an apparent contradiction 
in how he managed the various crises which he faced during his terms in Van 
Diemen's Land and Upper Canada. As discussed, the bushrangers of Van 
Diemen's Land felt the full force of his authority and he did not hesitate to 
put to death anyone found to be a member of a bushranging gang. Arthur 
imposed similarly severe policies in Upper Canada. Arriving in March 1838 to 
take up the appointment of Lieutenant-Governor, he was immediately faced 
with the task of dealing with the prisoners arrested during an ill-conceived and 
ultimately abortive rebellion against the Canadian government that preceded 
his arrival. Though the rebellion was over almost before it began, Arthur 
24J. Stephen, Opinion re validity of statute 20 George II, c.xix, in Bathurst to Brisbane, 
7 October 1822, HRA, IV.l, pp.412-417; Glenelg to Gipps, 31 January 1838, HRA, I.19, 
pp.252-255; H. Reynolds, Law of the Land, pp.107-110; H. Reynolds, This Whispering in 
Our Hearts (St Leonards, 1998), pp.47-60. 
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nevertheless felt that he must quash "this most unparalleled, wicked conspir-
acy." 25 Consequently, less than a month after his arrival he had two of the 
rebel leaders, Samuel Lount and Peter Matthews, put to death. When others 
continued in their wake, carrying out raids along the Canadian-United States 
border, Arthur also advocated their executions. Many others who took part 
in the insurrections were transported to Van Diemen's Land.26 
Arthur's responses to the Aboriginal crisis in Van Diemen's Land, on the 
other hand, as discussed, were tempered with a surprising level of mercy and 
tolerance. Arthur's biographer, Phillip Buckner, gives a convincing reason for 
why Arthur acted so differently with the Aborigines. "Like many evangelicals", 
Buckner explains, "[Arthur] was extremely conservative in his political and 
social views. But he also embraced the evangelical commitment to the doctrine 
of 'imperial trusteeship'." 27 Thus, Arthur saw himself as a guardian over his 
native subjects. He felt it was his responsibility to protect their rights, and 
this often meant treating them with much greater compassion and charity. On 
the other hand, those Europeans who found themselves on the wrong side of 
the law faced a much harsher, more obdurate governor whose political and 
social conservatism did not allow for his sympathies to extend to their own 
plight. 
25P. Buckner, George Arthur entry in Dictionary of Canadian Biography, III (Toronto, 
1966-), p.27. 
26P. Buckner, George Arthur entry in Dictionary of Canadian Biography, pp.26-31. 
27P. Buckner, George Arthur entry in Dictionary of Canadian Biography, pp.28. 
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10.2 Bishop William Broughton 
As the official representative of the church in the Australian colonies and a 
self-appointed advocate for the disadvantaged, William Grant Broughton, was 
a powerful voice for the Aborigines of the Australian colonies. Broughton 
assumed the position of Archdeacon of New South Wales on 16 September 
1829, replacing Thomas Scott. In 1836 he was consecrated Bishop of Australia. 
Broughton's impressive achievements as a clergyman and scholar in Britain 
helped secure his career in the Australian colonies. He was a King's scholar at 
The King's School in Canterbury between 1798 and 1803 and later attended 
Pembroke Hall at Cambridge where he completed a Bachelors degree in 1818 
and a Masters degree five years later. At the conclusion of his Bachelors degree 
Broughton entered the priesthood but continued to research and publish. His 
academic efforts won him the praise of a number of prominent dignitaries and 
eventually the patronage of the Duke and Duchess of Wellington.28 
Upon beginning his tenure in New South Wales Broughton declared that 
his focus in his new role would be on promoting the moral and religious ad-
vancement of convicts, frontier settlers and Aborigines. 29 On three occasions, 
28V. Parsons, William Grant Broughton entry, D. Pike (ed.), Australian Dictionary of 
Biography, 1 (Melbourne, 1966), pp.158-164; G. P. Shaw, Patriarch and Patriot: William 
Grant Broughton, Colonial Statesman and Ecclesiastic (Melbourne, 1978); Hobart Town 
Courier; 24 April 1830, Colonial Times, 16 April 1830. 
29V. Parsons, William Grant Broughton entry, ADE, pp.158-164; G. P. Shaw, Patriarch 
and Patriot: William Grant Broughton, Colonial Stateman and Ecclesiastic; Hobart Town 
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he was given the opportunity to promote the Aboriginal cause in a significant 
way. 
When Broughton arrived in New South Wales the Aborigines of both Aus-
tralian colonies were in a desperate state. Aboriginal-settler hostilities contin-
ued unabated in Van Diemen's Land and in New South Wales alcohol, disease 
and frontier violence threatened the Aborigines' very existence. Broughton, 
thus, made the Aboriginal question a priority.30 
Almost immediately he set out to visit the outlying settlements that fell 
under his jurisdiction. In April 1830 he arrived in Van Diemen's Land-the 
outermost settlement in his diocese. In a sermon he gave at St. David's church 
in Hobart he addressed the general state of the Aborigines in the Australian 
colonies. He regretted that after nearly half a century of contact they remained 
in their "original benighted and degraded state", that, indeed, "our settlement 
in their country has even deteriorated [their] condition of existence". "Shall 
we look on and see them perish", he asked the congregation, "without so much 
as an effort at their preservation?" 31 
Realising the opportunity that Broughton's visit offered him, Governor 
Couner, 24 April 1830, Colonial Times, 16 April 1830. 
30V. Parsons, William Grant Broughton entry, Australian Dictionary of Biography, 
pp.158-164; G. P. Shaw, Patriarch and Patriot: William Grant Broughton, Colonial State-
man and Ecclesiastic; Hobart Town Courier, 24 April 1830, Colonial Times, 16 April 1830. 
31 Colonial Times, 16 April 1830; Hobart Town Couner, 24 April 1830. 
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Arthur asked the clergyman to chair a committee to consider the Aboriginal 
crisis that Van Diemen's Land was facing. Broughton agreed and the commit-
tee began its investigations. After taking evidence from a variety of prominent 
settlers, the committee retired to compile its findings and to give its recom-
mendations. As discussed in Chapter 5, what was reflected in its report was 
that the colony was in the midst of war and strong measures needed to be 
taken to put an end to hostilities. The recommendations focused on estab-
lishing a system whereby the rights of both Aborigines and colonists could be 
protected. They also reflected the need to better organise the military oper-
ations of the colonial government so that hostilities could be quickly brought 
to an end.32 
In developing questions for his witnesses, Broughton was looking to form 
a detailed description of how and why hostilities had developed into war and 
the means by which to end it. He was not necessarily trying to appraise how 
enlightened the colonists of Van Diemen's Land were, though a number made 
reference to the fact that for the Aborigines, if not the colonists, at its core the 
Aboriginal crisis was a struggle for land rights. Isaac Sherwin believed "the 
natives wished to have their lands to themselves." Roderic O'Connor stated 
that "the natives are as tenacious of their hunting grounds as setters are of 
32Report of the Aborigines Committee, 19 March 1830, in Arthur to Murray, 15 April 
1830, CO 280/24, PRO Reel 244, pp.396-508. 
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their farms .... "33 
For the most part, though, Broughton did not receive answers that would 
have propelled him to believe that the majority of his witnesses considered that 
the Aborigines held territorial rights over those districts in which they were 
carrying out their depredations. Broughton's report, nevertheless, reflected 
the evangelical view that the rights of the Aborigines, however limited, must 
not be forgotten. To be sure, the Archdeacon saw the Aborigines as savages 
who must be civilised and Christianised. He concluded that the Aborigines 
had a "wanton and savage spirit inherent in them, impelling them to mischief 
and cruelty .... "34 However, like Arthur, he understood the root causes of the 
Aborigines' outrage. 
It would indeed appear that there prevail[s] too general a forget-
fulness of those rights of ordinary compassion to which, as human 
beings, and as the original occupants of the soil, these defenceless 
and ignorant people were justly entitled-They were sacrificed, in 
many instances, to momentary caprice or anger, as if the life of a 
Savage had been unworthy of the slightest consideration; and they 
sustained the most unjustifiable treatment in defending themselves 
33Report of the Aborigines Committee, 19 March 1830, in Arthur to Murray, 15 April 
1830, CO 280/24, PRO Reel 244, pp.408 & 431. 
34Report of the Aborigines Committee, 19 March 1830, in Arthur to Murray, 15 April 
1830, CO 280/24, PRO Reel 244, p.440. 
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against outrages which it was not to be expected that any race of 
Men should submit to without resistance, or endure without im-
bibing a spirit of hatred and revenge. 35 
Broughton, again like Arthur, realised what was owed to the Aborigines. "The 
debt which [the colonists] have incurred in taking possession of this country 
they would willingly acquit themselves of by every justifiable degree of for-
bearance and moderation towards the native inhabitants .... " 36 
Broughton's opportunity to influence Aboriginal policy did not end there. 
In 1835 he had the chance to present evidence on the Australian Aborigines to 
a House of Commons select committee in London.37 Fortunate timing found 
Broughton in London as the committee was gathering to take evidence. The 
clergyman was eager to present his views to the commissioners. He felt that 
the Aborigines were in such a state of "degradation" that their cause seemed 
hopeless. "While, as the contagion on European intercourse has extended itself 
among them", he lamented, "they gradually lose the better properties of their 
own character, they appear in exchange to acquire none but the most objec-
tionable and degrading of ours." Missionaries in New South Wales, Broughton 
35Report of the Aborigines Committee, 19 March 1830, p.437. 
36Report of the Aborigines Committee, 19 March 1830, p.452. 
37The findings of this select committee will be discussed below. 
CHAPTER 10. THE TREATY OF WAITANGI: AN AUSTRALIAN LEGACY? 379 
reported, felt their efforts to bring religion and "civilization" to their Aborigi-
nal wards had been futile. Broughton did not think that the problem was that 
the Aborigines were unable to learn or adapt to a European society-rather 
there was little incentive to do so. The cultural divide was just too great.38 
Broughton repeated to the committee what he had preached to his Hobart 
congregation: "we look on and see them perish without so much as an effort 
for their preservation." Again, he thought that much was owed them. "Natural 
and much more Christian equity points out that, as in the occupation of their 
soil we are partakers of their worldly things, so in justice should they be 
of our spiritual." Ultimately, the problem was, Broughton realised, that the 
Aborigines had been dispossessed of their lands-lands to which they clearly 
felt a proprietorial entitlement, but more importantly, lands whose access was 
vital to their well-being.39 
In 1838 Broughton was, again, asked to chair a committee to enquire into 
Aboriginal policy, this time closer to home. Glenelg had directed the Aus-
tralian governors to implement Arthur's Aboriginal protectorate scheme and 
the Legislative Council of New South Wales met in August 1838 to consider the 
charge. Glenelg had written to New South Wales Governor, Richard Bourke, to 
38Report from the Select Committee on Aborigines (British Settlements), 1837, p.11. 
39Report from the Select Committee on Aborigines (British Settlements), Minutes of 
Evidence, 1837, pp.13-24. 
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direct that protectors be employed throughout the Port Phillip and Spencer's 
Gulf region. At the behest of Arthur who was now residing in London and 
in almost daily contact with Whitehall,40 Glenelg had also suggested that the 
Aborigines now on Flinders Island be relocated to a mainland reserve to be 
employed as Robinson's guides. Bourke asked Broughton to determine how 
appropriate the implementation of this second policy would be. 41 
Witnesses brought before the committee painted a very bleak picture of 
the fate of the Aborigines and the role of colonists in their demise. Robert 
Scott of Glendon on the Hunter River thought the problem lay with the Abo-
rigines' lawlessness. Reverend William Cowper blamed the lawlessness of the 
frontier colonists. When questioned on the issue of the "improvement" of the 
Aborigines, a number of the witnesses detailed instances where individuals 
whom they assumed were "civilised" had reverted to their traditional habits. 
Lieutenant Richard Sadlier who oversaw the Male Orphan School in Liverpool 
worried that Aboriginal groups " ... within the pale of white population must, 
within a very few years, be utterly destroyed, if the most prompt measures are 
not taken." 42 
The majority of the witnesses, thus, supported the proposal to employ 
40 Arthur to Glenelg, 1837 correspondence, CO 280/84, PRO Reel 282. 
41 Report from the Committee on the Aborigines Question, with Minutes of Evidence. 
New South Wales Legislative Council, votes and proceedings (October 1838), pp.1-2. 
42Report from the Committee on the Aborigines Question, pp.16, 52, 55 & 60. 
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Aboriginal Protectors in the various Australian colonies.43 Reverend Lancelot 
Threlkheld even made an astute suggestion about what role the Protector 
should play: "I consider a Protector as a legal advocate to watch over the 
rights and interests of the natives, and to protect them from aggression." 44 
Only Sadlier, however, recognised that along with protective measures should 
also come the acknowledgement of Aboriginal land rights: 
[W]e claim them as our subjects, and bring them under the ad-
ministration of our laws; therefore, as our subjects, they ought to 
have protection ... as we deprive them of their lands and means of 
subsistence, in justice we ought to remunerate them ... "45 
Ultimately, Broughton recommended against the transfer of the Tasma-
nians. From his time in Van Diemen's Land, he was patently aware that a 
number of the Aborigines now residing on Flinders Island were the same indi-
viduals who had carried out some of the most barbarous and violent acts that 
the colony had suffered. Though Robinson painted a picture of the Tasma-
nians now conciliated, civilised and Christianised,46 still Broughton baulked 
at the idea of removing them from Flinders Island. He concluded that it was 
very possible that the presence of the Tasmanian Aborigines would manifest 
43Report from the Committee on the Aborigines Question, pp.4, 22, 28, 31, 54, & 60. 
44Report from the Committee on the Aborigines Question, p.22. 
45 Report from the Committee on the Aborigines Question, p.31. 
46Report from the Committee on the Aborigines Question, pp.1-15. 
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in the Aborigines of New South Wales "the same fierce and hostile deportment 
towards the settlers here, as those in Van Diemen's Land were with so much 
difficulty released from." 47 Broughton did not offer a recommendation on the 
question of Aboriginal Protectors because Glenelg had not given Bourke the 
authority to veto the scheme. The evidence presented by Broughton's wit-
nesses, nonetheless, gave credence to the plan and ultimately, G.A. Robinson 
found himself employed in the task. 
While Broughton's views of native land rights were not as fervent as Arthur's, 
and though he did not play a direct role in the decision to negotiate the Treaty 
of Waitangi, he certainly painted a lamentable picture of the results of native 
land rights being ignored in the Australian colonies. Broughton's was a clear 
and powerful message. Britain's neglect of these rights could well lead to the 
extinction of the very people it was attempting to protect. The method by 
which New Zealand would be colonised, some around him realised, needed to 
be considered with this lesson in mind. 
10.3 Reverend Samuel Marsden 
Variously dubbed the "Flogging Pastor,'' the "Saint Augustine of New Zealand" 
and a "pioneer of Empire", Reverend Samuel Marsden was an active and 
prominent figure in early colonial affairs in both New South Wales and New 
47Report from the Committee on the Aborigines Question, p.ii. 
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Zealand. Marsden arrived in New South Wales in March 1794 to assume the 
position of assistant chaplain of New South Wales. He settled in Parramatta 
where he established a farm on his one hundred acre grant. In 1795 he was 
appointed a magistrate and superintendent of government affairs. Marsden's 
evangelical bent lead him to accept the position of local agent for the London 
Missionary Society's Pacific operations in 1804. His frustrations in his dealings 
with the convicts and Aborigines of Parramatta, lead him to turn his attention 
to missionary work in the Pacific.48 
Marsden went to London in 1807 where he put to the Church Missionary 
Society a proposal for establishing a mission in New Zealand. The Society 
supported him and two years later he and the missionary William Hall re-
turned to Sydney in preparation for their journey to New Zealand. After a 
delay of several years Marsden, Hall and Thomas Kendall (who had gone to 
New South Wales later) set sail for New Zealand. On 10 June 1814 Marsden 
and the missionaries arrived in the Bay of Islands to find a small settlement 
already established for them by two Maori chiefs who had lived with Marsden 
in Sydney for a time. The arrival of the missionaries marked the beginning of 
48J. Belich, Making Peoples: A History of the New Zealanders, From Polyneszan Settle-
ment to the End of the Nineteenth Century (Ringwood, 1996) p.134; J. R. Elder, Letters 
and Journals of Samuel Marsden, pp.17-43; G. S. Parsonson, Samuel Marsden entry in Dic-
tionary of New Zealand Biography, updated 4 April 2003; URL: http://www.dnzb.govt.nz, 
cited October 2005. 
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the permanent European settlement of New Zealand.49 
Figure 10.1: 
Samuel Marsden, 1765 - 1838; Source: image taken from: Dictionary of New 
Zealand Biography, URL: http://www.dnzb.govt.nz/dnzb/default.asp. 
Over the next two decades seven more mission stations were established 
(three by Wesleyan and Catholic mi sionary organisations), a printing press 
was constructed and fifty schools built. Out of these schools came fifteen 
hundred students who were taught agricultural and animal husbandry skills 
as well as English. The missionaries also translated the Bible into the local 
dialects. The various missionary groups reported great success in taking their 
Christianity to the Maori. Marsden was able to report to his superiors that the 
permanent presence of the missions in the islands had a very positive impact 
49 G. S. Parsonson, Samuel Marsden entry ; Elder, Letters and Journals of Samuel Mars-
den, 1765- 1838, pp.17- 43. 
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on Maori adaptation to and adoption of European culture. 50 
To be sure, when Marsden arrived in New Zealand Maori-Pakeha relations 
were already well established. Over the course of 130 years between 1642 
and 1772 the coast of New Zealand had been explored by the Dutch, the 
British and the French, though regular contact with the Maori did not occur 
until the end of the eighteenth century. The early explorers viewed the Maori 
very differently from Australian Aborigines. The Maori proved themselves 
to be aggressive warriors. Their cannibalistic rituals furthered their fierce 
reputations. Those who did welcome the explorers, demonstrated an interest 
in their European visitors. Many of the explorers observed villages and farms 
dotted along the New Zealand coastline and from this they perceived that the 
Maori had attained a higher level of "civilisation" than their counterparts in 
other regions of the Pacific.51 
Regular European contact with the Maori began in the 1790s when seals, 
whales and flax (hemp) were discovered. Very quickly, trading relationships 
developed. A frontier exchange economy developed naturally as Pakeha and 
Maori traded in a variety of goods and services including guns, timber, flax, 
pigs, potatoes and sexual services. Contact did not end there. Many Maori 
50Belich, Making Peoples, especially pp. 117-203 & Elder, Letters and Journals of Samuel 
Marsden. 
51see Belich, Making Peoples, especially pp. 117-203 & Elder, Letters and Journals of 
Samuel Marsden for a thorough analysis of the history of Pakeha-Maori relations. 
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men joined the sealing and whaling vessels, whose motley crews included 
adventure-seekers, runaway convicts, and native peoples from other areas of 
the Pacific. A few intrepid individuals found their way into the homes and 
hearts of influential citizens in New South Wales and London (including Mars-
den). These Maori took their knowledge and experience of European culture 
and society back with them to New Zealand where they used it to further 
develop Pakeha-Maori ties. This sporadic and temporary contact had given 
the Maori time to incorp'orate elements of European culture into their own 
without being overwhelmed by it. Hall's and Kendall's presence proved to be 
just one more point of contact for the Maori. 52 
Despite the fact that the Maori had adopted some key habits of their 
"civilised" European counterparts, and that they had developed generally am-
icable and peaceful relations with the Pakeha which had endured long enough 
to support the creation of a solid frontier trading economy, there still prevailed 
the view amongst most missionaries that the Maori were for the most part a 
warlike, godless and lawless people. Europeans who recorded their experiences 
in New Zealand did not hesitate to note the racial and tribal hostilities that 
they encountered. Not comprehending that intertribal rivalry, often result-
ing in warfare, was a natural part of the hierarchy of Maori culture, British 
52Belich, Making Peoples, pp.156-164. 
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Resident, James Busby, spoke of the "frontier chaos" that existed in New 
Zealand. The introduction and booming trade of muskets and ammunition 
served merely to support the duration and intensity of these hostilities, which 
eventually resulted in extended intertribal hostilitl.es amongst tribes of the 
North Island that came to be known as the Musket wars which lasted through 
the 1820s and into the 1830s and took the lives of thousands of Maori. 53 
Pakeha-Maori hostility, however, was very different in nature. When it 
occurred, though often intense, it was always short-lived. Collaboration, rather 
than competition, guided race relations. It was the trade in sex and guns that 
caused the missionaries to perceive chaos. That they could not stem the tide 
of these trades of "sin" left them bitterly frustrated at their lack of control. 
Officials in the Australian colonies and in London, thus, received a picture of a 
land whose people needed "saving" -both from themselves and from derelict 
Pakeha. Ideally, what the missionary societies thus sought was to establish a 
political theocracy where they could control the nature and extent of Pakeha-
Maori contact. 54 
Marsden's vision was to "civilise" the Maori first and then later concentrate 
on their "Christianisation". He discovered quickly that he had a solid base 
53Belich, Making Peoples, pp.156-164. 
54Belich, Making Peoples, pp.127-178; Elder, Letters and Journals of Samuel Marsden, 
p.503. 
CHAPTER 10. THE TREATY OF WAITANGI: AN AUSTRALIAN LEGACY? 388 
from which to begin. The Maori were skilled agriculturalists, shrewd traders 
and open to contact with the European culture. They were also a people who 
had a clear sense of territorial rights. Indeed, Marsden realised, the only thing 
stopping the Maori from rising "above their present unpolished situation" was 
the lack of appropriate "tools of agriculture" . In order to better their lot the 
Maori needed more advanced technology. "If means are adopted to furnish 
them with [iron]", Marsden conjectured, 
then, indeed, their country will soon supply them with all the nee-
essary conveniences and comforts enjoyed in civil society, and as 
their comforts increase so will their wants stimulate their industry 
and lay a solid foundation not only for their civilization and men-
tal improvement in the civil arts but also for the introduction of 
Christianity. 55 
The introduction of Christianity also came easily. 
Regardless that the Maori appeared godless and lawless, Marsden never 
questioned that they retained sovereignty over their territories. Though his 
goal was to raise their level of "civilisation", he assumed that their territorial 
rights were indisputable. Indeed, when he wished to establish a second mission 
station in February 1815 Marsden purchased land from the nephews of the late 
55Elder, Letters and Journals of Samuel Marsden, pp.130 & 166. 
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chief Tippahee "who were the proprietors of the ground who the Europeans at 
present possess." On 24 February, in the presence of chiefs from the Ranghee-
hoo district, for the price of 12 axes, Samuel Marsden signed a deed of sale 
to purchase 200 acres of land from the tribe. "Ahoodee 0 Gunna", Marsden 
wrote in his journal, "one of the chiefs of whom I had purchased the land, 
publicly declared that the land was no longer theirs, but the sole property of 
the white people and was tabooed for their use." 56 
Marsden's efforts did not go unnoticed in official circles. As a colonial offi-
cial in New South Wales he had a close association with the various governors 
under whom he served and through them a voice in London. Indeed, a selec-
tion of his correspondence with the London Missionary Society was presented 
to Thomas Fowell Buxton's 1837 select committee and was printed in the final 
report. His description of the violence between Maori and Pakeha groups had 
a strong impact on the commissioners who, in their report to Parliament, de-
dared that "it is incumbent upon this nation to provide against the repetition 
of outrages so destructive to the natives and so discreditable to the British 
name." 57 
By 1830 it had become clear to Marsden that an official British presence 
was required in New Zealand. His missionaries had been unable to stem the 
56Elder, Letters and Journals of Samuel Marsden, p.123. 
57Report from the Select Committee on Aborigines (British Settlements), 1837, p.16. 
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tide of contact between Pakeha traders and the Maori and he felt forced to 
raise his concerns with New South Wales Governor, Ralph Darling. "Your 
Excellency," he wrote, 
is aware there is not legal authority-civil, military, or naval-to 
restrain the bad conduct of the masters and crews of those ships 
which put into the harbours of New Zealand, nor to notice their 
crimes, however, great; and from the great quantity of arms, pow-
der, and ammunition now in the possession of the natives, there 
is much reason to apprehend that they will at some period redress 
their own wrongs by force of arms if no remedy is provided to do 
them justice.58 
Finding himself in a newly emerging political environment in which some of 
the most powerful members of Parliament were advocating for the acknowl-
edgement and protection of native rights, Marsden seized the opportunity 
to agitate for the British government to take a position with regard to New 
Zealand. Marsden suggested that a military presence, in the form of a warship, 
be stationed in the islands. He also recommended that a Crown official should 
be sent to New Zealand to "notice the misconduct of the Europeans .... " Dar-
ling forwarded Marsden's letter to Goderich, informing him that he intended 
to act upon Marsden's advice and despatch a government representative to 
58Marsden to Darling, 2 August 1830, HRNZ, 1, pp.705-8; Darling to Goderich; 13 April 
1831, HRA, l.16, pp.234-241. 
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New Zealand.59 He appointed James Busby to the position. 
10.4 James Busby 
James Busby was born in Edinburgh in 1801 and moved to New South Wales 
with his father and step-mother in 1824. Busby was granted 2000 acres along 
the Hunter River. He was briefly employed at the Male Orphan School in 
New South Wales. However, his true passion was viticulture and he published 
several books and pamphlets on the practise and art of grape-growing and 
wine-making. In March 1833 James Busby left for New Zealand to begin his 
term as British Resident.60 Busby would be instrumental in paving the way 
for the eventual negotiation of a treaty. While the Resident had no legal 
position with either the British or the Maori populations of New Zealand, it 
was hoped that he could work to "conciliate the good-will of the native chiefs, 
and establish upon a permanent basis the good understanding and confidence 
which it is important to the interests of Great Britain and of this colony to 
perpetuate .... " 
Working closely with the various missions there, it was hoped that Busby 
could help "civilise" the Maori through "the establishment of some system of 
jurisprudence among them." 61 
59 Marsden to Darling, 2 August 1830, HRNZ, 1, pp.705-8; Darling to Goderich; 13 April 
1831, HRA, 16, pp.234-241. 
60J. Davidson, James Busby entry in D. Pike (ed), ADE, 1, pp.186-187. 
61 Bourke to Busby, 13 April 1833 and J. Stephen to J. Backhouse, 12 December 1838, 
CHAPTER 10. THE TREATY OF WAITANGI: AN AUSTRALIAN LEGACY? 392 
Figure 10.2: 
James Busby. Source: Alexander Turnbull Library, National Library of New 
Zealand , picture reference: HC-651 ; image taken from: Dictionary of New 
Zealand Biography, URL: http: //www.dnzb.govt.nz/ dnzb 
Busby would never be able to achieve his full potential as Resident. His 
powers were too limi ted and imprecise for him to have any real authority 
amongst either the Pakeha or Maori. Under the command of New South 
Wales Governor, Richard Bourke, who, for a variety of reasons resented him, 
Busby's efforts were stonewalled at every turn. Nonetheless, Busby was able 
to effect some change, establishing himself as an effective mediator and con-
ciliator between Maori and Pakeha. His greatest successes , however, were 
creating a Maori flag and faci litating the formalisation of their independence 
and sovereignty. 62 
Correspondence with the Secretary of State Relative to New Zealand, BPP, 2, pp.3- 4. 
62 0range, The Treaty of Waitangi, p.14. 
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On 20 March 1834, at the behest of Busby, twenty-five northern chiefs 
gathered on the Resident 's front lawn to select a design for the flag. The flag 
was later officially recognised by the Colonial Office on behalf of the Crown, 
and instructions were sent to the Commissioners of the Admiralty to register 
the design so that it would be identifiable to British Naval forces in foreign 
ports.63 
Figure 10.3: 
The flag of the United Tribes of ew Zealand, 1834; Source: image taken 
from: http: //www.mch.govt .nz/ nzflag/ history / united-flag2. html. 
The following year, on 28 October 1835, with two English missionaries and 
two English traders as witnesses, thirty-five northern chiefs gathered, again 
at Waitangi , to ratify a "Declaration of the Independence of New Zealand." 
The declaration, which Busby had drafted in response to what appeared to be 
French interest in the region, specified that 
63 Bourke to Stanley, and Aberdeen to Bourke, HRA, I.17, p.412 & 608- 609. 
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[a]ll sovereign power and authority within the territories of the 
United Tribes of New Zealand is hereby declared to reside entirely 
and exclusively in the hereditary chiefs and heads of tribes in their 
collective capacity, who also declare that they will not permit any 
legislative authority separate from themselves in their collective 
capacity to exist, nor any function of government to be exercised 
within the said territory, unless by persons appointed by them, 
and acting under the authority of laws regularly enacted by them 
in congress assembled. 64 
Busby certified that the document was authentic and sent it to the Colonial 
Office attached to a despatch detailing the proceedings. On 17 August 1835, 
Goderich approved the declaration. 65 
Two years later Busby made his case for this recognition to be made official. 
"Whatever acts approaching to acts of sovereignty or government have been 
exercised in the country," he wrote to Governor Bourke, 
have been exercised by these chiefs in their individual capacity 
as relates to their own people and in their collective capacity as 
relates to their negotiations with the British Government, the only 
Government with which the chiefs or people of New Zealand have 
64Report of the House of Lords Committee of 1838, BPP, pp.179, 245-6 in Elder, Letters 
and Journals of Samuel Marsden, 1765-1838, pp.510-512. 
65 Church Missionary Register, 1834, p.553; New South Wales Government Gazette of 
1835, pp.580-. 
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had any relations of a diplomatic character. 66 
As to the Declaration of Independence, Busby asserted that 
the Articles of Confederation having centralized the powers of sov-
ereignty exercised both de jure and de facto by the several chiefs, 
and having established and declared the basis of a constitution of 
government founded upon the union of those powers of the state as 
declared by its constitution of government founded upon the union 
of those powers, I cannot, I think, greatly err in assuming that 
the congress of chiefs, the depositing of the powers of the state as 
declared by its constitution, is competent to become a party to a 
treaty with a foreign power. 67 
Historian John Ross argues that Busby pressured the Bay of Island chiefs 
to sign the Declaration of Independence for purely personal reasons. In 1823 
the French naval officer, Baron de Theiry, had purchased land from a Maori 
group and was considering establishing a French out-station in New Zealand. 
de Theiry returned to New Zealand in October 1835 intent on taking possession 
of his purchase. Alarmed, Busby immediately gathered the local chiefs and 
66Busby to Bourke, 16 June 1837 in Correspondence with the Secretary of State Relative 
to New Zealand, p.8 
67Busby to Bourke, 16 June 1837 in Correspondence with the Secretary of State Relative 
to New Zealand, p.8. 
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convinced them to officially proclaim themselves as a congress of the "United 
'Ifibes of New Zealand." 68 
Ross argues that de Thierry's threat was not nearly as serious as the Res-
ident suggested and that Busby's later inaction verifies this. Busby failed to 
enact legislation to ratify the terms of the Declaration and, even though he did 
collect signatures from eighteen more chiefs over the next three years, Busby 
made no attempt to obtain signatures from any southern tribes. Indeed, when 
de Thierry settled on the west coast of the North Island in Hokianga, Busby 
paid little attention to the Frenchman's activities finding that "there was not 
much ground for apprehension of any serious mischief." 69 
So why did Busby act, as Ross describes, "so curiously out of character" ?70 
Ross argues that the answer lies with the appointment of Thomas McDonnell, 
a timber dealer and land speculator in the Hokianga district, as Additional 
Resident in August 1835. Ross maintains that Busby resented McDonnell and 
his activities amongst British settlers in the Hokianga district. Busby felt 
that McDonnell had overstepped the bounds of his authority when, with the 
aid of local Hokianga chiefs, he enacted a law prohibiting the importation or 
68J. Ross, "Busby and the Declaration of Independence", The New Zealand Journal of 
History 14.1 (1980), pp.83-84; de Thierry to Bathurst, 2 December 1823, Historical Records 
of New Zealand, v.1, pp.614-618; Bourke to Glenelg, 9 September 1837 in Stephen to Back-
house, 12 December 1838, Correspondence with the Secretary of State Relative to New 
Zealand, p.9. 
69 J. Ross, "Busby and the Declaration of Independence", pp.83-86. 
70 J. Ross, "Busby and the Declaration of Independence", p.86. 
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sale of liquor in that district. 71 Feeling his own authority threatened, Busby 
pushed for a Maori Declaration of Independence which would thus nullify 
the liquor laws and undermined McDonnell's position amongst the Hokianga 
chiefs. Consequently, "far from being the inspired document Busby claimed it 
to be or even an instrument to deter Thierry" , Ross further argues that 
the Declaration of Independence was merely a measure, hastily con-
ceived and executed, to circumvent McDonnell and his Honkianga 
liquor law on the grounds that it did not derive from the authority 
of the assembled chiefs; a weapon, in brief, in what had become a 
ridiculous vendetta with McDonnell. 72 
Nonetheless, despite the reasons why Busby went to the effort to have 
a Declaration of Independence created, Normanby's instructions to Captain 
Hobson two years later, directing him to take possession of New Zealand, 
clearly demonstrate that the British Government acknowledged the Maori flag 
and Declaration of Independence as legitimate. The northern Maori, Nor-
manby stated, "whose title to the soil and to the sovereignty of New Zealand 
is indisputable ... has been solemnly recognized by the British Government." 73 
Thus, regardless of the motivation behind his hasty actions, Busby played a 
71 Ross, "Busby and the Declaration of Independence", p.87. 
72Ross, "Busby and the Declaration of Independence", p.88. 
73Normanby to Hobson, 14 August 1839 in Correspondence with the Secretary of State 
Relative to New Zealand, pp.37. 
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pivotal role in facilitating the eventual negotiation of the Treaty of Waitangi. 
10.5 The Humanitarians 
By the end of the eighteenth century the movement to end slavery had gained 
momentum throughout Britain and Europe. Supported by Britain's Prime 
Minister, William Pitt, the influential parliamentarian and humanitarian, William 
Wilberforce, led the way in agitating for legislative change. The year that the 
First Fleet arrived in Botany Bay, the Privy Council established a Committee 
for the Abolition of Slavery. Wilberforce's efforts early on were frustrated by 
powerful parliamentarians who agitated as diligently to maintain and support 
the slave trade. A series of abolition bills presented to Parliament failed. A 
decade after the abolition movement had begun the slave trade still prospered. 
Each year 50,000 slaves were being shipped to the Americas and by 1806 the 
number of slaves in the British empire had actually increased by twenty-five 
percent.74 
Wilberforce did not relent. The early years of the nineteenth century saw 
a new mood emerging in the British parliament-a mood that was sympa-
thetic to the abolitionists' ambitions. In 1804 Wilberforce presented a bill-his 
74H. Thomas, The Slave Trade: The History of the Atlantic Slave Trade: 1440-1870 
(London, 1997), pp. 448-556. 
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fourth- to the House of Commons and this t ime it passed. By 1806 economic 
as well as moral arguments emerged in support of abolit ion because the slave 
market had been saturated. 1807, thus, saw the passing into law of an abolit ion 
bill that outlawed the trading of slaves throughout the British empire. 75 
Figure 10.4: 
William Wilberforce, humanitarian and anti-slavery activist; Source: image 
taken from URL: http:/www.wmcarey.edu/ carey /portraits/wilberforce.jpg. 
By the mid-1820s many in the humanitarian movement had come to realise 
that improving slaves' conditions was not enough. Real justice, they felt , could 
not be realised until the institut ion was abolished altogether. In 1833 the anti-
slavery movement finally achieved success when the House of Commons passed 
a motion emancipating all British slaves. A year later slavery in the British 
75Thomas, The Slave Trade: The History of the Atlantic Slave Trade: 1440- 1870, pp. 
448- 556. 
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colonies was illegal. This was to be a posthumous victory for Wilberforce 
who had died in 1821. Leadership of the anti-slavery movement devolved to 
Thomas Fowell Buxton. 76 
Figure 10.5: 
Thomas Fowell Buxton, Source: image taken from URL: 
www.anti-slaverysociety.addr.com/campaigns.htm. 
Thomas Fowell Buxton was a notable philanthropist , humanitarian and 
parliamentarian. A stalwart member of the Church Missionary Society (he 
had converted to an evangelical faith as an adult and married into a Quaker 
family) , Buxton concerned himself with three issues during his adult life: slav-
ery, prison reform, and the treatment of native groups. While focussing on 
76 R. Blackburn, The Overthrow of Colonial Slavery, 1776-1848 (London, 1988) , Chapters 
4 & 8; G. M. Trevelyan, British History in the Nineteenth Century and After (1782- 1919) 
(London, 1983), pp.252- 253; J.S . Watson, The Reign of George III, 1706- 1815 (Oxford, 
1960), pp.440- 441; William Wilberforce entry in L. Stephen & S. Lee (eds. ), The Dictionary 
of National Biography (London , 1917), pp.208- 216. 
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the plight of slaves, it had become apparent to Buxton that the deleterious ef-
fects of British colonisation activities on native groups throughout the colonies 
had been ignored for too long. Though colonial governors had always been in-
structed to protect and preserve the native groups for whom they were respon-
sible, the reality was that it had been tacitly accepted that Aboriginal groups 
throughout the British empire would inevitably fall sacrifice to the activities 
that followed settlement and economic development. By 1834 Buxton realised 
that the Aboriginal question needed to be comprehensively examined. Native 
land rights, he quickly concluded, were at the core of the issue: "What have 
we Christians done for them?" he wrote in a meditation, 
[w]e have usurped their lands, kidnapped, enslaved, and murdered 
themselves. The greatest of their crimes is that they sometimes 
trespass into the lands of their forefathers; and the very greatest 
of their misfortunes is that they have ever become acquainted with 
Christians. 77 
In a letter to his friend and colleague Reverend Dr John Phillip, then super-
intendent of the London Missionary Society and the man who had, in fact, 
agitated for Buxton to act on the native question, Buxton explained his con-
cern. "In order to do justice" he wrote, "we must admit ... that the natives 
77C. Buxton (ed.), Memoirs of Sir Thomas Fawell Buxton, bart (London, 1855), p.301. 
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have a right to their own lands ... " Buxton needed to know two things: "what 
encroachments we have made on their property[?]" and "what are the most 
judicious modes of securing to them some portion of their own land, and giving 
them an equivalent for their losses and sufferings ... [?]" After agitating for an 
official examination of the issue, Buxton was given the responsibility of head-
ing a parliamentary committee to enquire into the matter. One of his charges 
was to determine how the home government could better "secure to [native 
groups] the due observance of justice and the protection of their rights." He re-
leased his report to the House of Commons in two parts in 1836 and 1837. His 
findings, not surprisingly, had a profound effect on the formulation of native 
policy in the colonies thereafter. 78 
The Colonial Office was particularly interested in the committee's findings. 
At an official level, the report's recommendations would have a direct effect 
on native policy-making in the future. More significantly, it was released at a 
time when the Colonial Office had appointed a number of new recruits. Many 
senior officials in the Colonial Office were individuals dedicated to seeing the 
objectives of the humanitarian movement effected. 
Lord Glenelg (Charles Grant) was the Secretary of State for the Colonies 
78Buxton (ed.), Memoirs of Sir Thomas Fawell Buxton, bart, p.301; Report from the 
Select Committee on Aborigines (British Settlements), 1837, p.3; A.F. Walls, "Buxton, 
Thomas Fowell, 1786 to 1844, Evangelical", International Bulletin of Missionary Research, 
15.2, 1991, pp.74-78. 
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for most of the latter half of the 1830s. During his tenure he worked vigor-
ously towards implementing more effective protectionist native policies in the 
colonies. His successor, the liberal minded, often politically contentious Mar-
quis of Normanby (Constantine Henry Phipps) continued Glenelg's work to 
ensure the effecting of the Treaty of Waitangi. 79 
Figure 10.6: 
G.F. Watt's Sir James Stephen, 1863; Source: Leslie Stephen's, The Life of 
Sir James Fitzjames Stephen, Bart. , K. C.S.I: a Judge of the High Court of 
Justice; image taken from http: //www.heritage.nf.ca/society / . 
James Stephen came to be arguably the most influential public servant to 
serve in the Colonial Office in the nineteenth century. He assumed the position 
of Permanent U ndersecretary to the Colonial Office in 1836 and quickly became 
a guiding force in colonial policy-making. He was a deeply religious man whose 
car er was guided by his devotion to evangelical and humanitarian causes. 
Stephen dedicated his career to aiding the plight of underprivileged British 
79 Charles Grant (Lord Glenelg) and Constantine Henry Phipps (Marquis of Normanby) 
entries, L. Stephen & S. Lee (eds.), Dictionary of National Biography (London, 1917). 
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subjects and especially native groups. He worked to end slavery in the British 
colonies and then, after the institution was abolished, he worked to ensure that 
the new laws protecting ex-slaves were implemented and upheld. Appointed 
as the permanent legal advisor in 1825, Stephen's tenure in the Colonial Office 
approximated that of Arthur's in Van Diemen's Land and it was a close and 
supportive relationship that the two shared. 80 
In the antipodean colonies, the most prominent British humanitarian and 
government official was Governor Arthur. A self-confessed "perfect Wilber-
force as to slavery" he was active and dedicated to the movement's causes. 
Like Stephen, his evangelical faith, combined with an interest in the welfare 
of slaves and native groups, established during his time as Superintendent of 
Honduras from 1812 to 1823, led him to take a personal interest in slaves and 
Aborigines.81 
80Stephen, who was a personal friend of Governor Arthur, took an interest in Arthur's 
management of the affairs of Van Diemen's Land. Stephen supported Arthur's bid to sepa-
rate Van Diemen's Land from New South Wales; and gave the governor his full support on 
the issue of limiting free press in a convict colony. When Arthur feared that he would be 
recalled midway through his tenure in Van Diemen's Land, it was Stephen who set his mind 
at ease. It was Stephen to whom the often harried governor turned when he needed personal 
support; see ShawSir George Arthur, bart, Chapters 4, 5 & 6; for more general discussions 
of Stephen's activities see James Stephen entry, L. Stephen & S. Lee (eds.), Dictionary 
of National Biography (London, 1917); P. Knaplund, "Mr. Oversecretary Stephen", The 
Journal of Modern History, 1.1 (1929), pp.40-66; H. T. Manning, "Who Ran the British 
Empire, 1830-1850?", Journal of British Studies, 5.1 (1965), pp. 88-121; The Journal of 
Modern History, 13.1 (1941), pp.19-35; P. Knaplund, James Stephen and the British Colo-
nial System, 1813-1841 (Madison, 1953), P. Knapland, "Sir James Stephen: The Friend of 
the Negroes", Journal of Negro History, 35.4 (1950), pp.368-407. 
81 During his time in Van Diemen's Land, however, Arthur was not directly concerned 
with the slavery issue. Issues regarding slavery as they might have related to convicts as 
unpaid labourers was an issue of controversy for some. Nonetheless, Arthur did not struggle 
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10.6 Buxton's Select Committee on Aborig-
. 1nes 
Buxton released the final report from the Select Committee on Aborigines 
(British Settlements) to the House of Commons on 26 June 1837. The corn-
mittee had been charged with determining 
.... what measures ought to be adopted with regard to the native 
inhabitants of countries where British settlements are made, and 
to the neighbouring tribes, in order to secure to them the due 
observance of justice and the protection of their rights .... 82 
This was the first comprehensive investigation of its kind to be carried 
out by the British parliament since Australia had been settled by Britain. 
Its findings had a lasting impact on many areas of colonial administration 
and politics and some important policy changes followed as a result. Most 
significantly the report gave an official voice to the view that indigenous groups 
with it for he believed that one's incarceration was a reflection of a temporary lapse in 
judgement rather that a reflection of one's character. Arthur felt that every man or woman 
who was a convict was merely moving through a process of social restitution where they 
were paying dues for their offences against the Crown and could ultimately return to society 
rehabilitated. For Arthur, the humanitarian, the important issue was the calamitous impact 
of settlement on the Aborigines (as individuals, if not as a society). To this end, he invested 
a great deal of energy attempting to protect the rights of his native wards. (For a discussion 
of Arthur's life from his time in British Honduras through to his governorship of Upper 
Canada see A.G.L. Shaw's, Sir George Arthur, bart). 
82Report From the Select Committee on Aborigines (British Settlements), 1837, p.3. 
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had rights to the lands upon which they resided. 
From the outset Buxton's committee admitted the failure of the British 
government to consider the situation it had created not only for the native 
peoples in its colonies, but also those settlers to whom these new lands were 
being opened. It determined that many British laws regarding colonisation 
were contradictory and fraught with injustice, that 
while Acts of Parliament have laid down the general principles of 
equity, other and conflicting Acts have been framed, disposing of 
lands without any reference to the possessors and actual occupants, 
and without making any reserve of the proceeds of the property of 
the natives for their benefit. [T]he intercourse of Europeans in 
general without any exception in favour of the subjects of Great 
Britain, had been ... a source of many calamities to uncivilised na-
tions .... 
Quoting Bishop Broughton directly, the committee lamented that the Aborig-
ines of Australia had suffered most acutely: "They do not so much retire as 
decay ... they appear to wear out, and gradually to decay: they diminish in 
numbers; they appear actually to vanish from the face of the earth." This was 
the case because, as the committee reported, 
[t]oo often their territory has been usurped; their property seized; 
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their numbers diminished; their character debased; the spread of 
civilization impeded. European vices and diseases have been in-
traduced amongst them, and they have been familiarized with the 
use of our most potent instruments for the subtle or the violent 
destruction of human life, viz, brandy and gunpowder. 83 
The commissioners concluded that 
[i]t might be presumed that the natives inhabitants of any land have 
an incontrovertible right to their own soil: a plain and sacred right, 
however, which seems not to have been understood. Europeans 
have entered their borders uninvited, and, when there, have not 
only acted as if they were undoubted lords of the soil, but have 
punished the natives as aggressors if they have evinced a disposition 
to live in their own country. 
If they have been found upon their own property, they have been 
treated as thieves and robbers. They are driven back into the 
interior as if they were dogs or kangaroos. 84 
The committee concluded that the Australian Aborigines were the "most 
degraded of the human race" and that, indeed, " ... intercourse with Europeans 
83Report from the Select Committee on Aborigines (British Settlements), 1836, pp. 1, 4, 
5, 10 & 11. 
84Report from the Select Committee on Aborigines (British Settlements), 1837, p.6. 
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has cast over their original debasement a yet deeper shade of wretchedness." 
The committee reflected on Bishop Broughton's evidence. Like Commissioner 
Bigge who, twelve years earlier, had concluded that the "black population 
will undergo a gradual diminution in proportion to the advances of the white 
population into the interior", Broughton lamented that the utter debasement 
of his Aboriginal wards had led to the situation where, "it does not appear 
that the territorial rights of the natives were considered, and very little care 
has since been taken to protect them from the violence or the contamination 
of the dregs of our countrymen." Indeed, 
so entirely destitute are they even of the rudest forms of civil polity, 
that their claims, whether as sovereigns or proprietors of the soil, 
have been utterly disregarded. The land has been taken from them 
without the assertion of any other title than that of superior num-
bers ... 85 
Having been presented with a vivid picture of race relations in New South 
Wales and Van Diemen's Land, the committee concluded that it had been a 
wise decision by Governor Arthur to remove the Aborigines of Van Diemen's 
Land from the island. Evidence presented to the committee reflected that 
85J. T. Bigge, Report on Agriculture and Trade in New South Wales (London, 1823), p.83; 
Report from the Select Committee on Aborigines (British Settlements), 1837, pp. 10-11 & 
82. 
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the Aborigines appeared to be content with their lot on Flinders Island. The 
colonists were certainly relieved that hostilities had come to an end. The select 
committee recommended that voluntary removal, such as Arthur had effected, 
should, where appropriate, be undertaken in other colonies. Nonetheless, the 
commissioners deeply regretted that the events predicted by Sir George Murray 
when he spoke of the possible extinction of the Aboriginal people and the 
"indelible stain upon the British Government" that it would leave, was a very 
real possibility.86 
Ultimately, the Buxton committee concluded that in other British ter-
ritories a "system of dealing with the rights of natives" needed to be im-
plemented." 87 The committee outlined the variety of relationships that had 
formed between colonial governments and native groups: from independent 
self-sufficient indigenous groups operating alongside British colonists, to groups 
that allowed themselves to be protected by Great Britain but who contin-
ued to effect their own laws and customs, to those groups who had become 
completely dependant upon, managed by and vulnerable to a colonial govern-
ment.88 The committee's recommendations reflected the patriarchal position 
that the Crown had assumed since the beginning of its colonising days. 
86Report from the Select Committee on Aborigines (British Settlements), 1837, p.14. 
87Report from the Select Committee on Aborigines (British Settlements), 1837, p.75. 
88Report from the Select Committee on Aborigines (British Settlements), 1837, p.76. 
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Though indigenous land rights were acknowledged, the commissioners re-
sisted the idea that native groups could and should be considered independent 
sovereign nations akin to other European powers. At best they were more 
like Chief Justice Marshall's "domestic dependent nations." 89 As such, the 
committee staunchly opposed the utilisation of treaties. Though many wit-
nesses brought before the committee were in favour of the use of treaties, the 
commissioners still concluded that they were not an effective tool to manage 
race relations. They considered that, rather than being "securities for peace,'' 
treaties had evolved into devices used to apologise for past wrongs. Treaties 
had become mechanisms by which foreign powers could continue to justify 
their mistreatment of indigenous groups. "As often as the resentment or the 
cupidity of the more powerful body may be excited,'' the committee wrote, 
"a ready pretext for complaint will be found in the ambiguity of the language 
in which their agreements must be drawn up, and in the superior sagacity 
which the Europeans will exercise in framing, in interpreting, and in evad-
ing them." The committee, thus, recommended that the official status qua be 
maintained; that policies based on the Christianization and civilization of in-
digenous groups be continued. The eventual integration of Aboriginal groups 
into the European societies in the colonies, rather than their separation from 
89see Chapter 2 for a discussion of the Marshall trilogy and 'domestic dependent nations'. 
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them, thus remained the aim.90 
The resolution of the current problems, the committee therefore main-
tained, lay in the adoption of more precise protectionist policies. If the civil 
and human rights of indigenous groups could be protected, and their physical 
well-being maintained, then more long term successes could be realised.91 
90Report from the Select Committee on Aborigines (British Settlements), 1837, p.80. 
91Very soon after the Buxton's report was released to the colonial governments, New South 
Wales governor, George Gipps, found himself acting upon the latest directive from Secretary 
Glenelg. Britain's native wards, Glenelg articulated, are "subjects of the Queen, and as 
within Her Majesty's allegiance". Their right to be protected by the colonial government, 
he proclaimed, was "derive[d] the highest possible claim from the sovereignty which has 
been assumed over the whole of their ancient possessions". The colonial governors in the 
Australian colonies, however, was still operating within the bounds of the legal reality, 
established in 1788 and reiterated by Stephen, in 1820 that " ... the colony was acquired 
neither by conquest or cession, but by the mere occupation of a desert or uninhabited 
land." While Gipps' focus was on the former, it was the within the pale of the latter which 
many colonial settlers still acted. To this end, the massacre of a group of Aborigines at Myall 
Creek, 350 miles north of Sydney, and the colonial government's response to it, reflected 
that while much had changed, much still remained very much the same. 
On the evening of Sunday 10 June 1838, in retaliation for the spearing of their cattle, 
eleven stockman from the Myall Creek area rounded up and killed a group of twenty-eight 
Aborigines camped on the property of Henry Dangar. The stockmen later returned to the 
site and burned the bodies. William Hobbs, superintendent at Dangar's station, reported the 
incident to Dangar who passed on the details to authorities in Sydney. At the end of June a 
magistrate was dispatched to Myall Creek to investigate the case. Eleven of the twelve men 
known to be involved were located, arrested and taken to Sydney. On 15 November they were 
tried for the murders of six of the twenty-eight massacred. Though a number of witnesses 
testified against the stockmen, providing specific evidence about the events surrounding 
the massacre, the jury, nonetheless, found that insufficient evidence existed to determine 
guilt and the accused were acquitted. The Attorney-General immediately arraigned seven 
of the eleven accused and brought further charges against them. On 27 November, they 
were tried for the murder of three of the Aboriginal children not named in the previous 
suit. Though the stock keepers were represented by prominent attorneys and though the 
description of the children was vague, this time the jury found for the prosecution. So 
controversial was the finding that memorialists-including the judge who presided over the 
first case-sent a petition to Gipps pleading for clemency for the prisoners. The colonial 
government stood its ground. The verdict was upheld by the unanimous decision of three 
other Supreme Court judges. The Executive Council concurred and the death sentence was 
imposed. On 18 December 1838 the seven men were hanged. Gipp's handling of the case 
met with "unqualified approbation" from the Colonial Office now headed by the Marquis 
of Normanby, the man who would usher in the Treaty of Waitangi; see Bourke to Arthur, 
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The select committee consequently supported the establishment of Arthur's 
Aboriginal protectorates in all colonies. Protectors, the committee recom-
mended, should be employed to educate their wards, prosecute crimes by and 
against them and generally act as a support for the Aboriginal groups with 
whom they worked. 92 
10.7 Private Enterprise and Colonisation 
Having heard of the failure of an ill-planned land bartering scheme imple-
mented at Swan River in Western Australia,93 Edward Gibbon Wakefield ini-
tiated a "scientific" plan in 1830 to establish a private colony in what is now 
the State of South Australia. His idea was to make lands available, at a fixed 
price, to British citizens who were interested in emigrating to the Australian 
17 December 1831, in Arthur to Horwick, 19 January 1832, C.O. 280/33, PRO Reel 250; J. 
Stephen, "Validity of Statute, 20 George II, c.19, in the Colony", HRA, IV.I, p.414; Glenelg 
to Bourke, 26 July 1837, Correspondence Relating to the Massacre of Various Aborigines 
and to the Trial of their Murders, British Parliamentary Papers, 1839 (526), XXXIV, p.3. 
92Report from the Select Committee on Aborigines (British Settlements), 1837, pp. 83-85. 
93In 1826 a group of 800 English emigrants led by Captain James Stirling settled on the 
west coast of Australia on what was then known as Swan River. The English emigrants had 
been attracted to the new colony by reports of its beauty as well as by a land settlement 
scheme that promised them great wealth and prosperity. The plan involved bartering goods 
for land. The scheme promised that for every £3 worth property taken to the new colony 
40 acres of land would be granted. However, it failed miserably. By 1830 the Swan River 
settlement had attracted only 1000 settlers. The land was barren and neither crops nor 
livestock could survive. Labourers taken out as "assets" often abandoned their masters; the 
livestock wandered off; those who were able to return to England, did so. Wakefield used the 
disaster as a lesson in what not to do; see P. Borroughs, Britain and Australia, 1831-1855: 
A Study in Imperial Relations and Crown Lands Administration (Oxford, 1967), p.169. 
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colonies. The infrastructure of colony, Wakefield determined , could be <level-
oped with the funds provided by the sale of lands and by importing low-cost 
labour from the British working classes.94 
Figure 10.7: 
Edward Gibbon Wakefield ; Source : Alexander Turnbull Library, ational 
Library of New Zealand , picture reference: A-042-02 ; image taken from : 
Dictionary of New Zealand Biography, URL: http: //www.dnzb .govt .nz/ dnzb 
When he was released from Newgate Prison in 1830, after serving a sentence 
for abducting an heiress,95 Wakefield formed the National Colonisation Society 
and was the force behind the founding of the South Australian Association. 
94 G. Tuegarthen, Australasia: New South Wales, Tasmania, Western Australia, South 
Australia, Victoria, Queensland, New Zealand (London, 1895), pp.276- 285; see E.G. Wake-
field , A Letter from Sydney, the Principal Town of Australasia: fj Other Writings on Col-
onization by Edward Gibbon Wakefield (London, 1929). This was a series of letters ent to 
London's Morning Chronicle by an anonymous author later identified as Wakefield. Though 
he claims to have written the letters from Sydney, in fact he wrote the fictitious letters while 
he was incarcerated. 
95 Wakefield convinced a school girl to elope with him to Europe. However, becau e he was 
t ill a minor the marriage was considered unlawful and was annulled by an act of parliament. 
Wakefield was charged with abducting a minor; see P. Temple, A Sort of Conscience: The 
Wakefields, Chapter 12. 
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Wakefield's goal was to systematically colonise South Australia (beginning 
at Spencer's Gulf) with British immigrants who, with their cheap imported 
labour, would purchase lands in the new colony and settle there. Land prices 
would be set high enough to attract a class of investors beyond the speculator 
and squatter. The revenues produced would fund the administration of the 
new settlement. Wakefield felt that for the colony to be successful it essentially 
needed to be free of interference by the British government. In May 1831 a 
proposal to settle Spencer's Gulf was presented to the Colonial Office. 96 
Not willing to sanction the creation of a pseudo-republic by private en-
terprise in a British colony, the Colonial Office repeatedly vetoed proposals 
received from the South Australian Association. Wakefield persevered and 
over the next few years continued to present to successive Colonial Secre-
taries revisions of the scheme. Finally in April 1834 Lord Stanley gave the 
association approval to settle lands in the Spencer's Gulf region. Though, in 
the words of Wakefield biographer, Phillip Temple, "[m]any suspected it was 
a get-rich-quick plan for its promoters" ,97 still the South Australia Bill was 
quickly pushed through both the House of Lords and the House of Commons 
and received royal assent in August 1834. The South Australian Act of 1834 
96 M Fairburn, Edward Gibbon Wakefield entry in Dictionary of New Zealand Biography, 
updated 7 July 2005, URL: http://www.dnzb.govt.nz/, cited October 2005; P. Temple, A 
Sort of Conscience: The Wakefields. 
97P. Temple, A Sort of Conscience: The Wakefields, p.157. 
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which followed was essentially a blueprint by which the new colony would be 
established and run. The cost of founding the colony would be borne by a 
semi-independent body of commissioners, but political control would be re-
main with a colonial governor whose officials who would be appointed by the 
Crown. The first settlers arrived in Spencer's Gulf to take up their holdings 
in 1836.98 
A central concern of the Colonial Office was that Aboriginal groups were 
protected. Statesmen including Buxton, Stephen, and Secretaries of State, 
Spring Rice and Glenelg, all feared that the rights of the Aborigines would be 
compromised by the desires of the land-hungry. James Stephen wondered how 
the boundaries of the new colony would be established "with any due regard 
to the rights of the present Proprietors of the Soil or rulers of the country." 99 
Buxton's committee noted that the South Australia Act had failed to consider 
the rights of the native peoples of the new colony and that the South Aus-
tralian legislation had completely failed to make "reference to the possessors 
and actual occupants" of the region. Before his resignation, Spring Rice, an 
avid Buxton supporter, wrote to the commissioners instructing them to take 
98P. Burroughs, Britain and Australia 1831-1855 (Oxford, 1967), pp.167-184; P. Bloom-
field, Edward Gibbon Wakefield: Builder of the British Commonwealth (London, 1961), 
pp.119-143; D. Jaensch (ed.), The Flinders History of South Australia (Adelaide, 1986), 
pp.11-12; P. Temple, A Sort of Conscience: The Wakefields; E.G. Wakefield, A Letter from 
Sydney, the Principal Town of Australasia. 
99Stephen memo in Torrens to Grey, December 1835 correspondence quoted in Reynolds, 
Law of the Land, p.106. 
CHAPTER 10. THE TREATY OF WAITANGI: AN AUSTRALIAN LEGACY? 416 
possession of only those lands which were not occupied by Aboriginal groups. 
Though reference to the protection of Aboriginal rights did not appear in the 
South Australia Act of 1834, the Letters Patent of February 1836 declared that 
nothing in the laws of South Australia "shall affect or be construed to affect 
the rights of any Aboriginal Natives of the said Province to the actual occupa-
tion or enjoyment in their own persons or in the persons of their descendants 
of any lands therein now actually occupied or enjoyed by such natives." 100 
The South Australian commissioners replied that they had a scheme for 
"securing to the natives their proprietary rights to the soil, wherever such right 
may be found to exist." Paying lip service to the Colonial Office's instructions, 
the commissioners reported that they planned to purchase lands from those 
groups who were found to be in possession of any regions that were to be settled 
by Wakefield's immigrants. To further ameliorate the Colonial Office, the 
commissioners also announced that they planned to set aside twenty percent 
of the proceeds from the sale of lands to fund schemes to protect and promote 
the welfare of the Aborigines. The proposal-essentially a smokescreen to 
appease Whitehall until South Australia was settled-was never implemented. 
Wakefield and his men had little interest in compromising their profits in an 
attempt to protect Aboriginal land rights. Indeed in a letter to Glenelg, Robert 
100Report from the Select Committee on Aborigines (British Settlements), 1837, p. 12; 
H. Reynolds, The Law of the Land, pp.103-107, Letters Patent Establishing the Province of 
South Australia, 19 February 1836, State Records of South Australia, GRG 2/64. 
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Torrens, chairman of the Colonization Commission for South Australia, at one 
point argued against the need to consider native land rights at all because 
colonial precedent had established that the Aborigines of Australia were not 
at "that stage of social improvement in which a proprietary right to the soil 
exists." 101 
Aboriginal-settler hostility inevitably followed as settlement spread and 
race relations on the frontier remained unchecked. Despite the appointment 
of Aboriginal protectors in 1838 to "protect ... [the Aborigines'] ... enjoyment 
of proprietary rights to such lands as may be occupied by them in any special 
manner" the scheme's authors could not report success.102 
By 1836 Wakefield had turned his attention to New Zealand, considering 
it to be "the fittest in the world for colonisation ... the most beautiful country 
with the finest climate, and the most productive soil." Wakefield had a num-
ber of challenges facing him. The Colonial Office had been overhauled and 
accountability amongst colonial government officials in the colonies increased 
considerably. Buxton's recommendations, moreover, made clear how native 
101N. Love, "Edward Gibbon Wakefield: A Maori Perspective" in Edward Gibbon Wakefield 
and the Colonial Dream: A Reconsideration (Wellington, 1997), pp.3-10; J. Martin, "The 
Foundation of South Australia" in D. Jaensch (ed.), The Flinders History of South Australia 
(Adelaide, 1986), pp.11-12; H. Reynolds, The Law of the Land, pp.106; C.D. Rowley, The 
Destruction of Aboriginal Society (Ringwood, 1978), pp.74-85. 
102This will be discussed in more detail below. 
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groups were to be treated and with this ringing in the ears of the decision-
makers to whom Wakefield was appealing, this was something that the en-
trepreneur knew he must heed if he was to succeed in his latest venture. 103 
However, Wakefield was much better prepared this time. The members of 
his New Zealand Association-the organisation that would prepare the way 
for the settlement of New Zealand-"comprise[d] a more influential body than 
that which founded South Australia." Moreover, he took into account that 
he must accommodate not just the Colonial Office but, more importantly, 
the Maori whom he recognised were "not savages, but a people capable of 
civilization." 104 
In March 1839, Standish Motte, a representative of the New Zealand Col-
onization Company, of which Wakefield was a member, wrote to the Secretary 
of State-now the Marquis of N ormanby-asking for the Colonial Office to 
sanction and support its plans to establish a new colony in New Zealand. 
Motte informed Normanby that the company had received Glenelg's approval 
and was now waiting on a bill to be passed before Parliament. Motte relayed 
that the company had a vessel ready to sail and that land had already been 
purchased from a number of Maori groups in New Zealand. Over the next 
103N. Love, "Edward Gibbon Wakefield: A Maori Perspective", pp.3-10. 
104E.G. Wakefield quoted in P. Temple, A Sort of Conscience: The Wakefields, p.190. 
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month communication passed between the Colonial Office and the company 
and on several occasions representatives for each met. Each time the company 
asked for London's sanction and each time the Colonial Office refused.105 
On 1 May, hearing that a company ship was about to set sail, Normanby 
wrote a strongly worded communication to one of the directors, William Hutt, 
making very clear the Colonial Office's position. Normanby stated that His 
Majesty's government in no way sanctioned the proceedings and that London 
would not acknowledge "proprietary titles to land" purchased from or granted 
by Maori groups. Any such purchases would be annulled once New Zealand 
came under British sovereignty and title to all lands acquired thus would be-
come Crown land. The ship set sail anyway. 106 
Ultimately, however, the resistance of the Colonial Office to seemingly every 
plan and proposal presented by Wakefield or his associates finally took its toll. 
Wakefield withdrew his support of the New Zealand Association and its plans 
for settling a new colony in lieu of a more promising future with his political 
patron, Lord Durham, in Canada.107 
105Motte to Normanby, 4 March 1839, Correspondence with the Secretary of State Relative 
to New Zealand, BPP, London, 1840, pp.20-21. 
106Henry Labouchere to William Hutt, 1 May 1839, Correspondence with the Secretary of 
State Relative to New Zealand, BPP, London, 1840, pp.27-28. 
107P. Temple, A Sort of Conscience: The Wakefields, p.207-208. 
CHAPTER 10. THE TREATY OF WAITANGI: AN AUSTRALIAN LEGACY? 420 
Though Wakefield's difficulties with the Colonial Office reflect an interest-
ing story of the struggle between private and public colonizing interests at the 
time, 108 what is more significant is the attitudinal changes of both the company 
members and the Colonial Office towards the native land rights. Both tacitly 
recognised that the acquisition of land in New Zealand must follow a process 
that acknowledged native title. In its instructions to Colonel Wakefield, the 
New Zealand Land Company clearly stated the need to conduct "negotiations 
for the purchase of lands in Cook's Straight." The company recognised that 
Maori groups, through their dealings with the missionaries, had come to un-
derstand the systems and procedures involved in land transfer agreements. 
The company was also careful to instruct Wakefield 
that you should, on every occasion, treat ... [ the Maori] ... with the 
most entire frankness, thoroughly explaining to them that you wish 
to purchase the land for the purpose of establishing a settlement of 
Englishmen there ... Above all, you will be especially careful, that 
all the owners of any tract of land which you may purchase, shall 
be approving parties to the bargain, and that each of them receives 
his due share of the purchase-money. 109 
108For a study of private enterprise in the colonies see F. Broeze, "Private Enterprise and 
the Peopling of Australasia, 1831-50", Australasian Economic History Review (May 1992), 
pp. 8-32. 
109Instructions from the New Zealand Land Company to Colonel Wakefield, principal 
Agent of the Company, 29 April 1839, CO, 204/4. 
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10.8 Missionaries and Treaties 
The missionary societies in London and the colonies had an enormous influ-
ence in colonial policy-making, especially as it related to the management of 
native peoples. Many who sat on Buxton's select committees were active and 
prominent in the various British missionary societies and the majority of its 
witnesses were or had been missionaries, themselves. To this end, the com-
mittee was predisposed to judge the Aboriginal question from an evangelical 
perspective. Both the members and their witnesses assumed the high value 
of Christianity and understood that native groups must be taught to be loyal 
Christians for their "civilization" to advance. Nonetheless, most assumed that 
natives groups had an intrinsic and incontrovertible right to their lands. 
Three witnesses who were called to testify before the committee were Dan-
deson Coates, Reverend William Ellis and Reverend John Beecham-all active, 
highly ranked members of British missionary societies. Coates worked as an 
Anglican missionary for the Church Missionary Society during his prestigious 
career, and eventually became its first lay secretary. Ellis was a member of the 
London Missionary Society. Having worked in missions in South Africa and 
the South Pacific, he eventually earned the position of Chief Foreign Secretary. 
Beecham served as a general secretary for the Wesleyan Missionary Society. 
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His missionary efforts helped to create Wesleyan church societies in the Aus-
tralian colonies. All three societies were also at work in New Zealand.U0 
Questioned together, Coates, Ellis and Beecham gave comprehensive tes-
timony to the committee. Each strongly advocated native land rights. Ellis 
understood that the British government needed to recognise the "inalienable 
right to the soil they [native groups] inhabit." Invoking the Lockean theory, 
he argued that these rights evolved from the fact that native groups did, in 
fact, cultivate the land, "and the productions of the soil. .. [were the] game or 
fruits and roots, on which they live .... " Beecham perceived that the lands in 
dispute "are theirs [native groups] by a prior right." When asked, "[is] ... the 
Committee to understand that it is your opinion ... [t]hat we are bound to as-
sume as an incontrovertible fact that they have an inalienable right to their 
own soil. .. [a]nd that it is nothing short of usurpation and robbery to take 
from them their soil and means of subsistence, without a fair and adequate 
compensation?" each answered with a resounding "yes." Ellis and Beecham 
felt that the only way to ensure that history did not repeat itself was to ne-
gotiate treaties that formally recognised the independence and authority of 
110Dandeson Coates entry, Wellington Valley ProJect, URL: http://www.newcastle.edu.au/ 
group/amrhd/wvp/entitites/br_c.htm; John Beecham entry, N. Harmon (ed.), Encyclopedia 
of World Methodism (Nashville, 1974); William Ellis entry, The 1911 Edition Encyclopedia, 
URL: http://80.19llencyclopedia.org. URLs referenced October 2005. 
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native peoples. 111 
While it was easy enough to theorise about the notion of native land rights, 
it was the reaction of the Church Missionary Society to the Wakefieldian de-
signs on New Zealand and the resulting British colonisation of the region, 
which revealed the extent to which the missionary societies were willing to 
work to protect these rights. Concerned with the potential harm that Wake-
field's activities would have on both the rights of the Maori and the success 
that the missionaries in New Zealand had already achieved, the Church Mis-
sionary Society, led by Coates, lobbied the Colonial Office, and Glenelg in 
particular, to implement policies which would check these dangers. 112 
In two petitions to Glenelg in November and December 1837 the missionary 
society lobbied strongly against the systematic colonisation of New Zealand, 
be it led by the Wakefieldians or the British government. The first petition 
was sixty-eight pages long and included notes for the society's members as 
well as the outline of the society's objections to the New Zealand Association. 
The second was a petition to the House of Commons similarly opposing the 
111Report from the Select Committee on Aborigines (British Settlements), 1836, pp.509-
516. 
112Notes for the Information of Those Members or The Deputation to Lord Glenelg, Re-
specting the New-Zealand Association, Who Have Not Attended the Meeting of the Com-
mittee on the Subject, 28 December 1837; The Principles, Objects and Plan of the New 
Zealand Association Examined in a Letter to the Right Hon. Lord Glenelg, Secretary of 
State for the Colonies, 27 November 1837; & To the Honourable The House of Commons of 
the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, in Parliament Assembled: The Humble 
Petition of the Committee of the Church Missionary Society for Africa and the East, 1837, 
CO 209/3, PRO Reel 1001, pp.134-146 & 176-197. 
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official colonization of New Zealand. Both were written by Dandeson Coates 
(Thomas Fawell Buxton was a member of the committee) .113 The Society's 
primary objection to the New Zealand Company's plan was that it had the po-
tential to compromise the "rights and interests of the Natives of New Zealand." 
Coates ended by pointing to the legacy of natives peoples-one that had been 
so clearly articulated in the Select Committee Report. "[R]esults similarly 
disastrous to the Natives of New Zealand," he wrote, 
are to be anticipated from the colonization of that country, as 
have followed in all former instances; viz. injustice and wrong in 
acquiring territory; the loss of the independence and sovereignty of 
the Natives; and the degradation and extinction of the aboriginal 
race. 114 
The petitioners felt that the presence of thousands of new settlers brought in 
by the New Zealand Association might effect such a scenario because there 
113all references in this section to the petitions of the Church Missionary Society are from 
the following sources: Notes for the Information of Those Members or The Deputation 
to Lord Glenelg, Respecting the New-Zealand Association, Who Have Not Attended the 
Meeting of the Committee on the Subject, 28 December 1837; The Principles, Objects and 
Plan of the New Zealand Association Examined in a Letter to the Right Hon. Lord Glenelg, 
Secretary of State for the Colonies, 27 November 1837; & To the Honourable The House of 
Commons of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, in Parliament Assembled: 
The Humble Petition of the Committee of the Church Missionary Society for Africa and the 
East, 1837. 
114Notes for the Information of Those Members or The Deputation to Lord Glenelg, Re-
specting the New-Zealand Association, Who Have Not Attended the Meeting of the Com-
mittee on the Subject, 28 December 1837; The Principles, Objects and Plan of the New 
Zealand Association Examined in a Letter to the Right Hon. Lord Glenelg, Secretary of 
State for the Colonies, 27 November 1837, p.145. 
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would be no government, nor any laws securing the rights of the Maori, which 
would hold these new settlers in check. Coates spoke of the problems relating 
to the association's plans to purchase lands from the Maori. He wondered if 
the company directors had ulterior motives for instructing its representatives 
to purchase Maori lands. Realising that their British citizenship meant little 
in these parts, Coates also wondered if the company realised that it had to 
secure rights to the lands by dealing directly with the Maori, a group whose 
sovereignty the missionary society was not sure the company acknowledged. 
Moreover, the New Zealand Company had been very vague in its instruc-
tions about how much should be paid for those lands ceded. Coates thus had 
doubts about the equity of these transactions. He also perceived that Wake-
field's land company had little real interest in ensuring that the Maori with 
whom they were dealing fully comprehended the consequences of their trans-
actions. Coates was certain that the chiefs would not willingly surrender their 
lands, and ultimately their independence and sovereignty. To gain control of 
the land by potentially underhanded means, Coates argued, was "unjust and 
cruel." Finally, he pointed to difficulties that would arise from a private com-
pany gaining control over the region. He feared that such a scheme was simply 
too dangerous. These were precisely the issues that finally determined that 
Britain would colonise New Zealand. 
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The missionary society realised, though, that simply objecting to the colo-
nizing schemes of a private company would achieve little. If the settlement of 
New Zealand by British subjects was inevitable then the Church Missionary 
Society had to offer suggestions for a compromise. The petitioners felt that 
the British government, if it could not put a stop to private enterprise in New 
Zealand, had to take decisive steps to ensure that the goals of settlement were 
"grounded in the recognition and maintenance of Native sovereignty." Official 
British annexation of New Zealand was, thus, the preferred option. 
Several suggestions were made regarding the details of such arrangements. 
The petitioners thought that a consular agent with magisterial powers needed 
to be appointed to manage relations between the Maori and the settlers. A 
native police force might also be established to protect Maori groups from 
these settlers. Moreover, ships of war could be stationed to protect the Maori 
from whalers and sealers. All of this, Coates wrote, was necessary for a single 
end: "the recognition of the independence of the Native Authorities." 115 
115D. Coates, The Principles, Objects and Plan of the New Zealand Association Examined 
in a Letter to the Right Hon. Lord Glenelg, Secretary of State for the Colonies, 27 November 
1837, p.32. 
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10.9 Maori Sovereignty Recognised 
The Colonial Office felt pressure to act. Busby, with his lack of any real 
authority, had hardly been able to effect any kind of practical change. To this 
end, moves were made to establish a more permanent British presence in the 
New Zealand islands and to install a governor who had the power to institute 
laws and regulate Pakeha-Maori interaction. Native policies would be founded 
upon principles of justice and equity and, most importantly, the recognition 
of native land rights. 116 
The Colonial Office determined that New Zealand would be governed as a 
protectorate of New South Wales and Captain William Hobson would be ap-
pointed as the British Consul to New Zealand operating under the authority 
of Governor Bourke. James Stephen was charged with formulating Robson's 
instructions for assuming British sovereignty over New Zealand. Before Hob-
son was presented with his instructions, Bourke sent a despatch to Glenelg 
with suggestions put forth by both Hobson and Busby regarding the nature of 
the Consul's appointment .117 
116Henry Labouchere to William Hutt, 1 May 1839, Correspondence with the Secretary of 
State Relative to New Zealand, BPP, pp.27-28. 
117T. Williams, "James Stephen and the British Intervention in New Zealand, 1838-40." 
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Busby had spoken of the terrible effects of firearms, venereal diseases, alco-
hol and tobacco-all British imports-which many felt had exacerbated con-
fl.ict amongst Maori groups. He thought that in order to reverse the calamitous 
effects that current contact with Europeans was having, the British govern-
ment needed to intervene in New Zealand. He was convinced that in order 
for intervention to be beneficial, the British needed to treat the Maori as a 
sovereign power. 118 
Consequently, by 1839 it had become clear in the Colonial Office that the 
only way for Britain to assume sovereignty over New Zealand was by way of 
a treaty. Governor Hobson knew that he would be settling amongst groups 
already acquainted with British institutions and systems and so could envision 
the successful negotiation of a treaty with them. Unlike Busby, though, he 
did not consider the Maori to be sufficiently advanced politically to be able to 
continue to exist as an independent nation. He thought them a very intelligent 
people but questioned their level of civilization. He did not think that the two 
societies could coexist. Rather, Hobson thought that the Maori were destined 
to become, in essence, wards of a British state in New Zealand (not unlike 
Marshall, "domestic dependant nations"). His ideas centred around those 
which Arthur had regretfully come to accept as inevitable in Van Diemen's 
118Busby to Colonial Secretary, 16 June 1837 in Bourke to Glenelg, 9 September 1837 in 
Correspondence with the Secretary of State Relative to New Zealand, BPP, pp.6-12. 
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Land- segregating the New Zealanders and colonists. He felt , then, that the 
most effective way to protect the Maori was to alienate all of New Zealand as 
a British possession and then to establish native reserves, within which limits 
the Maori 's own laws would apply. 119 
Figure 10. 8: 
James Ingram McDonald 's William Hobson, Source: Alexander Turnbull 
Library, National Library of New Zealand , picture reference: G-826-1 ; image 
taken from: Dictionary of New Zealand Biography, URL: 
http://www.dnzb.govt.nz/dnzb. 
On 14 August 1839 Hobson was sent his orders from the Marquis of Nor-
manby. Normanby addressed the issue of emigration to New Zealand. With 
more than 2000 British residents already settled on the north island and more 
on the way, ormanby noted that there was nothing to do but to establish 
law and order there. Normanby admitted that London had not been unaware 
that New Zealand had the potential to reap great wealth for Britain. "There 
119Hobson to Bourke, 8 August 1837, in Correspondence with t he Secretary of State Rel-
ative to New Zealand, BPP, pp.8-11. 
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is, probably, no part of the earth,'' he wrote, "in which colonization could be 
effected with a greater or surer prospect of national advantage." However, the 
Colonial Office was still cognisant of Buxton's select committee report recom-
mendations and it was "with extreme reluctance" that it made its decision. 
"The increase of national wealth and power, promised by the acquisition of 
New Zealand", Normanby relayed, 
would be a most inadequate compensation for the injury which 
must be inflicted on this kingdom itself by embarking in a measure 
essentially unjust, and but too certainly fraught with calamity to a 
numerous and inoffensive people, whose title to the soil and to the 
sovereignty of New Zealand is indisputable, and has been solemnly 
recognized by the British Government. 120 
Ultimately it was realised that without intervention the same unfortunate fate 
would befall the Maori that befell various native groups in other parts of the 
British empire. Normanby emphasised to Hobson that the "principal object 
of your mission", thus, is to "mitigate and, if possible, to avert these disasters, 
and to rescue the emigrants themselves from the evils of a lawless state of 
society .... " The British government had acknowledged Maori independence 
and sovereignty and so found itself bound to the "admission of their rights." 
120Normanby to Hobson, 14 August 1839, HRNZ, 1, 729-739. 
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Thus, the only way to proceed was to negotiate a treaty. So to Hobson, 
Normanby was careful to give specific instructions on how he must carry out 
his commission.121 
10.10 Treaty of Waitangi 
On 14 August 1839 Lord Normanby sent a despatch to William Hobson au-
thorising him to "treat with the Aborigines of New Zealand for the recognition 
of Her Majesty's sovereign authority over the whole or any parts of those is-
lands which they may be willing to place under Her Majesty's domain." 122 
Though issues soon arose with how the treaty was presented and interpreted, 
Normanby's instructions to Hobson reflected the spirit of fairness and equity 
upon which the treaty was premised. 
Hobson was instructed that he must pay careful attention to how the nego-
tiations would proceed, making every effort to communicate his intentions to 
the Maori so as to convince them of his good regard for them. He was not to 
use coercion but to employ "mildness, justice and perfect sincerity" with them. 
Normanby recommended that Hobson seek the assistance of the missionaries 
who had become familiar with the Maori character and language. Hobson was 
121 Normanby to Hobson, 14 August 1839, HRNZ, 1, 729-739. 
122Normanby to Hobson, 14 August 1839, HRNZ, 1, 729-739. 
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also to employ a protector. This individual would be appointed "to watch 
over the interests of the aborigines," especially as regards their selling their 
lands. 123 
Hobson was authorised to "propriate [Maori] consent by presents or other 
pecuniary arrangements." However, he was encouraged to keep his pecuniary 
arrangements to a mere trifle: "the price to be paid to the natives by the local 
government will bear an exceedingly small proportion to the price for which 
the same lands will be re-sold by the Governme'nt to the settlers." Those lands 
exchanged, moreover, should only be the wastelands for which the Maori had 
little or no use. Normanby forbade Hobson to alienate lands which the Maori 
held valuable. 124 
The consul was instructed that all of his dealings with the Maori must be in 
good faith; that he must "frankly and unreservedly explain to the natives, or 
their chiefs, the reasons which should urge them to acquiesce in the proposals 
you will make to them". Moreover, "they must not be permitted to enter into 
any contracts in which they might be the ignorant and unintentional authors 
of injuries to themselves." Though ultimately Hobson failed to fulfil many of 
these directives, still it is instructive that such a list of orders was formulated 
for each of them reflected the advice offered by Arthur on how the Aborigines 
123Normanby to Hobson, 14 August 1839, HRNZ, l, 729-739. 
124Normanby to Hobson, 14 August 1839, HRNZ, l, 729-739. 
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of the Australian colonies should have been treated.125 
Little time was lost executing treaty negotiations. Hobson arrived at the 
Bay of Islands on 30 January 1840. Over the next few days he met with 
Archdeacon Henry Williams and James Busby. Together they scrutinised the 
treaty document, then Williams and his son translated it into Maori. So speedy 
was London's decision that until this point nobody outside the upper echelons 
of the Colonial Office knew that a treaty was even being considered. There had 
been much talk of the animosity between British officials and the New Zealand 
Land Company, but nothing said of Britain's plans to claim sovereignty over 
the region. Williams was, thus, taken aback at what he was being asked to 
present to his Maori associates. 126 
On 5 February 1840 a large group of both Europeans and Maori gathered 
under a marquee erected in front of Busby's house to hear what Hobson had 
come to present to them. Williams read to an utterly silent crowd. Asking his 
audience to hold their questions until he was finished, he slowly and deliber-
ately articulated each clause of the treaty. Williams ended by explaining that 
the treaty had the full support of the missionaries, that this was an "act of 
love towards them on the part of the [British] queen, who desired to secure to 
them their property, rights and privileges ... [t]hat this treaty was as a fortress 
125 Normanby to Hobson, 14 August 1839, HRNZ, 1, 729-739. 
126Normanby to Hobson, 14 August 1839, HRNZ, 1, 729-739. 
CHAPTER 10. THE TREATY OF WAITANGI: AN AUSTRALIAN LEGACY? 434 
for them against any foreign power which might desire to take possession of 
their country .... "127 
Responses from the audience varied. One Maori chief quickly and readily 
accepted what had been presented and asked to sign the treaty. Others, both 
European and Maori, had instant objections. Their concerns centred around 
the potential that the treaty would ultimately lead to Maori dispossession and 
disenfranchisement. Williams assured them that they would be protected as 
British subjects. He told them that he would meet with them again in three 
days to hear their decisions. Only twenty-four hours passed before the chiefs 
had made their decision. Hobson, Williams and Busby reassembled the chiefs 
and at 11:00 A.M. on 6 February 1840, under the same tent, the Maori chiefs 
of the Bay of Islands signed the Treaty of Waitangi. The next day, under 
the supervision of William Williams, the Archdeacon's brother, a number of 
missionaries were discharged to take the treaty to the rest of the chiefs of the 
north and south islands. Over the next several months missionaries travelled 
to the rest of the tribes to collect their signatures. Though some were, at first, 
resistant, ultimately the majority accepted the terms of the treaty and signed 
it on behalf of their people. In all, more than 500 chiefs signed the Treaty of 
127 Copies of Extracts of Correspondence relative to New Zealand (In continuation of the 
papers presented to the House of Commons, on the 14th April 1840, in pursuance of Address 
8th April). 
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Waitangi.128 
§ 
The final negotiation of the Treaty of Waitangi was a process that was both 
quick to happen and slow to happen. It did not take long for Britain to act 
on the decision to take possession of New Zealand through the treaty-making 
process. On the other hand, it took nearly half a century of contact for the 
British to officially acknowledge that the Maori were peoples who held native 
title to their lands. 
It was the combined efforts of a number of agents, many of them haling 
from the Australian colonies, that finally led to this realisation. Marsden had 
led the way in bringing New Zealand to the notice of the Colonial Office. His 
depiction of the lawlessness that prevailed there served to alarm those in power 
back in London. Busby's appointment did nothing to remedy the problems 
and his reports to Bourke merely reinforced Marsden's message. Broughton's 
predictions about the potential fate of the Aborigines of Australia, a race 
whose rights had been almost completely ignored, underscored the need to 
re-evaluate the long-term affects of colonisation schemes on the prosperity of 
native groups. He had demonstrated time and again just how terribly wrong it 
128Copies of Extracts of Correspondence relative to New Zealand (In continuation of the 
papers presented to the House of Commons, on the 14th April 1840, in pursuance of Address 
8th April). 
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Map Location Date Signatures 
Wa1tang1 Total 213 + 
1a Wa1tang1 6 Feb 43 
1b Wa1mate 10 Feb 
"{-· 12 Feb 70 Wa1tang1 [?] 17 Feb 1a Pa1h1a [?] 13 [?]May 
Russell 5Aug 
Bay of Islands 6 Feb-Aug 28[?] 
1d Wa1temata 4 March 16 
1e Ka1ta1a 28 Apnl 61 
1d Tamakl 9July 
Ba~ of Plen!l'. (Fedarb) ~ 
2a Opobkl 27 &28May 7 
2b Torere 11 June 
Torere 14 June 
2c Te Kaha 14 June 
2d Whakatane 16 June 12 
Hera!d-Bunbury 27total 
3a Coromandel 4May 
3b Mercury Bay (Island) 7May 
3c Akaroa 30May 
3d Rua puke 10June ~-~ 
3e Otago 13June 
3f Cloudy Bay 17 June Map Location Date Signatures 
3g Mana (off-shore) 19June 6 Tauranga 21 Total 
3h Hawke's Bay 24June Tauranga 10 Apr-23 May 
Hen!)'. Williams 132 total East Coast 41 Total 
4a Port Nicholson 29 Apnl 34 7a Turanga (G1sboume) 5 May and later 25 
4b Queen Charlotte Snd 4-5May 27 7b Uawa (Talaga Bay) 16/17May 2 
4c Rang1toto Island 11 May 13 7c Wa1apu (Whakawh1bra) 25May 
Walapu (Rang1tuk1a) 1 June 10 
4d Kap1b 14 May 
7d Tokomaru 9June 
4e Wa1kanae 16May 20 
Manukau-Kawh1a 13Total 
4f Otak1 19&21 May 18 
Sa Manukau 20 March 
4g Manawatu 26 May 
8b Kawh1a 28Apnl 
4h Wanganu1 23 May 10 
41 Molungarara 4June 2 
21 May 
25May 
Waikato-Manykau 39total 1SJune 
Sa Waikato Heads March (Apnl?) 32 27 August 
Sb Manukau 26 Apnl 3 September 
Figure 10.9: 
Location of Maori Signatories to the Treaty of Waitangi 
Source: Claudia Orange's Treaty of Waitangi. 
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had been to disregard the rights of the natives. Moreover, the Buxton report 
had, in effect, mandated that race relations in the colonies were managed with 
these rights in mind. Arthur's calls for native land rights to be acknowledged, 
thus, came at a time when Britain was willing to listen. 
To be sure, New Zealand was a very different story from Australia. Mis-
sionary groups had been making great inroads with Maori groups in the north 
island and the Colonial Office was aware of just what economic opportunities 
New Zealand had to offer. Moreover, the Colonial Office was not willing to 
allow Wakefield to establish a pseudo-republic of British subjects in a land 
where British law were not in effect. Consequently, in hindsight, the decision 
to annex New Zealand was not surprising. 
But what of Arthur's role in the Colonial Office decision to negotiate the 
Treaty of Waitangi? Certainly, his experiences in Van Diemen's Land had 
made a strong impression. His missives, thus, bore fruit, albeit in a land to 
which he had not referred in his written correspondence. Though there is scant 
evidence to suggest that he played a direct role in the decision to negotiate the 
Treaty of Waitangi, still everything he had advocated for in letters past was to 
be found in Robson's instructions. More significantly, in light of the fact that 
Buxton had staunchly opposed the use treaties to manage race relations, that 
Colonial Office concluded that the only way to effectively protect and promote 
native land rights in New Zealand was by negotiating a treaty with the Maori, 
certainly indicates something of Arthur's influence. 
Chapter 11 
Conclusion 
Too many factors precluded the negotiation of a de jure treaty between the 
colonial government and the Aborigines of Van Diemen's Land. Still, those 
involved in the crisis and its eventual conclusion were all focussed on reaching 
a mutually satisfying arrangement to end the conflict. Though the Aborigines 
themselves clearly understood that they were agreeing to a deal which, as 
Reynolds claims, was effectively a de facto peace treaty, it is too much to say, 
however, that Arthur or any of his representatives went so far as to consciously 
consider that they were entering into the treaty-making process with the Big 
River and Oyster Bay tribes. 
Nonetheless, towards the end of the Aboriginal crisis the Lieutenant-Governor 
appears to have considered the notion of a treaty and in the end he deeply 
438 
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regretted that he did not take it to its natural conclusion. Moreover, he seems 
to have been attempting to effect such an end without actually admitting on 
paper that he was doing so. Ultimately, though, Arthur would have never had 
officially acknowledged that the negotiations carried out on the shores of Lake 
Echo on that fateful January day constituted a treaty such a those which had 
been concluded so frequently in the north American colonies. Nonetheless, 
this does not mean that the Aborigines of Van Diemen's Land, as Reynolds 
argues, did not perceive that the negotiations were any less binding than those 
of the formally ratified treaties concluded in other parts of the British empire. 
This was the case because Arthur had created the conditions and impetus 
for the negotiating of mutually satisfying land-sharing arrangements, which 
under other circumstances might have resulted in a treaty being concluded 
between the colonial government and what remained of the Aboriginal tribes 
of Van Diemen's Land. Indeed, Arthur's actions, if not his words, were those of 
someone who seemed to have been attempting to effect, even if subconsciously, 
something akin to a treaty-style settlement. 
To be sure, Arthur's motivations came from without. In theory at least, 
British Imperial policy during the first half of the nineteenth century focussed 
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on protecting the Aborigines, promoting their traditional activities, and es-
tablishing good-will relations with them. Sir James Cook's orders as early 
as 1768, and later the colonial governors' instructions certainly indicates that 
the British Crown acknowledged that indigenous groups, at the very least, 
deserved protection as quasi-British subjects, if not sovereign polities. 
Some practises that had become integral to the treaty-making tradition in 
other colonies and countries were also adopted in the Australian colonies, and 
specifically in Van Diemen's Land. Cook was told that he was to compensate 
the Aborigines with gifts of trinkets and the early explorers presented trin-
kets to coastal groups with whom they made contact. Arthur offered gifts to 
Aboriginal groups which visited Hobart town. Robinson, likewise, distributed 
tokens to various tribes during his expeditions throughout the island. Indeed, 
he was careful to conclude his negotiations with the Big River and Oyster Bay 
people by presenting them with trinkets and other gifts. 
All Arthur's policies, though increasingly focussed on force to attempt to 
remove Aboriginal groups from their traditional homelands, were nonetheless 
aimed at establishing conditions based on land sharing arrangements there-
after. For Arthur, the separation and/9r removal of the Aborigines was merely 
the initial step in a process which would facilitate the eventual incorporation 
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of two societies, albeit at the expense of the Aboriginal culture. Indeed, de-
spite all the factors militating against a treaty, almost to the very end of 
the Aboriginal-settler crisis, Arthur remained committed to the possibility 
that something approximating a treaty could be concluded in Van Diemen's 
Land. All his Aboriginal policies-settled districts, reserves, roving parties, 
picture boards, martial law, the Black Line, and finally Robinson's "friendly 
missions" -were aimed at securing an Aboriginal peace through negotiation 
and compromise, two notions fundamental in the treaty-making process. 
Robinson's activities in the wilderness of Van Diemen's Land most closely 
approximated how agents had been interacting with the various tribes of north 
America for several centuries. To be sure, Robinson played a direct role in the 
near-extermination of the Aborigines of Van Diemen's Land, and certainly 
he was focussed on their cultural and social assimilation into British colonial 
society. However, neither he nor Arthur sought their extirpation. 
Both eventually found that they could not, in reality, control the escalation 
of hostilities until Aboriginal and European groups were separated completely 
from one another. Thus, Arthur and Robinson both concluded that the only 
way to protect the Aborigines was to exile them. As such, Robinson's time in 
the Tasmanian wilderness, even though he acknowledged that the Aborigines 
were the real proprietors of the lands over which they wandered, was focussed 
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on their removal. It would be a process, however, that would be initiated only 
after Robinson had secured their consent. 
Arguably, Robinson's greatest achievement was in identifying those in his 
mission party who had the skills and talent to help him realise his goals. A 
select few women stand out for their role as diplomats and conciliators. The 
efforts of the Bruny Island and Port Davey women, Trugernanna, Pagerly and 
Dray, have been discussed at length by both Reynolds and Ryan. 1 However, 
others played equally important roles. To be sure, the Bruny Island and 
Port Davey women were from generally peaceful and conciliatory tribes who 
accepted Robinson willingly. 
On the other hand, Kubmanner, Luggenemenener and Karnebutcher-
the three surviving women from the Hobart Town asylum whom Arthur had 
released back to their people in March 1830-were from those bands that had 
resisted settlement most fiercely. Yet they accepted Arthur's terms for peace 
and facilitated the eventual coming together of their kinsman, Mannalargenna, 
with Robinson-a man who in reality represented the enemy. The role that 
these women played was nothing less than remarkable. Though their people 
continued to be hunted, and they themselves fell victim to the violence of 
1see for example, Reynolds, Fate of a Pree People, pp.139-146; L. Ryan, Aboriginal 
Women and Agency in the Process of Conquest: Some Recent Work, Australian Feminist 
Studies, 2 (1986), pp.35-43; L. Ryan, Indigenous Women as Agents: A comparison of the 
Lives of Three Indigenous Women Agents in Colonial Society, 58th ANZAAS Centenary 
Congress, 190 (1988), pp.1-19. 
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the settlers, still they remained active proponents of peace and managed to 
convince their people to accept promises made by Arthur that they would be 
protected from further harm if they worked with the Government. 
The little known Big River woman, Wooliterpineyer, also played a central 
role in facilitating her people's "coming in." As the only Big River native in 
Robinson's party she was probably the member most aware of the significance 
of this particular mission. She would have been told that Robinson's ultimate 
aim was to remove her people from their land, and even if she were acting 
on the premise that it would be a temporary removal, still she would have 
realised that the fate of every surviving member of her nation rested with her. 
Had the meeting on the shores of Lake Echo ended in violence and bloodshed, 
Wooliterpineyer would have been at least partially responsible for causing it 
to happen. Yet, this woman remained loyal to Robinson, so much so that he 
employed her as his lead guide during his expedition, relying on her to keep 
the peace while his mission guides negotiated with her kin. 
As to Robinson's male guides, their roles cannot be underestimated. Black 
Tom, Umarrah and Mannalargenna had all been leaders of resistance guerrilla 
groups in the east. Once attached to Robinson they proved essential to his 
success. Their knowledge of both the English and Aboriginal languages proved 
invaluable during their time in the wilderness. Furthermore, that they were 
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willing to act as agents for the Colonial Government, demonstrated to others 
the positive aspects of "coming in." This must have had an impact upon the 
Big River chiefs Montpeilliatter and Tongerlongter. 
Ultimately, thus, Robinson's mission was successful, in terms of returning 
peace to the colony, if not in terms of the preservation of Aboriginal culture 
and society in Van Diemen's Land, because what he and Arthur had created 
were the conditions for the development of a peace agreement that involved a 
mutual respect for the process of negotiation and compromise-precisely that 
upon which treaty-making practices in other parts of the world were based. 
Arthur did not come to his conclusions about the need for a treaty alone. 
The advocacy of William Walker and later, that of Chief Justice Pedder, had 
made an impact. That less than a week after Robinson had brought in the 
Big River people, Arthur penned his first despatch about how Aboriginal pol-
icy in burgeoning mainland colonies should be formulated, indicates that the 
governor must have been contemplating the notion of a treaty even before 
contact had been made. Moreover, the ceremonies that followed on the lawns 
of Government House were not unlike those carried out in the north American 
colonies to conclude the treaty process. That many townsfolk attended the 
celebrations suggests that Arthur may not have been the only colonist with 
such thoughts on his mind. 
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What came after the end of the Aboriginal crisis in Van Diemen's Land 
illustrated how deep its impact had been both in Australia and Britain. That 
before establishing a settlement at Port Phillip four years later John Batman 
felt it necessary to negotiate a treaty with the Duttigalla people (legitimate 
or not in the minds of the Colonial powers-that-be), demonstrated how far 
attitudes towards the Aborigines had evolved. More significantly, as Marie Fels 
so clearly demonstrates, what resulted-in the early days, at least-in terms 
of cordial, reciprocal land sharing arrangements, showed that what Arthur had 
been suggesting actually worked, even if only in the short term. 
While the effects of Batman's settlement scheme had an impact on the 
governments of New South Wales and Van Diemen's Land, Buxton's Select 
Committee brought about a change in attitudes concerning the management 
of native peoples that had a ripple effect that spread throughout the British 
Empire. To be sure, little in the way of major policy change was prescribed. 
The select committee recommended that colonial policy remain focused on the 
Christianisation and civilisation of the native groups. Moreover, Buxton had 
declared in no uncertain terms that the use of treaties as tools for settlement 
and racial integration had proven ineffective and even more detrimental to the 
preservation of native groups than the ad hoe methods used up to that time. 
What the report did do, however, that brought about a real change in the 
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management of native affairs was to force the Colonial Office to consider and 
develop plans for the colonisation of lands before settlement began. This is 
precisely how it approached the annexation of New Zealand. 
To be sure, the decision by Whitehall to assume sovereignty of New Zealand 
came about as a result of external activities in the region that the Colonial 
Office sought to limit and control. As Marsden and his fellow missionaries 
spent more time in the North Island they came to see what was perceived 
to be the detrimental effects of continued contact with European sealers and 
whalers. However, what he also recognised was that the Maori were a people 
whose sovereign land rights could not be ignored. 
Wakefield had also set his sights on New Zealand, purchasing lands from 
Maori chiefs and creating interest back in Britain amongst speculators looking 
for financial opportunities. As in the settlement of the Port Phillip districts, 
the Colonial Office felt forced to act. Unlike Port Phillip, however, rather 
than considering the colonisation of New Zealand primarily for its economic 
benefits (though there was a very real possibility that New Zealand could reap 
great economic rewards for Britain) the main issue for the Colonial Office 
was that the Maori were protected from lawless British subjects. The British 
annexation of New Zealand by means of a treaty with the Maori was thus 
negotiated. Unlike in the Australian colonies, however, there was no question 
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in the minds of those familiar with the Maori that they held a sovereign claim 
to their territories. The Maori were considered more civilised, more open to 
Christianity, and, in general, more able to socially and culturally assimilate to 
British ways. Consequently, Undersecretary Stephen's instructions to Hobson 
reflected that the Colonial Office had finally realised that New Zealand could be 
annexed only after sovereignty had been transferred from the Maori. Hobson 
could not simply claim New Zealand as a British colony based on principles 
of discovery and settlement. An official acknowledgement by Britain of native 
land rights in the Pacific had thus been finally made. 
11.1 An Unexpected Epilogue 
In his efforts to promote treaty-making in Western Australia and South Aus-
tralia, George Arthur recommended that Lord Glenelg institute Aboriginal 
protectorates in the new colonies. Buxton's committee readily concurred and 
recommended that a protectorate system be created as quickly as possible. 
"The duties of the Protectors of the Aborigines of New Holland," the com-
mittee specified, "should consist first, in cultivating a personal knowledge of 
the natives, and a personal intercourse with them; and with that view these 
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officers should be expected to acquire an adequate familiarity with the na-
tive language." 2 Arthur naturally recommended George Augustus Robinson 
to head the scheme. Having refused the protectorship in South Australia, in 
part because he considered the salary insufficient, Robinson later accepted the 
position of Chief Protector for the Port Phillip region. 3 
When Glenelg forwarded Buxton's report to New South Wales governor, 
Sir George Gipps, he included with it instructions and guidelines for the pro-
tectors. Each protector was given provisions to supply to local tribes and his 
charge was to "watch over the rights and interests of the Natives, protect them, 
as far as his personal exertions and influence, from any encroachment on their 
property, and from acts of cruelty, of oppression or injustice, and faithfully 
represent their wants, wishes or grievances .... " During his time in the Port 
Phillip region in the late 1830s and early 1840s, Robinson became keenly aware 
of the affects of the pastoral leases on the dispossession of those whom he was 
charged with protecting. He prompted his superiors to acknowledge their land 
rights, stating that the "Aboriginal Natives have a right to a reasonable share 
in the soil of their Fatherland." He thought it "just and reasonable [that] the 
Natives should have spots to call their own and land whereon to settle." 4 
2Report from the Select Committee on Aborigines (British Settlements), 1836, p.83. 
3N.J.B. Plomley, George August Robinson entry in A.G.L. Shaw & C.M.H. Clark (eds), 
Australian Dictionary of Biography (Melbourne, 1967), pp.385-387. 
4 Glenelg to Gipps, 31January1838, HRA, UCIX, p.254; Robinson to Latrobe, 1 January 
1849 in Fitzroy to Grey, 7 May 1849, PRO Reel 402, C.O. 201/413. 
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The Crown, however, continued to grant pastoral leases. Despite Colonial 
Office entreaties, scant attention was paid to the Aborigines' rights to access 
their lands and a decade later Secretary of State, Earl Grey, was forced to 
admit to New South Wales Governor Charles Fitzroy that "little progress 
appears to have been made towards any effectual improvement in the condition 
of the natives in your colony." Grey recommended that the protectorate system 
be abolished. 5 
What Grey and Robinson could not anticipate was that Grey's alternative 
proposal for Aboriginal-settler land sharing, based on an acknowledgement of 
their "mutual rights" to the land would, a century and a half later, be used as 
the basis for a High Court decision that would play a pivotal role and have a 
resounding impact on the legal debate over land rights. 
On 23 December 1996 the High Court of Australia handed down its deci-
sion in The Wik People v Queensland.6 By a majority of four to three the High 
Court found that the issuing of pastoral leases did not necessarily extinguish 
native title to the same lands. The Wik decision evolved from one pivotal 
piece of historical evidence: a despatch from Grey to Fitzroy in 1848 outlin-
ing how Aboriginal access to lands leased by the Crown should be managed. 
Responding to the Crown Lands Unauthorized Occupation Act sent to him by 
5 Grey to Fitzroy, 11February1848 HRA, 1.XXVI, pp.223. 
6 The Wik People v Queensland (1996) 134 ALR 637 at 641; 63 FCR 45 at 454. 
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Gipps, Grey wrote to Governor Fitzroy explaining how Fitzroy should manage 
Aboriginal access to lands leased to pastoralists. "I think it essential,'' Grey 
wrote, 
that it should be generally understood that leases granted ... give 
the grantees only an exclusive right of pasturage for their cattle, 
and of cultivating such land as they may require within the large 
limits thus assigned to them, but that these leases are not in-
tended to deprive the natives of their former right to hunt over 
these districts, or to wander over them in search of subsistence, 
in the manner to which they have been heretofore accustomed, 
from the spontaneous produce of the soil except over land actually 
cultivated or fenced in for that purpose. 7 
The High Court's decision was controversial and prompted heated political 
and legal debate. The Liberal Government responded with its "Ten Point 
Plan" and implemented legislation aimed at allowing compromise between 
pastoralists and Aboriginal tribes. 8 However, of greater significance was that 
the decision demonstrated that the distant voices of Australia's colonial land 
rights advocates were still audible one hundred and fifty years later. 
7 Grey to Fitzroy, 11 February 1848, HRA, 1.XXVI, pp.225. 
8F. Brennan, The Wik Debate: Its Impact on Aborigines, Pastoralists and Miners (Syd-
ney, 1998); G. Edgerton, "Overcoming Uncertainty: Wik Peoples v. Queensland", Mel-
bourne Journal of Politics (1998), pp.1-16. 
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